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[D]econstruction cannot be transgression of the Law. Deconstruction 
is the Law. It’s an affi rmation, and an affi rmation is on the side of the 
Law.
Derrida ‘WB’ 149
‘Deconstruction is justice’, Derrida states famously in ‘Force of law: the 
“mystical foundation of authority”’. ‘Deconstruction is the Law’, Derrida 
says in the above epigraph, dating from 1984. Is this not a clear instance of 
Derrida (again) contradicting himself ? Did he not in ‘Force of law’ strain to 
distinguish between justice and law? Yet here, in the context of a discussion 
of ‘Before the law’, he seems to associate deconstruction with law. In his 
early texts on law, as we have often been told in commentaries, Derrida 
points to the absence of  a legitimate foundation for law. The attempt to 
fi nd such a foundation, he allegedly says there, leads to infi nite regress. In 
‘Force of law’ Derrida is said to repeat this claim and then in addition to 
argue that justice is about a concern for the singular individuals before 
the law, as opposed to law’s generality. Read thus, there can indeed be said 
to be a belated turn to ethics in ‘Force of law’. The above epigraph would 
then serve as further evidence of such a ‘turn’. In line with this reading, 
Derrida in 1989 wished no longer to simply associate deconstruction with 
the absence of foundations, but also with singularity. Such a reading, which 
is incidentally not uncommon in the legal context, misses everything that 
is at stake in Derrida’s thinking. As Derrida himself  notes in ‘Force of law’ 
(AR 235), the themes of justice, ethics and politics were at the forefront 
of many of his earlier texts, such as the texts devoted to Levinas, including 
‘Violence and metaphysics’ (1964), as well as Glas (1974), ‘To speculate – 
on Freud’ (1980), ‘Before the law’ (1982), ‘Declarations of Independence’ 
(1976), ‘The laws of refl ection: Nelson Mandela, in admiration’ (1986), etc. 
He furthermore notes that ‘[i]t goes without saying that discourses on 
double affi rmation, the gift beyond exchange and distribution, the undecid-
able, the incommensurable or the incalculable, on singularity, difference and 
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heterogeneity are also, through and through, at least oblique discourses on 
justice’ (AR 235). This means that all his texts can in a way be said to relate 
to justice. Little attempt has been made thus far to enquire into this assertion 
by Derrida, and to establish what it means for an understanding of the 
concept of law. Law as Absolute Hospitality seeks to do so, through a slow, 
detailed and contextual reading of a number of Derrida’s texts, including 
some of those mentioned above.1 It will seek to chart a new direction in 
the reception of Derrida in the legal context and, at least to some extent, 
beyond that context as well. What will come to the fore is a very different 
understanding of the concept of law than has dominated legal discourse 
up until now. The main focus of this introductory chapter will be an outline 
of Derrida’s broader ‘project’. Without a grasp of this project, it is simply 
impossible to contemplate the transposition of his thinking to the legal 
context. Derrida’s relation to Heidegger, Husserl, Levinas and Freud will, 
because of their signifi cant infl uence on his project, play an important role 
throughout this book and will be briefl y considered here within the context 
of Derrida’s project. Before coming to that, we will fi rst analyse some of 
the most infl uential readings of Derrida in the legal context thus far, which 
Law as Absolute Hospitality will seek to distinguish itself  from. This analysis 
will at the same time introduce certain aspects of Derrida’s thinking. To 
conclude the chapter, an explanation will be given of the title of the book 
and a brief  analysis will be undertaken of the sequence and content of 
Chapters 2 to 8.
Dominant readings of Derrida in the legal context
Since Derrida appeared on the legal radar in the 1980s, his texts have been 
discussed and referred to in numerous legal works. Such references have 
varied from the sympathetic to the downright hostile. Almost without 
exception, the hostile readings are characterised by a superfi cial reading of 
Derrida. Detailed attention will not be given to these readings here, although 
Law as Absolute Hospitality as a whole seeks precisely to address the many 
misconceptions that exist in relation to Derrida’s thinking. The sympathetic 
readings unfortunately sometimes fare little better. As noted above, they are 
in many instances similarly informed by a lack of appreciation or disregard 
of  Derrida’s broader project. In what follows, a number of  infl uential 
readings of Derrida in the legal context will be briefl y engaged with. The 
scholars to be discussed are faithful to Derrida’s thinking in varying degrees. 
The engagement with the readings of these scholars will set the scene for a 
1 In the legal context, this kind of approach (analysing in detail the texts of Derrida) has not 
as a rule been followed, perhaps with the exception of commentaries on ‘Force of law’. 
Outside of the legal context, it is more often employed.
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different reading of Derrida in the legal context, which will seek to follow 
him as closely as possible.2
The methodical reading
In the early reception of Derrida by Critical Legal Studies (CLS) in the 
United States, Derrida’s deconstruction of hierarchical oppositions, such as 
that between speech and writing, was employed to ‘deconstruct’ hierarchical 
oppositions to be found in law.3 One of the problems that plagued the CLS 
reception of Derrida was the descendance of CLS from legal realism. Legal 
realism, as is well known, promoted a view of law freed from all transcen-
dentalism. Derrida’s challenge to transcendentalism made him appear as a 
kindred spirit, whereas the position was much more complex. In the early 
reception of Derrida his analysis of language was consequently relied on to 
show that some legal concepts and doctrines are usually or traditionally 
privileged over others (in US law), for no defi nitive reason, and that legal 
concepts and doctrines are thus ultimately constructs which have no basis 
in reality. In the case of CLS this ‘deconstruction’ was motivated by left 
political thinking. From this early reception of Derrida it was however 
easy to derive the conclusion that deconstruction is simply a technique of 
argumentation which could be relied on by both the political left and 
the right. Deconstruction in some hands thus soon became a politically 
neutral method which could be used to overturn the preferences shown 
in any argument or rule. In one highly infl uential version of this reading,4 
Derrida’s deconstruction of the speech–writing opposition was understood 
as entailing the ‘temporary’ reversal of this hierarchy, by viewing speech as 
a kind of writing. This new privilege could however, in turn be reversed. 
What Derrida ultimately shows, it was contended, is that neither of the two 
terms can be privileged, as they are mutually dependent on each other. 
This same ‘method’ can, so the argument goes, be applied in the legal fi eld to 
any kind of hierarchy that exists, for example in relation to rules informed by 
a view on human nature: that is, whether human nature is characterised by 
2 This said, there are of course limits to the extent of ‘closeness’ to Derrida’s thinking in a 
book of this nature. Law as Absolute Hospitality gives an account of Derrida’s thinking, and 
thus proceeds by way of reason and calculation, which is of course exactly what Derrida 
places in question in his writing. Closeness would furthermore require following Derrida’s 
‘style’, which would make it diffi cult to explain Derrida’s thinking in an accessible way. This 
book will therefore almost without exception be in the constative mode, even when its primary 
‘theme’ is Derrida’s notion of absolute performativity (see Chapter 2).
3 See e.g. Tushnet (1984); Dalton (1985); and Frug (1984). For a brief  analysis and other 
similar types of argument, see Douzinas and Gearey (2005: 64 –9).
4 Balkin (1986 –7). Balkin, to his credit, indicates that his version of deconstruction does not 
necessarily correspond with that of Derrida. This way of proceeding nonetheless assumes that 
different brands of ‘deconstruction’ can be constructed at random (and ‘sold’ to legal scholars).
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self-interest vis-à-vis the belief  that it is characterised by altruism and com-
munity. Neither of these two ways of viewing human nature can however serve 
as a foundation, as they are both different from and mutually dependent on 
each other. Deconstruction in this way, it was argued, provides the possibility of 
emancipation from dominant ways of thinking – that is, the belief  that there 
is one foundational, complete and self-suffi cient principle.
This reading of Derrida, as well as other similar readings, tends to retain 
a distinction between language on the one hand and (social) reality on the 
other. Derrida’s famous statement that ‘[t]here is nothing outside of the text’ 
(OG 158) is as a result understood to mean that language only imperfectly 
represents reality. In this reading of Derrida, truth thus remains fully intact, 
with all attempts to grasp it through language being incomplete. Derrida’s 
understanding of the notion of ‘text’ is however very different from the way 
it is presented in this reading. Because of the importance of this issue for 
the rest of our analysis, it will be useful to now already give attention thereto. 
Different from the way in which Balkin and others understand it, ‘text’ for 
Derrida already includes a description and a grasping of ‘things’ or ‘reality’. 
Hegel was the fi rst to propagate this view regarding the relation between 
thinking and reality, noting in relation to Kant’s noumenon or ‘thing in itself ’ 
that there is no beyond to the phenomenon (Hyppolite 1974: 125). Things 
are simply the way they appear to us. For Heidegger (1962: 246 –52), similarly, 
in so far as man’s relation to the world is concerned, Dasein is already thrown 
into the world and ‘is’ thus Being-in-the-world. This means that there is no 
world or reality outside of Dasein the existence of which has to be proven, 
as for example Descartes attempted or Kant’s ‘thing in itself ’ to which one 
has no access. Both these ‘metaphysical’ approaches assume a subject that is 
world-less and that seeks to assure itself  of a world (Heidegger 1962: 250). 
Language for Derrida similarly does not stand vis-à-vis ‘reality’, but is already 
in its construction of ‘reality’ a ‘text’, which is why he states that ‘there is 
nothing outside of the text’ or that ‘life is a text’ (‘FT’ 27). He has explained 
his notion of ‘text’ as follows:
What I call ‘text’ implies all the structures called ‘real,’ ‘economic,’ ‘his-
torical,’ socio-institutional, in short: all possible referents. Another way 
of recalling once again that ‘there is nothing outside the text.’ That does 
not mean that all referents are suspended, denied, or enclosed in a book, 
as people have claimed, or have been naïve enough to believe and to have 
accused me of believing. But it does mean that every referent, all reality 
has the structure of a differential trace, and that one cannot refer to this 
‘real’ except in an interpretive experience.
(Ltd 148)
The ‘text’, or what Derrida refers to elsewhere as ‘the text in general’ (Pos 44, 
59, 60) furthermore does not have an inside that can be clearly distinguished 
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from an outside, in the same way in which life cannot simply be opposed to 
death, as is assumed by metaphysics. As appears from the reference to the 
‘differential trace’ in the above quotation, and following from the analysis of 
Derrida’s relation to Freud,5 the text is structured by a ‘desire’ for death (Pos 
88) which is what motivates every deconstruction. Although it is therefore 
not incorrect to point to Derrida’s adherence to the view that language has 
no basis in reality, it is premature to stop at this point, and to believe that 
this is all that Derrida asserts. The view that language has no basis in ‘reality’ 
is to be found also in ‘structuralist’ thinking such as with Saussure, a view 
which Derrida further develops. Derrida more particularly seeks to analyse 
with reference to Freud’s notion of drives and of the unconscious, the ‘laws’ 
which determine constructions of ‘reality’.
The postmodern reading
A kind of reading of Derrida which ties in closely with the above methodical 
reading is to the effect that Derrida exposes all views or constructions of 
reality as subjective, which would have the consequence that he himself cannot 
complain about ‘incorrect’ readings of his own texts. In my own interaction 
with ‘postmodern’ legal scholars I am likewise often confronted with the 
argument that Derrida’s approach emphasises the instability of written texts, 
and that his own texts speak of undecidability, indeterminacy and dissemin-
ation. Multiple readings of Derrida’s texts would therefore be possible and 
no objective criteria would be available to judge one reading as ‘better’ or 
‘more accurate’ than another.6 Viewed as such, the present book would simply 
provide a partial reading of Derrida, a ‘Freudian’ or ‘Heideggerian’ reading 
perhaps. Just as valid would be a ‘Nietzschean’, ‘Levinasian’ or ‘Foucauldian’ 
reading of Derrida. The relativist or ‘postmodern’ reception of Derrida in 
the legal context has made debate about the content of Derrida’s texts or his 
relation with other thinkers more or less impossible, as all interpretations of 
these texts are viewed as ‘subjective’.
Derrida has frequently disassociated himself  from postmodernism.7 In 
‘No (point of ) madness – maintaining architecture’ Derrida (Psy II 87–8) 
notes that the idea of the postmodern ‘still surrender[s] to the historicist 
compulsion’. He continues as follows in his evaluation of this categorisation 
of time periods:
5 See below.
6 I should perhaps confess here that a number of years ago, with the help of mostly secondary 
readings, I also understood Derrida in this way. For an example of such a reading, see Wheeler 
(1993: 125– 45, 209–38).
7 See e.g. ‘M&S’ 228–9, 263– 4 on the need to distinguish Derrida’s work from postmodernism 
and the failure to do so as a ‘facile, demagogic, grave error’ and ‘a massive failure to read and 
analyze’. See further TS 9 on the mistrust deconstruction has for any kind of periodisation.
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It is as if one wished yet again to order a linear succession, to periodize, to 
distinguish between the before and the after, to limit the risks of reversibility 
or repetition, transformation or permutation: a progressivist ideology.
(Psy II 88)
Derrida has responded similarly to attempts to associate deconstruction with 
modernity, noting that as soon as:
we give it the label of ‘modernity’, we inscribe it in a certain historical 
system of evolution and progress (a notion derived from Enlightenment 
rationalism) which tends to blind us to the fact that what confronts us 
today is also something ancient and hidden in history. I believe that what 
‘happens’ in our contemporary world and strikes us as particularly new 
has in fact an essential connection with something extremely old which 
has been covered over (archi-dissimulé).
(DCC 112)
These comments, where the repetitive nature of Freud’s death drive feature prom-
inently (‘something ancient and hidden in history’ and ‘something extremely 
old’) again show the importance of an understanding of Derrida’s broader 
project when one seeks to comprehend his relation to law. The association of 
deconstruction with relativism has in similar fashion been clearly refuted by 
Derrida. In another interview he expresses himself as follows in this respect:
[R]elativism is a doctrine which has its own history in which there 
are only points of view with no absolute necessity, or no references to 
absolutes. That is the opposite of what I have to say. Relativism is, in 
classical philosophy, a way of referring to the absolute and denying it; 
it states that there are only cultures and that there is no pure science or 
truth. I have never said such a thing.
(QE 78)8
Derrida’s problematising of truth does not therefore mean the total rejection 
of truth, nor does it simply lead to the belief  that there are many truths, but 
instead to an investigation into that from which truth derives (Ltd 150).9 In 
8 See similarly Ltd 137.
9 See also Neg 224 on the ‘foolish simplicity of aligning Nietzsche’s thought with relativism’. 
If  one is relying on a ‘Nietzschean’ reading of Derrida, account has to be taken of Derrida’s 
comment on the law at stake in Nietzsche’s discourse, specifi cally in the Genealogy of Morals 
(Neg 223– 4): ‘The law, or this “must,” can, indeed, be read in all the prescriptive modalities of 
Nietzsche’s discourse. When he speaks of the different hierarchies of force and of differences 
of force, there must also be law. The reversal of values or their hierarchical ordering presupposes 
law – hence the foolish simplicity of aligning Nietzsche’s thought with relativism.’
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so far as the charge of relativism refers to interpretation as a subjective 
exercise, it can clearly be seen from the above quotation that Derrida does 
not subscribe to such an approach.10 As a reading of any of his texts will 
furthermore show, he always respected the basic principles of reading, even 
though he at the same time sought to go beyond these principles. This 
subversion of the traditional rules of reading however happened in a very 
rigorous manner, as the rest of this book will seek to show. The notions of 
truth, correctness and accuracy are thus not abandoned by Derrida, but 
re-inscribed (Ltd 150). They therefore retain their value and can in a way be 
used, also against Law as Absolute Hospitality, to contest the accuracy of 
the readings argued for here. Even if  Derrida has distanced himself  from 
postmodernism and relativism, there are of course still academics who insist 
on reading him in this way as they themselves believe that interpretation is 
something purely subjective (independent of what Derrida might have to say 
on the subject). Derrida, and Heidegger before him, however clearly and 
convincingly showed that such an approach is founded in the metaphysics of 
presence, more specifi cally the illusion of the self-presence of the subject.11 
Freud hammered the fi nal nail into the coffi n, in respect of both reading and 
writing.
What is therefore required in determining Derrida’s relation to law is a 
careful and as rigorous as possible a reading of his texts, in context, as 
Derrida often insisted should happen.12 In so far as Law as Absolute 
Hospitality can, for attempting such a reading, be accused of attempting 
to ‘police’ the reading of Derrida, this ‘policing’ takes place with the aim 
of  fending off  a metaphysical reading of  Derrida; and metaphysics, it 
needs to be noted, always relies on a police force itself  for its own pro-
tection, and a much more powerful one at that.13 It is for similar reasons 
in this book not about claiming any proprietary right over Derrida, but 
precisely about insisting on the force of expropriation in his texts. It is 
also not about claiming to be a (or ‘the only’) legitimate heir, but precisely 
to point to and affi rm that which is ‘illegitimate’ in Derrida’s texts14 and 
which often escapes scrutiny. This said, are things not perhaps different 
in the legal fi eld? Do rigorous readings of philosophers in the legal fi eld 
really matter? Legal scholars have after all through the ages interpreted 
philosophers in a variety of ways to make their thinking applicable and 
useful to law. This has not always taken place with the greatest degree 
of rigour, but law has nonetheless often benefi ted immensely from such 
10 See also QE 78–9.
11 See in this respect Chapters 4 and 7.
12 See e.g. MS 236 –8; Ltd 146 –7, R 173 fn 14.
13 See Derrida TP 325–7.
14 See in this regard ‘M&S’ 222–3, 232–3.
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adaptations.15 Even though there may on the face of it be merit in this 
argument, it does appear that something different is at stake in the case of 
Derrida’s thinking. To give a metaphysical interpretation to Derrida, as often 
happens in the legal context, can no doubt have some benefi t for law, and 
ultimately for the community served by that law. This is however precisely 
the problem with the argument. Derrida’s attempt to exceed metaphysics 
concerns itself  not in the fi rst place with the strengthening of law and of the 
community, but exactly with the suspension of law, and tied to that, with the 
auto-immunity (or desire for death) of the community served by such law. 
Interpreting Derrida in a metaphysical manner can thus be done, and it may 
indeed benefi t law and the community it serves, but it is perhaps the ultimate 
form of injustice towards a thinker like Derrida to interpret him in this way. 
If  more attention is given to the nuances of Derrida’s thinking than has 
happened thus far, a conception of law can be developed which can (to some 
extent) exceed metaphysics with its circular economy. Anyone who has a 
concern for justice and ethical responsibility has little choice but to take up 
the radical challenge posed by Derrida’s texts.
The ethical–liberal reading
A more sophisticated and less instrumentalised interpretation of Derrida 
has made it diffi cult to distinguish between deconstruction and political 
liberalism. This was astutely observed by Frank Michelman (2002: 246 – 62) 
in comparing his own (republican) liberalism with one of these versions of 
deconstruction. In this version, judges are in light of Derrida’s analysis of 
justice called upon to recognise the plurality of interests (the political); 
to re-evaluate in each new case the sacrifi ces deemed just(ifi ed) in earlier 
(similar) cases, and ultimately to acknowledge (and mourn) the destruction 
of plurality or the unjust sacrifi ce decided upon.16 In this version, we can 
say that justice, which is understood as the (full) recognition of the plurality 
of interests, is tragically impossible. The only thing which (this version of ) 
deconstruction seems to do different from political liberalism, Michelman 
noted, is to view as unjust the ‘sacrifi ce’ in pursuit of a social goal that goes 
along with politico-legal decision-making. Liberalism on the other hand 
accepts this as an inevitable feature of decision-making and moreover does 
not refrain from regarding a legal decision as ‘just’ when it is adequately 
justifi ed. This kind of ethical–liberal version of deconstruction has been 
adopted by a number of (legal) commentators, although they diverge at 
certain points. Levinas is often invoked as additional authority in arriving 
15 See e.g. the discussion of Berman (1983: 120 – 64).
16 See van der Walt and Botha (2000); and see further van der Walt (2005a).
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at this kind of reading of Derrida.17 This is often tied to a similar kind of 
argument as we fi nd in the methodical reading earlier referred to, that is, that 
representational systems such as a legal system cannot adequately represent 
reality, here individual interests.
The argument in another infl uential ethical–liberal version of deconstruc-
tion which adopts these ideas goes briefl y thus: Levinas points to the claim 
which others make on me. This claim goes beyond the rights and duties 
allocated by means of the legal system. Derrida adopts this position of 
Levinas. The responsibility of a judge consequently is towards the parties to 
a dispute rather than the legal system. This (seeming) insistence of decon-
struction on the singular, it is believed, has the potential of leading to greater 
transformation (Cornell 1992). Others, adopting a similar reading of Derrida, 
have however criticised this ‘deconstructive ethics of difference’ for making 
impossible the evaluation of competing claims. Derrida’s condemnation of 
religious fundamentalism in an interview after the events of September 11, 
2001, is as a result viewed as contradictory, as an ‘ethics of difference’ after all 
calls for the equal recognition of all others (Rosenfeld 2008). The contention 
of Law as Absolute Hospitality is that these ethical–liberal readings each in their 
own way entail an unjustifi ed and unfortunate domestication of Derrida’s 
thinking.18 Derrida’s concern with the other has much more radical conse-
quences than is typically portrayed in these readings.19 That is the case because 
deconstruction concerns itself  with the impossible, not simply with what is 
impossible. Furthermore, although it can indeed not be disputed that Levinas 
plays an important role in Derrida’s thinking, there are also signifi cant diver-
gences in their thinking.20 In this respect one needs to carefully consider the 
implications of Derrida’s thinking on ‘the other’ for subjectivity. In some of 
these liberal readings of deconstruction, the subject tends to be left in place 
even when something of the ‘ethical’ dimensions of Derrida’s thinking is grasped. 
Derrida’s response to a question from Vattimo about the self  making room 
for the other in A Taste for the Secret, shows that much more is at stake here 
than a subject with an ‘ethical responsibility towards the other’:
‘Leaving room for the other’ does not mean ‘I have to make room for 
the other’. The other is in me before me: the ego (even the collective ego) 
17 There is another infl uential non-liberal reading of Levinas and Derrida which tie them 
closely to psychoanalysis and specifi cally serves as a slight ‘correction’ to Lacan; see Douzinas 
(1995); and see below.
18 At the same time I have to again confess that I at some stage found these readings of 
Derrida, specifi cally by Cornell and van der Walt, very convincing; see de Ville (2000, 
2004).
19 For a more detailed analysis of some of these readings of Derrida, see de Ville (2007a, 
2007b, 2007c).
20 See similarly Saghafi  (2010: 10 –11).
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implies alterity as its own condition. There is no ‘I’ that ethically makes 
room for the other, but rather an ‘I’ that is structured by the alterity 
within it, an ‘I’ that is itself in a state of self-deconstruction, of dislocation. 
This is why I hesitated just now to use the word ‘ethical’. This gesture 
is the possibility of the ethical but is not simply ethical, which is why I 
speak of the messianic: the other is there in any case, it will arrive if  it 
wants, but before me, before I could have foreseen it.
...
Which means that I am not proprietor of my ‘I’, I am not proprietor of 
the place open to hospitality. Whoever gives hospitality ought to know 
that he is not even proprietor of what he would appear to give.
(TS 84 –5)
The cosmopolitan reading
The last reading to be discussed here can be termed a cosmopolitan or utopian 
understanding of deconstruction. This refers to the important and unique 
contribution of Douzinas, one of the fi rst legal scholars to have commented 
on Derrida’s texts. Douzinas’s reading is based on a fusion of sorts of the 
insights of, among others, Derrida, Levinas, Lacan and Foucault. In his 
earlier texts, Douzinas, in collaboration with others, adopted a Levinasian 
approach in setting out the relation between the self  (or the law) and the 
singular other, which he viewed as similar to the relation posited by Derrida 
in ‘Force of law’ between (universal) law and (unique, singular) justice (Douzinas 
and Warrington 1994: 231–2; Douzinas 2000: 348–51).21 This was combined 
with a Lacanian understanding of desire, that is, a desire for the (m)other, 
also referred to as jouissance or the death drive, the latter being understood 
by Douzinas (1995: 1326 –7) in an essentially Oedipal sense. The face-to-face 
relation with the other, according to Douzinas, in other words at the same 
time evokes unconscious desire. In a recent text, Human Rights and Empire, 
Douzinas combines the above model with Derrida’s notion of a ‘democracy 
to come’ in developing a political philosophy of cosmopolitanism. Douzinas 
takes account of Derrida’s relation to Marx, and in doing so, admirably goes 
beyond the ethical–liberal readings analysed briefl y above. It exposes and 
resists, like Derrida (as well as Foucault and others), the (still) totalitarian 
character of liberal democracies. To his further credit, and here he indeed 
seems very close to Derrida, Douzinas (2007: 294) subscribes to a notion of 
cosmos which ‘uproots every city, disturbs every fi liation, contests all sover-
eignty and hegemony’, extending ‘beyond nations and states, beyond the 
nation-state’. At stake here is what Douzinas (at 293) refers to as a ‘cosmo-
politanism to come’, which he compares favourably with Derrida’s notion of 
21 For an analysis of this kind of reading of Derrida, see Chapter 6.
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a new International in Specters of Marx.22 From Douzinas’s subsequent con-
tention, it however becomes clear that Derrida is invoked to support a thinking 
of cosmopolitanism in oppositional terms. Similar to CLS in the United States, 
the paradoxes detected by Douzinas, do not become aporias in the sense that 
they do in Derrida.23 Douzinas’s contention (at 295), invoking Derrida’s 
Rogues, that ‘this attack on sovereignty does not take place in the name of non-
sovereignty but in that of another sovereign, the individual’ therefore raises 
certain questions. The reading given to Rogues clearly corresponds with the 
above Lacanian–Levinasian model. The (metaphysical) opposition between the 
particular and the universal – that is, between presence and representation, 
as a result – however remains. This reading does not quite do justice to what 
Derrida is saying in Rogues, when read in context. In line with the exposition of 
Derrida’s project in this chapter, Derrida seeks to show here how the concept 
of sovereignty is in the process of self-destruction, in a more accelerated form 
today than in earlier times. One of the ways in which this happens is (indeed) 
by way of international human rights. Derrida is not however arguing here 
for the opposition of one form of sovereignty by another. This is made clear 
in Rogues itself, in the texts where he problematises the foundation of (human) 
rights in the notion of sovereign subjectivity (AR 246 –7, PTT 132–3), as well 
as in ‘Violence and metaphysics’ where he challenges Levinas’s analysis of the 
relation with the other.24 The analysis in Rogues is thus about the auto-immunity 
or ‘implosion’ of the concept of sovereignty itself. This is one of the ways in 
which the (metaphysical) opposition between the singular and the universal, 
as well as other metaphysical oppositions is transcended. Whereas for Douzinas 
(2007: 295) the principle of sovereignty thus ultimately remains intact (playing 
itself  out in oppositional form),25 Derrida seeks to affi rm auto-immunity as 
the condition of possibility, as well as the displacement of sovereignty, with 
implications for both the state/law and the individual.
As we will see in more detail in Chapter 3, serious diffi culties furthermore 
present themselves when one attempts to construct a philosophical model 
22 Certain questions can be raised about this analogy. Apart from the fact that Derrida has 
problematised the notion of cosmopolitanism (e.g. in CF ), the new International in Specters 
of Marx is not of the order of an a-temporal future ‘to come’ as e.g. justice, the gift and 
democracy in Derrida’s texts, but ‘refers to a profound transformation, projected over a long 
term, of international law, of its concepts, and its fi eld of intervention’ (SM 105). The 
cosmopolitanism to come in Douzinas’s model thus on the one hand (by virtue of its ‘to 
come’ nature) seeks to go beyond temporality, yet Douzinas (2007: 296 fn. 13) still refers to 
it as an ontology, and thus remains within temporality.
23 See Chapter 6.
24 See below.
25 This is so especially in relation to human rights, where Douzinas (2007: 197) opposes a view 
of human rights as an instrument of state/empire (human rights as ideology) on the one 
hand, to a view of human rights as opposing sovereignty in these forms (human rights as 
revolutionary critique, linked to Oedipal desire) on the other.
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based on a belief  in the universality of the Oedipus complex, as Douzinas 
does. The adoption of Lacan’s notion of the Real, understood in an Oedipal 
sense (Douzinas 2007: 46 –7), for instance makes it impossible for this 
‘political philosophy’ to escape from what characterises metaphysics par 
excellence, that is, circular exchange.26 Because of its Levinasian heritage, and 
especially because it does not fully take on board Derrida’s reading of and 
problematising of Levinas’s thinking, the positing of an ‘ontology’ of alterity 
or of plural singularities’, as Douzinas acknowledges himself, remains within 
metaphysics (Douzinas 2000: 349–51; 2007: 296).27 This retention of a dis-
course within metaphysics will almost inevitably lead to diffi culties in founding 
a radical left legal politics in the long run. This diffi culty also stems from 
the reading given to Rogues, where the (sovereign) self, the I as (lacking) 
subject, even though it becomes somewhat destabilised or ‘shifting’, ultimately 
remains in place in Douzinas’s model.28 To give only one example, the Levi-
nasian attachment to (only) the human face, almost inevitably leads to an 
alignment with the traditional man–animal distinction,29 with all its accom-
panying cruelties.30 The notion of absolute hospitality, which as Derrida (CF 
16 –17) points out, relates to ‘a manner of being there, the manner in which 
we relate to ourselves and to others’, appears to have a much more ‘radical’ 
political potential, at least in this respect.31 The ‘Great Law of Hospitality’, 
as Derrida notes in speaking of the medieval tradition, entails:
An unconditional Law, both singular and universal, which ordered that 
the borders be open to each and every one, to every other, to all who 
might come, without question or without their even having to identify 
who they are or whence they came.
(CF 18)
26 See in this respect GT 15, and see further Chapter 5. Douzinas does not seem to take 
account of Derrida’s problematising of Lacan’s ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”’ (Lacan 
2006: 6 – 48) in ‘The purveyor of truth’ (PC 411–96).
27 See in this respect also ‘M&S’ 257–8.
28 See e.g. Douzinas (2007: 42).
29 See Douzinas (2007: 51) where the issue is raised but not further pursued. Simply extending 
rights to animals (in relation to which Douzinas 2001: 197 takes a sceptical stance), will of 
course not address this issue; see Points 255–87.
30 See also AIA. Similar questions can be raised in relation to the implications of Critchley’s 
analogous reading of Derrida (via Levinas) in terms of a politics of ethical difference. 
Critchley’s claim of an ‘impasse of the political in Derrida’s work’ (Critchley 1999b: 236) and 
of the need for a supplement to ensure that it has a future (at 237) is highly problematical. 
The present text will show that there is no such ‘impasse’ in Derrida’s thinking and that it 
is par excellence about the future.
31 When the ‘starting point’ is an affi rmation of absolute hospitality, the (progressive) effects 
are likely to be greater also in other respects, compared to when one starts off  with the 
‘singularity of the self ’, e.g. in Douzinas (2007: 42).
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Although Douzinas’s approach can in many respects be commended, especially 
in its taking on board of certain psychoanalytical insights, it is necessary to 
go beyond the Oedipus complex, in teasing out the implications of Derrida’s 
thinking for law.
Derrida and the metaphysics of presence
Although Derrida’s ‘project’ has been analysed many times before, this needs 
to be returned to here. What appears to have happened in the legal context 
is that legal scholars have in their understanding of Derrida generally been 
restricted to the insights offered by commentaries which do not in all respects 
appreciate the nature of Derrida’s broader project. Where legal scholars 
have relied on Derrida’s texts themselves, insuffi cient attention has often 
been given to detail. Law as Absolute Hospitality will seek to steer clear 
of these pitfalls by not only enquiring into what Derrida says, but also into 
why he says it – that is, by enquiring into his broader project. Without an 
appreciation of Derrida’s ‘project’, notions which he often refers to in his 
texts such as undecidability, singularity, the other, aporia, the impossible, 
difference, deference, différance, the text, iterability, the future, the ‘to come’, 
responsibility, as well as Derrida’s relation to conceptuality in general, can 
easily be misunderstood. An understanding of Derrida’s broader project 
is also essential to be able to appreciate his relation with earlier thinkers 
and it is moreover only then that a meaningful debate can take place with 
contemporary philosophers. When speaking of Derrida’s project, the reference 
is of course to his deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence. Metaphysics 
(from meta = after, beyond; and physis = nature)32 of course concerns itself  
with the founding principles of existence or being, for example Plato’s Ideas. 
In brief, Derrida’s contention is that all Western philosophy (even when, as 
in for example empiricism and logical positivism, metaphysics is seemingly 
rejected), is based on a desire for ‘presence’ as its founding principle. Because 
of their (implicit) reliance on philosophy, that is, metaphysics, the language 
(specifi cally Western languages) used in academic discourse and everyday 
thinking are based on the same principle (Pos 19). In his texts Derrida shows 
the problematic nature of this founding principle in its many guises and 
at the same time seeks a passage beyond it. One of the manifestations of 
metaphysics is the setting up of hierarchical oppositions, such as that between 
good–evil, pure–impure, proper–improper, meaning–nonsense, essential–
accidental, original–imitation, normal–abnormal, speech–writing, nature–
culture, literal–metaphorical and reason–madness, where the fi rst term serves 
as foundation or as a form of ‘presence’, with the second term representing 
a ‘fall’ from presence which is to be understood in terms of the fi rst term. 
32 See however Chapter 7 on Heidegger’s problematisation of this translation.
14 Jacques Derrida: law as absolute hospitality
Plato’s Ideas is one of the ways in which this oppositional structure has been 
grounded in Western philosophy.33 In considering Derrida’s relation to law 
– our specifi c aim here – a basic understanding of this project is all the more 
essential because of law’s enclosure within metaphysics through its reliance 
on the concepts and typical thought-processes of metaphysics (Pos 13).34 
It is then also specifi cally by considering Derrida’s relation to the thinking 
of Husserl, Heidegger, Freud and Levinas that we can come to a better 
understanding of  this project.35 As the relation between the thinking of 
Heidegger and Derrida is analysed in detail in Chapters 4 and 7, the dis-
cussion of Heidegger here will be relatively brief, in comparison with the 
others. As will become clear from the discussion that follows, Derrida’s project 
can be summed up by saying that what is ultimately at stake is the relation 
between life and death.36
Husserl
In Derrida’s fi rst texts the ‘project’ of deconstructing the metaphysics of 
presence proceeds through an analysis of the texts of Husserl (PG, HOG, 
SP). In the legal context, Derrida’s relation to Husserl is seldom explored. 
In the texts of Derrida referred to, he shows the problematic nature of certain 
assumptions of  Husserl, whose phenomenological thinking for Derrida 
represents the high point of metaphysics (OG 49), more specifi cally the belief  
in the ‘presence of  sense to a full and primordial intuition’ (SP 5) – that is, 
the possibility of meaning, present to consciousness without the need for 
mediation through indicative signs or signifi ers. Husserl’s texts nonetheless 
point to a way beyond metaphysics by showing that presence is always invaded 
by nonpresence. What Derrida will ultimately seek to show, is the inter-
relationship between life and death, which is illustrated par excellence by 
33 See further below the discussion of Heidegger on other ways of grounding this structure.
34 This is of course not only the case in the West, but everywhere that Western legal ideas have 
been imported.
35 There are of course others who can be said to require discussion here too, such as Hegel, 
Kant, Nietzsche and Blanchot. A discussion of all the philosophers and thinkers who have 
infl uenced Derrida’s thinking would however take us too far beyond our present concern: 
a brief  discussion of Derrida’s project.
36 It should perhaps be stated at the outset that I do not share in the general enthusiasm with 
which one of the recent readings of Derrida which also focuses on this relation – Hägglund 
(2008) – has been met. The main shortcomings of this book, centred around the notion of 
‘survival’ in Derrida’s thinking, is its disregard of the fi ner nuances in Derrida’s thinking, 
including Derrida’s relation to thinkers such as Freud and Heidegger, as well as of Derrida’s 
broader project (see Naas 2009 and Laclau 2008 for a similar assessment, at least regarding 
the last point). Because of the attention it has attracted, and as its claims directly confl ict 
with the reading of Derrida argued for here, Hägglund’s book will be briefl y referred to in 
the discussion below, as well as elsewhere in this book.
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writing. Two of Derrida’s texts on Husserl will be briefl y analysed here so 
as to introduce Derrida’s project.37
In Derrida’s ‘Introduction’ to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry he explores the 
implications for truth and meaning of Husserl’s analysis of the necessarily 
historical dimension of ideas, that is, their need to be expressed in language, 
and specifi cally in writing. Whereas Husserl believes that ideality remains 
unaffected by its expression in writing, Derrida shows by analysing the struc-
ture of writing that this cannot be the case. The reason for expressing an 
idea for the fi rst time in writing, as Derrida points out, is the insuffi ciency 
of the speaking subject in so far as the absolute grounding of such ideal 
objectivity is concerned (HOG 87–9). What is necessary for the ideal objectivity 
of meaning to be constituted is the possibility of it being repeated or reactivated 
and shared by others, even after the death of the original inventor and his 
initial audience. Ideas expressed in graphic signs as a necessary requirement 
for their constitution, as a consequence become public property, with the 
unavoidable risk of  losing their (original) meaning, of  becoming empty 
repetition, of the death of sense (meaninglessness), in other words. The 
necessary expression of truth in language furthermore goes along with the 
irreducible, radical equivocity of language which always again needs to be 
rendered univocal by the author as well as the reader (HOG 100 – 4). Its 
expression in graphic signs moreover carries the risk that the sign may be 
destroyed (HOG 87–94). Truth and ideal objectivity are thus made possible 
by what at the same time places it at risk of absolute destruction. Death 
seems in a strange way to be lodged ‘within’ the concept itself, one could say 
(HOG 88). To summarise: the graphic sign within which an idea fi nds the 
possibility of its indefi nite repetition as well as its possible disappearance is 
what in advance and in the fi rst place makes meaning and truth possible. As 
we will see, this has important implications for the concepts employed in law, 
including the very concept of law itself.
The (metaphysical) idea of the possibility of meaning fully present to 
consciousness, which Husserl himself  complicates through his analysis of 
time as well as of language, is explored by Derrida in Speech and Phenomena 
(1967). This analysis, as Derrida will also point out in a later text, ultimately 
tells us something about the structure of experience in general (Ltd 10). In 
so far as language is concerned, Derrida shows that Husserl, and in this he 
(Husserl) follows in the footsteps of all his metaphysical predecessors, shows 
a preference for the voice, as simulating the conservation of presence, over 
and above the graphic sign (SP 15–16). This appears more specifi cally in the 
distinction which Husserl draws between signs functioning as expression 
37 A number of excellent commentaries are available on these texts; see e.g. Marrati (2005: 
1– 44); Lawlor (1995: 151–84); Bernet (1989); Ijsseling (1986: 90 –112); Allison (2004: 
113–20).
16 Jacques Derrida: law as absolute hospitality
(Ausdruck) and as indication (Anzeichen), which he (Husserl) nevertheless 
himself later complicates by admitting that in all instances of communication, 
signs fulfi l an indicative function. The problem for Husserl is that the relation 
of indicative signs with meaning is via a detour, whereas expressive signs 
involve no such mediation (Marrati 2005: 65). This prejudice in favour of the 
voice, Derrida contends, has to do with the attempt of metaphysics to seek 
its foundation in the living present (SP 5), and thereby to deny the necessary 
relation to death (SP 10, 54). This relation is expressed in the graphic sign 
(SP 40, 54), which explains the prejudice against writing. Derrida, tying in 
with his analysis in the ‘Introduction’, but here more critical of Husserl, will 
thus in Speech and Phenomena seek to show:
an irreducible nonpresence as having a constituting value, and with it 
a nonlife, a nonpresence or nonself-belonging of the living present, an 
ineradicable nonprimordiality.
(SP 5– 6)
In his reading of Husserl, Derrida shows that the self  can relate to itself  only 
via language understood in terms of writing (that is, by way of indicative, 
as compared to expressive, signs), so that truth and meaning can never be 
fully present in consciousness (for example in interior monologue, as Husserl 
contends), but always require mediation through signifi ers, marks or traces 
(indicative signs). No examples can thus strictly speaking be given of signs 
fulfi lling an expressive function. The indiscernibility of consciousness and 
language, Derrida notes, introduces ‘nonpresence and difference (mediation, 
signs, referral back, etc.) in the heart of self-presence’ (SP 15). Similar to 
what we saw in the ‘Introduction’ to the Origin of Geometry, Derrida further-
more shows that meaning is not the result of an intentional act. Instead, the 
(radical) absence of the speaker/writer, as well as of the object described, 
shows itself  to be a structural condition for meaning (SP 92–7). This even 
applies in saying ‘I’ or ‘I am’ in representing oneself  to oneself  in so-called 
solitary mental life, which in Husserl’s phenomenology functions as full presence 
and origin (SP 95):
the signifying function of the I does not depend on the life of the speaking 
subject ... [W]hether or not life as self-presence accompanies the uttering 
of the I, is quite indifferent with regard to the functioning of meaning. 
My death is structurally necessary to the pronouncing of the I.
(SP 96)38
38 Gasché (1986: 191–2) points out that Derrida in a sense ‘generalizes’ the notion of ‘indica-
tion’ in this reading of Husserl, another way of referring to the arche-trace.
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In so far as time is concerned, Derrida challenges Husserl’s contention of 
a present moment where meaning can be fully present to consciousness. 
Husserl specifi cally contends that this is the case in interior monologue 
where there is no need for signifi ers (signs functioning as indication) as these 
mental acts ‘are “lived by us in the same instant” (im selben Augenblick)’ (SP 
59). At stake here, Derrida notes, is a perception of the present ‘as punctuality 
of the instant’ (SP 61). This privilege accorded to the present (living) now, 
Derrida adds, ‘defi nes the very element of philosophical thought, it is evidence 
itself, conscious thought itself, it governs every possible concept of truth and 
sense’ (SP 62). Husserl (1999: 186 –221) in The Phenomenology of Internal 
Time-Consciousness seems to adopt a somewhat different view, noting that 
every present moment or ‘now’ is essentially linked with the retention of the 
past and an anticipation or protention of the future. In terms of the latter 
view there can thus be no present moment which is completely isolated from 
the past and the future.39 Husserl nonetheless even here can be said to rely 
on the now as source point (SP 61–2; OG 67). This view of time and its 
relation to consciousness can be challenged with reference to, and by way of 
the further development of, Freud’s notion of the unconscious (SP 63).40 
Husserl’s original analysis of time nevertheless allows us to no longer think 
of the present as a simple self-identity and thus to challenge his (Husserl’s) 
idea of ‘the same instant’ as well as his argument against the need for signs 
in the self-relation (SP 64 – 6). Although, as Derrida acknowledges, there is 
clearly a difference between the representation of signs and the retention of 
the past (in thinking about temporality), both involve repetition, not from a 
position founded on presence, but the repetition and return of what Derrida 
refers to here as a ‘primordial’ trace (SP 67).41 The structure of writing, which 
Derrida discloses here, that is, ‘the operation of differing which at one and 
the same time both fi ssures and retards presence’, including its effaceability 
as a trace, thus in a strange way points to an ‘originary’ movement through 
39 Hägglund’s understanding of temporality remains restricted to this notion of time in Hus-
serl and consequently stays within the limits of metaphysics (see Hägglund 2008: 15–16; 
2009: 5–8; for a similar assessment see Johnston 2009: 152–3). In order to exceed the concept 
of time, which as Derrida points out, is per defi nition metaphysical (MP 63), it would have 
to in addition take on certain Freudian and Heideggerian insights, which Hägglund does 
not do.
40 Derrida at this point refers to ‘Freud and the scene of writing’ (WD 196 –231). See further 
‘Me-psychoanalysis’ (Psy I 133), where Derrida, in a reading of Nicolas Abraham, points 
out that ‘Husserl understood the Unconscious from the standpoint of experience, sense, 
presence, as “the forgetting of experiences that once were conscious”’. Derrida, with Abraham, 
will attempt to think ‘the Unconscious ... by removing it from this whole phenomenological 
axiomatic of sense and presence’ with reference to what can be referred to as the (unpresent-
able) kernel, the crypt, the phantom within the ego, or an ‘artifi cial unconscious’. See further 
below, on Freud.
41 This is of course not a trace left by an originary presence.
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which presence (as well as its metaphysical opposite, absence) appears. Derrida 
also refers to this ‘movement’ as différance or the ‘differential trace’. This 
movement is a necessary one as full presence would entail both being 
absolutely alive and being absolutely dead (SP 102).42 The nonpresence which 
was shown to be lodged within presence, that is, death, in other words pro-
duces the desire for presence in a return movement. This desire for presence, 
or what can also be termed the understanding of Being43 as presence, has 
characterised metaphysics from the start, as we will see below in our discussion 
of Heidegger. The reasons for this movement, which clearly shows the con-
tamination rather than the separation of life and death, will become clear in 
the discussion of Heidegger, and perhaps even more so, in the discussion of 
Freud.
The implications of the above analysis for law will likewise become clear 
later on, although we can now already briefl y mention some of these, in light 
of the structure of writing as analysed above, which will, in his later work, 
partly inform Derrida’s hyper-ethics or hyper-politics. It is precisely the life–
death structure fi rst explored in the readings of Husserl, which will determine 
Derrida’s ‘ethico-political’ explorations. Before we come to that, it is necessary 
to point out that the assumptions of metaphysics necessarily determine the 
way in which concepts are viewed, that is, in terms of an ideal essence. Berns 
(1998: 60) summarises the metaphysical idea of conceptuality as follows:
The aim of knowledge is the concept. A concept is an idealisation in 
which the object itself  is present to consciousness. Such presence of the 
object in its singularity requires that rigorous and exact distinctions are 
made. The telos of  the concept is to be distinguished in order to bring 
things to presence in their ideality. Vague concepts, concepts which fl ow 
over into other concepts or which entail empirical gradations, are not 
concepts. It is this or that but never (a little) this and (a little) that. Idealisa-
tions are thus always identities. Therefore a concept is also in principle 
repeatable in the strict sense of the word [as we see clearly in Husserl’s 
analysis].44
Law, and specifi cally legal philosophy, knows very well the enquiry which 
follows upon this assumption, in its asking – specifi cally in the traditional 
debate between natural law and legal positivism – about the essence of law 
(‘what is law?’). This approach likewise underlies all the concepts which law 
42 See also Dis 164.
43 The use of the capital B is in line with the practice followed in many translations of 
Heidegger’s texts, to distinguish ‘Being’ (a substantive, formed by turning the verb sein (to 
be) into a noun) more clearly from ‘beings’ or ‘a being’.
44 Own translation. See also Ltd 116 –17; and Boshoff (2004: 379–80).
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employs.45 The written nature of concepts, as explored by Derrida through 
a reading of Husserl, that is their relation to death, as well as its implications, are 
yet to be explored in the legal context. In the chapters that follow, an attempt 
will be made to do so, specifi cally in relation to the concept of law itself. If  
there is furthermore no self-identity to consciousness or to the present moment, 
as we saw in Derrida’s reading of Husserl in relation to time and language, 
politico-legal decision-making would have to be completely rethought. A 
judge can, for example, no longer be viewed as a fully conscious subject who 
has to (objectively) apply the law to the facts of the case or interpret the law 
with reference to background principles. As we will see in the discussion that 
follows, the acknowledgement of a certain ‘alterity’, which structures con-
sciousness and the present, takes us well beyond contemporary debates on 
the subjectivity or objectivity of judicial decision-making.
Heidegger
In his enquiry into Being, Heidegger notes that Plato’s Ideas, God as creator, 
the self-presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity and the belief  
in a reality that is directly accessible to the senses, are some of the ways in 
which Being has through the ages been understood in Western philosophy. 
Being has, in other words, been understood as something that is secure 
and present, as is clearly shown by the notion of the calculating subject 
in modernity which will be discussed below. This has had a determining 
infl uence on conceptuality in metaphysics, which as a consequence is informed 
by or grounded in what Derrida refers to as onto-theology or the belief  in 
a transcendental signifi ed (OG 14, 23). In his analysis, fi rst of Dasein and 
then of Being itself, Heidegger shows that these ways of understanding Being 
in metaphysics (in terms of  beings) are tied to a certain way of  thinking 
about death (or absence), that is, as something which stands opposed to life 
and which is on its outside. Heidegger wants to rethink death as part of 
Being and with that to rethink the meaning of Being. Being must according 
to Heidegger be understood not in terms of permanence, but as arising and 
passing away. Derrida ties his own thinking to Heidegger’s ‘project’, but he 
takes a different stance towards metaphysics, a stance which, as we will see, 
is closely tied to the way in which he (Heidegger) views death. Marrati (2005: 
184) thoughtfully summarises the relation between Derrida and Heidegger 
as follows:
45 See WAP 7 on this question as the oldest theme of philosophy. See further Hage and Von 
der Pfordten (2009: 17–33) for an argument about the importance of concepts to law; and 
see Berman (1983: 120 – 64) on the infl uence of Platonic and Aristotelian thinking for the 
development of legal conceptuality.
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In the articulation of the ontic and the ontological, Derrida espies the 
power and desire of a philosophical discourse that wants to think itself  
and that, in order to do so, has also to think its other as its other, a 
process of reappropriation that protects it from any outside and from 
any exteriority such that ‘its outside, never surprises it, such that the logic 
of its heteronomy still resounds from within the vault of its autism’.
Heidegger believes that metaphysics has come to an end, that it needs to be 
destructed and overcome, in order to make possible a thinking of the truth 
or sense of Being itself, as well as a responding to Being as such (Heidegger 
2007a: 279). The diffi culty that Derrida detects in Heidegger’s attempt is that 
although Heidegger’s reliance on metaphysical conceptuality to overcome 
metaphysics is unavoidable, Heidegger does so without ‘changing terrain’ 
(MP 135). Heidegger more specifi cally continues to rely on the conceptual 
oppositions of metaphysics such as between the authentic and the inauthentic; 
he accords in typical metaphysical style a privilege to speech, the proper, light 
and proximity; shows a disdain for literature; and maintains the quest for a 
pure origin (MP 63, 129–34; Pos 10 –11, 54). In doing so, Heidegger risks 
simply confi rming metaphysics on a deeper, more fundamental level (MP 
135). Derrida on the other hand seeks to change terrain through the ‘invention’ 
of a new conceptuality. He therefore prefers to speak of the ‘closure’ rather 
than the ‘end’ of metaphysics, and sees this closure as having been at stake 
in metaphysics since its beginning and throughout all the so-called ‘epochs’ 
of Being’s sending which Heidegger identifi es – that is, the different ways in 
which Being has been viewed through the ages (Pos 56 –7). Analysing the 
texts of metaphysical thinkers, Derrida shows that although dominated by 
metaphysics, there is also something in each of these texts (in those of 
Heidegger too, for example when he analyses the appearance and withdrawal 
of Being) that exceeds metaphysics. Metaphysics can in other words not 
simply be overcome.46 However, as Derrida will show, inter alia in relation to 
justice, its fi eld can be modifi ed and also ‘exceeded’ in an atemporal moment 
(Pos 12). Another important characteristic of metaphysics, which will be 
referred to again repeatedly in the rest of the book and which Heidegger also 
at times risks succumbing to, is its restrictive economic circularity (SM 34). 
As we will see specifi cally in analysing the ethico-political concepts of meta-
physics such as justice, the gift, hospitality, and democracy, they traditionally 
demand a return on investment; they expect and require a return to the self. 
When Derrida analyses these concepts in seeking to make them exceed their 
restricted economy, he then also does not enquire into their essence or ideal 
form as metaphysics typically does, but into their structure, their condition 
46 It of course needs to be acknowledged that Heidegger’s own notion of ‘overcoming’ meta-
physics is by no means simple.
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of possibility, or the ‘law’ which regulates them. In the discussion that follows, 
we will see that this does not amount to ‘restoring the classical motif  of the 
system’, but to the determination of ‘the possibility of meaning on the basis 
of a “formal” organization which in itself  has no meaning’ (MP 134).
Levinas
As we saw earlier, it is especially Levinas’s refl ections on the ethical relation 
to the other which have grabbed the attention of legal scholars. It has often been 
said that Derrida follows Levinas in this respect in going beyond metaphysics. 
Such a reading is not completely inaccurate, yet it cannot be accepted with-
out a number of qualifi cations. A careful reading of ‘Violence and metaphysics’ 
is essential to understand the not-insignifi cant differences between the think-
ing of Levinas and Derrida. In his early texts, Levinas criticises the thinking 
of both Husserl and Heidegger for not making provision for a relation to 
the other (person) as infi nitely or absolutely other. Husserl is said to view 
the other as another ego and Heidegger, to prioritise the relation to Being over 
beings. Levinas wishes to escape from both phenomenology and ontology as 
philosophies of violence (Naas 2003: 98). He protests against the concept, 
the state and totality (WD 110). Levinas then attempts to construct an 
ethical relation with the other which would not be subject to the domination 
of what he refers to as ‘the same’. He does so by positing the nudity of the 
face of the other which places me under an absolute obligation. Derrida fi rst 
defends Husserl against this charge and points out that the other (person) 
can only be regarded as ‘infi nitely other’ if  the other appears as such in the 
zone of what Levinas refers to as ‘the same’ (WD 125).47 The other must in 
other words be recognised as ego otherwise its entire alterity would collapse 
(WD 125). Dissymmetry and alterity are only possible because of this sym-
metry (WD 126).48 According to Husserl, and Derrida agrees with him, ‘the 
intentional relationship of “ego to my world” cannot be opened on the basis of 
an infi nitely other radically foreign to my world’ or by a God who determines 
this relationship (WD 132). This of course does not mean that the other or God 
only ‘exists’ through a production of the ego. The ego is limited to experiences 
in the living present which, as we saw earlier, includes the past present and 
the future present (WD 132). They can, however, only have meaning for an 
ego in general (WD 132). This does not however as yet fully explain how a 
relation with the other as other or an exceeding of the same is possible. As 
a fi rst step, it is necessary to contemplate Being as is done by Heidegger.
Levinas’s charge against Heidegger in relation to Being is that ‘to sub-
ordinate the relation with someone, who is an existent (the ethical relation) to 
47 See also Llewelyn (1985: 195); Bennington (2000: 204 fn. 8).
48 See in this respect the analysis of Saghafi  (2010: 7–28).
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a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the appre-
hension, the domination of existents (a relationship of knowing), subordinates 
justice to freedom’ (Levinas 2002: 45; WD 97, 135). This is not the case, 
Derrida contends. Heidegger’s move causes a fi rst tremor in philosophical 
security and at the same time of self-confi dent presence (WD 134). Derrida 
specifi cally contests Levinas’s charge that the ontological difference involves 
the ‘priority’ of Being to the existent (WD 136, 144). As there can be an 
order of priority only between existent things, and as Being is not an existent 
(it is nothing outside the existent), Derrida dismisses this charge (WD 136, 
144). It is therefore not correct either to say that Heidegger’s ‘ontology’ 
subordinates the ethical relation (WD 136 –7). Indeed, as Derrida points out, 
no ethics in the Levinasian sense can be opened without a thought of Being 
(WD 137).49 Furthermore, Being:
conditions the respect for the other as what it is: other. Without this 
acknowledgement, which is not a knowledge, or let us say without this 
‘letting-be’ of an existent (Other) as something existing outside me in the 
essence of what it is (fi rst in its alterity), no ethics would be possible.
(WD 138)50
Without the possibility of distinguishing between the self  and an other whom 
one is not, which is made possible by Being, violence would reign to such 
a degree that it could not even appear and be named, Derrida contends 
(WD 138).51 Being is furthermore not a concept or category with the result 
that its contemplation leads to the submission of the other (person) to our 
(totalitarian) power and violence, as Levinas appears to suggest in the 
quotation above (WD 139– 41). Derrida therefore suggests that the experience 
of the face in Levinas as the foundation of ethics still presupposes Being 
(WD 143).
As we saw in the preceding section, Derrida nevertheless in a certain way 
goes beyond Heidegger’s thinking of Being and in doing so, comes close to 
Levinas, but with a twist. As noted, Heidegger views (the relation to) death 
as an essential part of life,52 but still as the ownmost possibility of Dasein 
(Heidegger 1962: 294; 1984a: 101). To have a relation with the other as other 
(as Levinas requires), a different thinking of the relation with death is however 
49 See also Ben-Dor (2007: 205–7); and Hirsch (1999: 29–30). Levinas’s discourse can thus be 
read as ontic in nature, a discourse about beings; see further Llewelyn (1985: 199); Ben-Dor 
(2007: 209–10).
50 See also WD 141.
51 See further Chapter 5.
52 Heidegger (2000: 139) explains this in simple terms: ‘For the capricious, life is just life. For 
them, death is death and only that. But the Being of life is also death. Everything that comes to 
life thereby already begins to die as well, to go towards its death, and death is also life.’
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required. This is made possible, as we saw in the section on Husserl, by an 
analysis of the law of language and in addition by a reading of Freud. For 
Derrida no direct access to the other (or the other’s ‘face’) is thus possible 
as it is for Levinas. The notion of the epiphany of the face, Derrida points 
out, remains tied to the metaphysics of light (WD 92, 118). The appearance 
of the self  to the self  as we saw above is only possible through ‘mediation’, 
and the same applies in so far as the appearance of another person (or thing) 
to the self  is concerned (SP 15).53 This shows again the importance of a 
refl ection on ‘mediation’ itself, in this case of the language which Levinas uses. 
The face of the other can in a way, as Naas (2003: 100 –1) puts it, be thought 
only within (philosophical) language, yet it can be thought differently, as 
Levinas indeed does. Metaphysical conceptuality can be imploded, as Levinas 
shows by way of, for example, the language of the face which he employs (A 
76; Naas 2003: 111). As we also saw above, and as will be analysed in more 
detail in Chapter 2, this mediation, if  analysed rigorously, involves a drifting, 
a going outside of the self, an ‘experience’ of death. This ‘experience’ – which 
can never be experienced as such – corresponds with Levinas’s notions of 
responsibility, the welcome and hospitality. The ‘diffi culties’ in Levinas’s think-
ing of course does not mean that his texts should be ignored or rejected. As 
Derrida shows in a number of texts, Levinas can be read as giving expression 
in the philosophical language he uses, to another kind of beyond to the 
metaphysics of presence. Levinas in other words, at least implicitly, can be 
said to work at transforming (Greek) philosophical language from the inside, 
rather than as positing a radical (Jewish) exteriority outside of philosophical 
language (Naas 2003: 100). The seemingly small differences between Levinas 
and Derrida understandably become crucial in the reading of ‘Force of law’.
The way in which Levinas transforms philosophical language as well as its 
hyper-ethical and hyper-political implications can be clearly seen in Derrida’s 
essay ‘A word of welcome’, in Adieu. Here Derrida refers to Levinas’s Totality 
and Infi nity, and in a way to his whole œuvre, as a text(s) on hospitality. 
It should be pointed out that hospitality is not to be understood here in a 
regional sense as one of the questions in ethics or as the name of a problem 
in law or politics, but as ethicity itself  (A 59; CF 16 –17). Although it has 
profound implications for ethics on a personal level, it goes far beyond that 
towards the relation between states as well as the relation between states and 
individuals, including (economic and political) refugees, as well as the relation 
of states vis-à-vis citizens with a migration background. The question of 
sovereignty, both of the self  and of the nation, is thus at the forefront of 
what is at stake here (R 149).54 In Adieu, Derrida carefully traces the appearance 
of the word ‘hospitality’ and other related words such as welcome, attention, 
53 See also Weber (2008: 178–9); Saghafi  (2010: 7–28, 111).
54 See further Chapter 2.
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and the face in Levinas’s texts. In the concluding pages of Totality and Infi nity, 
Derrida notes, ‘hospitality becomes the very name of what opens itself  to 
the face, or, more precisely, of what “welcomes” it’ (A 21). With this state-
ment it should already be clear that there is little difference between ‘Violence 
and metaphysics’ (1964) and Adieu (1997).55 Both concern themselves with 
the importance of something unique within language in the possibility of 
welcoming the other.56 The ‘essence’ of language, as Levinas (2002: 305) 
himself  notes, and as Derrida (A 51) affi rms, is hospitality. In Adieu, Derrida 
reads Levinas’s texts, after his death, as having always already ‘spoken’ of 
this hospitality and other ‘quasi-transcendental’ words (A 25). Adieu is there-
fore a text on the concept of hospitality which, as Levinas notes, is ‘opposed 
to “thematization”’ (A 22).
Departing in a very subtle way from the predominant reading of Levinas, 
Derrida contends that the welcome offered to the other in Levinas’s texts is 
always already a response to the welcoming offered by the other (A 23– 4). 
To understand the difference in these two readings, this latter welcoming has 
to be carefully scrutinised. What Derrida specifi cally wants to show in this 
reading, which of course ties in very closely with Levinas’s own project, is 
that this welcoming is not secondary in the sense that it follows upon a more 
primary being-at-home-with-the-self. The welcoming in question ‘precedes’ 
subjectivity, yet both subjectivity and the welcome are in a way a condition 
of possibility of each other (A 28). The structure of différance is clearly at 
stake here.57 To read Levinas as explicating the structure of différance in 
writing about justice and the third is a particularly arduous task. As we know, 
Levinas is often read as saying that the face-to-face relation is later inter-
rupted by the arrival of the third, or what he refers to as justice. Translated 
into the relation between ethics on the one hand and law–politics on the 
other, this means that the one-to-one ethical relation is interrupted by the 
arrival of others and thus of the law ( justice as law). I am thus called upon 
to refrain from acceding to the demand of the other (and the same would 
apply in the case of a judge), because of the demand that third parties place 
upon me.58 Derrida however points out that Levinas elsewhere notes that the 
third arrives without waiting and therefore has always already interrupted 
the face-to-face relation with the other (A 29, 60, 110). Derrida describes the 
‘double bind’ which follows from this in the following terms:
55 See also Derrida’s ‘At this very moment in this work here I am’ (Psy I 143–90).
56 The reference here is to OG 112; see also Naas (2003: 95).
57 The notion of différance will be important again towards the end of Derrida’s reading when 
he argues (different from many Levinasian readers) that ‘it is necessary to deduce a politics 
and a law from ethics’ (A 115). This is made possible by the notion of différance. See further 
below where the notion of différance is explored in relation to Freud.
58 This is the position adopted by authors such as Cornell (1992); Douzinas (2000); and 
Manderson (2006).
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The third does not wait; its illeity calls from as early as the epiphany of 
the face in the face to face. For the absence of the third would threaten 
with violence the purity of ethics in the absolute immediacy of the face 
to face with the unique. Levinas does not say it in exactly this way, but 
what is he doing when, beyond or through the dual of the face to face 
between two ‘uniques,’ he appeals to justice, affi rming and reaffi rming 
that justice ‘is necessary,’ that the third ‘is necessary’? Is he not trying to 
take into account this hypothesis of a violence in the pure immediate 
ethics of the face to face? A violence potentially unleashed in the experience 
of the neighbour and of absolute unicity? The impossibility of discerning 
here between good and evil, love and hate, giving and taking, the desire 
to live and the death drive, the hospitable welcome and the egoistic or 
narcissistic closing up within oneself ?
(A 32–3)
This is the fi rst step Derrida takes in the deconstructive reading of Levinas. 
The refl ection on the relation between the other and the third, does not 
therefore stop here. We will return to the next step below. One of the conse-
quences of this interruption, which has always already taken place, is the 
inevitable betrayal of the ethical relation, or of what Derrida refers to as 
justice ‘heterogeneous to law’ (A 33– 4). Derrida however sees the ‘ethical 
relation’ in Levinas different from the way in which it is usually viewed.59 He 
points out that for Levinas, the hospitable welcome is achieved par excellence 
by ‘the woman’ (A 36 –8). Derrida reads this fi gure of feminine alterity as a 
welcoming before ethics (A 38–9). Although Levinas’s texts on the woman 
can also be given an androcentric reading, Derrida reads these texts in a way 
similar to his earlier reading of Nietzsche in Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles.60 At 
stake in this welcoming is a kind of hospitality which involves the host or 
master who welcomes someone in what he considers to be his house or his 
land, becoming the guest or tenant in his or perhaps rather in her own home, 
a hostess whose home or land ultimately does not belong to her, being dis-
possessed and expropriated in an originary sense (A 41–2).61 The space of 
this hospitality is furthermore beyond Being (A 48), which does not mean 
that its foundation is to be found in beings/existents. As Derrida notes in his 
59 Hägglund’s criticism of certain ‘ethical’ readings of Derrida by way of Levinas (e.g. Häg-
glund 2008: 31), which is no doubt justifi ed to some extent, unfortunately proceeds by way 
of the argument that one should not confuse Derrida’s ‘ultratranscendental descriptions’ 
with ‘prescriptions’ about what must be done. From such statements one can see clearly that 
the author makes little attempt to follow Derrida (who in the fi rst place follows Heidegger) 
in seeking to go beyond metaphysics, and thus also beyond the is–ought or descriptive–
prescriptive distinction.
60 See also Psy I 143–90 (‘At this very moment in this work here I am’); and A 43– 4.
61 It should be clear that we are referring here to sexual difference, to be explored in Chapter 5.
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discussion of the way in which Levinas transforms phenomenology, and the 
importance of this should be emphasised, hospitality ultimately involves an 
interruption of the self  by the self  as other (A 51–2), and thus not directly 
by the other (person).62 Derrida refers at this point implicitly to his earlier 
analysis of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena and of Levinas in ‘Violence 
and metaphysics’, noting (again) that the other ‘never makes itself  accessible 
except by way of an appresentational analogy and so remains radically sep-
arated, inaccessible to originary perception’ (A 51).63 The subject is in other 
words both host and hostage (A 54 –5). ‘The word I’, as Levinas (2004: 114) 
notes, ‘means here I am, answering for everything and for everyone’. In 
language, which seems very close to that of a certain Freud, Levinas (2004: 
111–12) also refers to the subjectivity of the subject as a ‘persecuting obses-
sion’, and as ‘under accusation’. Being-at-home-with-oneself, Derrida fur-
thermore points out, is for Levinas not the natural state, but is instead a 
response to an originary, uprooted wandering (A 92). There is thus nothing 
natural about the home – it is instead allotted, entrusted (A 93). This applies 
not only to the self  or the family, but also to the territory laid claim to by 
a nation (A 92–3). The home is moreover not free from trauma. As Derrida 
notes, the election of the hostage is often described by Levinas not in a 
pacifying language, but in violent and traumatising terms (A 59). Here the 
Freud of the death drive is clearly at stake, when Derrida refers to ‘a memory 
before memory, the memory of a word that will have taken place even before 
taking place, of a past event that is older than the past and more ancient 
than any memory ordered along the lines of an empirically determined string 
of presents’ (A 69).
This hospitality goes far beyond a show of tolerance towards those who 
visit one’s home or land (A 72; PTT 124 –30). If  it is still called by this name, 
then this ‘tolerance’ must be of a love without measure (A 72). Hospitality 
understood thus, necessarily has important implications for state sovereignty, 
as we will again see in Chapter 2. Hospitality in this respect translates into 
what Levinas refers to as a messianic politics or a ‘Beyond the State in the 
State’ (A 73– 6). It specifi cally involves a pre-originary, an-archic peace which 
goes beyond the political (A 49, 81–2). This peace does not simply entail the 
cessation of hostilities. The concept of peace, as Derrida points out, implies 
within itself  eternity: an eternal peace (A 86 –7). Any threat of war, whether 
conscious or unconscious, would destroy this peace (A 88). For Kant, whom 
Derrida is partly following here, war is the natural state, and peace has to 
62 On my reading, Bennington (2000: 39– 46) does not succeed in fully capturing the complexity 
of Derrida’s text in this respect. The notion of ‘the other (already) in me’ is briefl y mentioned 
(43– 4) and the relation to Freud noted (207 fn. 30), but this is not followed by a change in 
or an overturning of the earlier analysis (39– 41) which pointed to the tension between the 
face-to-face relation and relation to the third party.
63 See similarly OG 189–91 in an analysis of Rousseau.
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be instituted. Peace so instituted according to Kant remains threatened by 
war, and, Derrida adds, drawing the inevitable consequence from the notion 
of eternal peace, also by a promise which it itself  threatening (A 89).64 In the 
case of Levinas, peace is likewise not ‘natural’, yet everything begins with 
peace, a peace which goes beyond the merely institutional or politico-juridical 
and which has a sense of urgency about it (peace now), rather than a pro-
gressive movement (A 87–91). This ‘peace without process’ can also be referred 
to as the an-archic pre-originary welcoming which for Levinas, even inhabits 
war (A 90 –1). Returning now to the relation between the other and the third, 
although in a sense we have never left it, Derrida notes that illeity in Levinas 
sometimes does not simply disrupt the face-to-face relation, but instead 
designates ‘the very transcendence of the face in the face to face, the condi-
tion of the You, the rupture of the I-Thou (and thus of a certain femininity, 
a certain experience of “feminine alterity”) in the experience of the neighbour’ 
(A 60). This is, for example, the case when Levinas refers to ‘the neighbour 
bearing the trace of a withdrawal that orders it as a face’ or to the prophetic 
word ‘which by essence is aroused by the epiphany of the face inasmuch as 
it attests to the presence of the third’ (Levinas 2004: 121; 2002: 213). What 
is usually read as a simple movement whereby the singularity of the face 
becomes effaced through ‘universality’ or ‘representation’ is read by Derrida 
as a double movement. In the legal–political sphere (in illeity) for example, 
the face becomes manifest and is thereby dissimulated, rendering it invisible 
(A 98): ‘The political dissimulates because it brings to light. It hides what it 
throws light on. Giving the face to be seen, bringing or attracting it into the 
space of public phenomenality, it thereby renders it invisible. Visibility renders 
invisible its invisibility, that is, the withdrawal of its epiphany’ (A 98). At stake 
here is Levinas’s transformation of metaphysical conceptuality, here the concept 
of hospitality which is now to be understood in an unconditional sense. As 
should become clear by now, this is not unrelated to the reference to the 
death drive mentioned in the quotation above, or to what Derrida refers 
to on the next page as ‘a disjunction in the immanence to the self ’ (A 99). 
Derrida continues as follows:
In each case [referring to subsequent texts of Levinas], this disjunction 
has to do with the pre-originary ex-propriety or ex-appropriation that 
makes of the subject a guest [hôte] and an hostage, someone who is, 
before every invitation, elected, invited, and visited in his own home in the 
home of the other, in a given at home, an at home that is given, or, rather, 
loaned, allotted, advanced before every contract, in the ‘anachronism of 
a debt preceding the loan.’
[referring to Levinas 2004: 112]
64 See further Chapter 2 on the promise as a speech act.
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And in addition, to return to the previous page of Adieu, there is another 
dissimulation (the one that is usually detected in reading Levinas): ‘The vio-
lence of the political mistreats the face yet again by effacing its unicity in a 
generality’ (A 98). Levinas’s face-to-face ethical relation is thus read as a 
transformation of metaphysical conceptuality. The violence that goes along 
with the treatment of singularity in general terms is not ignored, but is at 
the same time not where the analysis stops. The way in which to address this 
is for Derrida not (only) to criticise or decry law (and law’s conceptuality) 
for not being able to deal with the singular because of its inevitable generality,65 
but to transform or implode conceptual generality itself  thereby giving 
hospitality (and a relation to the other) a chance.
Freud
In an interview with Roudinesco, Derrida notes that he became aware of the 
importance of psychoanalysis to his ‘project’ in 1965 (FWT 170). This means 
that his early texts on Husserl (‘“Genesis and structure” and phenomenology’ 
of 1959, and HOG, 1962), on Levinas (‘Violence and metaphysics’, 1964), 
and on Foucault (‘Cogito and the history of madness’, 1963), are some of 
the few where psychoanalysis plays no overt role. This does not however 
mean that psychoanalysis, and specifi cally Freud, plays no role at all in these 
early texts (Pos 83) or that there was an overturning of or an early ‘turn’ in 
Derrida’s project in 1965. There can rather be said to have been a ‘deepening’ 
of this project, a realisation therefore of the important ‘supporting’ role of 
Freud’s thinking in relation to the project of deconstructing the metaphysics 
of presence, as well as a further radicalisation of this project. The thinking 
of Freud thus in the mid-1960s starts playing an explicit role in Derrida’s 
elaboration of the problematic of the trace, of writing and of différance, in 
texts such as ‘Freud and the scene of writing’, 1966), Of Grammatology (1967, 
but published earlier as essays between 1963 and 1966), and ‘Difference’, 
from 1968.66 Other important texts of Derrida on Freud include ‘To speculate 
– on Freud’, ‘Telepathy’, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, ‘Resistances’, 
‘Psychoanalysis searches the states of its soul: the impossible beyond of a 
sovereign cruelty’; and then there are also a number of texts by Derrida on 
Lacan (‘The purveyor of truth’, ‘For the love of Lacan’), on Abraham and 
Torok (‘Me–psychoanalysis’, ‘Fors: the anglish words of Nicolas Abraham 
and Maria Torok’), and on psychoanalysis in general. In the latter texts, 
Freud, and to be more precise, not so much the Freud of psychoanalysis 
(that is, of the unconscious and the Oedipus complex) who is still under the 
determining infl uence of metaphysics, but the Freud of the death drive, plays 
65 For discussion, see Chapter 6.
66 See in this regard Derrida’s remarks in FWT 170.
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a ‘central’ role. This is not however where the infl uence of Freud in Derrida’s 
texts stops. In an interview dating from 1971, Derrida (Pos 83) confi rms that 
all his work after 1965 had been determined by Freud’s thinking, and a reading 
of subsequent texts confi rms that this infl uence was exerted until the end. 
Not only does Freud’s name and works appear in many, if  not most of 
Derrida’s texts, but the deconstructive ‘implosion’ of metaphysical concepts 
such as writing and the trace, as well as of ethico-political concepts such as 
justice, friendship, hospitality, forgiveness, the gift, and democracy, would 
perhaps not have been possible if  it was not for the infl uence of Freud.67 At 
the same time, Derrida does not simply adopt, but radically transforms 
Freud’s thinking in the process of putting it to work.
‘To speculate – on Freud’ in The Post Card (1980) involves a close reading 
of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud 2001: XVIII 1– 64). Derrida 
here in a sense confi rms Freud’s hesitant hypothesis of  a death drive. In 
Derrida’s reading of Freud’s analysis, the death drive does not manifest itself; 
it therefore does not ‘exist’ in an ontological sense, and cannot be known 
epistemologically (PC 362, 399). Derrida’s own earlier analysis of language 
furthermore assists him in radically transforming this hypothesis. How these 
two ‘approaches’ (a certain linguistics and a certain psychoanalysis) tie in 
with each other is perhaps best expressed in ‘Shibboleth’ when Derrida 
comments on the spectral errancy or revenance of  words (SQ 53): ‘One 
cannot say that we know this [about words] because we experience death and 
mourning. That experience comes to us from our relation to this revenance 
of the mark, then of language, then of the word, then of the name.’ Derrida’s 
reading of Freud on the death drive, thus confi rms his earlier investigation of 
the law of writing, for example the development of the notion of iterability.68 
Iterability, as we will see in more detail in Chapter 2, refers to the ability of 
signs (or marks) to function in or be grafted onto other contexts and also 
to function in the event of the absence and even the death of their ‘producer’, 
the intended addressees as well as the referent, risking thereby – not as a 
chance but as a structural necessity – the loss of self-presence, of meaning, of 
readability, of property. It is then also through a close reading by Derrida 
of (the graphic marks of ) Beyond the Pleasure Principle that Freud’s hypothesis 
of a death drive and thus of something beyond the pleasure principle (and 
metaphysics) can be affi rmed. This does not stem in the fi rst place from the 
content of what Freud says – he instead confi rms the sovereign domination 
of the pleasure principle and remains undecided about whether there ‘is’ such 
a beyond – but more so from what happens in Freud’s text when writing 
about this beyond (PC 295, 397). Like that of Rousseau and others, Freud’s 
text shows the operation of the law of différance beyond his own intentions.
67 See WA 276.
68 See also above, and WD 213.
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It is not easy to summarise what happens in this intricate text of Derrida, 
which follows closely every turn of phrase in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle as well as the (personal, familial and professional) circumstances 
surrounding the writing of this text. Freud’s motivation for enquiring into a 
possible beyond to the pleasure principle (hereafter ‘PP’)69 stems from the 
observation that some people tend to repeat unpleasant experiences. This is, for 
example, the case with the fort/da game of his grandson Ernst. Psychoanalytic 
patients likewise tend to repeat earlier traumatic experiences, including child-
hood events, in (recurrent) dreams, fantasies, and in the analytic situation 
through transference. All of these ‘actions’ appear to refl ect a mysterious 
masochistic trend in the ego, tied to a compulsion to repeat, which seems to 
contradict the thesis of the dominance of the pleasure principle. In what 
follows, each of the seven chapters of Beyond will be discussed, the fi rst three 
briefl y, and the rest in more detail, as well as the points in each chapter which 
Derrida highlights.
In so far as the fi rst chapter is concerned, Derrida highlights specifi cally 
Freud’s remarks on the tendency in the mind towards the PP. Derrida also 
points to Freud’s investigation of the relation between the PP and the reality 
principle (PR), Freud (2001: XVIII 10) commenting in this regard on the 
diffi culty of educating the sexual instincts; as well as Freud’s remarks that 
as a result of repression, what is effectively pleasure, may be experienced as 
unpleasure by the ego (2001: XVIII 11). In chapter II, Ernst’s fort/da game 
is analysed, and Derrida points specifi cally to the role of the veiled bed in 
this game (into which Ernst throws his toys), and which Freud disapproves 
of; the fact that the toys were thrown away ( fort) more often than they were 
returned by Ernst (PC 324 –5); as well as Freud’s relation with his (favourite) 
daughter Sophie (Ernst’s mother). Also highlighted is Freud’s raising of the 
question whether a ‘drive for mastery’, operating independently of and beyond 
the pleasure principle might explain this game (PC 325, 403). Chapter III of 
Beyond focuses on the compulsion to repeat, which Freud attributes to in-
fantile sexual life and the repression thereof. Derrida notes specifi cally Freud’s 
reference to this compulsion as demonic in nature and as returning without 
having been invoked by the subject or the pleasure principle (PC 341–2). 
Derrida however questions the privilege accorded here by Freud to the Oedipus 
complex (PC 340 –1).
Chapters IV and V of Beyond refl ect on the origin of consciousness, as 
well as its relation to external and internal stimuli. Freud describes specifi cally 
what happens when an onrush of  internal stimuli overfl ows the psychic 
apparatus, with the PP losing its mastery. The psychic apparatus in this event 
panics and, no longer concerned with pleasure, seeks to bind and master the 
69 The PP (in French pronounced pépé) has a double meaning here as it is also an affectionate 
term for grandfather, that is, Freud himself; PC 287 fn. 18.
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incoming quantities of excitation (PC 348; Freud 2001: XVIII 29–31). These 
remarks tie in closely with Freud’s earlier observation of the drive for mastery 
operating independently of the PP in the case of the fort/da game. The existence 
of such a drive is again noted by Freud when he refl ects on repetitive dreams 
and comments that these dreams present an exception to or perhaps rather 
‘precedes’, as Derrida notes (PC 350), the rule of dreams as the fulfi lment 
of wishes and thus have a function which go beyond the PP (Freud 2001: 
XVIII 32). At stake here, Freud contends, is an attempt at the retrospective 
mastering of a stimulus. Freud furthermore notes that the drives and their 
representatives are not bound (PC 350, Freud 2001: XVIII 34). The bind-
ing of the PP thus appears to be secondary to a preceding unbinding or 
‘absolute astricture’ (PC 350). The binding of  excitation however already 
starts before the PP comes to impose its mastery (PC 350 –1; Freud 2001: 
XVIII 35). A differential structure can thus be said to be at stake here 
which Derrida equates with the line or forward slash in the following formu-
lation: PP + PR/pp. This line, Derrida notes, functions like a belt or lace 
which can be either relaxed or more tightly fastened: the differantial stricture 
of a belt (PC 351).
In analysing these chapters, Derrida attempts to rethink the concept of 
repetition which plays such an important role in Freud’s refl ections. As tradi-
tionally understood, Derrida notes, repetition is understood as secondary, 
the repetition of something original. Repetition can however also be under-
stood as originary in itself, as Freud’s analysis and terminology of a ‘backward 
path’ indicates (Freud 2001: XVIII: 42, PC 351–2, 362). In light of these two 
forms of repetition, Derrida notes, repetition can be said to sometimes 
collaborate with the mastery of the PP and sometimes, ‘older than the PP, 
and even permitting itself  to be repeated by the PP, repetition haunts the PP, 
undermining it, threatening it, persecuting it by seeking an unbound pleasure 
which resembles ... an unpleasure chosen for its very atrocity’ (PC 352). Derrida 
however immediately qualifi es this statement. There is actually no ‘sometimes 
... sometimes’, he notes; these forms of repetition do not oppose, but instead 
repeat each other. In other words, and as appears from ‘Plato’s pharmacy’, 
which he invokes at this point, the one form of repetition implies the other; 
they cannot be thought separate from each other (Dis 166). Repetition, Derrida 
comments here, involves an ‘incalculable double bind’, and has a ‘constitutive 
duplicity’ (PC 352). Not sometimes ... sometimes therefore, but ‘both at the 
same time’. When Freud thus speaks of repetition, we have to think of it in 
both ways described here.70
70 This is taken up again later when Derrida (PC 381– 4) comments on the relation 
between observation and language, with Freud remarking that the latter makes observation 
possible in the fi rst place, and Derrida noting that speculative repetition starts the 
march.
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Later in chapter V of Beyond Freud refl ects on the origins of life in attempt-
ing to understand the nature of the drives. From the conservative nature of 
the drives (their tendency to restore an earlier state of things), he concludes 
that it must have been through external disturbing forces that inanimate 
matter was transformed into living entities (at 36, 38). The tension which in 
this way arose in the organism, which had until then been inanimate, he 
contends, must have tried to cancel itself  out (at 38). In this way, Freud notes, 
the fi rst drive or force came into existence, namely to return to the inanimate 
state.71 External forces again obliged the surviving organism to take ever more 
complex detours before reaching its ultimate aim of death. The (component) 
conservative drives in the ego, which aim at the self-preservation of  the 
organism, self-assertion and mastery, Freud contends, ultimately seek to make 
the organism ‘follow its own path to death’ or ‘die only in its own fashion’ 
(at 39).72 They seek to ‘ward off  any possible ways of returning to inorganic 
existence other than those which are immanent in the organism itself ’ (at 
39). The conservative drives, Derrida extrapolates, thus seek to ensure that 
the organism follows it own, proper path towards death, thereby preventing 
it from going directly towards death (PC 358–9). They paradoxically fi ght 
most energetically against what would make them reach their aim (that is, 
death) most rapidly (Freud 2001: XVIII 39). The conservative drives, the 
guardians of life, were thus according to Freud, originally the ‘myrmidons’ 
or ‘satellites’ of death (at 39). All living organisms can be said to seek to 
return to the inanimate state, but do so in the form of detours of longer or 
shorter duration (at 38–9).73 In his analysis, Derrida attaches great importance 
to the remarks of Freud on the proper (eigenen Todesweg des Organismus), 
seeing that they tie in closely with his own project, and more specifi cally, 
because they open the possibility of going beyond the metaphysical opposition 
of life and death. In Freud’s analysis, the function of the conservative drives 
is, as Derrida notes, to help in one’s death ‘being a return to the most proper, 
to the closest to oneself, as if  to one’s origin’ (PC 355– 6). These drives in 
other words give expression to the desire for the proper, for presence. The 
non-proper, on the other hand, must be sent away, a reappropriation of 
oneself  has to take place until death (PC 355). However, this attempt at self-
appropriation is ultimately impossible, Derrida contends (PC 356). Freud 
specifi cally raises the question whether the belief  in the familiar domesticity 
of death (death as an internal necessity of life, rather than an accident or 
71 See also Freud (2001: XII 107).
72 Derrida (PC 358–9) points to the similarity here of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s relation 
to death as a condition of authenticity, with its implications of a certain relation to the 
proper.
73 The conservative drives thus ultimately serve death, because as Freud argues, they fi nd their 
origin in the need to restore an earlier state of things, i.e. the inorganic state which the 
organism had been forced to abandon (at the origin of life).
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chance) is not perhaps an illusion to help us bear the burden of existence 
(Freud 2001: XVIII 45, PC 363). Translating this question into Heidegger’s 
terminology, thereby seeking to go beyond Heidegger’s Destruktion of  
metaphysics, Derrida raises the following rhetorical question: ‘and if  the 
authenticity proper to Dasein as Sein zum Tode, if  its Eigentlichkeit were but 
the lure of a proximity, of a self-presence (Da) of the proper, even if  in a 
form which would no longer be that of  the subject, of  consciousness, of 
the person, of man, of living substance?’ (PC 363) Derrida furthermore 
refers to this ‘lure’ as a ‘great narrative poem, the only story that one always 
tells oneself, that one addresses to oneself, the poetics of  the proper as 
reconciliation, consolation, serenity’ (PC 363). Whereas Heidegger views the 
denial of one’s own death as inauthentic, Derrida thus raises the question 
whether this (inauthentic) relation to death – that is, the inability to ‘own’ one’s 
death or the non-access to death as such – is not actually more ‘primordial’ 
than the authentic relation with death which Heidegger appears to privilege 
(Heidegger 1962: §51–53; Ap 76 –7); and moreover, whether this ‘authentic’ 
relation is not a ruse. As Freud (2001: XIV 296) points out in Thoughts 
for the Times on War and Death, which Derrida invokes at this point, our 
unconscious ‘does not believe in its own death ... it does not know its own 
death’.74 The implication of  this insight of  Freud is that what the uncon-
scious refuses to accept is precisely that which it ultimately desires (AF 10 –12). 
The impossibility of appropriating one’s own death, stems more specifi cally 
from the fact that the drive towards the proper does not have its foundation 
in itself, but always involves a return to the self  within what can be termed 
a differantial relation of  forces. This means that the movement of  self-
appropriation (that is, subjectivity) can never arrive at a full (economic) 
circle (PC 362).75 The self  can arrive, Derrida notes, ‘only by itself  differing /
deferring itself  in (its) totally-other, in a totally-other which should no longer 
be its own’ (PC 359). The ‘nature’ of this ‘totally-other’ will become clear 
when we discuss the concept of pleasure in more detail below. The way in 
which the self  arrives at itself  is evident also in Freud’s writing of Beyond, 
which compulsively repeats (like Ernst’s fort/da game) the process of sending 
away ( fort) and thus attempting to master that which comes to him and 
threatens him (as well as psychoanalysis) from beyond. Before analysing this 
further, let us enquire into the famous Freudian (metaphysical) opposition 
between Eros and Thanatos.
74 Heidegger (1962: 298) interestingly says something very similar about Dasein’s factical Being-
towards-its-end: ‘And it hides this Fact from itself  by recoining “death” as just a “case of 
death” in Others – an everyday occurrence which, if  need be, gives us the assurance still 
more plainly that “oneself” is still “living”.’
75 A belief  in the primordial nature of the Oedipus complex seems to be tied to a circular 
economy – a desire for the own (the mother); see GT 15–17; PC 413– 496 (‘Le facteur de la 
vérité’); and for discussion, de Ville (2008).
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Can what was said above about the conservative nature of the drives, be 
said of all the drives, Freud asks. He notes that the sexual drives seem to 
rather aim at ensuring the immortality of the organism as compared to the 
conservative drives which, as we saw, ultimately aim at death (at 39– 40). 
Freud (at 40 –1) here (provisionally) posits an opposition between the sexual 
instincts, which he calls the true life instincts on the one hand and the 
conservative or ego instincts on the other.76 He however later abandons this 
opposition in light of the implications of narcissism, psychoanalysis having 
shown that the self-preservative instincts too are of a libidinal nature (at 
52–3). Freud nonetheless insists on an oppositional structure, this time 
between what he terms ‘life instincts’ (later referred to as Eros at 60 –1 fn) 
and ‘death instincts’, the latter to be distinguished from the ego instincts (at 
53). As Derrida notes, it seems possible for Freud at this point to demonstrate 
scientifi cally the existence of libidinal instincts (the conservative ego drives 
themselves being libidinal in nature), but not anything beyond that. Yet Freud 
is not prepared to let go of his suspicion of the ‘existence’ of death instincts 
(at 53), ‘evidence’ of which he then proceeds to seek in sadism (as a perversion, 
injuring the sexual object). Sadism, he notes, would be diffi cult to explain 
should Eros (the instinct to preserve life) from which it then necessarily has 
to be derived, is the only drive that exists (at 54). Freud (at 54 –5) therefore 
posits a relation between the death instinct and what he refers to as ‘original 
sadism’ or ‘primary masochism’.77 He argues that by means of the muscular 
apparatus and under the infl uence of the narcissistic libido, the death instinct 
is turned away from the ego towards external objects, thereby entering the 
service of the sexual function (at 54).78 In this ‘original’ mode, it appears from 
Freud’s other writings, the infl iction of pain is not the aim of the actions. It 
simply involves the exercise of the drive for mastery referred to above (Freud 
2001: XIV 128; Laplanche and Pontalis 1973: 402; PC 404).
In chapter VII the question of pleasure is taken up again, together with 
the question of binding. Freud summarises his fi ndings by noting that the 
binding of the instinctual impulses can be said to be one of the earliest and 
most important functions of the mental apparatus. As mentioned before, at 
this stage no account is taken of the development of unpleasure. This does 
not however mean that the PP is ‘suspended’, Freud (at 62) notes, as this 
binding takes place ‘on behalf of  the pleasure principle; the binding is a 
preparatory act which introduces and assures the dominance of the pleasure 
principle’.79 Derrida (PC 396) comments that the binding at stake here appears 
76 See also PC 362–3.
77 See also Freud (2001: VII 158 fn. 2; XIX 164); PC 405; as well as Laplanche and Pontalis 
(1973: 245, 403).
78 See also Freud (2001: XIX 163– 4); Laplanche and Pontalis (1973: 218); PC 404.
79 See also Laplanche and Pontalis (1973: 51); PC 400.
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to be indifferent to pleasure–unpleasure and at the same time interested or 
inspired by the PP. The preparatory act is thus both teleological and indifferent. 
The PP itself, as we saw earlier, is furthermore in the service of a more general 
function, that is, rendering the psychic apparatus unexcitable, returning to 
the inanimate state (PC 396). The PP moreover stands in a strange relation 
to ‘pleasure itself ’, when one refrains to think of the latter in essentialist 
terms, as Freud tends to do. This is nonetheless not the case everywhere. In 
chapter I, Freud (at 10) seems to acknowledge the unmeasured or unbounded 
nature of pleasure, as well as its self-limiting nature (PC 398– 400). At stake 
here, it appears, is a kind of ‘stricture’, the nature of which appears clearly 
from Derrida’s rhetorical question: ‘Does not pleasure remain ... a master 
whose sole indefi nitely produced operation, insensitive to any lesson from 
experience, would always amount ... to producing itself  only by limiting itself  
strictly, as strictly as possible? in arriving only to erase itself ?’ (PC 398) 
The PP itself  thus amounts to a limitation of pleasure, which is ‘essentially’ 
unmeasured (PC 400). The PP would thus involve a limiting of pleasure so 
as to make it possible (PC 399). The limiting of pleasure consequently can-
not be said to take place only by virtue of the PR, as chapter I of Beyond 
appears to suggest. The PR actually has no independent role to play here. 
Reality is effectively produced by the imposition of measure by pleasure upon 
itself, Derrida contends (PC 400). The PP (here alluding specifi cally to its 
double meaning specifi ed above) is thus not the master, subject or author of 
this process, but simply an emissary (PC 400). Understanding pleasure in 
this way, in terms of a ‘drive for mastery’ or for ‘domination/power’ which 
necessarily limits (and thereby masters) itself  (PC 403), also transforms the 
notion of instincts or drives in Freud. As Derrida formulates it, ‘[t]he drive 
to dominate must also be the drive’s relation to itself: there is no drive not 
driven to bind itself  to itself  and to assure itself  of mastery over itself  as 
drive’ (PC 403).
Derrida’s ‘adoption’ of Freud’s theory of the death drive appears to happen 
in a double sense, which can be best expressed in terms of the logic or ‘stricture’ 
of différance, which will play an important role also in Derrida’s later more 
explicitly ethico-political texts. The drive for the proper, the strongest drive as 
we saw above, if  carried out to its end, leads to death. Full, absolute presence, 
we can also say, equals death (PC 285– 6; Dis 164; OG 244). The same would 
happen if  there is no limitation or binding of pleasure:
If  it limits itself  absolutely, it disappears. Inversely, if  it can be put thus, 
if it liberates something as close as possible to the pp [the primary process] 
(a theoretical fi ction), thus if  it does not limit itself, not at all [ pas du 
tout], it limits itself  absolutely: absolute discharge, disbanding, nothing-
ness or death.
Irresolution belongs to this impossible logic. It is the speculative stricture 
between the solution (non-binding, unleashing, absolute untightening: 
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absolution itself ) and the non-solution (absolute tightening, paralyzing 
banding, etc.).
(PC 401)80
Derrida can perhaps also be said to reformulate Freud’s contention as to the 
possibility of a death drive beyond the pleasure principle. Derrida refers to 
this beyond as ‘power’ (PC 405). This power is not however a unity and is 
not situated beyond what Freud refers to as the death drive, which, as Derrida 
notes, overfl ows power and, at the same time, functions as its origin and 
limit. At stake in Derrida’s reformulation is, more precisely, a différance of  
power (PC 405). This différance lasts until death, until the moment the 
doorkeeper closes the door, meant specifi cally for Kafka’s man from the 
country, but which he is never allowed to enter (chapter 3). This différance 
of  power is at stake in all of Derrida’s texts as appears from the ‘Envois’ in 
The Post Card where he relates the story of how he was asked by a student 
why he does not simply kill himself  (PC 15). His response, as he reports it, 
was elusive and in the form of a question: ‘what proves to you that I do not 
do so ... and more than once’? The suicide at stake here, as appears from his 
counter-question, involves repetition, and not the ‘once and for all’ of suicide 
as traditionally conceived (see also Dis 225).
The differantial relation between forces which exceed the opposition between 
life and death at stake in ‘To speculate – on Freud’, as noted, also come to 
the fore in Derrida’s later more openly ethico-political texts.81 This should 
not be viewed as strange, as the drive for power which is analysed here fi nds 
such clear expression in the notions of sovereignty and subjectivity, the decon-
struction of which is at stake in most, if  not all of Derrida’s texts. The law 
of différance, as Derrida specifi cally spells out in The Post Card, does not 
80 See also PC 286; WD 202; SP 150 –1. Hägglund’s reading of Beyond suffers from the 
employment of the restricted notion of (Husserlian) temporality referred to above, as well 
as a very restricted, subject-centred notion of ‘desire’ (Hägglund 2009). He is as a result not 
able to follow Freud/Derrida to the end in conceiving of an immeasurable pleasure (where 
pain and pleasure are no longer viewed in oppositional terms), which necessarily limits itself  
and thereby ‘radically’ displaces subjectivity. This is closely tied to Hägglund’s understanding /
appropriation of death in the thinking of Freud: the death drive and the pleasure principle 
according to Hägglund (simply) operate in terms of the same principle. This leads him to 
reject Freud’s theory of the death drive as ‘untenable’ (at 13) and Derrida’s adoption of the 
Freudian death drive as ‘mistaken’ (at 21). It would perhaps have been more advisable for 
him to question his own understanding of death in the thinking of Freud and Derrida. 
Hägglund’s overly simplistic construction of the logic, drive or desire of/for survival in 
Derrida’s thinking, has a snowball effect. It ultimately allows the subject, albeit mortal, 
to remain fully in place. It furthermore leads to the misjudging of the ‘ethico-political’ 
implications of deconstruction and more specifi cally of the notion of undecidability; see 
further Chapter 6.
81 Derrida comments specifi cally on the ‘political’ nature of Freud’s refl ections in WA 252, 
258.
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restrict itself  to individual human beings: ‘[e]very being-together ... begins 
by binding-itself, by a binding-itself  in a differantial relation to itself ’. This 
again has important implications for conceptuality.82
Title and series
In the above section, we saw how Derrida’s careful reading of Husserl, Heidegger, 
Levinas and Freud points the way towards exceeding metaphysics. In this 
respect, the refl ections of Husserl on language, Heidegger on Being, Levinas 
on hospitality, and Freud on the death drive, play a central role. In every 
instance, Derrida does not simply ‘appropriate’ their thinking for his ‘project’, 
but develops it in a radically new direction. The mention of hospitality 
in relation to Levinas brings us to the title of this book, which contains in 
summary form the book’s modest but nonetheless important claim. When 
we start by considering the notion of hospitality in the title, we can perhaps 
already grasp something of the possible practical implications of Derrida’s 
deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence discussed above in broad terms. 
Derrida enquires in a number of his texts into the question of hospitality, 
which brings it in close relation to his thinking on law and justice.83 In brief, 
Derrida distinguishes in these texts between what he terms absolute or 
unconditional hospitality on the one hand and restricted or conditional 
hospitality on the other. Although the notion of hospitality perhaps has 
a broader fi eld of application than law/justice, hospitality is also a more 
convenient way in which to express the relation between justice and law 
posited in ‘Force of law’. Absolute hospitality in Derrida’s texts can in other 
words be understood as another name for justice, and restricted hospitality, 
for law (OH 25–7). The metaphysical understanding of a concept such as 
hospitality is according to Derrida dominated by the idea of presence to the 
self  of consciousness. It in other words refl ects a belief  in a subject (a host), 
both in an individual and in a collective sense, which is fully present to itself. 
In metaphysics the actions of such a subject in offering hospitality are con-
sequently also understood in terms of a restricted economy or as characterised 
by a return to the self. Whereas restricted hospitality refers to the usual ways 
in which the master of a house or the laws of a country impose conditions 
on visitors, absolute hospitality entails no such restrictions. It shows no 
concern for the self  or the self  as subject, whether in an individual or in a 
collective sense. As we saw above and will see again in later chapters, there 
is a direct relation between (Derrida’s reading of ) Freud’s death drive and 
justice, absolute hospitality, the gift, friendship, forgiveness and the democracy 
82 See similarly Psy I 134 –5 where Derrida refers to pleasure with reference to Freud/Abraham 
as exceeding ‘the order of sense, of presence, and of signifi cation’.
83 See PM 66 – 9; AR 356 – 420; ‘Host’ 208–30; A; CF 3–24.
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to come in Derrida’s texts. In the same way in which the concept of the ‘sub-
ject’ is ‘constituted’ by a desire for death, all politico-legal concepts implicitly 
also give expression to this relation. Derrida can be said to ‘re-conceptualise’ 
these concepts so as to give expression to the desire for death. Hospitality 
understood in this unconditional sense thus entails a meaninglessness, which 
must now be viewed as an ‘essential’ part of the structure of this concept.
More practically, absolute hospitality according to Derrida would demand 
an unlimited opening of all borders (and of the home), whereas restricted 
hospitality refers to the legal (and personal) limitations that, for the sake of 
self-protection, are necessarily placed on absolute hospitality. At stake are 
two equally imperative ‘laws’ which form part of the ‘concept’ of hospitality 
and which are not in opposition to each other, but in a differantial relation. 
These restrictions in the case of the nation-state usually relate to the possibility 
of integration and the contribution that the person concerned can make to 
society. Law thought of as restricted hospitality in other words involves a 
calculation as well as the imposition of all kinds of restrictions on those who 
may or may not visit a specifi c country or region as well as for how long they 
are permitted to stay and what they may and may not do. Absolute hospitality 
or justice, on the other hand, requires that there be no such limitations. If  a 
judge (or a legislature) is therefore to do justice in the case of  (economic) 
refugees, it must, as Derrida spells out in ‘Force of law’, be realised that 
the limits which law imposes, ultimately have no foundation. The existing 
inhabitants of a nation-state are as we know always such as a result of invasion, 
occupation, murder and robbery, often in the long-forgotten past. Absolute 
hospitality as a consequence requires that ‘each and every one’ should be 
welcomed without exception (CF 18). In developed countries this evokes 
images of masses of poor immigrants streaming into the state, of the current 
inhabitants ultimately losing their majority status as well as their culture, their 
language, their religion, their identity, their rights, their homes and even their 
lives. Absolute hospitality and justice as described by Derrida entail a hyper-
ethics and hyper-politics which can only with disastrous consequences be 
given effect to in law or politics (or on a personal, ethical level). This realisation 
does not however in the least mitigate the demand which deconstruction seeks 
to affi rm. What is required on a politico-legal level, and which is implied in 
the concept of hospitality as deconstructed, is inevitably a negotiation with 
the non-negotiable, with unconditional justice, with absolute hospitality; a 
negotiation so as to arrive at the ‘better’ or the least bad (A 112).
Another part of the title which requires consideration here and which was 
mentioned in the fi rst section is the reference to the law. In the paragraph 
from which the opening epigraph is taken, Derrida in response to a question 
on the ‘destructuring of law’ notes in more detail the following:
We cannot be sure there is a way of destructuring Law. You see, decon-
struction cannot be transgression of the Law. Deconstruction is the Law. 
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It’s an affi rmation, and affi rmation is on the side of the Law. This is 
rather diffi cult. Usually we represent deconstruction as a negative or 
destructuring movement, which it is not. It is an affi rmative movement, 
fi rst: and then, as an affi rmation, it is not an affi rmation against the Law 
or going beyond the Law. What is diffi cult to think is that Law is an 
affi rmation, has the structure of an affi rmation. It’s not something which 
limits the desire or forbids the transgression. As soon as you affi rm a 
desire, you perform something which is the Law. The Law says ‘yes.’ 
That’s diffi cult to understand. The Law is not simply negative.84
When we read this response together with Derrida’s texts on justice and 
hospitality, it is clear that what Derrida says here about ‘the Law’ amounts 
to something very similar as justice and hospitality. It is furthermore clear 
from what Derrida says about desire and transgression that the law at stake 
here is tied closely to the Freudian ‘desire’ for death mentioned above or 
what Derrida elsewhere refers to as ‘the impossible’. In an interview with 
Borradori (PTT 134) Derrida similarly speaks in relation to the impossible, 
with clear reference to Kant, of ‘heteronomy ... a law come from the other 
... a responsibility and decision of the other – of the other in me, an other 
greater and older than I am’. When Derrida speaks about law, a double law 
is therefore often at stake, for example ‘the unconditional law of hospitality’ 
and laws which in a concrete sense regulate hospitality in a conditional sense 
(OH 79).85 In Of Hospitality Derrida speaks of this unconditional law in 
terms which clearly echo what is said in ‘Before the law’, as ‘above the laws’ 
and ‘thus illegal, transgressive, outside the law, like a lawless law, nomos 
anomos, law above the laws and law outside the law’ (OH 79; AL 204). This 
other law, the law itself, the law above other laws, a law beyond legality, also 
comes to the fore in Derrida’s essay on Mandela (‘NM’ 15, 34). Deconstruc-
tion, the law (itself ), absolute hospitality and justice can thus be said to refer 
in a way to the same ‘thing’. ‘The law’ in our title should then likewise be 
understood in a double sense, as a reference both to the law in the sense of 
a legal system (le droit), and the law itself  (la loi ).
The series within which Law as Absolute Hospitality is published is Nomikoi: 
Critical Legal Thinkers. The Greek nomikoi is derived from nomos (law) and 
refers to a lawyer, someone learned in law, an expert in law, an interpreter 
or teacher of (Mosaic) law. In light of what was said above, Derrida can be 
said to be a nomikos par excellence.86 It is however somewhat more diffi cult 
to think of Derrida as a ‘critical’ legal thinker in one of the senses of ‘critical’, 
in light of his own remarks about the relation between deconstruction and 
84 Derrida ‘WB’ 149.
85 See also PM 67.
86 See also Goodrich (2005: 813) who describes Derrida as ‘a nomikos or adviser to lawyers’.
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criticism. In ‘Letter to a Japanese friend’, Derrida for example comments 
that ‘deconstruction is neither an analysis nor a critique ... in a general sense 
or in a Kantian sense. The instance of krinein or krisis (decision, choice, 
judgment, discernment) is itself, as is all the apparatus of transcendental 
critique, one of the essential “themes” or “objects” of deconstruction’ (Psy 
II 4).87 Deconstruction thus involves a movement beyond ‘criticism’, the latter 
remaining a metaphysical activity. If one wants to nonetheless classify Derrida 
as a critical legal thinker as is done here, ‘critical’ has to be understood in 
the sense of important, discerning, crucial, vital or indispensable. To such a 
characterisation there can be little objection.
Sequence and overview of chapters
The texts of Derrida which will be analysed in detail in the chapters that 
follow all relate to the concepts of law, justice and hospitality, alluded to in 
the title. This detailed reading involves an attempt at following closely the 
outline of Derrida’s reading of each of the texts under discussion. This is 
a crucial fi rst step in seeking to establish some of the implications for law 
of Derrida’s thinking. The inclusion of an analysis of Derrida’s texts with 
law and justice as explicit themes such as ‘Before the law’, ‘Declarations of 
Independence’ and ‘Force of law’ therefore speaks for itself. This can also be 
said of Specters of Marx where Derrida expands further on his analysis of 
justice in ‘Force of law’. In so far as the inclusion of a reading of Derrida’s 
‘Cogito and the history of madness’ (Chapter 4) as well as of Given Time 
(Chapter 5) is concerned, this follows from Derrida’s defi nition of justice in 
‘Force of law’ as without reason and theoretical rationality, as ‘madness’ and 
also as a ‘gift without exchange’ (AR 254). These are of course not the only 
texts of Derrida that deal with law, justice and hospitality.88 All of Derrida’s 
texts where law makes it appearance can, for reasons of space, not be dealt 
with in the same detail here, but they will be referred to in support of the 
analysis undertaken.
The sequence of the chapters that follow is partly chronological – that is, 
based on the order in which Derrida’s texts on which the chapters are based 
have been published. Chronology is of course an arbitrary method to use in 
the case of Derrida, as we also saw in the above analysis in relation to time. 
In the end, it nevertheless seemed to make sense, mainly for pedagogical 
reasons, to start with a somewhat later text (‘Declarations of Independence’, 
dating from 1976) which draws on Derrida’s early work in relation to speech–
writing, the promise, speech acts and iterability, and to proceed more or less 
chronologically thereafter. This sequence should make it somewhat easier to 
87 See also Points 212; and ‘M&S’ 261.
88 See also Glas, AL 221–52 (‘The law of genre’), WAP 1– 66 (‘Privilege’); ‘NM’.
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understand the argument presented here and also points to the continuity 
in Derrida’s thinking. The chapters can nonetheless be read in any order. In 
Chapter 2 – ‘Declarations of independence’ – Derrida’s well-known essay 
with the same title will be analysed in detail. An enquiry will be made into 
speech-act theory, representation, the signature, and the proper name. The 
chapter seeks inter alia to give an explanation of the importance of language 
and psychoanalysis in Derrida’s thinking as well as the ‘law’ at work in his 
thinking and to explain more specifi cally how it fi nds expression in ‘Declar-
ations of Independence’. The chapter in this regard specifi cally investigates 
the importance and role of the notion of iterability, as well as death, loss of 
meaning, loss of ownership and loss of sovereignty in Derrida’s texts. The 
contention is that if  we take account of Derrida’s reading in ‘Declarations 
of Independence’, it is possible to view constitutions in a very different way, 
more specifi cally their ‘origins’, with inevitable implications for national legal 
systems as well as for international law. Chapter 3 – ‘Before the law’ – includes 
a close reading of ‘Before the law’, a text of Derrida on Kafka’s text with the 
same title as well as on Freud’s Totem and Taboo. The latter book repeatedly 
makes its appearance in Derrida’s texts, but in ‘Before the law’ we fi nd the 
most detailed reading thereof by Derrida. Freud’s Totem and Taboo enquires 
into the origins of religion, morality, social institutions and law. Freud contends 
that this origin is to be found in a crime, the killing of the primal father by a 
band of brothers, followed by the institution of totemism and the prohibition 
of incest. Freud’s psychoanalytical account of the origins of the totem and the 
prohibition of incest has been challenged from various quarters. The chapter 
seeks to answer the question whether Freud’s Totem and Taboo and its theory of 
the primal horde in relation to the origins of law should be dismissed in light 
of this criticism, or whether some insight can still be gained from it. The 
second option will be chosen, it being submitted that Derrida’s text points 
to the importance of reading Freud in a specifi c way, and more specifi cally 
to a reconsideration of the originary nature of the Oedipus complex.
In Chapter 4 – ‘Madness and the law’ – two of Derrida’s texts on Foucault 
will be scrutinised with the aim of establishing the relation between law and 
madness. As noted above, Derrida defi nes justice in ‘Force of law’ in terms 
of madness. We will see in this chapter, fi rst with reference to ‘Cogito and 
the history of madness’ that the madness referred to here is not the popular 
and everyday idea of madness, but a ‘total’ madness which exceeds metaphysics 
and which places in doubt all certainties. In Descartes’ Meditations, which 
Foucault analyses, although in Derrida’s view not rigorously enough, this 
total madness is alluded to when the evil genius enters the stage. Derrida 
argues that madness in this form does not start being interned in the ‘classical 
age’ as Foucault asserts, but that it is so interned by the rise of language and 
reason. Descartes’ Meditations furthermore show that philosophy (and con-
sequently law too) can never completely exclude madness; it asserts itself  in 
the midst of madness: I think, even if I am completely mad’, is what Descartes 
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effectively asserts. Through an analysis of ‘Doing justice to Freud’ the close 
relation between Freud’s death drive on the one hand, and madness and 
justice on the other, is moreover pointed to. In Chapter 5 – ‘The gift beyond 
exchange’ – the relation between justice and the gift in Derrida’s thinking 
will be explored. Derrida’s analysis of the gift takes place with reference to 
Mauss’s anthropological study of the gift in archaic societies, as well as 
Heidegger’s thinking on the ‘giving’ of Being and of time. The chapter will 
show that an understanding of the ontological difference or the relation 
between Being and beings in Heidegger’s thinking, as well as Freud’s specu-
lations on the death drive, are essential to comprehend the notions of the gift 
and of justice in Derrida’s thinking. These are ‘situated’ beyond Being in the 
same way in which différance in Derrida’s thinking goes beyond the onto-
logical difference. In this chapter the relation between the gift and mourning 
as well as the gift and sexual difference will furthermore be enquired into.
Chapter 6 – ‘Force of law’ – will propose a reading of Derrida’s essay with the 
same title. The analysis above of Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas and Freud, as 
well as the reading of the texts in Chapters 2 to 5, will play an important role 
in teasing out the implications of what Derrida says in this famous text. This 
chapter will engage specifi cally with earlier readings of ‘Force of law’ in the 
legal context and will attempt to chart a new direction in the understanding of 
this text. The contention is specifi cally that the notions of singularity, undecid-
ability, and the ‘mystical’ foundation of authority need to be understood in 
a different way than traditionally argued for in the dominant interpretation(s). 
Chapter 7 – ‘The haunting of justice’ – will show how in Heidegger’s Der 
Spruch des Anaximander, this fragment is related to the thinking of Being, 
the latter having been ‘forgotten’ by metaphysics. Derrida’s reading of 
Heidegger’s Der Spruch highlights specifi cally those parts of Heidegger’s text 
where that which precedes Being’s gathering – that is, Being’s disjoining or 
dissemination – is pointed to. This disjoining, Derrida contends, speaks of the 
gift of a day more ancient than memory itself  and ties in closely with certain 
aspects of the thinking of Marx. This gift of Being, which Heidegger’s text 
also speaks of, it will be argued, involves a ‘higher law’ which can serve as a 
‘measure’ for the evaluation, interpretation and transformation of positive 
law. Chapter 8 – ‘Hospitality towards the future’ – gives a summary of the 
fi ndings in earlier chapters and specifi cally enquires into the task of the (legal) 
philosophers of the future. Nietzsche calls on these new philosophers in 
Beyond Good and Evil, and Derrida echoes this call in Politics of Friendship. 
It is contended that these philosophers will rethink legal conceptuality as well 




‘Declarations of independence’ (hereafter ‘DoI’), dating from 1976, the year 
marking two hundred years of US Independence, is one of the earliest essays 
of Derrida which explicitly has law as its theme. It is a short essay, presented 
for the fi rst time at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, which draws 
on Derrida’s other texts in which he enquires in more detail into concepts 
such as speech acts, representation, the proper name and the signature. In 
‘Force of law’ (AR 235) Derrida refers to this essay among others in refuting 
the claim that his texts hitherto had shown little or no concern for the themes 
of justice, ethics and politics. Close scrutiny of ‘DoI’ confi rms that there is 
no break or turn in Derrida’s thinking from the time of the presentation of 
this essay to ‘Force of law’. With the benefi t of hindsight, all the claims 
Derrida makes about justice in ‘Force of law’ are already to be found, or at 
least anticipated, in ‘DoI’. Moreover, the undeniably ‘ethico-political’ placing 
in question of sovereignty in Derrida’s texts of the 1990s and the early 2000s 
is clearly already at stake here. In ‘DoI’, Derrida more specifi cally seeks to 
challenge the traditional view that a state is founded by the people as sovereign 
and as the originating source of political power ( pouvoir constituant), and 
thus of the notions of self-government and democratic self-determination. The 
point of this deconstruction is not however simply to reveal the consequent 
absence of origin in the founding of a state, nor to simply reject these founding 
democratic ideas, but to enquire into their ‘pre-origin’ or condition of possibility, 
thereby reinscribing these ideas within new ‘concepts’ which go beyond the 
restricted economy of metaphysics.
The diffi culty with this text of Derrida is its brevity and accompanying 
elusiveness as well as the fact that in challenging sovereignty, it relies without 
referring to them explicitly, on a range of  his other texts which challenge 
traditional philosophical ideas about language. Different from what is at 
times stated, and as is shown by a somewhat more careful analysis of his 
texts, Derrida never abandons his earlier analysis of language and literature, 
when he starts to address more openly politico-legal issues. This is to be seen, 
for example, in ‘Force of law’ and Specters of Marx where the notion of per-
formative speech acts plays a prominent role. These later texts thus rely either 
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explicitly or implicitly on Derrida’s earlier analysis of language and literature. 
To understand the nature of Derrida’s analysis in ‘DoI’, it is furthermore 
essential to keep in mind his relation to structuralism (Chapter 3). In this 
respect the texts of Lévi-Strauss are of course paradigmatic, for example his 
analyses of myth. Lévi-Strauss shows himself to be less concerned with fi nding 
the meaning of individual myths, than with exposing the structure which 
underlies all myths. Derrida’s relation to the work of Lévi-Strauss and to 
structuralism in general is complex and it would perhaps be accurate to say 
both that he places in question the central presuppositions of structuralism 
(Sedgwick 2001: 194) and that he takes structuralism to its ultimate conse-
quences (Berns 1998: 25). Derrida fi nds specifi cally problematic structuralism’s 
reliance on the fundamental principles of metaphysics such as the search for 
an origin, its reliance on metaphysical concepts, as well as its reliance on the 
typical oppositional structure of  metaphysics.1 Moreover, structuralism’s 
emphasis on ‘the accomplished, the constituted, the constructed ’, in Derrida’s 
view, disregards the importance of force in giving rise to the construct (WD 5). 
‘Force’ is here to be understood in a specifi c ‘sense’, as a force of weakness 
which gives rise to language (WD 27); it is itself  without meaning, and fi nds 
expression for example in the notions of ‘iterability’ and ‘performative power-
lessness’ which will be explored below. As we will see in this chapter, Derrida, 
as typically happens in structuralist texts, explores underlying structural con-
ditions in his analysis of concepts, but these show an acute regard for ‘force’. 
We could moreover say that Derrida’s reliance on the notion of ‘structure’ 
is no longer to be understood in its metaphysical sense, but in a quasi-
transcendental sense which exceeds metaphysics and which, as we saw in 
Chapter 1, he sometimes refers to as a ‘stricture’.2
To enable a close reading of ‘DoI’, it is also necessary to address briefl y the 
way in which Derrida deals with the conceptual oppositions of metaphysics.3 
The most well-known example of this is the speech–writing opposition which 
is analysed in Of Grammatology and ‘Plato’s pharmacy’. Often, in relying on 
or relaying this typical deconstruction of hierarchical oppositions in the legal 
context, not enough care is taken in discerning as well as in explaining the 
motivation behind the steps taken in doing so, the steps themselves as well as 
the ‘translation’ of such deconstruction into law.4 In attempts at ‘translation’, 
it has been contended, for example, that deconstruction sanctions the over-
turning of all or any hierarchical opposition(s) in a specifi c legal system.5 
This in turn easily leads to the conclusion that deconstruction is relativistic 
1 See WD 278 –93.
2 See also BS 301.
3 Jacques Derrida, Pos 41–2; Ltd 21; WD 19–20.
4 For a detailed analysis of ‘Plato’s pharmacy’, see de Ville (2010b).
5 See the discussion in Chapter 1.
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as well as that it can be instrumentalised. Things are somewhat more complex 
as will also appear from the more detailed discussion below. One of the themes 
of ‘DoI’ is, for example, the distinction between constative and performative 
speech acts. With reference to what was said above, it is important in reading 
‘DoI’ to note that in deconstructing texts or hierarchical oppositions, Derrida 
does not simply overturn or equalise, and thereby expose the ‘undecidability’ 
between (an existing hierarchy of ) concepts. What he does or what happens 
through his reading of texts is that a further inscription takes place. Derrida 
searches for and brings out the condition of possibility of concepts. This leads 
to the invention of ‘non-concepts’ such as iterability, general writing or différance 
within which the concept(s) analysed are reinscribed. Derrida’s analysis of 
constative and performative speech acts, representation, the signature, and 
the proper name, which are the most prominent themes in ‘DoI’, illustrates 
this well and will be explored within this context in what follows. Although 
all of these aspects are closely interlinked, they will be discussed separately 
for explicatory purposes.
Speech acts: founding a state
The constative and the performative
In ‘DoI’ Derrida asks the question whether the people, in declaring themselves 
free, are simply declaring or stating an existing state of affairs or whether they 
actually only become free through the performative act of the Declaration 
(Neg 49). The following passage from the Declaration is of specifi c interest here:
We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in 
General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world 
for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority 
of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That 
these united Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent 
States, that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, 
and that all political connection between them and the State of Great 
Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved.
This passage, in two instances, clearly relies on both the performative and 
the constative modes, by invoking God to secure this conjoining (Neg 51–2).6 
6 Honig (1991: 104 –11) focuses her analysis of the constative–performative speech acts 
specifi cally on this invocation of the absolute. She seeks to negotiate a compromise between 
the readings of Arendt and Derrida of the Declaration, with both said to point to the need 
to go beyond the constative invocation of the absolute through political intervention. In 
relation to Derrida, this is not an accurate claim in all respects.
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In so far as the fi rst instance is concerned, as Derrida points out, in spite of 
what the Declaration may claim, the people do not ‘exist’ as an entity before 
the signing of the Declaration. The people give birth to themselves only 
through the act of signature (Neg 49–50).7 The representatives, when they ‘sign’ 
in the name of the people, likewise only obtain this right or the legitimacy 
to sign, retroactively (Neg 50). The people, through the intervention of their 
representatives, thus give themselves a name, as well as the power, right or 
ability to sign, and they do so in the future perfect tense (Neg 50).8 The 
second instance of a performative–constative structure involves the erasure 
of another state signature, by dissolving the paternal or maternal link with 
the colonial country (Neg 50).
‘DoI’ does not fully explore and only alludes to Derrida’s other texts which 
deal with the performative–constative speech-act distinction initiated by J. L. 
Austin.9 A constative speech act consists in the saying or describing of what 
exists and can be tested for its truth or falsity against reality. An example: 
‘It is raining today.’ A performative speech act on the other hand does some-
thing in so far as it is uttered (Austin 1975: 6). Examples of performative 
speech acts are promises (‘I promise to do this or that’), apologising, the 
naming of a ship, marrying (‘I do take this woman as my lawful wedded wife’), 
the making of a bet, bequeathing something to someone, making a gift, bidding 
someone welcome, forgiving someone, making a judgement, and here, declaring 
one’s own independence (Austin 1975: 5, 9, 45 – 6). These utterances cannot 
be evaluated as to their truth or falsity. They are rather to be evaluated as 
to their success or failure, depending on whether the conditions conventionally 
required by the context are fulfi lled (Austin 1975: 14 –15). When I make a 
promise, for example, I am not commenting on an event; my speech act instead 
constitutes the event, produces the event (‘CIP’ 446). The importance of the 
discovery of performative speech acts by Austin for Derrida lies in the fact 
that a performative speech act does not have its ‘reference’ outside of itself. 
It in other words does not refer to something that exists beyond language 
and prior to language (Ltd 13). It rather produces or transforms a situation. 
Although, as Austin later acknowledges, a constative speech act can actually be 
said to do the same, Derrida notes that this is not constitutive of its internal 
structure; it is not its manifest function or aim (Ltd 13). Another important 
7 See also ‘NM’ 17–18.
8 The attempt by Evans (1990: 175) to discredit Derrida’s reading by showing that a fi xed 
ground for the Declaration (and the Resolution preceding it) can be found in the people of 
the colonies, shows little understanding of the intricacies of Derrida’s terminology (such as 
différance and undecidability) as well as of his broader ‘project’ (Chapter 1).
9 Austin (1975: 4) remarks that performative utterances commonly masquerade as statements 
of fact. He then notes that ‘[o]f  all people, jurists should be best aware of the true state of 
affairs. Perhaps some now are. Yet they will succumb to their own timorous fi ction, that a 
statement of “the law” is a statement of fact.’
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aspect of the identifi cation of the performative for Derrida lies in the move-
ment away from the truth value of  an utterance and its replacement by 
the value of force, that is, the original production of an effect rather than the 
transference of a thought-content. The performative thus departs from the 
traditional idea of communication, that is, and as we will see further below, 
the transmission of  a prior meaning, idea or thought dominated by an 
orientation towards the truth (Ltd 13 –14). In ‘DoI’, Derrida at fi rst stresses 
the performative nature of the Declaration, despite its pretension, in order 
to legitimise itself, to be a constative speech act:
Such an act does not come back to a constative or descriptive discourse. 
It performs, it accomplishes, it does what it says it does: this at least would 
be its intentional structure. Such an act does not have the same relation 
to its presumed signer – to whatever subject (individual or collective) 
engages itself  in producing it – as a text of the ‘constative’ type, if  in all 
rigor there are any ‘constative’ texts and if  one could come across them 
in ‘science,’ in ‘philosophy,’ or in ‘literature.’ The declaration that founds 
an institution, a constitution, or a state, requires that a signer engage 
him- or herself.
(Neg 47)
One may be tempted to infer from this emphasis of Derrida on the performa-
tive nature of the Declaration as well as from his later statement about the 
people not existing before the Declaration, that he simply wishes to question 
the legitimacy of this performative, to expose its vicious circularity, or that 
he wishes to emphasise the fact that a foundational origin (in this case God) 
is always needed. From the fact that Derrida describes this retroactivity, with 
reference to Francis Ponge, as ‘fabulous’, one might even be tempted to 
conclude the converse: that he praises in Arendtian fashion performatives of 
this nature (Neg 50).10 One could also focus on Derrida’s remark about the 
obscurity or ‘undecidability between, let us say, a performative structure and 
a constative structure [which] is required to produce the sought-after effect’ 
(Neg 49) and conclude that he simply points to a contradiction or instability 
in the founding of a state.11 Such readings perhaps do not go far enough. 
When account is taken of other texts of Derrida where he challenges the 
constative–performative speech-act distinction, it is clear that the point he is 
10 See Arendt (1963).
11 See Norris (1987: 195 – 8, concluding that the contradiction in the founding of a state which 
Derrida points to is ‘indispensable to civilized existence’); and Horwitz (2002: 159– 63, reading 
Derrida as saying that the undecidability between the constative and the performative makes 
the act of foundation impossible yet necessary, the point of this deconstruction being to 
render visible ‘the political event that founds social structures and relations’ (at 162) and to 
reveal ‘the unstable point of every order and institution’ (at 163)).
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making may be somewhat more complex. The Austinian structure analysed 
above implies that a performative utterance such as the Declaration of 
Independence brings about an event as a consequence of the conscious and 
intentional presence of the person(s) who participate(s) in the accomplish-
ment of the performative. Derrida seeks to problematise these notions, that 
is, the conscious and intentional presence of a subject, which Austin still 
associates with performative utterances (Ltd 14; Austin 1975: 15), as well as 
the notion of an ‘event’. Derrida’s problematisation proceeds specifi cally by 
way of an analysis of the notion of iterability – that is, the iterable structure 
of the signs, marks or traces that are employed in such utterances. As we 
will see, this has important implications for the notions mentioned above, 
and for constitutional theory in general. The notion of iterability has to be 
understood with reference to Derrida’s analysis of the metaphysics of presence 
as well as of the structure of communication, and requires a slight detour 
here.
Language and origin
As noted in Chapter 1, Western philosophy from Plato to Heidegger is in 
Derrida’s view characterised by the metaphysics of presence. Metaphysics, as 
we saw, is based on certain assumptions and prejudices tied to an ideal of 
presence. This is not so by accident or because of a mistake, but for necessary 
reasons, which are as we saw ‘quasi-psychoanalytical’12 in nature. All the 
metaphysical thinkers through the ages have sought a secure foundation for 
truth, origin or telos, which effectively coincides with itself, on which their 
philosophical systems are built, for example Plato’s ideas, Descartes’ ‘think-
ing I’, Kant’s transcendental subject, Hegel’s absolute spirit and Heidegger’s 
Being. These philosophical models regard this pure foundation as independent 
from anything exterior, for example the material element of a sign with which 
such a truth or origin is posited. For Derrida, metaphysics, which covers 
the whole of Western philosophy as well as its derivatives, is characterised 
by its insistence on the existence of the intelligible (the truth, meaning, or 
the signifi ed) without the need for exterior representation. Since Descartes 
specifi cally, it is believed possible for the subject to have a meaning or truth 
in his mind and only thereafter to express this meaning in words through 
reliance on the material elements (sounds or marks) of speech and writing. 
The advance made by Saussure was to posit a sign (signe) consisting of an 
auditory or acoustic image (signifi er, signifi ant) and a corresponding concept, 
ideal object or meaning (signifi ed, signifi é). Saussure, through the notion of 
12 Referred to as such because although it ties in with certain elements of Freud’s thinking, it 
goes beyond certain founding truths on which psychoanalysis is built, such as the Oedipus 
complex.
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the sign, thus posits against the metaphysical tradition a signifi ed which 
is inseparable from a signifi er, a two-sided unity in other words. Another 
important step that Saussure takes, in tension with his construction of the 
phonic character of the linguistic sign, is to state that ‘[l]inguistic signals are not 
in essence phonetic. They are not physical in any way. They are constituted 
solely by differences which distinguish one sound pattern from another’ (de 
Saussure 2008: 164). Saussure furthermore proceeds by stating that the value 
of a sign within language is not an inherent characteristic of such sign, but 
a consequence of the differences between signifi ers and between signifi eds. It 
is in other words not substance that makes the functioning of signs possible 
(as one might think based on Saussure’s construction of the sign), but dif-
ference. That this is indeed the case, Saussure, in spite of his preference for 
speech as the model of language, illustrates with reference to writing which 
shows (better than speech) the process of differentiation at work. Saussure 
explains the importance of difference in this respect as follows:
In the language itself, there are only differences. Even more important 
than that is the fact that although in general a difference presupposes 
positive terms between which the difference holds, in language there are 
only differences, and no positive terms. Whether we take the signifi cation 
or the signal, the language includes neither ideas nor sounds existing 
prior to the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonetic differences 
arising out of that system. In a sign, what matters more than any idea 
or sound associated with it is what other sounds surround it.
(de Saussure 2008: 166)
There is thus no origin, no purity of self-presence or self-possession in 
an individual or collective sense which only afterwards gets spoilt by the 
introduction of a system of differences. The originary violence of language 
as a system of differences already leads to the loss of that which never was 
(OG 112). The so-called origin is interrupted already from the start. This 
partly explains the privilege traditionally accorded to speech (because of 
the evanescence of sound, the phoneme, and its seeming proximity to the 
idea itself ), and the consequent condemnation of writing. There is however 
more to this typical hierarchical opposition, as we will see below, returning 
us to Freud.
Communication and iterability
As Derrida points out in ‘Signature, event, context’ (dating from 1971), the 
traditional approach to communication (which is also relied on in speech-act 
theory by Austin) is based on a specifi c idea of how meaning is constituted. 
In accordance with this model, the signifi ers used in writing or speech do not 
in principle have any effect on the meaning, ideas or thoughts it is supposed 
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to transmit (Ltd 4). These signifi ers simply serve as a vehicle, transport or site 
of passage for meaning, ideas or thoughts. They follow upon a pure presence. 
Derrida’s reference in ‘DoI’ to Jefferson as merely the ‘secretary’ and ‘drafts-
man’, as responsible for writing (not in the creative or initiating sense of the 
term), who cannot sign, as having been delegated ‘the task of drawing up 
what they [the delegates] knew they wanted to say’ (Neg 48, 52) seems to 
allude to this traditional understanding of writing.13 Jefferson plays the same 
subordinate role as Theuth (Thoth), the god of writing, in Plato’s Phaedrus, 
analysed by Derrida in ‘Plato’s pharmacy’.14 In this view, ‘[w]riting thus only 
intervenes at a time when a subject of  knowledge already possesses the 
signifi eds, which are then only given to writing on consignment’ (Dis 136).15 
The problem with this model, as Derrida points out, and tying in with our 
discussion in the previous section, is that it fails to recognise the constitutive 
role of language, and more specifi cally that language should be understood 
in terms of writing, and not speech.16 The proponents of the traditional 
model, because of their privileging of speech, as a consequence fail to enquire 
into the structure of writing. It is important to note that Derrida’s focus here 
on writing is not due simply to an overturning of the traditional speech–
writing hierarchy. As we will see, this privilege accorded to writing is merely 
a transitional step and is at this point motivated by the fact that writing (as 
Saussure also realised) displays somewhat better than speech the way in which 
signifi ers operate in the constitution of meaning. Derrida’s contention is that 
the proponents of the traditional model of communication specifi cally do 
not examine in writing the structural absence of the sender from the marks 
he or she abandons and which continue to produce effects beyond his or her 
presence. This clearly happens in writing, but it is not restricted to writing 
(Ltd 5). This ‘absence’ is traditionally understood as a continuous modifi cation 
and progressive extenuation of presence (Ltd 5 – 6).
Classical speech-act theory is thus in Derrida’s view based on a theory of 
communication which fails to recognise the constitutive role of writing and 
as a result does not investigate or take account of the conditions of possibility 
of writing itself. Following in the footsteps of the metaphysics of presence, 
13 See also McDonald (1999).
14 See Dis 91–7; for analysis, see de Ville (2010b). The role is nevertheless an ambivalent one, 
as will be indicated below.
15 We see this idea being expressed when a written constitution is described as serving the 
function of a storehouse or memory (Speicher) of the consciousness, desires or meaning 
(Sinn) of a political community (Haltern 2003: 532), or as medium of the cultural self-
positing of a people, a mirror to their cultural inheritance (Häberle 2006: 204).
16 Language, from Latin lingua (tongue) is of course a problematic concept in itself  (implying 
that speech constitutes the essence of language), and Derrida, as we know, prefers the term 
‘writing’ in thinking about language, see e.g. Hobson (2010: 266): for Derrida, ‘language is 
a kind of writing, a kind of text’. See also Vasterling (1987: 214).
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it furthermore privileges speaking or the voice. The latter happens because 
of the fact that what is said, seemingly does not cease to belong to the speaker, 
and because the sensible ‘body’ of the signifi er seems to disappear in the act 
of speaking (SP 76 – 8). According to Derrida, this privilege accorded to 
speech and the condemnation of writing is directly related to the attempt 
made by metaphysics to domesticate, dissimulate and annul death (SP 53 –5; 
Dis 123 –30).17 There are in other words, as pointed out above and as will be 
enquired into in more detail below, quasi-psychoanalytical reasons for the 
prejudice. The seemingly self-present living act of speech appears not to ‘risk 
death in the body of a signifi er that is given over to the world and the visibil-
ity of space’ (SP 77– 8). Derrida then enquires specifi cally into the implications 
of the notion of ‘absence’, which bears a specifi c meaning here and which is 
such a clear characteristic of writing, but which does not remain restricted 
to writing in this sense. It can likewise be said of language in general, of 
speech, and even of experience in general (Ltd 10). In order for it to function 
as writing, thus its condition of possibility, one’s written ‘communication’ 
must remain legible, repeatable, or iterable in the absolute absence and thus 
in the event of the death of every determined addressee in general (Ltd 7). 
This structure also applies in so far as the sender or producer of written 
words is concerned. The disappearance, absence or death of the sender does 
not prevent in principle the signs or marks from continuing to function, to 
be legible and to produce effects. The marks ‘signed’ by an author continue 
to function in his or her radical absence, thus also in the event of his or her 
death. These marks can furthermore be read without knowing what the 
author consciously intended to say (Ltd 9). In addition, it is possible for a 
mark to break with the context of its present inscription (including all the 
‘presences’ which organise such inscription, i.e. sender, intention, addressee, 
referent, meaning) and be inscribed in a different context (Ltd 9, 12). This 
force of rupture, which structures the mark, is according to Derrida caused 
by spacing, the separation of the mark from all other elements in the context 
within which it is inscribed, including possible referents (Ltd 9–10). For 
Derrida this structure with its specifi c inclusion of (non-identical) repetition 
and alterity (iter), which he refers to as ‘iterability’, is not simply a charac-
teristic of writing, but its condition of possibility, its ‘law’ (Ltd 15, 17). He 
explains this as follows:
[I]f  one admits that writing (and the mark in general) must be able to 
function in the absence of the sender, the receiver, the context of production, 
17 As Zima (1994: 37– 8) correctly points out, this condemnation of  writing typically does 
not take place with reference to technical reasons, but for moral, psychic and social 
reasons: writing places in doubt the stability of  meaning as well as the direct presence 
of  truth.
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etc., that implies that this power, this being able, this possibility is always 
inscribed, hence necessarily inscribed as possibility in the functioning or 
the functional structure of the mark.
(Ltd 48)
The possibility of the death of the addressee as well as of the sender is thus 
inscribed within the structure of the mark (Ltd 8; SP 93 –7). This ‘absence’ as 
a condition of possibility of writing is furthermore not simply a modifi cation 
of presence as is normally assumed – it constitutes a break with presence. 
Writing, one could also say, leaves behind a mark which remains and which is 
iterable in the absence of and beyond the presence of the subject who appears 
to have produced or emitted it (Ltd 9). The mark survives them a priori, lives 
on after them (‘LO’ 64).
Derrida uses a similar kind of  analysis in his deconstruction of  the 
performative–constative speech-act distinction. He points out, for example, 
(Ltd 15) that Austin, in spite of recognising that ‘infelicity is an ill to which 
all acts are heir which have the general character of ritual or ceremonial, 
all conventional acts’ (Austin 1975: 18 –19), ultimately regards the possibility 
of failure as a mere accident which does not tell us anything of the structure 
of the utterances that are analysed (Austin 1975: 21–2). Derrida points out 
that this approach is typical of the idealisation involved in the metaphysics 
of presence:
It consists in recognizing that the possibility of the negative (in this case, of 
infelicities) is in fact a structural possibility, that a failure is an essential 
risk of the operations under consideration; then, in a move which is almost 
immediately simultaneous, in the name of a kind of ideal regulation, it 
excludes that risk as accidental, exterior, one which teaches us nothing 
about the linguistic phenomenon being considered.
(Ltd 15)
Austin specifi cally excludes from consideration – because of their (inherent) 
failure or infelicity as performative speech acts – performative utterances by 
an actor on a stage, introduced in a poem or spoken in soliloquy – that is, 
the non-serious (citational) use of language (Ltd 16). He takes account only 
of ‘ordinary circumstances’ (Austin 1975: 22). Derrida however views the 
risk to which all performative speech acts are exposed and which Austin 
explicitly excludes from consideration (mere mechanical repetition or parody) 
as an essential predicate or law, as constituting their structure (Ltd 15 –19). 
As he asks rhetorically in this respect:
Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a 
‘coded’ or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in 
order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifi able 
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as conforming with an iterable model, if  it were not then identifi able in 
some way as a ‘citation’?
(Ltd 18)
It should be clear that what is at stake here is not simply a feature or charac-
teristic of writing, but a condition of possibility in the quasi-structuralist 
sense referred to earlier. Derrida’s argument in relation to death as a condition 
of possibility of communication is also underpinned by the Freudian analysis 
discussed in Chapter 1, which considerably strengthens the argument. To 
grasp what is at stake in the notion of iterability, it is essential to understand 
the role of  Freud’s thinking in this respect. This quasi-Freudian analysis 
further undermines the reliance in classical speech-act theory on the conscious 
ego in identifying a performative utterance, namely the belief that speech acts 
have a fully conscious structure. This approach is, as we have seen, typical of 
philosophy since Descartes, philosophy having been constructed on the basis 
of the full presence of the subject of consciousness to itself. Derrida shows 
that this is an illusion. This belief  ignores what happens unconsciously in 
speech acts or what Derrida refers to as the ‘structural unconscious’ of speech 
acts (Ltd 73 –7).18 A certain kind of dislocation from self-present experience 
always takes place. Self-consciousness is itself  structured by iterability. Self-
consciousness can in other words only occur, self-consciousness can only 
arrive at itself, because of what Derrida refers to elsewhere as arche-writing, 
that is (the desire for) death (OG 60, 68 –9). The notion of iterability, under-
stood thus, therefore complicates signifi cantly the traditional notion of com-
munication, as well as the understanding of the Declaration of Independence 
as a performative speech act. Iterability problematises specifi cally Austin’s 
assumption that conscious intention fully determines the force of a performative 
utterance (Ltd 14). Its force, it now appears, is determined by what Derrida 
refers to as the ‘essential absence of intending the actuality of utterance ... 
[a] structural unconsciousness ... [which] prohibits any saturation of the 
context’ (Ltd 18). Iterability furthermore shows that what is understood, in 
the traditional view, to communicate meaning (i.e. language on the model of 
writing), actually expropriates, dispossesses or dislocates the control supposedly 
retained by the subject.19
18 As Derrida has pointed out elsewhere, the Freudian distinction between consciousness and 
the unconscious is itself  a metaphysical distinction. In BS 183 he therefore speaks rather of 
‘differences of force’ in all living beings.
19 Iterability, similar to arche-writing, can be said to imply ‘the loss of the proper, of absolute 
proximity, of self-presence, in truth the loss of what has never taken place, of a self-presence 
which has never been given but only dreamed of and always already split, repeated, incap-
able of appearing to itself  except in its own disappearance’ (OG 112).
54 Jacques Derrida: law as absolute hospitality
Performative powerlessness
At stake in Derrida’s analysis in ‘DoI’ is therefore not simply the undecidability 
between the constative and the performative speech acts of the Declaration.20 
Of greater importance is the structure of the performative speech act of the 
Declaration as always already split. This structure is explored further by 
Derrida in some of his other texts, confi rming what was stated in the intro-
duction of this chapter regarding the overturning of metaphysical oppositions 
as well as the Freudian aspect of the notion of iterability referred to in the 
preceding paragraph. In Rogues Derrida for example elaborates further on 
the ‘notion’ of  undecidability of  the constative and performative touched 
on in ‘DoI’, showing clearly that something more is at stake here than an 
undecidability in the ordinary sense:
Now, just like the constative, it seems to me, the performative cannot 
avoid neutralizing, indeed annulling, the eventfulness of the event it is 
supposed to produce. A performative produces an event only by securing 
for itself, in the fi rst person singular or plural, in the present, and with 
the guarantee offered by conventions or legitimated fi ctions, the power 
that ipseity gives itself  to produce the event of which it speaks – the 
event that it neutralizes forthwith in so far as it appropriates for itself  a 
calculable mastery over it.
(R 152)21
Performativity in its classical sense has a necessary relation with legitimised 
power (‘PP’ 466 –7). In ‘Force of law’ Derrida therefore speaks of the ‘time’ 
of justice in terms of an ‘overfl owing of the performative’ (AR 256). As 
compared to the intentional consciousness of performative speech acts, justice, 
he contends, entails an irreducible ‘thoughtlessness and unconsciousness’ as 
well as a to-come which must be rigorously distinguished from the future 
(AR 255, 256). A few pages later, Derrida mentions in similar fashion a ‘pure 
performative’ and an ‘absolute performative’, when he compares the revolu-
tionary founding of law with Kafka’s Before the Law (AR 270). In Specters 
of Marx Derrida refers to an ‘originary performativity’ which does not, as 
performative speech acts do, conform to existing conventions, but ‘whose 
force of rupture produces the institution or the constitution’ (SM 36). Alluding 
20 Austin had already noted that all constative speech acts implicitly share the same structure 
as performative speech acts (‘(I tell you that) this is what I saw’) (Ltd 19; AR 256). In his 
later texts, e.g. PTT, Derrida relies on this structure to comment on the Gulf War and events 
of September 11, 2001, as instances where (as is generally the case) the media does not, as 
they pretend to do, simply report on events (thus a constative speech act), but also makes 
the event (thus a performative); see also ‘CIP’ 446 – 8.
21 See Chapter 6 on the notion of undecidability in Derrida’s texts.
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to his own ‘Before the law’, he refers to this originary performativity as 
‘[v]iolence of  the law before the law and before meaning, violence that inter-
rupts time, disarticulates it, dislodges it’ (SM 37). In The Post Card, in analys-
ing Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Derrida reads Freud’s speculations 
in this respect as themselves overfl owing the pleasure principle, even though 
Freud will remain non-committal about such a beyond (PC 301–2). Freud is 
thus effectively engaging in a ‘perverformative’ which goes beyond his con-
scious intentions (PC 136).
A performative speech act such as the Declaration of Independence thus 
cannot constitute an event in the ‘pure’ sense22 in so far as it is subject to the 
‘order of the masterable possible’ (WA 233 – 4). For an event which is worthy 
of the name, without sovereignty and without power, both the constative and 
the performative must capitulate to a performative powerlessness (‘CIP’ 
467– 8). The force of an event, as Derrida notes, is ‘irreducible to the force 
or the power of a performative, even if  it gives to the performative itself, to 
what is called the force of  the performative, its chance and its effectiveness’ 
(WA 235). The event, as Derrida further points out in Without Alibi, belongs 
to the perhaps, in keeping with the impossible (at 235). The ‘impossibles’ 
which Derrida explores in his later texts, such as the gift, justice, hospitality 
and forgiveness, which go beyond sovereign mastery and the circularity of 
economic exchange, can thus be said to all be ‘examples’ of events in this 
pure sense (‘CIP’ 448 –52). With Derrida’s invocation of the impossible, the 
notion of iterability which is explored especially in his earlier texts is not 
abandoned. The impossible, which is of course another name for iter, the 
other (not to be confused here with another person), can be said to form 
part of the structure of iterability. As was the case in the exploration of the 
structure of writing, the impossible (giving expression to the relation to death) 
exceeds the ability, power, control and mastery of the subject (‘CIP’ 454). 
Having shown the way in which meaning and the truth require language to 
function (Chapter 1) and having shown the structure of writing (as the model 
of language), the further implications of the operation of iterability are now 
explored. Iterability is viewed, so to speak, from the ‘other side’. Derrida’s 
deconstruction of the Freudian death drive here again comes to the fore. 
Iterability is, as we saw, always already in place as the condition of possibility 
of speech acts. This means that the repetition at stake here does not take 
place in a linear movement, that is, as a movement towards the future, a 
future that will become present. Iterability, as Derrida notes, means that ‘the 
arrival of the arrivant – or the coming of the inaugural event – can only be 
greeted as a return, a coming back, a spectral revenance’ (‘CIP’ 452). It is 
22 Derrida analyses the concept of an event in a number of texts; see e.g. ‘CIP’; AR 257; PTT 
90 where the event is related to the Ereignis in Heidegger as well as the Freudian death drive, 
referred to as an auto-immunitary process; see further Chapter 1.
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this return, which is not at the disposal of any subject, that makes sovereignty 
strictly speaking impossible (BS 130 –1).
The promise
The structure explored above, can also be found in the notion of the promise. 
In ‘DoI’ Derrida starts off  as follows: ‘It is better that you know right away: 
I am not going to keep my promise.’ This statement clearly alludes to Austin’s 
discussion of promises as a typical example of performative speech acts 
(Austin 1975: 11). In Memoires for Paul de Man Derrida notes that ‘we always 
promise too much’ with which he means to say that a ‘promise is always 
excessive’ (MfPdM 93 – 4). As a performative, a promise cannot simply relate 
to (what will happen in) the future, as then it would effectively fall within 
the category of a constative speech act. For Derrida this excess moreover 
does not relate to a promised content which I would not be able to keep, but 
to a disturbance or perversion which also dislodges it from its apparent 
performative structure. This again has to do with the structure of language 
(on the model of writing) which Derrida here ties to de Man’s perversion 
of the Heideggerian expression die Sprache spricht (language speaks) into die 
Sprache verspricht (sich) (language promises or language involves a slip of 
the tongue) (MfPdM 94 –5). This promise or perversity, which Derrida, tying 
in with the above discussion, also refers to as ‘a kind of fatal drift’ (MfPdM 98), 
forms part of the structure of language and ‘precedes’ the speech act which 
is at stake:
It is a faktum, a fact of language which has established the impossibility 
of the promise and over which we have no control. This ‘fact’ is not 
natural, it is an artefact, but an artefact which for us ... is already there, 
as a past which has never been present. We might say that it is historicity 
itself  – a historicity which cannot be historical, an ‘ancientness’ without 
history, without anteriority, but which produces history. Before the act 
[of language], there is no speech; nor before speech is there an act. There 
is this fact to which we are recalled by a strange recollection which does 
not recall any memory.
(MfPdM 95)
The intersection between Heidegger and the Freudian death drive, which 
Derrida also explores elsewhere (PC ), is clearly at stake in this passage. 
Heidegger’s saying (die Sprache spricht), as Derrida points out, already gives 
expression to the important idea that language is not a governable instrument 
and thus subject to the control of a subject (MfPdM 96). De Man, in Derrida’s 
reading, takes this even further with the notion of an Ur-sprechen (an arche-
language) (MfPdM 98). The promise which Derrida speaks of here with 
reference to de Man is clearly more than a performative speech act. Every 
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speech act, every sentence invokes and is inscribed within the space of what 
can be referred to as an ‘arche-promise’ (MfPdM 119).23 Tying in with the 
previous section, one can speak of this arche-promise as a promise which 
entails both a threat and a chance, and thus also as justice, a gift without 
exchange, absolute hospitality as well as the democracy to come (SM 201, 
210 –12; R 91). In Monolingualism of the Other Derrida explains as follows 
the structure of  the arche- or messianic promise without proper content 
contained in language:
An immanent structure of promise or desire, an expectation without a 
horizon of expectation, informs all speech. As soon as I speak, before 
even formulating a promise, an expectation, or a desire as such, and when 
I still do not know what will happen to me or what awaits me at the end 
of a sentence, neither who nor what awaits whom or what, I am within 
this promise or this threat – which, from then on, gathers the language 
together, the promised or threatened language, promising all the way to 
the point of threatening and vice versa, thus gathered together in its very 
dissemination.
(MO 21–2)24
This ‘originary’ promise is given, although at the same time erased, in every 
Declaration of Independence or founding Constitution as its condition of 
possibility, similar to what happens to the arche-trace (MP 24). This arche-
promise, which is necessarily linked to a loss of  property and absolute 
hospitality, tends therefore to end up in a betrayal, in a return primarily, if  
not exclusively, to the interests of the (collective) self, the people as ‘origin’, 
as sovereign. The event (in the absolute sense) is thereby neutralised, but this 
cannot completely exclude the haunting of the founding document by the 
impossible.
Representation
In ‘DoI’, Jefferson is referred to as representing, in drafting the Declaration, the 
representatives of the people who do not as yet exist at the time of drafting. 
The representatives, as Derrida points out, had the right to revise, correct 
and ratify the draft prepared by Jefferson. The right to sign the Declaration 
belongs to the ‘good people’ who, Derrida notes, ‘declare themselves free and 
independent by the relay of their representatives and of their representatives 
23 See also Psy II 153.
24 See also MO 67– 8. As Derrida notes here (MO 68), the promise is threatening contrary to 
what is generally thought about the promise: it promises the impossible. No distinction can 
thus be drawn between promise and terror (MO 73).
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of representatives’ (Neg 49). As we saw above, it is only through the signing of 
the Declaration that the people come into existence and that the representatives 
obtain their legitimacy (Neg 50). If  the people do not as yet exist at the time 
of the drafting of the Declaration, we may ask who the representatives actually 
represent at this stage. It is not easy from these passages to understand Derrida’s 
stance towards representation. Does he attempt to problematise and thereby 
call on us to abolish representation, for example political or parliamentary 
representation? Some passages in ‘Force of law’ where Derrida discusses 
Walter Benjamin’s opposition to representation or where Derrida seems 
to oppose respect for singularity to the generality of law, may create this 
impression.25 Derrida’s famous statement that ‘[t]here is nothing outside 
of the text’ (OG 158), has similarly been interpreted as if  ‘a signifi er only 
imperfectly represents the thing it signifi es’ with all attempts to grasp it through 
language being incomplete and a mere supplement (Balkin 1986 –7: 760). On 
these readings, Derrida would draw a distinction between language on the one 
hand and reality on the other.26 From what was said in the previous section, 
from Derrida’s broader project which problematises the metaphysics of presence, 
as well as from Derrida’s texts that deal with the question of representation, it 
appears that things are more complex. In a number of texts, Derrida distances 
himself  from the anti-representative prejudice (AR 298; Psy I 108). This 
prejudice, he notes, is closely aligned to the prejudice against writing.27 The 
problem for Derrida lies therefore not in the inability of representation to 
convey reality. He instead seeks to analyse the traditional prejudice against 
representation, to analyse the concept of representation, and more specifi cally 
to refl ect on its relation to the unrepresentable (Psy I 115).28
Let us fi rst turn to the notion of  a text, noting that in ‘DoI’ Derrida 
mentions that Jefferson (the representative of the representatives) ‘suffered 
because he clung to his text’ (Neg 52). It is important to note again here that 
the notion of text for Derrida already includes a description and a grasping 
of ‘things’ or ‘reality’.29 There is a clear relation between Derrida’s notion of 
the text and the notion of performative speech acts which was discussed 
earlier. Account must specifi cally be taken in this regard of the notion of the 
‘general text’ which Derrida speaks of elsewhere (Pos 44, 59– 60). The notion 
of the ‘general text’ is relied on by Derrida to refer to the ‘origin’ of textuality 
25 See Chapter 6.
26 See similarly, van der Walt (2005a: 7); Thurschwell (1994: 1638, 1639); and see Chapter 1.
27 For Rousseau (and in all metaphysics) writing is a mere supplement to speech, a mediated 
representation of thinking. He associates writing and representation with death, evil, alienation, 
immorality, vice, chance, risk, loss of meaning, loss of self-sameness, loss of autonomy and 
loss of freedom; OG 296 –307.
28 For an excellent analysis of Derrida’s thinking on the relation between representation and 
death in the context of photography, see Saghafi  (2010: 83 –98).
29 See the discussion in Chapter 1.
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as is the case with arche-writing or the differential trace at the ‘origin’ of 
speech and writing.30 In slightly different terms, one can say with reference 
to Derrida’s analysis in ‘Plato’s pharmacy’ that the text is ‘invaded’ by and 
structured by (the ‘desire’ for) death which motivates every deconstruction.31 
This relation between the trace, the text and sovereignty is confi rmed by 
Derrida when in The Beast and the Sovereign, he notes in discussing Lacan’s 
views on animals, that he (Derrida) chose the concept of trace in his early 
work over the signifi er because ‘the structure of the trace presupposes that 
to trace comes down to effacing a trace as much as imprinting it’ (at 130 –1). 
From a psychoanalytic point of view, man as well as animals can consciously 
erase their traces, although this is not necessarily effective as these traces 
(whether individual, social, historical, political or technical) can always return. 
The trace, understood here in a pre- or non-linguistic sense (BS 141), therefore 
effaces itself, which means that God, man and beast cannot be its sovereign 
subject and do not have at their disposal the power to efface it.
This brings us back to the question of representation. Freud, as Derrida 
points out, uses the terminology of representation and delegation specifi cally 
when he speaks of the relation between the conservative drives and the death 
drive (Psy I 123; PC 259– 409).32 We saw in Chapter 1 that in order for life 
to be possible at all, this drive or instinct has to already restrain, limit or bind 
itself, independently of, but also in collaboration with the pleasure principle 
(Freud 2001: XVIII: 35; PC 350 –1, 396). The conservative drives which appear 
to serve the pleasure principle or to be the guardians of life are also or in 
the fi rst place the satellites or couriers (Trabanten) of death. They seek to 
keep the organism away from a death that would not be its own (Freud 2001: 
XVIII 39; PC 82, 356, 360). The representation at stake here can be said to 
show the structure of representation in general, as seeking to represent the 
‘unrepresentable’ or ‘unpresentable’. It is not only that the unrepresentable 
cannot be represented, but rather and also that it must not be represented, 
Derrida points out (Psy I 126).
When we think about language as a system of representation in the above 
terms (as compared to language as a representation of reality), we can say 
that it is made possible by the ‘relation’ to death or the desire for death. 
Language, in spite of its repeated attempts to give expression to or to ‘represent’ 
the proper, thus belongs to or actually ‘represents’ the other, that is, death 
(MO 25). It is furthermore exactly because language does not belong to us 
30 See Gasché (1986: 278 –93).
31 We will return to the notion of the text in the section on the signature below.
32 Derrida seems to allude to this relation when he comments on Jefferson’s draft of the 
Declaration: ‘You know what scrutiny and examination this letter, this literal Declaration 
in its fi rst state, underwent, how long it remained and deferred, undelivered, in sufferance 
between all those representative instances, and with what suspense or suffering Jefferson 
paid for it’ (Neg 48).
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that it gives rise to what Derrida refers to as ‘appropriative madness ... jealousy 
without appropriation’ (MO 24). Language, he notes, ‘is nothing but jealousy 
unleashed’ (MO 24). This then perhaps explains Jefferson’s suffering:
It would appear that he suffered because he clung to his text. It was very 
hard for him to see it, to see himself corrected, emended, ‘improved,’ 
shortened, especially by his colleagues. A feeling of wounding and muti-
lation should be inconceivable for someone who knows not to write in 
his own name, his proper name, but simply by representation and in place 
of another. If  the wound is not erased in the delegation, it is because 
things are not so simple, neither the structure of the representation nor 
the procuration of the signature.
(Neg 52)
Jefferson’s attempted appropriation of the text cannot succeed. This is because 
of the structure of the text, its opening, like a door, its inscription within the 
general text, which we could also refer to as a ‘wound’.33 Jefferson, who 
wanted to have the last word on how the text should read, can be said, with 
reference to Derrida’s reading of Celan’s poetry and Freud’s refl ections on 
the death drive, to suffer from the same wound, a wound which does not 
heal, yet which he (Jefferson) seeks to close, to master (SQ 152–3, 166 – 8).34 
Things are thus not always as simple as they appear, which may provoke us 
to risk saying that although Jefferson and the other representatives appear 
to be the representatives of the people, they at the same time ‘represent’ the 
‘desire’ of the people (as well as their own) for death, or what Derrida will 
later refer to as absolute hospitality and unconditional justice, which cannot 
or rather ‘may not’ be brought to presence.
The signature
‘[W ]ho signs, and with what so-called proper name, the declarative act that founds 
an institution?’ Derrida asks (Neg 47). He declares this to be the main focus 
of his essay. At fi rst sight, three possibilities seem to arise here as answer to 
the question: the people, their representatives, or perhaps Jefferson. Derrida 
fi rst deals with a number of complexities in relation to a signature that founds 
an institution, which he compares with what happens in the case of a scientifi c 
33 See also ‘CC’ 44, where Derrida, speaking about his Circumfession, notes that what is at 
stake in the circum is a wound or scar that remains open, not a full circle. This is to be 
compared with what Derrida says elsewhere on the unscathed and the immune, in relation 
to auto-immunity; see Rel 1–78. See also ‘AO’ 22–3 where the wound is discussed in relation 
to originary guilt, which Derrida associates with the universal structure of being Jewish. On 
this notion of guilt, see further Chapter 3.
34 See also PC 348; and SM 24.
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text, which could be categorised as a constative speech act. In the latter 
instance, in order to attain objectivity, it is required that the text not be linked 
too closely to the author, and be able to more easily cut itself  off  from the 
name of the author. It is however different in the case of a declaratory act 
that founds a state or other institution. Here the signature as an act of language 
or writing necessarily maintains a link with the instituting act (Neg 47), even 
though the institution must also be able to function independently of its 
founders. This link is in other words a condition of possibility for the coming 
into being of an institution, or as Derrida puts it: ‘the founding act of an 
institution – the act as archive as well as the act as performance – must 
maintain within itself the signature’ (Neg 48). This is linked to its structure 
as a performative speech act and the traditional view on the role of the 
signature in speech-act theory:
By defi nition, a written signature implies the actual or empirical non-
presence of the signer. But, it will be claimed, the signature also marks 
and retains his having-been present in a past now or present [maintenant] 
which will remain a future now or present [maintenant], thus in a general 
maintenant, in the transcendental form of presentness [maintenance]. That 
general maintenance is in some way inscribed, pinpointed in the always 
evident and singular present punctuality of the form of the signature. 
Such is the enigmatic originality of every paraph. In order for the tethering 
to the source to occur, what must be retained is the absolute singularity 
of a signature-event and a signature-form: the pure reproducibility of a 
pure event.
(Ltd 20)
The discussion above in relation to intention and consciousness has already 
raised the question as to whether a signature can actually be understood 
in the above way. Derrida raises the stakes when, soon after considering the 
relation between a signature and the founding act, he asks ‘whose signature 
exactly’ is at stake here: ‘Who is the actual signer of such acts? And what 
does actual [effectif ] mean?’ (Neg 48) Although Jefferson was by right the 
draftsman or ‘writer’ of the Declaration, Derrida reminds us that he was 
not by right the signatory. The representatives were also ‘in principle’ not 
the signers of the Declaration. Although they did sign in fact or adopt the 
Declaration in their own name, they also signed for others. As the Declaration 
indicates, the representatives signed in the name of the ‘good people’ (Neg 49), 
this attribute indicating their fi ne intentions. It is therefore by right the ‘good 
people’ who sign and declare themselves to be free and independent ‘by the 
relay of their representatives and of their representatives of representatives’ 
(Neg 49). Derrida here touches on the question of the necessarily aporetic 
constative–performative structure at stake here (as referred to above), as well as 
the overdetermined temporality of this event. This is no accident, as Derrida 
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notes, but can be said of every signature. The interesting thing about the ‘good 
people’ as signatory is, as noted earlier, that they do not as yet exist as an entity 
before the Declaration. ‘[O]nly in the act of the signature’, Derrida (Neg 49) 
comments, is birth given to the people as possible signer. ‘The signature invents 
the signer’, he says (Neg 49). This furthermore happens by way of a ‘fabulous 
retroactivity’, as it is only when coming to the end of the signature that the 
authority arises to sign. This retroactivity (an act in the future perfect tense) is 
furthermore to be seen in the people’s representatives who are only through the 
signature, and thus after the fact, legitimised to act as the people’s repre-
sentatives. Before the Declaration there is therefore no one who is by right 
authorised to sign, and the Declaration can be said to produce and guarantee 
its own signature. Derrida attempts to explain what happens here as follows:
With this fabulous event, with this fable that implies the structure of the 
trace and is indeed only possible by means of the inadequation of the 
present to itself, a signature gives itself  a name. It opens for itself a line 
of credit, its own credit for itself  to itself. The self rises forth here in all 
cases (nominative, dative, accusative) as soon as a signature gives or 
extends credit to itself, in a single ‘coup de force,’ which is also a stroke 
[coup] of writing, as the right to writing. The ‘coup de force’ makes right, 
founds right or law, gives right, brings the law to the light of day, gives 
both birth and day to the law [donne le jour à la loi ]. Brings the law to 
the light of day, gives both birth and day to the law: read The Madness 
of the Day by Maurice Blanchot.
(Neg 50)
This is a complex passage which requires careful analysis. Before doing so, 
we need to take note of yet another signatory, another ‘subjectivity’ who 
signs (Neg 51), and whose signing (likewise) raises the question of sovereignty. 
The people, in inventing for themselves a signing identity, as Derrida notes, 
sign the Declaration in the name of the laws of nature and in the name of 
God. God, the creator of nature and the founder of natural laws, in effect 
guarantees the rectitude of popular intentions and of the unity and goodness 
of the people. God thus provides the ‘good people’ with the ultimate signature, 
confi rming that they are (factually) and ought to be (legally) free and in-
dependent (Neg 51–2). There are consequently only countersignatures in 
this ‘differantial’ process, Derrida notes, and he asks ‘Who signs all of these 
authorizations to sign?’ (Neg 51, 53)
Let us now return to Blanchot’s The Madness of the Day which Derrida 
refers to in the above quotation and which he analyses in other texts.35 This 
35 For an analysis of the relation between Derrida and Blanchot, including the distinction 
between the narrative and narratorial voices at stake here, see Saghafi  (2010: 101–27).
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detour will assist us in eventually answering Derrida’s question as to the 
actual signatory of the Declaration. It will in addition help us to understand 
what Derrida means when he refers to the process as ‘differantial’ (Neg 51) 
and to the fact that there are only countersignatures here. In ‘Living on’, 
Derrida enquires into the scene of the demand placed on the main character 
in The Madness of the Day to give a narrative of the events that occurred to 
him (an accident in which he nearly lost his sight). Derrida’s analysis of the 
narrative seeks to move away from the (metaphysical) question as to its 
essence (what is narrative?) to the analysis of the prior scene of origin of 
narrative. The question is whether the narrative of the origin of narrative, 
the representation or staging of the demand (mise-en-scène) still qualifi es as 
a narrative (‘LO’ 72). Strictly speaking, as Derrida notes, it is not a mise-en-
scène that is at stake here, but a ‘judicial framing’ or a ‘jurisdiction of frames’, 
as a staging still relies on the notion of presence, on the eyes as origin: ‘the 
origin of visibility, the origin of origin, the birth of what, as we say in French, 
“sees the light of day” ... when the present leads to presence, presentation, 
or representation’ (‘LO’ 72). In Blanchot’s récit (story)36 this demand of a 
narrative is ‘staged’ or narrated: a narrative is demanded from the main 
character, a violent putting-to-the-question, as Derrida refers to it (‘LO’ 78). 
He has to explain the accident for the sake of remedial justice (AL 234). As 
Derrida notes, the demand of the authorities amounts to a demand for ‘an 
author, an I capable of organizing a narrative sequence, of remembering and 
telling the truth’ (‘LO’ 81). This demand, in the name of the law, as Derrida 
points out, is ‘mad for light’ (‘LO’ 74; AL 234). The character is however 
incapable of responding to this demand of the authorities. He does not 
succeed in taking on the role of narrator (AL 234). He tells them ‘that he 
cannot manage to identify with himself  suffi ciently, or to remember himself  
well enough to gather the story and récit that are demanded of him – which 
the representatives of society and the law require of him’ (AL 234). The récit 
is furthermore structured in such a way that there is no real beginning and 
end; it folds in upon itself  with no original performative speech act (‘LO’ 
79). Instead, what seems to be the beginning of the story is folded back inside, 
and the same happens to the supposed end of the story. The middle of the 
story in turn quotes, without quotation marks, the beginning and anticipates 
or quotes in advance the end of the story. In this way the demand for truth 
is itself, as Derrida puts it, ‘recounted and swept along in the endless process 
of invagination’ (‘LO’ 81). In the repetition of the demand for a récit, which 
we fi nd in the fi nal paragraphs, and the declaration as to its impossibility (‘A 
story? No. No stories, ever again’) it is similarly impossible to determine 
which is a quotation of the other (‘LO’ 82). Likewise the actual occurrence of 
the supposed event is impossible to determine (AL 237). The récit is therefore 
36 This text is elsewhere titled ‘Un récit?’, and ‘Un récit’; AL 241.
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without beginning and without end, without content and without border. 
This same structure, as Derrida points out, is a feature of all texts, whether 
in narrative form or not (‘LO’ 82):
Even before it ‘concerns’ a text in narrative form, double invagination 
constitutes the story of stories, the narrative of narrative ... the appar-
ently outer edge of an enclosure [clôture], far from being simple, simply 
external and circular, in accordance with the philosophical representation 
of philosophy, makes no sign beyond itself, toward what is utterly other, 
without making itself  be ‘represented,’ refolded, superposed, re-marked 
within the enclosure, at least in what the structure produces as an effect 
of interiority.
(‘LO’ 83)
At stake in this récit is furthermore the important distinction which Blanchot 
draws between the narrative voice and the narratorial voice, the latter being 
the voice of the subject identical with itself  (‘LO’ 86):
The narratorial voice is the voice of a subject recounting something, 
remembering an event or a historical sequence, knowing who he is, and 
what he is talking about. It responds to some ‘police,’ a force of order or 
law (‘What “exactly” are you talking about?’: the truth of equivalence).
Viewed thus, the US Declaration of Independence appears to respond to a 
demand, purportedly in the narratorial voice, yet it at the same time unseats 
the subject. A division of the subject therefore takes place, which we can by 
way of another ‘narrative’ of Blanchot (The Instant of my Death) trace to 
death, to be distinguished from dying (Dem 53 – 4). Blanchot also defi nes the 
narrative voice as ‘a neuter voice that speaks the work from that place-less 
place in which the work is silent’ (Blanchot 1999: 467). It is not an I, an ego, 
even when the narrative refers to it as I, he or she (‘LO’ 87). This neuter 
voice is beyond dialectical contradiction and opposition, surpasses negativity, 
and gives passage to a double affi rmation (yes, yes, to both life and death, a 
yes which is measureless, excessive and immense (AL 243 –5). It is furthermore 
this I of the narrative voice, stripped of itself, who brings forth to light, who 
gives birth to law, both the law (la loi) and the representatives of law (AL 246). 
The narrative voice is in this respect coupled with the feminine or a female 
element, the law herself  (la loi), whom the narrative voice fi nds sexually 
seductive and wishes to seduce (AL 247– 8). The law herself  plays. She plays 
at being born like any person, ‘born of the one for whom she becomes the 
law’ (AL 249). The narrator submits himself  to that which/whom he is the 
author of, the mother of – his mad daughter (AL 250): ‘My daughter’s madness 
is to want to be born – like anybody and nobody [comme personne]’ (AL 
250). Although he submits to her, he does not shrink before her, but instead 
Declarations of independence 65
frightens her, tempts her and in doing so alarms her, as he does with her 
representatives in his inability to provide them with the truth:
That the ‘I’ here does not always accompany itself  is by no means borne 
lightly by the lawmen; in fact, he alarms thus the lawmen, he radically 
persecutes them, and, in this manner, conceals from them without alter-
cation the truth they demand and without which they are nothing. But 
he not only alarms the lawmen, he alarms the law; one would be tempted 
to say the law herself, if  she did not remain here a silhouette and an 
effect of the récit. And what is more, this law whom the ‘I’ frightens 
is none other than ‘me,’ than the ‘I,’ effect of this desire, child of his 
affi rmation, of the genre ‘I’ clasped in a specular couple with ‘me.’
(AL 248)
The allusions to Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle in this passage should 
be clear. The ‘desire’ at stake in the preceding passage is in other words 
for death, which can be equated with madness in the transgressive sense 
(Chapter 4) as well as with the perfect gift (Chapter 5). The gift in turn, at 
this point returning to the passage from ‘DoI’ quoted above which refers to 
Blanchot’s The Madness of the Day, makes possible the extension of credit 
to the self (GT 43 –5). There is clearly something ‘illegitimate’ in this extension 
– the stealing, in effect, of a signature (S/S 108).37 This is not however where 
the analysis stops. In ‘DoI’ as well as in ‘Force of law’, Derrida equates this 
extension of credit to an act of faith – the only foundation for the authority 
of law, he notes with reference to Montaigne, is the belief  in it (AR 240; Neg 
52). This (secret) reliance on an act of faith, which as Derrida notes, involves 
‘an appeal to blind confi dence, the testimonial that is always beyond proof, 
demonstrative reason, intuition’ (AR 70), clearly undermines law’s supposed 
rational or ontological foundation (AR 240). The philosophical distinction 
(and opposition) between faith and reason, law usually associating itself  
with the latter, is itself  made possible by what Derrida elsewhere refers to as 
an originary faith (Rel 60 –1). As we will see in somewhat more detail in 
Chapter 6, this pure faith involves a ‘breaking with knowledge or given norms’ 
or what can be referred to as ‘a venture into absolute risk, beyond knowledge 
and certainty’ (G&L 7– 8). Law, it appears, has no fi xed foundation, but is 
instead made possible (and its supposedly pure presence made impossible) 
by this originary faith, or what can also be referred to as the law (la loi) 
before the law, the gift, justice, madness or the arche-trace.
This structure of law is, as Derrida furthermore notes, tied to ‘the inad-
equation of a present to itself ’ (Neg 50). The future perfect referred to earlier, 
37 See also S/S 108: ‘Every time I sign, I give myself  the representation of the gift of what 
I cannot give myself. I give myself  something I will never, in any case, have had.’
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should not be understood in the sense of a future that will arrive (‘LO’ 82; 
AR 256). At stake in this inadequation, the ‘fabulous retroactivity’ (Neg 50), 
and ‘the simulacrum of the instant’ (Neg 51) is what can be referred to as an 
‘atemporal temporality’ (G&L 66) or the ‘future anterior’ which Derrida in 
a number of texts (PF 249–50; R 6; AR 269) links with the incalculable, the 
unconditional, the ‘to come’, and the impossible, as that which makes time 
and meaning possible. This atemporal temporality, which is clearly tied to 
the (radically forgotten) desire for death as well as the withdrawal of Being, 
thus refers to a time that will never be present; it exceeds the time of the 
present, and bears no relation to a past or a future as a modifi ed presence 
(SP 142–3). As Heidegger showed, Dasein’s experience of temporality involves 
an essential relation to the past and the future, and specifi cally to its own 
death. Although Derrida views death and time in some respects differently 
from Heidegger, this structure informs Derrida’s notion of disjointure or of 
a disjunction in time, and which he ties to the self-erasure of the trace (SM 
20 –34; MP 65 – 6).
We cannot conclude this section without referring to ‘Signature event 
context’, Signsponge and Glas where Derrida enquires in detail into the 
notion of the signature, in the last two texts with reference to Francis Ponge 
and Jean Genet. We will see that what he says here ties in closely with the 
above analysis of The Madness of the Day. In classical speech-act theory, the 
signature, as well as the word ‘hereby’ play a role in writing similar to that 
of the presence of the speaker in the case of oral utterances (Austin 1975: 57). 
The signature therefore traditionally has the role of guaranteeing legitimacy, 
authority and meaning, thereby seeking to ensure the continuing presence 
of the author to the document in question (Ltd 19–20). God, as we saw, 
is referred to in the Declaration as the fi nal and ultimate signatory – the 
transcendental signifi ed that assures presence and meaning (Neg 52).38 From 
the earlier analysis of the marks or traces utilised in speech and writing 
we however know that this ‘presence’ is strictly speaking impossible. The 
signature is an effect; its condition of possibility lies in its iterability:
Effects of signature are the most common thing in the world. But the 
condition of possibility of those effects is simultaneously, once again, 
the condition of their impossibility, of the impossibility of their rigorous 
purity. In order to function, that is, to be readable, a signature must 
have a repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must be able to be detached 
from the present and singular intention of its production. It is its same-
ness which, by corrupting its identity and singularity, divides its seal 
[sceau].
(Ltd 20)
38 See also Norris (1987: 197).
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The signature as an intentional, fully present and singular speech act thus 
does not lie at the origin of a founding document such as a Declaration 
of Independence. In order to function, a signature must be iterable, imitable 
– it must be detachable from the intention of its production, also when the 
signatory dies. The signature thus bears witness to the death of the signatory, 
to the fact that ‘I am already dead’, writing ‘out of a past that has never 
been present and out of a death that has never been alive’ (Glas 19b). Once 
inscribed within or on the border of a text, the signature becomes part of 
the text and is thereby put on stage, into play, into the abyss (S/S 22). As a 
consequence, ownership of the text is lost (S/S 56). The signature overfl ows 
itself  in ‘an altogether receptive, open and welcome’ sense (S/S 80). Derrida 
revealingly refers in Signsponge to this (differantial) process as ‘a certain 
coitus of signatures’ (S/S 50) and as an ‘orgasm’ (S/S 56) which should of 
course be understood with reference to what was said earlier about writing. 
Something similar thus happens to the signature as to the narratorial voice 
of the ‘I’ in The Madness of the Day. This is why Derrida in ‘DoI’ can say 
that there are only countersignatures here. All signatures, whether of the 
representatives, the people, or God, respond to, are allowed to sign by a 
‘pre-originary’ or general signature, the signature of the entirely other (S/S 
50, 82, 128 –132), namely the desire for absolute pleasure.39
The proper name
There is necessarily a close relationship between the signature and the proper 
name. This we already saw above in the main question Derrida poses for 
discussion in ‘DoI’ (47): ‘[W]ho signs, and with what so-called proper name, 
the declarative act that founds an institution?’ The representatives sign the 
Declaration in their own names but also in the name of and by the authority 
of  the (good) people and ultimately in the name of God, as we saw (Neg 
48 –9). Derrida refers in this respect to God as the ‘best’ name for the last 
instance which has to relate what ‘is’ to what ‘ought to be’ (Neg 52). The 
invocation in this founding act of the people and of God must be understood 
within the context of the metaphysical desire for presence, and at the same 
time as an expression of the political onto-theology of sovereignty.40 A per-
formative speech act such as a declaration, it appears, is directly tied to the 
notion of sovereignty, and thus to God. The concept of sovereignty, Derrida 
notes in his later texts where the deconstruction of this concept is at stake, 
39 See S/S 54, 128 –32. The other should here also not be understood as another person, but 
as death.
40 Carl Schmitt (1985: 36) remarks in this respect that ‘[a]ll signifi cant concepts of the 
modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts’. Derrida follows him in 
this assessment.
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has a theological origin, the true sovereign being God (FWT 91–2; BS 16 –17). 
Viewed historically, the monarch was fi rst accorded this authority, and there-
after the people or the nation, with the same (phallocentric) theological 
attributes as God and the monarch.41 In these texts Derrida initially adopts 
the defi nition by Carl Schmitt (1985: 5) of the sovereign (le souverain, i.e. 
masculine) as the one who decides the exception, who can suspend rights 
and the law, who is in other words above the law and can make the law (FWT 
91–2; BS 16, 32; R 76). Schmitt (2007: 26) moreover defi nes the sovereign, 
thereby tying in with his defi nition of the political, as the capability of drawing 
a distinction between the friend and the enemy (BS 10).
By pointing to the sovereignty of the people (of the United States) and 
ultimately to God, the Declaration of Independence seeks to invoke a presence 
and a ground. It attempts to ground the Declaration in proper names (with 
a fi xed meaning and referent) outside of  the act of  language and writing 
which the Declaration is, unsoiled by the common (AR 109). Proper names 
are specifi cally relied on here because, although part of language, they seek 
to situate themselves outside of language. Yet, the proper name is always 
already inscribed within a system of classifi cation, a system of appellation and 
of difference, resulting in the obliteration of the proper (OG 110). The proper 
name is a mark like any other; it is immediately also improper, a common noun. 
Like any common noun it is imposed and therefore also immediately effaced, 
erased or expropriated. What was said earlier in relation to writing applies 
a fortiori to the proper name. Because the proper name will ultimately survive 
the one it names, it announces my death, carries a death sentence (AL 432). 
In the same way in which language (with writing as model) is structured by 
its possibility of functioning in the absence, in the event of the death of the 
sender and of the addressee, the proper name is structured by the possibility 
of functioning after the death of who it names. The name is therefore ‘always 
and a priori a dead man’s name, a name of death’ (EO 7).42 It lives on; it is 
destined to survive me, and the same applies to God (AL 432; Ltd 82–3).43
Derrida analyses the structure of the proper name in detail in Of Gram-
matology. At stake here is the prohibition on the mentioning of proper names 
imposed by the Nambikwara as recounted by Lévi-Strauss and which he 
(Lévi-Strauss) succeeds in fi nding out when little girls in acts of revenge 
reveal these proper names to him. Derrida however notes that what we have 
here is not strictly speaking an interdiction on the use of proper names, nor 
is it proper names that are eventually revealed:
41 See in this regard FWT 92; R 14, 17; BS 53 – 4.
42 See also PC 39: ‘The name is made to do without the life of the bearer, and is therefore 
always somewhat the name of someone dead.’
43 As Derrida indicates elsewhere (‘E&F’ 42), in deconstructing the onto-theological tradition 
of sovereignty it would be necessary to ‘disassociate God’s sovereignty from the very idea 
of God. We would have God without sovereignty, God without omnipotence’.
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The expression ‘proper name’ is improper, for the very reasons that [Lévi-
Strauss’s] The Savage Mind will recall. What the interdict is laid upon is 
the uttering of what functions as the proper name. And this function 
is consciousness itself. The proper name in the colloquial sense, in the 
sense of consciousness, is ... only a designation of appurtenance and a 
linguistic-social classifi cation. The lifting of the interdict, the great game 
of denunciation and the great exhibition of the ‘proper’ ... does not 
consist in revealing proper names, but in tearing the veil hiding a 
classifi cation and an appurtenance, the inscription within a system of 
linguistic–social differences.
(OG 111)
What the girls reveal are thus not proper names strictly speaking, or absolute 
idioms, but ‘already varieties of invested common names’ (OG 111). The act 
according a so-called proper name already involves the suspension of the 
vocative absolute (OG 112). Derrida does not however dream of restoring 
this loss of self-presence and of the proper, but instead notes that it is always 
already lost. Such self-presence is only dreamt of, and cannot appear as such 
(OG 112).44 This destruction of the proper, as we saw earlier, gives expression 
to the relation to death (OG 183 – 4). So does the image (OG 184), which 
perhaps clarifi es somewhat Derrida’s invocation of the story of the hatter 
told by Franklin to Jefferson. The hatter consults with his friends about a 
signboard for his shop. The friends propose all manner of deletions to what 
he had in mind, including the reference to himself  as the producer of the 
hats, so that the signboard eventually only bears the image of a hat, with his 
name under it. Derrida’s description of Jefferson’s possible reaction to this 
story as ‘strongly undecided’ should presumably be understood in relation 
to the above. Jefferson, Derrida suggests, desired for his own name to be 
immortalised under a map of the United States, thus for the new state to 
effectively bear his name. According to Freud, a hat, as well as an umbrella 
and a pair of shoes, mentioned as alternatives by Derrida to the story of the 
hatter (Neg 53) are all sexual symbols.45 A map, as we furthermore know, is 
itself  a sexual symbol and a form of writing (Freud 2001: V 356; OG 107– 8). 
Jefferson’s ‘greatest desire’ (Neg 53) therefore ultimately appears to be for 
absolute pleasure, for death. And something similar can be said of the people 
of the United States, and of any state. By giving itself  a name, it inscribes 
itself  within a system of signifi cation, by virtue of a desire for death.
The above necessarily ties in closely with Derrida’s analysis of sovereignty in 
Rogues and elsewhere. What has not as yet been mentioned in the discussion 
44 In MP 66 Derrida points out that the ‘as such’ refers to the appearance of something in its 
presence; the ‘as such’ however precisely evades us forever. See also ‘AO’ 24 – 6.
45 See Freud (2001: XV 154, umbrella; XV 157, hat; XV 158, shoes).
70 Jacques Derrida: law as absolute hospitality
of sovereignty is that it is as a rule presented as silent, unavowable and 
indivisible (R 100, 109).46 It furthermore engenders like a father, but is itself  
withdrawn from genesis and becoming (R 138). In all of this it of course 
mirrors God (R 157). As Derrida puts it: ‘[S]overeignty itself  (if  there is one 
and if  it is pure) always keeps quiet in the very ipseity of the moment proper 
to it, a moment that is but the stigmatic point of an indivisible instant’ (R 
100 –1). Sovereignty’s indivisibility, as Derrida notes, excludes it in principle 
from being shared, that is, from time and from language. This is because 
sovereignty reveals itself in the exception which is a-temporal and a-historical; 
it also withdraws from language which per defi nition shares and universalises. 
The sovereign is precisely the one who does not have to respond, who has a 
right to silence, who does not have to take responsibility for his acts, who 
has the right to a certain irresponsibility (BS 57). Sovereignty however neces-
sarily has to rely on language (on the model of writing), has to justify itself by 
means of law, as we saw for example with the Declaration of Independence, 
so that no pure sovereignty can be said to exist:
To confer sense or meaning on sovereignty, to justify it, to fi nd a reason 
for it, is already to compromise its deciding exceptionality, to subject it 
to rules, to a code of law, to some general law, to concepts. It is thus to 
divide it, to subject it to partitioning, to participation, to being shared. 
It is to take into account the part played by sovereignty. And to take that 
part or share into account is to compromise its immunity. This happens 
as soon as one speaks of it in order to give it or fi nd in it some sense or 
meaning. But since this happens all the time, pure sovereignty does not 
exist; it is always in the process of positing itself  by refuting itself, by 
denying or disavowing itself; it is always in the process of disavowing 
itself; it is always in the process of autoimmunizing itself.
(R 101)47
In a similar way in which Derrida had shown in his earlier work the need 
for mediation – that is, signs, marks or traces for the self  in relating to itself  
and to others (SP 6 –7; Pos 28 –9), thereby placing in question the notion of 
the sovereign subject (Chapter 1) – he contends here that sovereignty, because 
of its need for language and the need for it to be clothed with meaning, is 
necessarily shared, divided and partitioned, thereby compromising itself. Once 
one tries to justify sovereignty, for example through a founding document, 
46 As Schuppert (2003: 157– 8) furthermore reminds us, sovereignty relates both to the greatest 
power inside and the ability to operate outside the state without any limitation. This dual 
operation of sovereignty is likewise indivisible.
47 Although the context of this passage is international law, it can, as appears from its cor-
respondence with our earlier discussion, clearly also be applied on a national level.
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one necessarily uses language and in so doing inevitably places sovereignty 
at risk. The reason for this we saw above in the analysis of language on the 
model of writing. The same point can likewise be reached through an analysis 
of the concept of sovereignty itself  and through an observation of what is 
happening with sovereignty in the world today, including the sovereignty of 
the only remaining superpower (PTT 94 –100).48 In both Philosophy in a Time 
of Terror and in Rogues, Derrida shows how the self  and therefore also 
sovereignty is affected and infected by a cruel auto-immunity, which is another 
way of giving expression to Derrida’s adaptation of Freud’s death drive (PTT 
94 –100; R 45, 55, 109, 157).49 Tying this notion to Derrida’s earlier work, we 
could refer to auto-immunity as a kind of biological ‘metaphoricity’.50 Like 
the death drive, as Derrida conceives of it, auto-immunity is not simply evil, 
as it makes possible a relation to the self  and the other (R 152). This auto-
immunity of sovereignty is especially to be detected in democracy, which 
necessarily lacks a proper meaning, to the extent that it even allows for its own 
abolition (R 18 –27, 36 –7, 72– 4). The events of September 11, 2001 with their 
roots in this auto-immune tendency, confi rms Derrida’s analysis which in ‘DoI’ 
appears to pass to a greater extent through language.51 Other indications 
of the erosion of state sovereignty in the world today (effects of this pre-
originary auto-immunity) are the international obligation placed on states to 
secure fundamental rights (R 87– 8), the movement towards the universal 
abolition of the death penalty, the institution of the International Criminal 
Court (R 87), the prosecution of heads of state (CF 57), and humanitarian 
actions by NGOs (BS 70).52 The aim here is of course not to discredit democracy, 
but to place in question democracy’s link to sovereignty which itself  is based 
on fantasy, a fantasy or fable of omnipotence (PM 105 – 6; BS 35), in favour of 
a ‘democracy to come’, a democracy without sovereignty, without autonomy. 
48 One could add to this that especially since the Second World War, there has been a dissolv-
ing of both inner and outer state sovereignty. Democratic constitutionalism has developed 
such that in these states there is no single state organ that has the fi nal decision-making 
power in all circumstances. Furthermore, whereas until the Second World War states were 
regarded as sovereign in international affairs – there were no limits as to what these states 
could do, this is no longer the case. This dissolution of sovereignty is seen most clearly in 
the European Union.
49 Auto-immunity, in brief, entails that immune cells ‘mistake’ the body’s cells as invaders and 
attack them, which can lead to a variety of auto-immune diseases.
50 See in this regard MP 207–1 ‘(White mythology’), ‘RM’, Gasché (1986: 293 –318). It should 
be noted though (in relation to the ‘biological’ metaphor at stake here), as Mitchell (2005: 
917) points out, that the concept of immunity actually has its origin in the legal concept of 
exemption. See further the Online Etymology Dictionary.
51 In both Derrida’s later and earlier work, texts in the broad sense are being analysed, so that 
the differences in the nature of analysis, if  any, are minimal.
52 These actions of placing sovereignty in question, as Derrida points out, nevertheless often 
takes place in the name of another sovereignty – the sovereignty of man himself  (BS 71), 
which is of course itself  placed in question by Derrida; see further Chapter 1.
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It is furthermore important to note that this is also not said to discredit 
sovereignty as simply a fable, but even more importantly to point to the pre-
origin or law of this fable as was the case earlier with The Madness of the 
Day. Derrida moreover does not thereby seek to abolish sovereignty, as it 
can be used for example to fi ght against colonialism and imperialism, but 
rather to destabilise it as a secure origin (BS 76; FWT 92).
Beyond sovereignty
The implications of Derrida’s analysis of writing as compared to the way in 
which language is viewed in metaphysics, has consequences which were hardly 
possible to anticipate in the 1960s and 1970s. From his later texts, we see 
that viewing language with writing as model has ‘radical’ implications not 
only for judicial decision-making (Chapter 6), but also for the transformation 
of (the institutions of ) international law, the death penalty, the granting of 
pardons, citizenship, immigration law and man’s relation to animals. In so 
far as our primary theme here is concerned, that is, constitutional democracy, 
this notion can no longer simply be viewed in terms of a return to the self  
– the people giving themselves a foundational document in order to rule 
themselves, giving themselves reason and rights in sovereign fashion, and 
subsequently enforcing these. Because of what Derrida refers to in his later 
texts as auto-immunity, the return to the self  necessarily runs the risk of 
becoming a turn against the self. This means that the so-called counter-
majoritarian diffi culty so often invoked in liberal constitutional theory, between 
democracy and constitutionalism, self-rule versus law-rule53 functions as little 
more than a fi g leaf. In seeking to resolve this ‘paradox’ by privileging one or 
both of the ways in which law seeks to preserve itself 54 and by consequently 
failing to enquire into the origins of self-rule and law-rule, it effectively extols 
sovereignty without any contemplation of its problematical nature. Something 
similar can be said of theories which traditionally inform constitutional 
understanding, whether of an overt political or more methodical nature. In 
so far as the fi rst-mentioned is concerned, these almost without exception 
posit a sovereign self  (whether individual or collective) which necessarily and 
unproblematically returns to itself. It furthermore places the meaning of the 
document at the disposal of a sovereign, freely choosing subject, namely a 
judge or plurality of judges. In so far as theories of a more methodical nature 
are concerned, the analysis above shows that the notion of intention, as well 
as purpose and context, which are often said to determine the interpretation 
of founding documents, are suspect, at least if  intention is viewed as fully 
determining such meaning. In so far as intention is concerned, it is traditionally 
53 See e.g. Bickel (1986: 16 –23).
54 See further Chapter 6.
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tied to the idea of subjectivity, sovereignty, and thus self-presence and self-
possession, which Derrida’s analysis in ‘DoI’ and other texts, thoroughly 
places in question, by showing its necessary relation to auto-immunity, thereby 
introducing the notion of an auto-immune sovereignty or heterogeneous 
subjectivity. Intention is in other words overfl owed by a radical alterity or 
as Derrida states elsewhere, ‘intentionality ... does not necessarily belong to 
a consciousness’ (WD 26).55 The same applies, for similar reasons, to context 
and purpose. What is called for in constitutional theory today is a move away 
from these traditional theories which are all founded on sovereignty towards a 
contemplation of the hospitable exposure to the event, without the domination 
and neutralisation of performative mastery and sovereignty.
55 In A 48 –50, which will be briefl y analysed in Chapter 8, Derrida similarly explores through 
Levinas’s texts, the notion of intentionality as hospitality.
Chapter 3
Before the law
‘Before the law’, an essay of Derrida on Kafka’s text with the same title, and 
which will be the main focus of this chapter, also includes a reading of Freud’s 
Totem and Taboo. The latter book repeatedly makes its appearance in Der-
rida’s texts,1 but in ‘Before the law’ we fi nd the most detailed consideration 
thereof. Freud’s Totem and Taboo enquires into the origin of religion, morality, 
social institutions and law. He contends that this origin is to be found in a 
crime, the killing of the primal father by a band of brothers, followed by the 
institution of totemism and the prohibition of murder and incest. Freud’s 
psychoanalytical account of the origin of the totem and of the prohibition 
of murder and incest has been challenged from various quarters. If  totemism 
thought of as a system is indeed an illusion, as Lévi-Strauss has perhaps 
most persuasively shown, should one for that reason dismiss Freud’s Totem 
and Taboo and its theory of the primal horde in relation to the origins of 
law, or is there still some insight to be gained from it? Through a reading of 
‘Before the law’ as well as a number of other texts of Derrida, it will be 
contended that Freud’s thinking remains of great importance in understand-
ing law’s origin, even though it may be necessary to somewhat revise the 
traditional reading of Totem and Taboo. Derrida’s texts point to the import-
ance of reading Freud in a specifi c way, rather than the rejection of his 
thinking as a whole in this respect, and more specifi cally, to the need for a 
reconsideration of the originary nature of the Oedipus complex. In rethinking 
the origins of law, Freud’s study of the universality of the incest prohibition 
in archaic societies remains of importance, as has been confi rmed by anthropo-
logical studies on this prohibition as well as on the gift by among others, 
Lévi-Strauss and Mauss. The focus of this chapter will be Derrida’s reading 
of these texts, in considering the origins of law. So as to enable us to under-
stand fully Derrida’s reading, the chapter will start with a brief  exposition 
and contextualisation of Freud’s contentions in Totem and Taboo. This will be 
followed by a consideration of Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist critique of totemism 
1 See e.g. R 16 –17, 57– 60; PF 279– 81; FWT 86 –7, 188; AF 59, 88, 95.
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as an institution as well as of the important role of incest in his thinking. 
We will then be in a position to understand Derrida’s problematisation of 
structuralism and his deconstructive reading of Lévi-Strauss’s texts as well 
as of Freud’s Totem and Taboo and Kafka’s Before the Law. In the fi nal sec-
tion we will briefl y consider how Derrida’s analysis in ‘Before the law’ ties in 
with his later deconstruction of concepts such as justice, hospitality, friend-
ship and democracy, with reference to the notion of originary guilt.
Freud’s Totem and Taboo
A number of Freud’s later texts concern themselves with the origin of religion, 
morality, law and other social institutions. Following the evolutionary think-
ing in relation to social phenomena which was prevalent around the turn of 
the twentieth century, Freud shared the view of certain anthropologists and 
sociologists that this origin is to be found in an elementary form of religion, 
specifi cally as practised by some Australian aborigines. Freud’s views in this 
regard are expressed primarily in Totem and Taboo (1913), where he enquires 
into the totem and its relation to the Oedipus complex. Freud in this respect 
fi nds a number of similarities between the beliefs in archaic communities, 
children (especially animal phobias), and neurotic patients as well as the 
symbolism in dreams. In the view which Freud (2001: XIII 103–7) adopts, 
the totem in its original form is an animal, which is peculiar to a specifi c 
clan and treated with superstitious respect. The totem may in general not be 
harmed, killed or eaten by members of that clan and they are believed to 
have descended from the totem. Originally the totem is inherited through the 
female line and restricts the sexual freedom of the younger generation – that 
is, sexual intercourse between brothers and sisters and between sons and their 
mothers (at 121–2). Freud as a consequence describes exogamy as the ‘notorious 
and mysterious correlate of totemism’ (at 105). At ceremonial occasions, 
identifi cation of the clan with the totem is particularly emphasised, for example 
by dressing in the likeness of the totem and imitating it in sound and move-
ment (at 140). At specifi c ceremonies the totem is furthermore killed and 
devoured by all the men of the clan (Freud 2001: XXIII 131).2 After the 
consumption of the totem animal, its death is mourned, followed by licentious 
festivities (Freud 2001: XIII 140). In an attempt to explain totemism as well 
as the fact that many of the archaic communities still to be observed at the 
time consisted of bands of males in totemic clans while concerning themselves 
primarily with the prohibition of two crimes (murder and incest), Freud (at 
141– 6) posits an ‘event’ analogous to the ‘crimes’ of Oedipus as depicted by 
2 Freud (2001: XIII 138 –9) bases this characteristic on the observation of a festival in the Sinai 
desert where a camel is torn apart by all the male members of the clan and consumed raw.
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Sophocles.3 In an early age, Freud contends, mankind lived in small hordes 
with a jealous, primal father in each instance ruling over such horde. The 
father had exclusive possession of all the women in the horde. If  a son would 
invoke his father’s jealousy, he would be killed, castrated or driven from the 
horde (Freud 2001: XXIII 81). The sons – fearing, admiring, loving and at 
the same time hating the primal father, because of being deprived by him 
from having their sexual desires fulfi lled by their mother(s) and sisters – one 
day decided to rise against him, and then killed and consumed him, so as to 
gain his strength. Either because no single brother was strong enough to take 
the place of the primal father or because if  one of them were, it led to new 
battles, they eventually realised that the previous position of a single leader 
is no longer tenable. For the sake of peace with one another, they therefore 
decided on the institution of a (totemic) community of brothers, a kind of 
‘social contract’ through which incest and murder (of the totem animal) were 
prohibited.4 In this development lies the commencement of social, moral and 
religious obligations, according to Freud (2001: XXIII 82–3). The institution 
of the totem (the totem being a substitute for the father (Freud 2001: XIII 
141)) as well as the totem prohibitions, served as a covenant between the 
sons and the totem: the totem granting them everything they could wish for, 
and they in turn respecting its life. It was also an attempt at self-justifi cation: 
if  the primal father had treated them the way the totem treats them, they 
would never have killed him, in this way making it possible to forget the 
event which lies at the origin of the totem (at 144 –5).5 Totemism was thus 
instituted as an attempt at reconciliation with the father. Freud notes in this 
respect that immediately after the murder, the feelings of affection they had 
for him, turned into remorse (at 143–5), raising the question how this could 
have happened even before the institution of morality.6
Did Freud believe that the killing of a primal father actually occurred, and 
is he therefore, because of a belief  in the phylogenetic inheritance of this 
‘event’ to be associated with Lamarckism? On the face of it, Freud7 can 
certainly be read in this way, as commentators have argued,8 although, as 
Derrida (AF 34 – 6) has pointed out, things may be somewhat more complex.9 
3 In Moses and Monotheism Freud (2001: XXIII 81) points out that this ‘event’ took place over 
thousands of years and were repeated numerous times.
4 Freud was aware of a number of exceptions which can be said to exist to the ‘universality’ 
of the incest prohibition, see Freud (2001: XXIII 120 –1); and see further below.
5 Freud (2001: XXIII 82) comments that the introduction of an animal to represent the father 
must be understood in light of the fact that archaic communities (and the position is the 
same with children) do not draw the same rigid distinctions between man and animal as is 
drawn in Western society.
6 See also Lacan (2006: 95); Douzinas (2000: 301), and see further below.
7 See e.g. Freud (2001: XIII 157–9).
8 See e.g. Gay (1988: 333); van Haute and Verhaege (2006: 80 –1); Fitzpatrick (2001: 19).
9 See further below.
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The major diffi culties with Freud’s account perhaps lies in (1) its assumption 
concerning the universality of the Oedipus complex and tied closely to this 
(2) the assumption of the existence of something like ‘totemism’ from which 
other institutions subsequently evolved. The latter point was elaborated on 
by anthropologists such as Alexander Goldenweiser, Alfred Lowie, Franz 
Boas, Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown and Claude Lévi-Strauss. Although 
Freud was aware of the various manifestations of the totem in different 
societies, he believed as noted earlier that certain clans of Australian aborigines 
give evidence of the most original form, totemism having at an earlier stage 
been a feature of  all societies. The criticism of this evolutionary view of 
society, specifi cally in relation to the totem, as held by Freud and others 
around the turn of the twentieth century, by Lévi-Strauss, is for our purposes 
the most important and will be discussed next. The fi rst point (totemism’s 
relation to the Oedipus complex) will be enquired into below in our discussion 
of Derrida’s ‘Before the law’.
Lévi-Strauss on totemism and the prohibition of incest
Lévi-Strauss, in stark contrast to Freud, contends that the notion of ‘totemism’ 
is nothing but an illusion, the bringing together of different ideas under one 
name as a result of Western prejudice against people deemed ‘primitives’ or 
‘savages’ (Lévi-Strauss 1991: 1–2). Anthropologists created the impression 
that there are vast differences between ‘primitive’ societies and Western 
civilisation, with only the latter being characterised by rational thinking. The 
‘phenomenon’ of totemism, Lévi-Strauss argued, was a projection of the 
Western mind, and, aligning himself  with Rousseau’s thinking on human 
nature, an exorcism of the close relation that exists between man and nature. 
In the traditional Western view of ‘primitives’ and of ‘totemism’, the ‘savage’ 
was too close to nature, too close to animals, in comparison with the discon-
tinuity evident in the relation which ‘civilised’ (that is, normal, white, adult) 
man has with nature (at 2–3). According to Lévi-Strauss, and in line with his 
structuralist views, totems function in heterogeneous ways in different clans, 
with the consequence that totemism cannot be viewed as a system. This is 
borne out by the fact that the reason for the adoption of a specifi c plant, 
animal or lifeless object as a totem differs greatly among different tribes and 
clans.10 Nonetheless, the different ways in which relations to a totem are 
structured (inter alia matrilineal/patrilineal hereditary transmission, as existing 
between the group/individual between a species of animal/plant or a specifi c 
animal/plant, as well as the different taboos related to a totem) are all dif-
ferent means to give expression to the relation between nature and culture 
10 Lévi-Strauss points out that in Australia one also fi nds totems such as laughing, illnesses, 
vomiting and a corpse (at 63). Imaginary creatures elsewhere also serve as totems (at 78).
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(at 16 –17). The ‘irregularity’ which exists in this regard does not therefore 
necessarily mean the non-existence of a ‘structural principle’ (at 88). The 
theory which Freud (2001: XIII, 110 –13) explicitly rejected – that the different 
totem animals are a way of distinguishing between different clans – fi nds an 
important place in Lévi-Strauss’s theory. According to Lévi-Strauss (at 77– 8) 
it is precisely because of the resemblance in relation to the differences between 
animals and the differences between men that totemic representation takes 
place. In this respect the myths on which totems are based, reveal, as observed 
by Radcliffe-Brown, that they have a single theme:
The resemblances and differences of animal species are translated into 
terms of friendship and confl ict, solidarity and opposition. In other 
words the world of animal life is represented in terms of social relations 
similar to those of human society.
(at 87)
Developing this idea further, Lévi-Strauss concludes that the choice of totem 
is simply one of the ways in which a structural principle – that of the union 
of opposites – fi nds application (at 88). The relation that is in this way posited 
between correlations and oppositions can of course take place in a variety 
of ways, which explains the wide array of totem representations throughout 
the world. Totemism is thus merely one of the ways in which opposition is 
made to serve the purpose of integration, rather than being an obstacle 
thereto (at 89). Through his analysis of totemism and myth, Lévi-Strauss in 
essence attempts to show that the ‘savage mind’ is as logical or coherent as 
the ‘Western mind’, the only difference being the nature of the things to 
which they are applied (Lévi-Strauss 1963: 230; 1966: ch. 1).11 The study of 
the totem in archaic societies in particular shows the unconscious logical 
structures of the mind, which is a feature of all of humanity, and which 
remains beyond human control.12 In different societies, both ‘primitive’ and 
‘civilised’, one can thus observe the recurrence of the same patterns, as a 
consequence of the demand for order (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 10).
According to Lévi-Strauss, in The Elementary Structures of Kinship (1969: 
24 –5), the prohibition of incest nonetheless remains of importance as it 
provides the bridge between nature and culture, the latter being born only 
with the prohibition of incest.13 This prohibition nonetheless forms part of 
both nature and culture, seeing that it has the universality of an instinct and 
11 One incidentally also fi nds the use of totems in Western society; see Lévi-Strauss (1991: 
7– 8).
12 Lévi-Strauss uses the notion of the unconscious in a different way than Freud. It involves 
a kind of Saussurean ‘deep grammar’ or structural unconscious of society.
13 Lévi-Strauss (1969: 24): ‘It is the fundamental step because of which, by which, but above 
all in which, the transition from nature to culture is accomplished.’
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is thus part of nature (at 10) whereas it is at the same time subject to con-
tingent rules and thus part of culture:
It is a rule which embraces that which in society is most foreign to it, 
but also a social rule which retains what in nature is most likely to go 
beyond it. The incest prohibition is at once on the threshold of culture, 
and in one sense, as we shall try to show, culture itself.
(at 12)14
The primary role of culture, as Lévi-Strauss contends, is to ensure the con-
tinuing existence of the group as a group, and as in other domains, to replace 
chance by organisation (at 32). The rules of exogamy are instituted, as with 
all classifi cations, because of the need for order, specifi cally for the purpose 
of the continuous existence of the group. It is thus an intervention, but not 
in any arbitrary sense: ‘it is the intervention’ (at 32). Formally, as Lévi-Strauss 
points out, the prohibition is an assertion by the group that in relation to 
sexual matters one cannot simply do as one pleases (at 43). The incest pro-
hibition and its inverse, the rules of exogamy, are ‘culture itself ’ because they 
aim at ensuring that the distribution or circulation of women takes place 
under the control of the group and are the same for everyone (at 42, 45). 
The incest prohibition, because of its implications (she who may not be taken 
is given up) in other words amounts to a rule of reciprocity similar to an 
exchange of gifts (at 51ff.), with women being the most highly prized category 
of goods (at 51, 61–3). The exchange of women, similar to the totem, but 
more fundamentally so, serves the purpose of integration (at 25):
Consequently, exogamy should be recognized as an important element 
– doubtless by far the most important element – in that solemn collection of 
manifestations which, continually or periodically, ensures the integration 
of partial units within the total group, and demands the collaboration 
of outside groups. Such are the banquets, feasts and ceremonies of various 
kinds which form the web of social life. But exogamy is not merely one 
manifestation among many others. The feasts and ceremonies are periodic, 
and for the most part have limited functions. The law of exogamy, by 
contrast, is omnipresent, acting permanently and continually; moreover 
it applies to valuables – viz., women – valuables par excellence from both the 
biological and the social points of view, without which life is impossible, 
14 Like Freud, Lévi-Strauss was acutely aware of exceptions to the rule, but as he remarks, 
‘every society is an exception to the incest prohibition when seen by another society with a 
stricter rule’ (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 24). The universality of the incest prohibition is not estab-
lished by ignoring the ‘exceptions’ thereto, but by asking the question whether any society 
exists where no prohibitions on certain types of marriage exists. The answer to this question 
is ‘completely in the negative’ (at 9).
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or, at best, is reduced to the worst forms of abjection. It is no exagger-
ation, then, to say that exogamy is the archetype of all other manifestations 
based on reciprocity, and that it provides the fundamental and immutable 
rule ensuring the existence of the group as group.
(at 480 –1)
The prohibition of incest is therefore not in the fi rst place about not being 
allowed to marry one’s sister, mother or daughter because of some intrinsic 
quality, but about being obliged to give them to others (at 481). Marriage, Lévi-
Strauss (at 483) concludes, is the archetype of exchange and ‘the woman herself  
[is] the supreme gift among those that can only be obtained in the form of 
reciprocal gifts’ (at 65). The rules of exogamy are furthermore not necessarily 
tied to the totem in a specifi c way. In the Inuit, for example, exogamy is practised 
only in relation to the immediate family, with the consequence that it is not 
related to totemism (Lévi-Strauss 1991: 11–12). The latter requires the formation 
of a system on the social level. Totemism cannot therefore be said to have been 
a feature of all societies and there cannot be said to be an original form of 
totemism from which all others derive as Freud believed.15 In some Australian 
groups the rules of exogamy moreover have no relation to totemic beliefs and 
customs (Lévi-Strauss 1991: 36). For Lévi-Strauss, the incest prohibition, rather 
than totemism therefore lies at the origin of culture, which (together with 
their ability of speech) place ‘primitive’ societies on the same level as modern 
societies (OG 108). Freud’s contention in relation to exogamy and the existence 
of an intrinsic relation to the totem are thus rejected too. The prohibition against 
incest is moreover subject to different rules in different societies and one of 
these (matrilineal) cannot be said to be more originary than the others.16
15 Totems, where they are in use, can be said to play a secondary role in the system of exchange 
which can for now be said to be centred around the prohibition of incest.
16 Lévi-Strauss (1969: 490 –1) believes that Freud’s account of the primal horde gives expression to 
a dream, the magic and power of which ‘arises precisely from the fact that the acts it evokes 
have never been committed, because culture has opposed them at all times and in all places. 
Symbolic gratifi cations in which the incest urge fi nds its expression, according to Freud, do not 
therefore commemorate an actual event. They are something else, and more, the permanent 
expression of a desire for disorder, or rather counter-order’ (at 491). Lacan’s reading of Totem 
and Taboo shows a number of similarities with the reading of Lévi-Strauss. Lacan (2007: 123; 
see also Lacan 1992: 216 –18) reads the Freudian myth as a retroactive fantasy-like positing of 
a father who experiences unlimited jouissance in his enjoyment of all the women, in his being 
his own law, beyond the symbolic order with its accompanying castration or prohibition of 
jouissance. Lacan refers in this respect to the primal father as the ‘real father’ or ‘father of 
the (impossible) real’ whose killing leads to the institution of the order of symbolic exchange. 
With his death, his power of prohibition (of the jouissance of  his sons, i.e. all men) is not 
limited, but actually increased. (Lacan 1999 incidentally distinguishes phallic jouissance, which 
women also share, as they are also at least partly subject to the symbolic order, from woman’s 
or Other jouissance, which, he notes, may be possible); for commentary, see Verhaeghe (2007: 
43– 4); Grigg (2007: 58 – 67); Fink (1997: 110); Shephardson (2003: 137– 47).
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Derrida on Lévi-Strauss
The important contribution of structuralism according to Derrida lies in its 
placing in question of the concepts of metaphysics, such as the nature–culture 
opposition, its abandonment at times of a search for an absolute origin (WD 
286), its rejection of an evolutionary approach, and its attempt to undermine 
the assumptions of Eurocentrism. As we will see, structuralism’s relation to 
metaphysics nonetheless remains ambivalent and at times it is not vigilant 
enough about its reliance on the concepts of metaphysics in its critique of 
metaphysics. In the case of Lévi-Strauss, this is because the full implications of 
the idea of a classifi catory structure are not as yet grasped and also because 
of a residual nostalgia for origins and pure presence (WD 292). The notion of a 
structure, as Derrida points out, has operated since the inception of Western 
philosophy with the idea of a centre, point of presence or fi xed origin, which 
keeps the structure in place (WD 278). This centre has in addition the role of 
limiting the ‘play’ of the structure, the ‘fi eld of infi nite substitutions’, as Derrida 
also refers to it (WD 278, 289).17 Within the traditional concept of structure, 
‘play’ in this sense is allowed, but only within certain defi nable limits. The centre 
is therefore inside the structure, yet it is also ‘outside’ of the structure in the sense 
that it is not itself subject to the play of the structure (WD 278). In structuralism, 
and specifi cally in the work of Lévi-Strauss, we see the centre of the structure 
operating in this sense in relation to the prohibition against incest, which Lévi-
Strauss posits at the origin of culture. Derrida here provides a minute analysis 
of what is at stake in the nature–culture distinction and the role of the prohibition 
of incest as origin in Lévi-Strauss. As noted earlier, Lévi-Strauss points out in 
this regard that the prohibition of incest fi nds itself in the peculiar position that 
it seems to (1) itself form part of the transparent system of (cultural) differences, 
and that (2) it at the same time provides the origin of the difference between 
nature and culture; it is therefore also located outside of the (cultural) system as 
its condition of possibility (OG 103– 4).18 The diffi culty Lévi-Strauss encounters 
here ties in with the traditional, metaphysical distinction which he adopts 
between nature and culture, and which he views as ‘two mutually exclusive orders’ 
(Lévi-Strauss 1969: 8). In accordance with this distinction, that which is uni-
versal and spontaneous, and which is not dependent on a particular culture or 
determinate norm, belongs to nature, whereas that which depends upon a 
determinate system of norms, which can vary in different societies, belongs to 
culture (WD 283). As we saw above, the prohibition against incest is universal 
and therefore must fall within nature, yet it is also determined by norms, 
subject to variation, and must therefore at the same time form part of culture 
17 The notions of ‘play’, substitution/supplement and writing bear a quasi-psychoanalytical 
connotation; see Chapter 5 and see further de Ville (2011).
18 Something similar happens with Rousseau in relation to pity, modesty and reason in their 
relation to boundless passion; see OG 174 –5, 179– 80.
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(WD 283, OG 104).19 Lévi-Strauss therefore refers to the prohibition of incest as 
a ‘scandal’ as it does not appear to fi t neatly into the traditional metaphysical 
framework (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 8 –9). As Derrida (WD 283) however notes, there 
is a ‘scandal’ here only because of the reliance on the concepts of metaphysics, 
here the nature–culture distinction. Lévi-Strauss, in spite of his awareness of the 
problem surrounding the nature–culture distinction, is nonetheless prepared 
to make use of this (metaphysical) distinction as a tool in his analysis or what 
he (Lévi-Strauss) refers to as bricolage. In this respect, Lévi-Strauss can be said 
to separate method from truth (WD 284). Both in relation to the concept of 
structure in general and here specifi cally with the incest prohibition in struc-
turalism, a contradiction is at stake which as Derrida notes ‘expresses the force 
of a desire’ (WD 279). In other words, because of the ‘play’ of the structure, 
and in order to counter the anxiety that goes along with this, metaphysics 
responds with a desire for presence.20 We can also express this in a different 
way: the incest prohibition does not simply produce a scandal to the concepts 
of metaphysics, but escapes these concepts, precedes them, perhaps as their 
condition of possibility (WD 283). How does the prohibition of incest relate 
to this pre-origin of play? Derrida accuses metaphysics of wanting us not to 
contemplate the origin of this prohibition:
It could perhaps be said that the whole of philosophical conceptualization, 
which is systematic with the nature–culture opposition, is designed to 
leave in the domain of the unthinkable the very thing that makes this con-
ceptualization possible: the origin of the prohibition of incest.
(WD 283– 4)
As appears from this passage, the ‘centre’ that is posited by structuralism 
(here the prohibition of incest) is already a substitute or a supplement, not 
of some pre-existing presence, or of an absence, but that which precedes the 
presence/absence distinction. The positing of an origin in other words always 
goes along with the suppression of its own pre-origin. The origin of this 
prohibition is explored further in Of Grammatology where Derrida discusses 
this prohibition in relation to the texts of Lévi-Strauss as well as of Rousseau.21 
19 See also OG 263–5. The fact that incest is prohibited or at least avoided also in the ‘higher 
primates’ of course further complicates this distinction; see FWT 66.
20 See further below on the nature of this anxiety.
21 This text of course also concerns itself  with the speech–writing opposition which ties in 
closely with the matter under discussion. For reasons of space, we will not analyse this 
aspect here (see Chapter 2), suffi ce to note that Lévi-Strauss’s nostalgia for a lost origin 
is tied to the perceived absence of writing in the communities living in seeming harmony 
with nature (OG 119, 136). If  one views writing in the broad way as Derrida does (the trace 
left by the desire for death, as we will see just now), Lévi-Strauss’s view comes across 
as somewhat naïve, as does his depiction of these communities (in light of the seeming 
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Here we return to the notion of ‘desire’ raised above. The desire for presence 
follows, as we noted, from the absence or rather abyss of presence, namely 
the representational structure which structuralism has exposed and which 
makes full presence impossible (OG 163). This abyss, which is the pre-
origin of representation, itself  involves a form of desire. What is ‘desired’ 
is ultimately total enjoyment, absolute expenditure – that is, death, ‘our 
indestructible mortal desire’ (OG 152, 183– 4, 266) or what Derrida also 
refers to as arche-writing (the trace left by this ‘desire’ for death).22 This 
means that the mother and the sister (the objects of incestuous desire) 
are always already supplements of what is ultimately desired (OG 156 –7, 
266).23 The mother (and/or sister) as fundamental signifi ed (in structuralism) 
is thus herself  in the position of signifi er and does not escape play (OG 266). 
This in turn means that the genealogical relation and social classifi cation 
which Lévi-Strauss analyses in his texts are themselves what Derrida refers 
to as ‘the stitched seam of arche-writing’ (OG 125). They are in other words 
secondary attempts at bringing to an end, at arresting unlimited play. The 
relation between unlimited play and the gift is explored further by Derrida 
in Given Time (Chapter 5). The relation between the circular exchange of 
women (and goods) on the one hand, and the gift on the other, recognised 
by Lévi-Strauss and Mauss, is here repositioned, reinscribed in relation to 
the perfect gift.24 As we will see in Chapter 5, the perfect gift does not involve 
exchange (as then it would no longer have the value of gift) and provides 
the condition of possibility of all circular exchange in accordance with the 
applicable rules of exogamy (in relation to women). The prohibition of incest 
which Lévi-Strauss posits at the origin of society is in other words itself  
made possible only by a restriction of absolute desire, of the perfect gift, of 
the pre-origin.25 We will now see how all of the above feed into Derrida’s 
essay ‘Before the law’.
absence of writing) as innocent and non-violent, despite clear evidence to the contrary; 
see OG 110, 120.
22 In Meno 77c–d Socrates defi nes desire as ‘to secure for oneself ’ so that ‘desire’ needs to be 
placed here in inverted commas.
23 Auto-eroticism and hetero-eroticism play a similar supplementary role; see OG 155.
24 In Lévi-Strauss’s critique of Mauss’s The Gift, as Derrida (GT 74 – 6) notes, Lévi-Strauss 
reduces the gift to exchange and thereby effectively annuls the very possibility of the gift. 
Derrida’s analysis ties in closely with that of Bataille (2006: 197–220), who investigates the 
link between the prohibition of incest in Lévi-Strauss and eroticism, the latter being intimately 
linked with death.
25 In Glas 136, 191–200 we fi nd a similar type of analysis in the context of Hegel and Genet, 
of the relation between marriage, incest and absolute pleasure. In the case of blood-relations, 
the individuals, Hegel contends, do not have ‘any personality proper to themselves’ (199a); 
behind incest thus appears to hide a ‘bare self-hunger’, a desire for ‘an absolute self-having’ 
(198c).
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Before the law26
In Kafka’s Before the Law (Vor dem Gesetz)27 a man from the country comes 
to seek access to the law, but a doorkeeper indicates that at the moment, the 
man is prohibited from entering. The man, upon peering through the open 
gate, is told by the doorkeeper that should he manage to enter without his 
permission (i.e. that of the fi rst doorkeeper) there are many other doorkeepers 
much more powerful than himself. The man waits for many years, but the 
doorkeeper, despite the man’s repeated attempts to gain admission (also 
through bribery and later even by begging the fl eas in the fur collar of the 
doorkeeper), never allows him in. The doorkeeper on a number of occasions 
asks him questions about his home and other things, but in an indifferent 
manner, like great lords (‘grosse Herren’) do. When he is about to die, the 
doorkeeper tells him in answer to his question that no one else sought to 
enter through this door as it was meant solely for him (the man from the 
country), and says that he will now shut it. How does Kafka’s Before the 
Law tie in with the earlier discussion of totemism and the prohibition of 
incest? In Derrida’s essay, dating from 1982, this relation is posited through 
a quasi-psychoanalytical reading of Before the Law.28 Freud’s originary tale 
is itself  read by Derrida as ‘literature’ (understood here in its strict sense, as 
will be explained), in that an event is narrated which is actually an event of 
nothing and consequently cannot be said to speak of an ‘origin’ as is usually 
thought. We will in addition see in Derrida’s reading of these two texts allusions 
to the notion of ‘play’ and to the perfect gift as discussed above.
Derrida alludes to the idea of the play of the structure in his discussion 
of the title of Kafka’s Before the Law.29 When deciding whether a text such 
as this is of the literary type, the text would effectively be brought ‘before 
the law’. However, as Derrida points out, the text at stake here (Kafka’s 
Before the Law) already stages this procedure, it enfolds it within its structure; 
26 The word ‘law’ as it appears in the English version is in every instance a translation of the 
French ‘la loi’ which Derrida uses throughout the text. Where Derrida uses ‘droit’ it is 
consistently translated as ‘right’. In the French original the text has the title ‘Préjugés: devant 
la loi’ and includes a refl ection on the work of Lyotard. These parts do not appear in the 
English translation and have, as far as I am aware, not been translated into English.
27 Published for the fi rst time in the journal Selbstwehr (Prague), IX, No. 34 (7 Sept. 1915). 
See Kafka (1997) for references to this and subsequent publications of Vor dem Gesetz; my 
thanks to Howard Cagill for alerting me to these versions. The text also forms part of 
Kafka’s The Trial, where it does not appear under this title.
28 Derrida refers to his essay on Kafka in ‘Force of law’ (AR 235), to indicate that he has for 
a long time been concerned with the question of justice, and in associating the man from 
the country before the law with the revolutionary moment where the law (la loi) is still 
undetermined, yet to come (AR 270).
29 Later on (AL 212, 216) Derrida refers to ‘the effect produced by the play of the title’ and of 
literature as being able to ‘play the law’, ‘playing at being the law’ and ‘deceiving the law’.
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it questions the law itself  which would arrogate to itself  the power to question 
it (AL 188). Derrida’s text, bearing the same title, can be said to repeat this 
gesture. As we will see, it lays down the law (or condition of possibility) of 
laws (as well as of literature (AL 36)). Usually we would assume from the 
title (here: Before the Law) that it refers to the subject-matter of the story. 
The title in other words heads the story and refers to what will be happening 
in the story. The title gives the story an identity and is important in the 
determination of property rights, more specifi cally, copyright. By making law 
(referring here to law or a legal system which traditionally accords a legal title 
to a story) part of the title of the story, the question is raised as to what gives 
law the right or what entitles the law to do so. It in other words questions 
whether literature is to be understood only in the sense in which it is defi ned 
and circumscribed by law, that is to say as having a certain identity (unity), 
an author and entailing the narration of  events.30 Kafka’s text, a singularity 
which is ‘before’ the law, as Derrida shows in his reading, can indeed be said 
to not have a unity or an identity. Before exploring this further, it is necessary 
to fi rst give attention to the meaning of the word ‘before’ in the title. The 
title names a space: before the law. Derrida refers in this regard to a singularity, 
but this should not be understood as positing an opposition between the 
singular (the individual(s) appearing before the law) and the general (the 
generality of law’s rules).31 The latter does not only refer to someone appearing 
before or in front of a judge in a court, but also to that which precedes law, 
the condition of possibility of law (AL 216).32 At stake here is what Derrida 
will, with clear reference to Freud’s topology of the mind, refer to as a ‘dif-
ferantial atopology’ (AL 208). Derrida notes in this respect that the man 
from country (as is the case with literature) is not only before the law, but 
also prior to the law in a certain sense (AL 216). He is both a subject of the 
law, and outside of the law, an outlaw (AL 204). As we will see below, this 
follows from the man’s non-identity with himself. He furthermore gives him-
self  the law and in that sense is outside of, precedes the law, apart from his 
being subject to the law. Kafka’s text does something similar in so far as it 
can be said to be a ‘pure story, or story without story’ (AL 209). Kafka’s 
30 Derrida explores similar themes in AL 221–52 (‘The law of genre’) with reference to 
Blanchot’s The Madness of the Day; see Chapter 2.
31 The introduction to the essay by the editor of the collection Derek Attridge, and specifi cally 
the assertion that Kafka’s essay deals with the ‘problematic relation between the singular 
and the general’ (at 181) should be treated with circumspection. Beardsworth’s analysis of 
the essay (1996: 25– 45), which is excellent in many respects, unfortunately also leans in the 
direction of such an interpretation (at 25, 41–3). See Gasché (1999: 297– 8) who shows an 
appreciation for the complexity that is at stake here. See further Chapter 6.
32 Derrida also refers in various places throughout the essay (AL 186, 218) to his own arraign-
ment before the law in Prague, on a charge of drug traffi cking, thereby including himself  
as one who is ‘before the law’ in the double sense that this phrase bears.
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text can moreover be described as ‘literature’ in the strict sense, non-identical 
to itself, essentially unreadable, intangible, or as Derrida puts it, ‘[i]t is the 
law, makes the law and leaves the reader before the law [Il est la loi, fait la 
loi et laisse le lecteur devant la loi.]’ (AL 211).33 It bears witness to and shows 
respect for the law before the law.34
Derrida notes that of the law itself, apart from its name, nothing is said in 
Before the Law; it (the law) is silent (AL 208). The law, das Gesetz, is of course 
capitalised like a proper name in the original German (Vor dem Gesetz). We 
do not know what, who or where it is. We do not know whether it is ‘a thing, a 
person, a discourse, a voice, a document, or simply a nothing that incessantly 
defers access to itself, thus forbidding itself in order thereby to become 
something or someone’ (AL 208). Das Gesetz is furthermore neuter, annulling 
the opposition between masculine and feminine, indeterminate, leaving the 
man from the country to freely determine himself  (AL 204, 206 –7). This 
self-determination is nevertheless at the same time cancelled out through the 
prohibition of entering the law. We are again concerned here with the question 
of identity, both of the man from the country and of Kafka’s text. As Derrida 
notes, neither the identity nor the non-identity of a text is natural; it is the 
result of a juridical performative. Although this can be said of all texts, it is 
uniquely the case with Kafka’s Before the Law, as it:
poses before us, preposes and proposes a text that lays down the law, and 
in the fi rst place with respect to itself. In its very act, the text produces 
and pronounces the law that protects it and renders it intangible. It does 
and says, saying what it does by doing what it says.
(AL 212)
Kant’s Second Critique (the Critique of Practical Reason) plays an important 
background role in Derrida’s analysis.35 As Derrida points out, for law as 
such (pure morality) to have authority according to Kant, it is required that 
it not have a history. The law (as such) must present itself  as ‘an absolutely 
emergent order, absolute and detached from any origin’ (AL 191, 194). The 
condition of possibility of laws, that which makes them laws, the law of laws, 
the law itself, thus remains concealed, and for this reason is enticing, or as 
Derrida puts it, involves letting ‘oneself  be tempted by the impossible’ (AL 
192). When one does tell stories about law’s origin, these at best deal with 
its modes of revelation. The law itself  cannot be made present; one cannot 
33 See also ‘WB’ 149–50. Gasché (1999: 294) refers to the law at stake here as a ‘quasi-
transcendental (legal) fi ction’.
34 See also Beardsworth (1996: 34, 37, 38).
35 For a more detailed consideration of Kant in the legal context, see Derrida’s ‘Privilege’ in 
WAO 1– 66.
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reach it or enter into a relation with it. Derrida suggests that the same can 
be said of Kafka’s man from the country as well as of the characters in 
Freud’s primal horde in so far as none of them gain entry into the law itself.36 
Freud’s mythical tale, which as we know was preceded by self-analysis (a 
smelling out of the origins of law, as Derrida (AL 194) puts it), seeks to 
uncover law’s origin through what appears to be a historical account. Freud 
can in broad terms be said to have believed that the origin of law is to be 
found in repression (AL 192). Yet as suggested above, Freud’s narrative is an 
uncanny one, similar to Kafka’s Before the Law (AL 210 –11), as no event in 
the ordinary sense is related. Even though the father is killed by the brothers, 
the father now becomes more alive, more powerful than before. The crime is 
thus totally useless as nobody is actually killed (AL 198). Freud (2001: XIII 
159) furthermore notes that the brothers felt remorse immediately after the 
deed and thus already before the institution of morality and law by them.37 As 
Derrida points out, the events (a ‘quasi-event’ or a ‘pure event’) as recounted 
by Freud inaugurate nothing ‘since repentance and morality had to be possible 
before the commission of the crime’ (AL 198).38 What Derrida is suggesting 
here is that Freud’s account (a simulacrum of narration) implicitly points 
to a ‘law’ or condition of possibility that must have preceded and made pos-
sible the institution of law and morality, similar to Kafka’s Before the Law.39 
This ‘pre-origin’ of morality and law is, as we will see, closely related to the 
‘desire’ referred to earlier and of course to a Kantian ‘pure morality’ as well 
as the perfect gift.
There are clearly a number of similarities between Kafka’s Before the Law 
and Freud’s attempt to understand the psyche.40 In relation to Kafka’s text, 
Derrida for example remarks that it does not point to any actual experience 
(AL 191) and similarly, that it opens ‘on nothing, before nothing, the object 
of no possible experience’ (AL 212).41 Derrida furthermore refers to the 
abundance of hair – natural as well as artifi cial – in Before the Law, as well 
36 See also Psy I 128.
37 Freud (2001: XIII 143 fn. 1) comments in this respect that ‘failure is far more propitious 
for a moral reaction than satisfaction’.
38 Freud (2001: XXI 131–3) appears to acknowledge this to a certain extent when in ‘Civilization 
and its discontents’ he traces the feeling of guilt to ‘the eternal struggle between Eros and 
the instinct of destruction or death’, although he still views this relation in oppositional terms.
39 See also BS 245; and Beardsworth (1996: 31) who notes that for the brothers to have felt 
remorse, there should already have been in place a prior law which they breached (and not 
produced) by committing the murder.
40 Derrida (AL 192) notes that it is well known that Kafka read Freud. His subsequent remark 
(AL 192) that ‘this relation is of little interest to us’ and remarks to similar effect (e.g. AL 
195) should clearly not be taken at face value, but as itself  an attempt at ‘deceiving the law’; 
see AL 216.
41 ‘Nothing’ here refers to nothing that is present, something without essence, without truth, 
and is not to be simply equated with ‘the nothing’ in Heidegger; see ‘TID’ 246 –7.
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as to the nose of the doorman (symbolising the genital zone), itself  adorned 
with hair on the inside. Freud’s letters to Wilhelm Fliess, incidentally an ear, 
nose and throat specialist and Freud’s close friend until around 1900, indicates 
that Freud was concerned not only with repression as origin, but with what 
he referred to as ‘knowledge of the essential thing lying behind it [i.e. ‘behind’ 
repression]’ (Freud 1985: 279; AL 193).42 Freud at the time expressed the idea 
that morality comes from man’s uprightness, the distancing that this entails 
from the sexual zones. This uprightness ensures ‘[d]elay, difference, ennobling 
elevation, diversion of the olfactory sense from the sexual stench, repression’ 
(AL 193). This turning away from the sexual zones, Derrida comments:
is an upward movement. The high (and therefore the great) and the pure, are 
what repression produces as origin of morality, they are what is better 
absolutely, they are the origin of value and of the judgment of value.
(AL 194)
This uprightness is clearly a feature of the doorkeeper who speaks to the 
countryman like a great lord and who becomes taller as the narrative progresses 
whilst the man from the country becomes smaller (AL 207– 8).43 As Derrida 
furthermore notes, it is at the sight of the doorman with his abundance of 
hair and his pointed nose that the man from the country decides rather to 
wait (AL 195). At stake here, as will appear from the discussion that follows, 
is an anxiety about absolute pleasure/death, alluded to above in relation to 
‘play’. As we will see, the doorkeeper can in a sense be said to be ‘produced’ 
by the countryman so as to defer entering the door of the law.44 Although 
Derrida does not refer explicitly to Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle,45 
a text which he (Derrida) gave a detailed reading to in 1980 (Chapter 1) – 
42 The letter in question is that of 14 Nov. 1897. See also SM 26 on the possibility of a step 
beyond repression.
43 With reference to Kafka’s Zur Frage der Gesetze (The Problem of Our Laws), Derrida notes 
that the task of keeping this secret is delegated to the nobility, and they ‘are nothing but 
this’ (AL 205). It would be a great risk for the people to rid themselves of the nobility.
44 It needs to be noted at this point that according to Freud a door in dreams, together with 
windows and gates, stands for openings or orifi ces in the body (Freud 2001: V 346; XV 158, 
159). In Resistances, Derrida notably refers with reference to Foucault, to Freud as a door-
keeper (Res 79).
45 There is nevertheless a reference to the fort /da game of Ernst which Freud recounts and 
which Derrida analyses in ‘To speculate – on Freud’ (see AL 208; Chapter 1). The accom-
panying description clearly corresponds with Derrida’s analysis of Freud’s death drive in 
that text: ‘Guardian after guardian. This differantial topology [topique differantielle] adjourns, 
guardian after guardian, within the polarity of high and low, far and near ( fort/da), now 
and later. The same topology without its own place, the same atopology [atopique], the same 
madness defers the law [la loi ] as the nothing that forbids itself  and the neuter that annuls 
oppositions. This atopology annuls that which takes place, the event itself.’
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that is, two years before the fi rst presentation of ‘Before the law’ – we see in 
the present essay clear allusions to the conservative drives (the doorkeeper) 
as the guardians of life, protecting the man from the country from his own 
desire for death (the law of law) until death (AL 211).46 As Derrida notes, 
the doorkeeper does not prevent by force the man from entering, although 
as noted earlier, he comments on his own powerfulness as well as that of the 
other doorkeepers. There is also no absolute prohibition from entering, but 
only a delay.47 One could say that no obstacle or barrier exists; the door 
simply marks a limit (AL 203). The man from the country thus effectively 
prohibits himself  from entering (AL 203), as Derrida puts it:
He must force himself, give himself  an order, not to obey the law [la loi ] 
but rather to not gain access to the law [la loi ], which in fact tells him 
or lets him know: do not come to me. I order you not to come yet to 
me. It is there and in this that I am law [la loi ] and that you will accede 
to my demand, without gaining access to me.
(AL 203, fn. omitted)
Derrida (AL 204) refers in this respect to the law of law as ‘itself  prohibited, 
a prohibited place’ (AL 203). The law thus forbids itself, and in that sense 
contradicts itself  and places the man from the country in this contradiction 
or double bind. One cannot enter into a relation (of respect)48 with the law 
itself; one cannot reach it directly, but only by way of its examples,49 its 
representatives, its guardians. These function at the same time as interrupters 
(AL 203– 4). Of the law itself, how it presents itself  and whence it comes, one 
must remain ignorant, without knowledge (AL 204). Read with Derrida’s 
The Post Card (PC 82, 351, 360 –2) and Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
46 The link between death and the law is made inter alia with reference to Saint Paul (AL 219).
47 Derrida notes (AL 202) that with this delay, time appears, in the story of course, but also 
in a more general sense; see further Chapter 5.
48 Derrida clearly alludes here to Kant’s doctrine of practical reason which is discussed briefl y 
as well as referred to elsewhere in this text (AL 190 –1, 199, 209, 210). With reference to an 
earlier seminar, Derrida attempts a reading of pure reason which, as he notes, links it with 
‘an unconscious fantastic’ (AL 199). This is tied to the strange relation Kant posits between 
the moral good on the one hand and the example, the symbol and the type. In respect of 
the example, Derrida notes that ‘although [respect is] never addressed to things, [it] is 
nevertheless aimed at persons only insofar as they offer an example of  the moral law: this 
respect is due only to the moral law, which never shows itself  but is the only cause of that 
respect’. The reading is furthermore tied to the second formulation of  the categorical 
imperative (‘Act as if the maxim of your action were by your will to turn into a universal 
law of nature’, italics added) which as Derrida notes ‘almost introduces narrativity and 
fi ction into the very core of legal thought’ (AL 190). The notion of respect is raised a number 
of times (e.g. AL 200: ‘standing before the law, the doorkeeper enforces respect for it’).
49 The allusion here is again to Kant.
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(Freud 2001: XVIII 39), the doorkeeper functions, as noted, as guardian of 
life, but also as a satellite of death, as an indifferent zone of différance, seeking 
to ensure that the self  dies its own proper death; that the countryman does 
not go directly towards death.50 A desire for the proper dominates therefore, 
in spite of the fact that the guardians who seek to assure this, ultimately 
serve death, via a detour, a delay (Chapter 1). The later doorkeepers, that is, 
the satellites closest to the desire for death/absolute pleasure are, as the fi rst 
doorkeeper remarks, even more prohibitive and have a greater power of 
deferral than the fi rst one. This interminable différance, Derrida notes, lasts 
‘up to the end of (the) man’ (AL 204).51 Clearly alluding to, but in an effort 
to undermine the originary nature of the Oedipus complex (as well as of the 
prohibition of incest) Derrida points out that what is delayed is not some 
experience, enjoyment or supreme good, and neither is it the possession or 
penetration of something or someone:
What is deferred forever till death is entry into the law itself  [la loi elle-
même], which is nothing other than that which dictates the delay. The 
law [La loi ] prohibits by interfering with and deferring the ‘ference’ 
[‘férance’], the reference, the rapport, the relation. What must not and 
cannot be approached is the origin of différance: it must not be presented 
or represented and above all not penetrated. That is the law of the law 
[Voilà la loi de la loi] ... It is neither natural nor institutional.
(AL 205)52
50 The sexual seductiveness of the law of law is also analysed by Derrida in ‘The law of genre’ 
with reference to Blanchot’s The Madness of the Day, see specifi cally AL 247– 8.
51 Agamben (1998: 49– 67; 1999: 169–71) reads Kafka’s Before the Law as portraying the idea of 
the sovereign exception – the being in force of the law without signifi cance – which has become 
the rule in modernity. According to Agamben, law in this way becomes indistinguishable from 
(bare) life. He sees the man from the country as having ultimately succeeded in his aim – of 
having the door closed – that is, interrupting the law’s being in force without signifi cance. This 
will allow him (as a messianic fi gure) to enter, as he can do so only after the law’s being in force 
without signifi cance has come to an end. Agamben thus sees in the man from the country (as 
in homo sacer), whose life coincides with death, a fi gure of silent resistance. There are of course 
a number of differences, but also clear overlaps between this reading and that of Derrida, especially 
when one compares it with a text such as ‘Plato’s pharmacy’ and the fi gure of the pharmakos 
(Dis 130 –5). A more detailed analysis of Agamben’s reading cannot be undertaken here. A com-
ment is however required in relation to Agamben’s remark that Derrida/deconstruction simply 
exposes this being in force of law without signifi cance and thereby remains inside nihilism 
(Agamben 1998: 54, 59, 60; 1999: 170 –1). As should be clear from the present and other chapters, 
this accusation is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Derrida’s work, specifi cally in 
relation to the ultra-ethical at stake there. For a response from Derrida to Agamben’s analysis, 
although not specifi cally in relation to this reading of ‘Before the law’, see BS 315–34.
52 The Oedipus complex is repositioned especially in PC 340 –1 as only one of the possible, 
and more precisely, one of the most restrictive effects of différance. See also OH 93–121 
where Derrida gives a reading to Oedipus at Colonus which ties in closely with the analysis 
here of Kafka’s Before the Law.
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According to Derrida, the secret that is guarded is of nothing present or 
presentable,53 and the doorkeeper thus guards nothing (AL 205, 206).54 He 
com pares this situation with Hegel’s account of the story of Pompey 
(106BC– 48BC) who enters the innermost part of the tabernacle, fi nding there 
however no image of any being as he expected, but only an empty space.55 
Hegel comments that Pompey ‘concluded from this that the genuine secret 
was itself  entirely extraneous to them, the Jews; it was unseen and unfelt 
(ungesehen und ungefühlt)’ (AL 208). The relation of the secret with sexuality 
is further explored by Derrida in his analysis of the phrase ‘ante portas’ 
(before the gates), which refers to the place of premature ejaculation and 
which could also be said to be alluded to in the title of Kafka’s text.56 Der-
rida however seeks to loosen this expression somewhat from its common 
meaning and Freudian analysis. At stake here, he notes, is a non-penetration 
(and non-insemination), whether this is because of premature ejaculation or 
non-ejaculation. The result would be the same: ‘The tabernacle remains empty 
and dissemination fatal. Relation to the law remains interrupted, a without-
relation’ (AL 209). The doorkeeper, Derrida furthermore notes, is not ante 
portas, but ante portam: he guards the door, insisting on the uniqueness and 
singularity of this door (AL 210). Derrida views this as one of Kant’s most 
acute insights: that the law is always an idiom, and not a universal general-
ity; it is meant for you alone. Nonetheless one cannot succeed in entering it. 
Like the law of law, the text ‘guards itself, maintains itself  ... speaking only 
of itself, that is to say, of its non-identity with itself ’ (AL 211). The text is 
ultimately ungraspable, incomprehensible, or impregnable. It is intangible, 
not only because we cannot, but because we also have no right to touch it 
(AL 212).57
53 In his essay on Nelson Mandela, Derrida refers similarly to ‘the law of laws’ (‘NM’ 29) and 
a ‘law beyond legality’ (‘NM’ 34) – a law which has not as yet presented itself  – in the name 
of which Mandela challenges the legal system; see Gasché (1994: 17–20); Bischof (2004: 
208 –9); Lawlor (2009: 9–14); Bernasconi (1993: 106 – 8).
54 The notion of the secret ties in with the question of inheritance referred to above. Derrida 
(AF 10 –11, 35) suggests that the desire for death does not itself  leave an archive – it is archive 
destroying – but it transits through an archive, a (ciphered) transgenerational memory or 
archive; see also PC 353; FWT 3– 6. At stake is therefore an ‘inheritance’ that precedes the 
biology–culture, body–psyche distinction.
55 See also Glas 49a–50a. Note further that according to Hegel, as Derrida (Glas 49a) notes, 
‘space is death’.
56 Derrida also repeats this move in ‘concluding’ his text prematurely a number of times, see 
e.g. AL 209, 212, the text ending only on AL 220.
57 On the untouchability of the literary text, see further PM 141–2. The link between untouch-
ability and sexuality is made at AL 194 –5. See further PC 341–5 on the relation between 
‘literary fi ction’ and the (demonic) death drive.
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Originary guilt and parricide
At this point we are in a position to appreciate the similarities between 
Derrida’s reading of Freud’s originary myth and Kafka’s Before the Law, as 
well as to see how his analysis ties in with the notion of justice. In the latter 
respect, it will for now perhaps be suffi cient to point out that in ‘Force of 
law’, the notion of justice takes the place of what is here referred to as ‘the 
law of law’ (la loi de la loi), and is furthermore distinguished from le droit 
(Chapter 6). As will be indicated in Chapter 6, the notion of justice in ‘Force 
of Law’ needs similarly to be understood in close relation to Freud’s thinking. 
The same applies to the discussion of justice in Specters of Marx (Chapter 7). 
The question of guilt, which clearly plays a role in the texts referred to above, 
in a sense links all these texts.58 Derrida elaborates on the notion of ‘originary 
guilt’ in a number of texts, specifi cally with reference to Nietzsche, Levinas, 
Blanchot, Freud and Heidegger.59 Here one fi nds for example the idea expressed 
that a rigorous distinction can never be drawn between death and murder.60 
The survivors, namely all those living and delaying entering the door of the 
law, are always already guilty and required to ask forgiveness for their being-
there which inevitably involves murder (AR 383–5).61 This originary guilt 
does not therefore wait for the commission of any particular crime, and gives 
rise to an infi nite responsibility (G&L 52–3), a duty beyond all debt (WM 
204 –5; A 6). In the essay ‘To forgive: the unforgivable and the imprescriptable’, 
Derrida gives expression to this responsibility and duty, by tying together 
the notions of originary guilt, the gift, forgiveness and hospitality, by noting 
that ‘I always have to be forgiven, to ask forgiveness for not giving, for never 
giving enough, for never offering or welcoming enough. One is always guilty, 
58 In ‘Préjugés’ 95 Derrida explicitly makes the link between being before the law and originary 
guilt.
59 See specifi cally Being and Time where Heidegger (1962: 332) remarks as follows on the 
origin of morality: ‘This essential Being-guilty is, equiprimordially, the existential condition 
for the possibility of the “morally” good and for that of the “morally” evil – that is, for 
morality in general and for the possible forms which this may take factically. The primordial 
“Being-guilty” cannot be defi ned by morality, since morality already presupposes it for itself.’ 
Derrida reads this as a capacity to be responsible before any debt, fault or law in the ordinary 
sense, as well as beyond subjectivity, knowledge and consciousness (PC 264 fn. 10).
60 See further PC 363.
61 In a number of texts, including Specters of Marx and Rogues, Derrida derives from this a 
responsibility not only towards those presently alive, but also towards those who are dead 
and still to be born (SM xix; R 54 –5). In BS 110, this responsibility is specifi cally linked to 
the guilt/shame of the sons in killing the primal father: ‘[I]t is not certain that even in the 
originary history or fi ction of the murder of the primal father according to which the 
brother-sons subject themselves to the law because, says Freud, the shame of their crime 
compels them to do so, it is not certain that this shame does not signify, always already, in 
its possibility, the bond of obligation or debt with respect to the dead.’
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one must always be forgiven the gift.’ (‘TF’ 22) At stake in this notion of 
originary guilt is thus something arche-ethical, ultra-ethical, or as Derrida also 
puts it with reference to Heidegger and Nietzsche, ‘a pre-ethical, pre-moral, 
pre-juridical conscience’ (Neg 223). Originary guilt could, with reference to 
the present context, be said to lie in the breach of the law itself, the law 
before the law, a breach which has always already occurred.62 Whereas Kafka’s 
text fairly easily lends itself  to such a notion of originary guilt, as we saw, 
Freud’s text calls for a somewhat greater effort.63
The above analysis is also important for understanding the notions of 
friendship and the democracy to come in their relation with sovereignty in 
Derrida’s thinking. From Derrida’s reading it appears that in Freud’s myth 
nothing really happens, as the father, after his murder, becomes even more 
powerful than before. In telling the myth, Freud furthermore continues the 
tradition of privileging the friendship between rival brothers in the construction 
of democratic equality, or, as Derrida puts it in Rogues, ‘the sharing of kratos 
in the dBmos’ (R 16 –17). Sovereignty, defi ned by Schmitt (1985: 5) as the 
ability to decide on the exception, thus simply takes a slightly new form in 
this transition from the violence of one to the violence of the community, 
as also happens in politics with the transition from monarchy to democracy, 
both these forms of rule remaining tied to the idea of a sovereign God, a 
father (FWT 91–2). Even modern democracy is thus based on a monarchical 
principle (WA 260). As Derrida however shows in ‘Plato’s pharmacy’, and 
as Naas (2003: 12–13) elegantly puts it, the son is ‘the father of the father, 
the father already an effect of the son’.64 This is of course because the father 
is invoked by the son in light of the fear of death (Dis 123– 4). A more 
radical parricide (a different kind of revolution, as we will see in Chapter 7) 
62 See also the fi rst part of PTT 85–100 where Derrida analyses the reaction to the events of 
September 11, 2001, in terms of an originary trauma. This ties in closely with Freud’s 
analysis of anxiety. In the New Introductory Lectures, Freud (2001: XXII 59) e.g. asks, 
perhaps rhetorically: ‘How would it be if  these insane people were right, if  in each of us 
there is present in his ego an agency like this which observes and threatens to punish, and 
which in them has merely become sharply divided from their ego and mistakenly displaced 
into external reality.’ Derrida in AL 209–10 also seems to allude to a kind of originary 
anxiety in his discussion of ante portas (see above).
63 Derrida alludes to his own originary guilt with reference to his experience in Prague, simi-
lar to that of K in The Trial (AL 218). The notion of originary guilt raises interesting 
questions about criminal law. If  ‘criminals’ commit crimes in acting upon this originary 
guilt, as Freud and Derrida seem to suggest, the attempt to make ‘guilt’ part of a system 
of exchange (in terms of which criminals are caught and punished) raises serious questions 
about the legitimacy of the criminal justice system as a whole; see FWT 176 – 80. This 
system could be said to inherently not be able to address ‘crime’ on the level where things 
actually ‘happen’.
64 See similarly Glas 56a.
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would have to take place than what we fi nd (explicitly) in Freud’s myth if  we 
are to displace sovereignty in relation to an originary guilt instead of viewing 
guilt as a consequence of the commission of some specifi c crime. This is 
indeed what happens in Derrida’s reading where Freud’s myth is placed in a 
mise-en-abyme, similar to the story of Kafka, without origin or foundation. 
These texts are effectively (made) unreadable, and in this way deprived of a 
father who would seek to assure meaning (SQ 146 –7; Dis 82, 126). They 
leave us with a concept of law which does not have its origin in the Oedipus 
complex and which has no essence, but which is instead to be understood as 
a repetitive search for the proper as a counter-reaction to the desire for death /
absolute pleasure, as a ‘stricture’ of this desire for the perfect gift.
Chapter 4
Madness and the law
Not only the reason of millennia – the madness of millennia too breaks 
out in us. It is dangerous to be an heir.
Nietzsche Thus Spoke Zarathustra 102
The law is mad. The law is mad, is madness; but madness is not the 
predicate of  law. There is no madness without the law; madness can-
not be conceived before its relation to law. This is the law, the law is 
madness.
Derrida ‘The law of genre’ (AL 251)
In ‘Force of law’ Derrida describes justice as ‘without reason and without 
theoretical rationality, in the sense of regulating mastery’. He then notes that 
‘one can recognize in it [i.e. in justice], even accuse in it a madness’, and adds 
that ‘deconstruction is mad about and from such justice, mad about and from 
this desire for justice’ (AR 254). Derrida furthermore refers to Kierkegaard 
who describes the instant of decision as madness (AR 255). The relation 
posited here between justice and madness stems at least partly from Derrida’s 
earlier debate with Foucault on the question of madness.1 In Derrida’s 1963 
lecture ‘Cogito and the history of madness’ (WD 31– 63), which likewise 
includes a reference to the above-mentioned passage from Kierkegaard, he 
provides a detailed reading of Foucault’s History of Madness, published in 
1961.2 Foucault responded in 1972 in two texts (Foucault 2006: 550 –90). The 
debate with Foucault is continued posthumously in Derrida’s 1991 lecture, 
‘“To do justice to Freud”: the history of madness in the age of psychoanalysis’ 
which specifi cally traces the intersection between the thinking of Foucault 
and Freud (Res 70 –118). Although the debate between Derrida and Foucault 
1 Derrida deals with the question of madness elsewhere too, see SA and Psy II 87–103.
2 An abridged edition was published in English in 1967 as Madness and Civilization: A History 
of Insanity in the Age of Reason, based for the most part on an abridged French edition 
published in 1964.
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has been the subject of much academic discussion,3 the relation between the 
Foucault–Derrida debate and law has not as yet been fully explored.4 This 
chapter will seek to do so through a reading of Derrida which will specifi cally 
concern itself  with the ‘site’ from which Foucault launches his radical critique 
of the practices of modernity which we tend to view as ‘normal’.5 As will be 
seen, this does not lead to the rejection of Foucault’s project, but its further 
radicalisation.6 The chapter will start with a reading of ‘Cogito and the history 
of madness’. This will be followed by a reading of Derrida’s ‘To do justice 
to Freud’, which enquires into Foucault’s thinking on power and pleasure. 
The chapter will conclude by pointing to the implications of Derrida’s reading 
of Foucault for law.
Cogito and the history of madness
In his reading of Foucault’s History of Madness, Derrida focuses primarily 
on the Preface of the History as well as Foucault’s reading of Descartes’ 
Meditations (1641) in chapter II of part one of the History. Only a small 
part of Foucault’s History of Madness concerns itself  explicitly with an 
interpretation of Descartes’ Meditations, but according to Derrida the whole 
of Foucault’s project is tied to this interpretation.7 Despite appearances to 
the contrary, Derrida does not seek to undermine Foucault’s project or place 
it in question, but rather to sharpen its edges ‘philosophically’.8 In analysing 
these two texts, and before engaging in a fairly detailed analysis of Derrida’s 
reading of Descartes’ Meditations, we will seek answers to the following 
questions:
3 Excellent commentaries on this debate are provided by inter alia Felman (1975); Flynn (1989); 
McNay (1994: 31–7); and Naas 2003: (57–75).
4 For a brief  discussion of this debate, see Williams (1988: 377–9). The author however mis-
understands Derrida’s notion of textuality as contending that there is no external reality (at 
376). He consequently sides with Foucault in the debate with Derrida. For a brief  mention 
of the debate, see also Eichner (2001: 17).
5 See e.g. Habermas (1990: 238 – 65); Fraser (1981); as well as Taylor (1984) who have raised 
this question in relation to Foucault.
6 In the early legal reception, Derrida and Foucault were both categorised as postmodern or 
poststructuralist thinkers whose arguments were essentially the same; see e.g. Peller (1985) 
and Hutchinson (1991), the latter contending that both Foucault and Derrida point to the 
historically situated character of truth and knowledge, and as emphasising the existence of 
many narratives rather than one meta-narrative.
7 This is borne out, at least superfi cially, by Descartes’ reappearance in various places through-
out the History of Madness.
8 The quotation marks are required here because of Derrida’s relation to philosophy. As pointed 
out in Chapter 1, he is not simply in opposition to philosophy (a position which Foucault at 
times adopts and which as we will see below ultimately remains philosophical), but seeks to 
exceed philosophy in a rigorous manner.
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Can a history of madness in fact be written? •
From which ‘site’ does Foucault write his history of madness? •
When did the ‘internment’ of madness start? •
With which concept of madness does Foucault work? •
The impossibility of a history of madness
Central to Derrida’s concerns is Foucault’s claim to write the archaeology 
of the silence imposed on madness through the division between madness 
and reason. In other words, Foucault attempts to write a history of madness 
itself, by letting madness itself  speak (WD 33– 4; Foucault 2006: xxviii, xxxii). 
Stated yet differently, Foucault does not want to write this history from within 
the language of reason, of madness interned, but of madness before its capture 
by knowledge. This history, as Derrida (WD 34) puts it, purports to be a 
history of untamed madness before being caught by classical reason, whilst 
using the language that was used to capture madness. The language of reason 
is however itself  the language of order and of the system of objectivity which 
necessarily captures or objectifi es madness. This raises the question whether 
a ‘history’ of silence can in fact be written, as all history, per defi nition, is 
of rationality and meaning in general (WD 308 fn 4). In his later discussion 
of Descartes’ Meditations, Derrida (WD 53– 4) phrases this principle thus:
[I]f discourse and philosophical communication (that is, language itself ) are 
to have an intelligible meaning, that is to say, if they are to conform to their 
essence and vocation as discourse, they must simultaneously in fact and 
in principle escape madness ... By its essence the sentence is normal.9
The question this raises is whether one can, by elaborating on the ways in 
which psychiatry has excluded reason and by suspending the language of 
psychiatry (as Foucault does), return to innocence and end one’s own com-
plicity in the exclusion of madness by the rational and political order (WD 
35; Flynn 1989: 203). The psychiatrist is after all only a delegate of this order, 
one of many. As Derrida points out, all European languages are implicit in 
the adventure of Western reason as well as in the delegations which have led 
to the capture of reason. It therefore seems to be impossible to put on trial 
this history (of the objectifi cation of madness) as Foucault seeks to do, as 
the proceedings as well as the verdict are, due simply to their articulation, 
bound to repeat the crime. Even an archaeology of silence amounts to a 
logic, an organised language, an order and a work. Foucault’s archaeology 
of silence therefore effectively amounts to a repetition of the act of excluding 
9 In Derrida (Res 71) this dilemma is expressed in terms of witnessing: who can ultimately 
bear witness to a history of madness (or of sexuality)?
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and objectifying madness, also at the moment when this exclusion is denounced 
(WD 35, 53– 4). Derrida nevertheless reads Foucault as being aware of this, 
at least on a certain level, as Foucault at certain points acknowledges the 
impossibility of writing this archaeology of silence (WD 36 –7). Foucault 
(2006: xxxii) acknowledges, for example, the necessity and impossibility of 
having to write his discourse without the support of the syntax of reason. 
Derrida comments that Foucault could perhaps be said to perform this feat 
(that is, his archaeology of  silence) through his practice rather than his 
formulation. In other words, because the silence cannot be spoken without 
at the same time re-captivating it within logos – the language of objectifi cation 
– Foucault gives expression to it through his pathos, by means of his new 
and radical silent praise of folly. Behind Foucault’s explicit project, another 
project can in other words be said to take place in silence.10 This raises the 
question of conditions of possibility. What makes possible Foucault’s feat? 
How does it happen that Foucault can at the point in time that he writes his 
History of Madness, understand and enunciate this breaking point in the 
classical age (spanning from approximately 1650 to 1800) between a determined 
reason and a determined madness (to be distinguished from reason and madness 
in general)? Foucault does not explicitly refl ect on this in his History. Derrida’s 
contention is that this could happen only because of a certain liberation of 
or dislocation within madness (WD 38). Implicit in this statement is the 
importance of Freud’s thinking which Foucault at times denies (Res 73).11 
Derrida enquires into the relation between Foucault and Freud in his ‘To do 
justice to Freud’ which will be discussed below.
Behind Foucault’s projected archaeology of silence, another project is there-
fore engaged in. To understand what is at stake here, we need to enquire into 
the way in which these two projects proceed. Because the silence of madness 
is not an original silence but one which (according to Foucault) was imposed 
at a certain point in history, Foucault feels the need to fi nd the origin of this 
imposition. He has to fi nd the origin of the separation between reason and 
madness (unreason) in contrast with their free circulation and exchange up to 
that point (WD 38). Foucault (2006: xxxiii) refers to this origin as ‘the decision’. 
Derrida believes that a slight change in vocabulary is required here: the split 
between reason and madness should rather be referred to as a ‘dissension’, 
in order to point to the self-dividing action at stake here, namely what is 
made exterior, is the interior (WD 38 –9). Madness is thus not exterior to 
philosophy, but at a certain ‘moment’ interior, and then cast out as if  it was 
10 These comments clearly show that a reading of Derrida’s ‘Cogito’ which is to the effect that 
he believes that there is no escape from or no space outside of reason (see Boyne 1990: 
53– 89) is on the wrong track.
11 For an analysis of the possible reasons behind Foucault’s reticence in this respect, see 
Whitebook 2003.
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already exterior. Once one recognises the importance of this change in 
vocabulary, a number of questions are raised which require a rethinking of 
some aspects of Foucault’s analysis. These relate specifi cally to the question 
referred to earlier as to when the internment of madness started. Foucault 
(2006: xxix) more particularly presents the Greek logos as having had no 
contrary. At the same time he refers to the ‘reassuring dialectic of Socrates’ 
in relation to the Greek notion of hybris, which as Derrida points out, shows 
(when read together with the texts of Greek philosophers) that the Greek 
logos had ‘already expulsed, excluded, objectifi ed or (curiously amounting to 
the same thing) assimilated and mastered as one of its moments, “enveloped” 
the contrary of reason’ (WD 40). This means, contrary to Foucault’s assertion, 
that the separation between reason and its other had not taken place (for the fi rst 
time) in the classical age, but long before then. The entire history of philosophy 
and of reason in fact bears witness to this struggle. Since the Greeks, reason 
has been divided against itself, and whatever happened afterwards (including 
the events as described by Foucault) are only socio-economic epiphenomena 
that take place on the surface. Madness therefore does not start being confi ned 
in the classical age; this internment already starts with the awakening of 
language. The risk Foucault runs in writing a history of madness in this way 
is to assume a unity of original presence followed by a subsequent event of 
division, thereby confi rming metaphysics in its fundamental operation.12
This brings us to the question of the concept of madness in the History. 
Derrida points out that the concept of madness is never submitted to thematic 
scrutiny by Foucault. Nonetheless:
everything transpires as if  Foucault knew what ‘madness’ means. Every-
thing transpires as if, in a continuous and underlying way, an assured 
and rigorous precomprehension of the concept of madness, or at least 
its nominal defi nition, were possible and acquired. In fact, however, it could 
be demonstrated that as Foucault intends it, if  not by the historical 
current he is studying, the concept of madness overlaps everything that 
can be put under the rubric of negativity.
(WD 41)
The allusion here is of course to Hegel, and the implication is that Foucault 
understands madness in a restricted sense, more specifi cally in terms of the 
popular and equivocal notion of madness (WD 41). Derrida’s ‘understanding’ 
of madness as we will see below is much more ‘radical’ for the reason, as he 
points out, that reason’s constitution of itself, lies at the origin of history; it 
is historicity itself. In other words, the exclusion of a certain madness is the 
12 As Flynn (1989: 214 –15) points out, the procedure of positing an inside and an outside (as 
Foucault does regarding reason and madness) is also a fundamental metaphysical move.
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condition of possibility of meaning and of language. This at the same time 
implies that what happens in the classical age as described by Foucault ‘has 
neither absolute privilege nor archetypal exemplarity’ (WD 42). It is merely 
an example among others of the way in which a certain madness is dealt 
with in history. As we will see below, much of this ‘criticism’ is later implicitly 
accepted by Foucault.
Descartes’ Meditations
We next arrive at the important discussion of Descartes’ Meditations, which 
Foucault engages in at the beginning of chapter II of part one of the History of 
Madness. It goes to the heart of the question of the ‘meaning’ of madness and 
thus requires careful scrutiny. Foucault views these passages as the philosophical 
internment of madness (WD 44) and we can see clearly from his reading how 
he understands madness in a restricted sense (in line with Hegel’s negativity).13 
Descartes in the First Meditation seeks to question all the opinions he has 
held up until then so as to ultimately arrive at a point where he holds onto 
only those opinions which are certain and indubitable. For this purpose he 
does not enquire into every opinion so held but only into its foundations. 
This is carried through in three successive stages. (1) He fi rst enquires into 
the senses as a source of knowledge and points out that although our senses 
sometimes deceive us in relation to things that are not clearly perceptible and 
things at a great distance, it would be unreasonable to doubt certain things 
that are presented to our senses. The senses are in other words mostly trust-
worthy. For example, the fact that he is sitting by the fi re, in his dressing gown, 
with a piece of paper in his hand of which he is aware through his senses, 
cannot reasonably be doubted. That is, unless he were a madman, who believes 
that he is a king when he is in fact poor; or who believes that he is wearing 
gold and purple when in fact he is naked; or who imagines that his head is made 
of earthenware, that he is a pumpkin or is made of glass. But, says Descartes, 
he himself  is clearly not mad, and it would be foolish of him to follow their 
example and deny the truthfulness of the senses. (2) Let us then go further, 
says Descartes, and consider that I might be asleep and dreaming everything 
that my senses represent to me – that is, that I am sitting here in front of the 
fi re, etc. In sleep we are after all often deceived into believing that what we 
experience is an experience in real life. Let us assume then that I am asleep, 
Descartes says, are there then not still certain things which remain indubitable? 
13 See in this respect the confession of Foucault (1988: 312): ‘[W]hat remained of traditional 
philosophical discourse in the work that I had done on the subject of madness embarrassed 
me. There is a certain Hegelianism surviving there. It isn’t necessarily enough to deal with 
such menial things as police reports, measures taken for confi nement, the cries of madmen 
to escape from philosophy. For me Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot, Klossowski were ways of 
escaping from philosophy.’
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Indeed. It is like a painter who paints something which does not exist in reality. 
Even then the forms or at least the colours will be real. Similarly physics, 
astronomy, medicine, etc. may contain many doubtful things, but ultimately they 
are based on mathematics, geometry and other similar sciences which, despite 
the fact that they may not exist, are certain and indubitable. These are in other 
words truths of a non-sensory origin which are true, whether or not one is 
awake or asleep (WD 46). Even if  I am asleep, Descartes concludes, ‘two and 
three together always make fi ve, and a square never has more than four sides’ 
(Descartes 1968: 98). (3) Descartes then goes even further to place all his 
certainties in doubt, this time by going beyond both sensory and non-sensory 
foundations, and questions the metaphysical foundations of his knowledge. 
He now imagines that the God in whom he has always believed as being all-
powerful may actually be an evil genius who has decided to deceive him so 
that all the certainties he has just established are only such because of deception. 
This places in doubt all his certainties, Descartes acknowledges.
For Foucault, the most important stage in the above process of questioning 
is the fi rst one, and specifi cally the following sentence of Descartes (1968: 96): 
‘But these are madmen, and I would not be less extravagant if  I were to 
follow their example.’ Foucault focuses his analysis on the fi rst two parts of 
the procedure ((1) and (2) above) and draws a distinction between three forms 
of doubt: (a) error of the senses (b) dreams and (c) madness. In the case of 
(a) and (b), truth does not slip away completely. There is still a residue of 
truth that remains in both instances. In the words of Foucault (2006: 45):
Thus neither sleep peopled with images nor the clear consciousness that 
the senses are deceived can lead doubt to its most universal point: we 
might admit that our eyes can deceive us, and ‘suppose we are asleep’, 
but the truth will never slip away entirely into darkness.
It is however different with madness. Here all truth dissolves, Foucault contends. 
Descartes consequently does not delve on madness as extensively as he does 
on dreams, but simply excludes it by decree as appears from the quotation 
from Descartes’ Meditations referred to above. This is because to think (ego 
cogito ergo sum) excludes the possibility of being mad. There can be little 
doubt about the originality of  this reading by Foucault, which provides 
an excellent introduction to this chapter which will, following upon this 
‘philosophical internment’, continue to trace the political decree of the great 
internment of madness. It however comes at a price. Apart from the fact that 
Descartes’ text needs to be distorted to arrive at this reading,14 it restricts the 
14 Derrida’s contentions in this regard again show that he is not of the view that correctness 
in reading (including of his own texts) is no longer a requirement or possibility. Correctness 
and truth are displaced in Derrida’s thinking, not discarded. This said, Derrida’s reading 
of Descartes is by no means an orthodox one.
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meaning of madness to something calculable and excludes from the reading 
Descartes’ consideration of ‘total madness’ which exceeds metaphysics. This 
‘total madness’ nonetheless corresponds with Foucault’s defi nition of madness 
as ‘the absence of a work’ or ‘the absence of an œuvre’ (WD 54; Foucault 
2006: xxxi).15
In his analysis of Descartes’ First Meditation, Derrida (WD 48) points out 
that Descartes does not, as Foucault contends, ‘sidestep the possibility of 
dream or error’ and that it is furthermore not the case that ‘[d]reams and 
illusions are overcome by the very structure of truth’ (Foucault 2006: 44 and 
45). There is fi rst no sidestepping or circumvention because Descartes follows 
a procedure in which fi rst the senses are questioned and then radically or 
hyperbolically placed in doubt (steps (1) and (2) above), whereafter even 
mathematical truth (which is all that remains after raising these ‘natural’ 
reasons for doubt) does not escape from being placed in doubt. Mathematical 
truth will more specifi cally be placed in doubt by ‘the artifi cial and meta-
physical assault of the evil genius’ (WD 46). According to Derrida, the reason 
why Descartes deals with dreams in greater detail (than with the other forms 
of sensory deception) is that what applies in the case of dreams applies a 
fortiori in the case of sensory perception: certainties and truths of a non-
sensory and non-imaginative16 origin are the only ones that escape sensory 
error and oneiric composition (WD 48). Sensory and imaginative sources can 
thus not provide one with certainty. Dreams and illusions consequently also 
cannot, as Foucault contends, be overcome or surmounted by the structure 
of truth, because Descartes is prepared to posit the possibility of total error 
for all knowledge gained from the senses and imaginary constructions. The 
only certain things which remain at this point (before the arrival of the evil 
genius) are that which is simple (such as colour) and intelligible (WD 49). In 
so far as the purely intelligible (for example, two plus three equals fi ve) still 
remains at this point (a provisional certainty which is no longer of a sensory 
or imaginative nature) it will, as said before, be placed radically in doubt in 
the next step. The ‘exclusion’ of madness at this point moreover does not 
occur for the reasons Foucault asserts, but simply because the madness that 
is invoked here (the popular and everyday idea of madness) is not wrong 
about everything, is not mad enough. Madness in this form does not provide 
the most serious form of sensory illusion. In this sense, the dreamer is more 
insane than the madman (WD 50) and the invocation of the evil genius will 
proceed further to posit the possibility of total madness.
Wherein lies the importance of Descartes’ evil genius and the importance 
of taking account of it in writing a history of madness? We are of course at 
15 Alan Bass, the translator of Derrida’s ‘Cogito’ understands this as a work which is not 
governed by institutionalised rationalism; see WD 308 fn. 6.
16 As examples of products of the imagination, Descartes (1968: 97) refers to pictures and painting.
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this point no longer concerned with natural doubt (stages (1) and (2)) but 
the fi ction or hypothesis of the evil genius (stage 3). Derrida’s description of 
the total madness that is at stake here clearly goes beyond the popular con-
ception thereof and is of great importance for the rest of our discussion:
Now, the recourse to the fi ction of the evil genius will evoke, conjure up, 
the possibility of a total madness, a total derangement over which I could 
have no control because it is infl icted upon me – hypothetically – leaving me 
no responsibility for it. Total derangement is the possibility of a madness 
that is no longer a disorder of the body, of the object, the body-object 
outside the boundaries of the res cogitans, outside the boundaries of the 
policed city, secure in its existence as thinking subjectivity, but is a madness 
that will bring subversion to pure thought and to its purely intelligible 
objects, to the fi eld of its clear and distinct ideas, to the realm of the 
mathematical truths which escape natural doubt.
(WD 52–3)
Derrida at this point seeks to, at least partially, defend Descartes from 
Foucault’s accusation to the effect that he (Descartes) was the fi rst philosopher 
to intern madness through an act of force and exteriorise it from the cogito 
(I who think, I cannot be mad), upon which followed the political internment. 
Derrida’s contention here, tying in with our discussion above, is fi rst that 
the ‘exclusion’ of madness is not something that happens at a determinate 
point in history. If  madness is indeed the absence of a work, as Foucault 
contends, then language by its nature excludes madness which is essentially 
silence, stifl ed speech (WD 54).17 This is not imposed at one determinate 
moment in history rather than another (for example with Descartes) but 
is linked to an act of force which opens up history and speech in general.18 
This silence, like non-meaning, furthermore continues to haunt language as 
its resource. At stake here is not a determinate language, for example Latin 
or French (the languages of Descartes), but language in general. Through 
his own language (in general), Descartes reassures himself  that he is not 
insane. Language, conceived in its essence (in other words, metaphysically) 
therefore entails the break with madness, and ‘it adheres more thoroughly 
to its essence and vocation, makes a cleaner break with madness, if  it pits 
itself  against madness more freely and gets closer and closer to it’ (WD 55). 
Foucault’s History, Derrida contends, similar to Descartes’ Meditations, seeks 
to in this way get closer to madness so as to protect itself  against it and to 
intern it.
17 These passages should not be understood as an indication of essentialism on Derrida’s part. 
What he describes here is the essence of language in metaphysics.
18 See also Flynn (1989: 209).
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Madness is moreover not simply exterior to philosophy as Foucault con-
tends, especially after Descartes. The certainty of the cogito is attained not 
by containing or interning madness, but by asserting itself  in the midst of 
madness. Descartes’ argument in other words amounts to the following: ‘I 
think, even if  I am completely mad’. Derrida reads Descartes here as going 
beyond a determined reason and a determined unreason to a ‘zero point at 
which determined meaning and nonmeaning come together in their common 
origin’ (WD 56).19 This is the ‘moment’, as Derrida later adds, ‘when reason 
and madness have not as yet been separated’ (WD 58). Derrida fi nds in this 
‘point’ the condition of possibility of Foucault’s narration of the history of 
madness.20 It is from this point that determinate forms of the opposition 
between reason and unreason can appear as such and be stated. At this point, 
which is also the proper and inaugural moment of the cogito, there is as 
Derrida notes, still very little certainty attached to the cogito – it is not in 
the least reassuring (WD 56).21 Descartes’ project is in this respect not dis-
similar to that of Socrates who contemplates the good beyond being (epekeina tes 
ousias), which Glaucon in Plato’s Republic refers to as a ‘daemonic superiority’ 
(Plato 1997: 1129–30 [509b–c]). The latter is as little reassuring and far exceeds 
the Greek notion of hybris, if  we understand the latter as a pathological 
modifi cation in man (WD 57). Foucault, by ignoring or not giving suffi cient 
attention to Descartes’ radical placing in question of all certainties through 
his invocation of the evil genius, excludes total madness from consideration 
and thus performs an even greater exclusionary act than he (unfairly) accuses 
Descartes of performing. Foucault in other words reduces Descartes’ project 
and encloses it within a determined historical structure, whereas what is at 
stake here far exceeds this structure (WD 57). Derrida therefore provocatively 
refers to Foucault’s discourse as being totalitarian in as far as it ‘risks erasing 
the excess by which every philosophy (of meaning) is related, in some region 
of its discourse, to the nonfoundation of unmeaning’ (WD 309 fn 26). The 
‘totalitarian’ nature of Foucault’s discourse also appears from his reading of 
Descartes to the extent that it involves a certain violence which reduces that 
which is hyperbolic (in Descartes) to what is intra-worldly. It is this violence 
which makes possible our conception of madness or what Derrida refers to 
as the ‘making possible [of ] all straitjackets’ (WD 57).
After having reached this extreme point, Descartes however immediately seeks 
to reassure himself  by certifying the cogito through God and by identifying 
19 The notion of ‘origin’ should be placed in quotation marks, because what is at stake here 
is more precisely a pre-origin, the ‘origin of origin’.
20 Derrida WD 309 fn. 24 also notes that it is less a question of ‘point’ than that of an original 
temporality, or what he elsewhere refers to as a ‘past that has never been present’; see Glas 79b.
21 There is of course an allusion here to Foucault (2006: xxix), who as we saw earlier, refers 
to ‘the reassuring dialectics of Socrates’.
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the act of the cogito with a reasonable reason (WD 58).22 He does this when 
he needs to temporalise the cogito. Descartes contended earlier that the 
cogito is valid only at the point where thought is attentive to itself, which 
means that it needs to reassure itself  through the positing of that which is 
stable and infi nite (God and reason). In the end, as Derrida notes, it is God 
alone (that is reason) who protects Descartes from the madness which the 
cogito, left to itself, opens itself  up to in the most hospitable way.23 Tying in 
with what was said earlier about the relation between language and reason, when 
one (as Descartes does), contemplates and retains the cogito, communicates 
it as well as its meaning, one must not be mad. Viewed from the other side, 
to be mad is to not be able to make the cogito as such appear to any other 
– even to myself. The madman, even if  he could repel the evil genius, would 
not be able to tell himself  this. He thus cannot say it, cannot express it in 
reasonable language (WD 59). This is, as we saw above, because language in 
its essence is reason and logos and constitutes the break with madness (WD 
55). From Descartes’ Meditations it therefore appears that philosophy is ‘the 
reassurance given against the anguish of being mad at the point of the greatest 
proximity to madness’ (WD 59).
What happens in Derrida’s reading of Descartes is that the cogito is divided 
into hyperbole which cannot be contained within a determined historical 
structure, on the one hand, and a fi nite structure – that which can be so 
contained, on the other. It is this division which according to Derrida defi nes 
the history of philosophy and makes historicity possible (WD 60). Philosophy can 
in other words only exist by constantly imprisoning and oppressing madness, 
the madman within us (WD 61). Foucault (2006: 343) notes something similar, 
stating that a power of unreason constantly keeps vigil over the cogito. There 
is moreover, Derrida adds, a continuing or unending dialogue in history 
between that which exceeds totality and that which is enclosed within totality 
(WD 60). This constant movement is referred to by Derrida as différance, and 
he describes its functioning in Descartes’ Meditations as follows:
[T]o-attempt-to-say-the-demonic-hyperbole from whose heights thought 
is announced to itself, frightens itself, and reassures itself  against being 
annihilated or wrecked in madness or in death. At its height hyperbole, 
the absolute opening, the uneconomic expenditure, is always reembraced 
by an economy and is overcome by economy. The relationship between 
reason, madness, and death is an economy, a structure of deferral whose 
irreducible originality must be respected.
(WD 61–2)
22 See also OG 97– 8; MP 294 – 6.
23 This chance reference to hospitality will be taken up in Derrida’s texts of the 1990s and 
thereafter; see e.g. OH, A, and see further below.
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Derrida’s contention in ‘Cogito’ could be summarised by saying that Foucault’s 
archaeology of the silence of madness, which exposes the distinction between 
reason and its other (madness) which is excluded, fi nds itself positioned within 
a broader framework which operates on the basis of a more radical exclusion 
(of  total madness). What Foucault describes is therefore a symptom of  a 
broader phenomenon which characterises language and reason. Derrida can 
consequently be said to in large part agree with Foucault, whilst at the same 
time contending that what Foucault writes about in a determined age, applies 
to reason and language in general. In a sympathetic reading, Foucault can 
be shown to be aware of  this, and to be engaging in such an analysis too. 
It is important to note that Derrida does not in any way cast doubt on 
the importance, necessity and legitimacy of Foucault’s project (Res 113).24 
He simply repeats what Foucault says about the concept of madness with 
reference to a madness which breaches all limits.
Foucault (2006: 550 –90) and others however understood Derrida’s reading 
as an attack in relation to his whole project or at least as the expression of 
an opposition to (all of ) Foucault’s thinking. In his fi rst response, published 
in the Japanese journal Paideia in February 1972 (now also included as an 
appendix in the History), Foucault (2006: 578) seeks to (further) distance him-
self  from philosophy and furthermore to situate philosophy within the sphere 
of knowledge. Philosophy, Foucault asserts, does not provide a foundation 
for knowledge. Philosophical discourse in a given period is instead subject 
to conditions and rules for the formation of knowledge in the same way as 
any other form of discourse with rational pretension. The question which 
Foucault’s stance raises is whether philosophy can indeed be escaped by 
historicising it and then simply stepping outside of it. Both questions must 
be answered in the negative. In the fi rst place, reason or meaning in general, 
which as we saw can be equated with the idea and name of God, cannot be 
historicised in this way without deceiving oneself  (WD 309–10 fns 27 and 
28). This is because there is a ‘oneness’ to reason which leaves one with 
limited options in protesting against it (WD 36). Second, all our concepts 
and the way in which they are organised, in this case, the concepts of mad-
ness, of experience, and of the event as well as the inside–outside distinction 
which Foucault (2006: 589) again invokes, stem from the Greek dawn of 
Western philosophy and are consequently metaphysical in nature (WD 40). 
As we saw above, one of Derrida’s main arguments in ‘Cogito’ and elsewhere 
is precisely that in believing that a simple escape from metaphysics is possible, 
one somewhat naively ends up repeating the gestures of metaphysics. The 
concept of history (archaeology) which Foucault employs here is, as we saw 
earlier, itself  rational in nature (WD 36). The Hegelian dialectic, which is 
24 As contended e.g. by Valverde (1999: 665); Saïd (1978); Boyne (1990); see also FWT 6, 
10 –12.
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clearly at stake here, cannot in other words be successfully challenged from 
a position which believes itself  to be simply exterior to philosophy. It can 
only be challenged from within (WD 36). In so far as the reading of Descartes 
is concerned, Foucault in both responses defends his earlier reading in relation 
to determined madness by relying on similar ‘structural’ arguments. Foucault 
(2006: 570 –2) furthermore rejects Derrida’s argument, specifi cally in relation 
to the evil genius, for structural reasons. He contends that when Descartes 
speaks of the evil genius this is ‘a voluntary exercise, controlled, mastered 
and carried out from beginning to end by a meditating subject who never 
allows himself  to be surprised’ (Foucault 2006: 571). Derrida is said to erase 
this from Descartes’ text. This indeed appears to be the case from Descartes’ 
text, and Foucault cannot be accused of an incorrect reading. The diffi culty 
with this reading is nevertheless its (metaphysical) assumption that Descartes, 
or for that matter any author, including Foucault himself, is capable of such 
an exercise. The reason why Derrida fi nds specifi cally this part of Descartes’ 
Meditation attractive is that there madness as a concept is put into play. It 
shows the relation between thinking and madness, not only in the text of 
Descartes, but in that of all writers, because of the nature of writing.25 For 
Foucault this is not important, because of the nature of his project – attempt-
ing to show how reason interns its other at a specifi c point in history. As we 
saw above, this is done at a cost. Foucault’s reading, also in his response to 
Derrida, has the consequence of excluding the (absolute) madness in ourselves 
from consideration.26
Doing justice to Freud
In ‘To do justice to Freud’, Derrida gives an even more sympathetic reading 
to Foucault, repeating his admiration for Foucault’s thinking. Derrida notes 
in this text that it would perhaps, in retrospect, have been better had he 
invoked Freud and psychoanalysis in his reading of Foucault’s History of 
Madness. The reason why he chose to focus on Descartes was the centrality 
of Descartes in Foucault’s text. At the time of Derrida’s ‘Cogito’, Descartes 
25 See also Flynn (1989: 216 –18). Such a reading can therefore by no means be said to involve 
simply a ‘“textualisation” of discursive practices’ or be said to give ‘to the voice of the 
masters that unlimited sovereignty that allows it indefi nitely to re-say the text’ (Foucault 
2006: 573) thereby ignoring the historical production of  a text. As we saw, Derrida’s read-
ing exceeds sovereignty/subjectivity and broadens Foucault’s assessment of  Descartes’ 
project, to include the whole of  metaphysics. The accusation of  textual solipsism (see 
also Saïd 1978) is based on a grave misunderstanding; for a response to this accusation 
(by others), see Ltd 148.
26 This is what Derrida implicitly points out in ‘To do justice to Freud’, without directly 
responding to Foucault. Žižek (2007) interestingly sides with Derrida on most points in this 
debate.
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was furthermore understood in a way very close to psychoanalysis and 
specifi cally in relation to Lacan.27 Lacan in the Écrits for example remarks 
on ‘a certain unsurpassability of Descartes’ and also refers to Socrates, 
Descartes, Marx and Freud as having had a passion for unveiling, the object 
of which is the truth (Res 75; Lacan 2006: 157). Derrida’s reading of Foucault 
in ‘Cogito’ therefore at the same time amounts to a challenge to the psy-
choanalysis of Lacan, by placing in question the centrality of truth. By 
seeking the conditions of possibility of Foucault’s History, Derrida conse-
quently at the same time enquires into the conditions of possibility of truth. 
Foucault’s History is ultimately made possible by the event of psychoanalysis, 
Derrida now points out (Res 75– 8). In ‘Cogito’, Derrida can thus in retrospect 
be said to have attempted to overturn the order of things in Foucault who in 
some respects, although not completely, objectifi es and reduces psychoanalysis 
as something one (simply) speaks of. That of which Foucault speaks, Derrida 
now more explicitly attempts to show, is actually that in which Foucault’s 
discourse is inscribed. This is not a reference to psychoanalysis in general, 
but to a particular psychoanalysis which precedes almost all psychoanalysis, 
Derrida notes.
Foucault, at certain points, is indeed sensitive to the importance of Freud in 
contemplating madness. At the end of the chapter on ‘Doctors and patients’, 
he for example emphasises the necessity of doing justice to Freud (Foucault 
2006: 338 –9). Freud, more specifi cally after the classical age, is said to have 
‘restored, in medical thought, the possibility of a dialogue with unreason’ 
(Foucault 2006: 339). Foucault also mentions the return to a proximity with 
madness brought about by Freud and seeks to draw a distinction between 
psychology and psychoanalysis: ‘Psychoanalysis is not about psychology, but 
it is about an experience of unreason that psychology, in the modern world, 
was meant to disguise’ (Foucault 2006: 339). Derrida notes that in seeking 
to do justice to Freud, Foucault, in a nonetheless ambivalent fashion, places 
Freud side by side with Nietzsche, Artaud, Van Gogh, Nerval and Hölderlin, 
those deemed insane by society (Res 82–3). When these and other passages 
are read together, Foucault seems to acknowledge that Freud bore witness 
to madness and excess which calls us to account. Foucault’s History is then 
also written in light of and as a response to this summons before madness. 
In the words of Foucault (2006: 537):
Henceforth and through the mediation of madness, it is the world that 
becomes guilty (for the fi rst time in the history of the West) in relation 
to the œuvre: it is now arraigned by the œuvre, constrained to speak 
its language, and obliged to take part in a process of recognition and 
27 See Lacan (2006: 161–75) (‘Logical time and the assertion of anticipated certainty’) and 
726 – 45 (‘Science and truth’).
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reparation, to fi nd an explanation for this unreason, and explain itself 
before it.28
Just after closely associating Freud and Nietzsche, Foucault (2006: 157– 8) 
moreover invokes the evil genius in a way which corresponds almost exactly 
with Derrida’s reading of Descartes in ‘Cogito’, and which seems to stand 
in tension with Foucault’s reading of Descartes in chapter 2 of part one, 
discussed earlier (Res 86 – 8).29 Foucault (2006: 157) declares here that the evil 
genius is anterior to the cogito and that ‘he is both the possibility of unreason 
and the sum of all its powers’. He furthermore notes that the evil genius places 
at risk the truth of the cogito through its perpetually threatening power. By 
acknowledging this perpetual haunting, Foucault himself  destabilises the 
historical categories which he invokes in relation to knowledge and madness 
as well as the logic of exclusion which he relies on in this context (Res 87– 8). 
Moreover, as Derrida points out, psychoanalysis has taught us that everything 
that is ‘excluded’ eventually returns, alluding to his analysis of the Freudian 
death drive in The Post Card, a ‘drive’ which as we will see ties in closely 
with madness (PC 257– 409; Res 86, 88).30
At other times Freud is however separated from Nietzsche by Foucault, 
treated as not being mad enough, with psychoanalysis placed on trial because 
it is too closely associated with the father, the family, authority and law (Res 
90 –2). Derrida in this context points to the interesting description which 
Foucault gives of Freud’s powers as being of a secret, magical, esoteric and 
thaumaturgical nature.31 In describing this thaumaturgy, Foucault furthermore 
portrays the (psychoanalytical) doctor as both ‘divine and satanic’, which, 
as Derrida points out, are the exact traits of an evil genius (Res 95).32 Foucault 
thus does not place thaumaturgy in opposition to authority and law, but on 
the same side. This description of the authority of Freud in turn corresponds 
closely with the notion of Pascal and Montaigne of law having a mystical 
foundation.33 As in the case of law, the authority of the psychoanalyst-doctor 
(that is, Freud) is in other words based on fi ction, on the credit given to fi ction 
28 See in this respect also the discussion of originary guilt in Chapter 3.
29 Derrida expresses his regret that these passages did not form part of his earlier debate with 
Foucault (Res 86).
30 See also Chapter 1.
31 This is apparently a reference to transference (Res 108). See also earlier in Resistances, where 
Derrida discusses the important role of Eros and seduction in overcoming resistance in 
psychoanalysis (at 9–10).
32 Foucault (1998: 159) refers expressly to Freud (in a positive sense) as the bad genius (mauvais 
génie) because of his pan-sexualism. This reference to a bad genius is not refl ected in the 
English translation.
33 See also AR 238 – 42, and see Chapter 6.
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(Res 95).34 Foucault then also proceeds to dismiss Freud in the same way as 
Descartes had dismissed the evil genius (at least on Foucault’s reading in ‘My 
body, this paper, this fi re’ (2006: 550 –74)). Psychoanalysis becomes the object 
of  the history Foucault is writing, rather than the space from out of which 
this history is written (Res 97). It is important to point out that Derrida does 
not analyse Foucault’s remarks on Freud and psychoanalysis in order to show 
that Foucault contradicts himself. Neither does he disagree with Foucault 
in his indictment of Freud and of psychoanalysis because of his/its close 
association with the father, the law and the family (Res 98 –9). The ‘con-
tradiction’ that is at stake here, Derrida comments, is so to speak in the things 
themselves. The fort/da that is in question in Foucault’s constantly repeated 
inclusion/exclusion of Freud is in other words tied to the lack of identity of 
both psychoanalysis and of Freud; their division from within.35 Derrida is 
referring here, on the one hand, to the Freud of psychology, evolutionism 
and biologism, and on the other, to the Freud ‘who shows himself  hospitable 
to madness ... the tragic Freud who deserves hospitality in the great lineage 
of mad geniuses ... the Freud who talks it out with death’ (Res 104). The 
latter is of course, as Derrida notes, the Freud of the death drive, of Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle. In The Order of Things Foucault (2002: 408 –9), with-
out explicit reference to the latter text, but seemingly alluding to it, then 
also ascribes the importance of psychoanalysis to the relation it has posited 
between death, desire and law or law-language. These are the three fi gures, 
Foucault (2002: 408) revealingly adds, ‘by means of which life, with its function 
and norms, attains its foundation in the mute repetition of Death’.
Derrida ends his essay by seeking to link in a certain way what Foucault 
says about power and pleasure in the History of Sexuality with Freud’s notion 
of the death drive. Here Derrida likewise concerns himself  with the point 
from which Foucault’s History of Sexuality is written rather than the object 
of  the history itself  (Res 114 –15). Derrida notes that Foucault raises the 
same question here as in the History of Madness, that is whether a history 
of sexuality can strictly speaking be written. Foucault’s notion of the essential 
dispersal or multiplicity of power is of great interest for Derrida in this respect 
(Res 116).36 Derrida relates what Foucault (1998: 45) says about a dispersal 
of power as well as the ‘perpetual spirals of power and pleasure’ to Freud’s 
attempt in Beyond the Pleasure Principle to explain Ernst’s fort/da game. 
Freud in this text incidentally refers to himself  as the devil’s advocate and 
frequently refers to what he is enquiring into as ‘demonic’, a depiction of 
34 The role attributed here to fi ction ties in closely with the stance both Foucault and Derrida 
adopt in relation to literature; see de Ville 2010a.
35 The same would of course apply to Foucault.
36 See also QE 74 –5; and Foucault and Blanchot (1990: 95– 6). It is possible to link what Derrida 
says here about Foucault and power, to what he says elsewhere about dissemination (Dis), 
dis-jointure (SM ), and an essential ‘weakness’ (Neg 226).
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himself  thus as an ‘evil genius’. At one point in the essay Freud asserts that 
Ernst’s actions ‘might be put down to an instinct for mastery that was acting 
independently of whether the memory was in itself  pleasurable or not’ (Freud 
2001: XVIII 16).37 He also refers to this attempt at mastery as the expression 
of a ‘primary event ... independently of the pleasure principle’ and as yielding 
‘pleasure of another sort’ (Freud 2001: XVIII 16). According to this thesis, 
a certain mastery thus precedes sex or sexual pleasure which would constitute 
a later, and a derived pleasure (Res 117). Derrida then attempts to link this 
notion of mastery, which he equates with death, to Foucault’s idea of a 
‘spiral’ of power/pleasure: preceding power/pleasure, making it possible, would 
be death functioning as the master. Derrida in other words suggests that 
Foucault’s notion of a dispersal of power could be linked to Descartes’ evil 
genius as well as to the Freudian idea of a drive for power or mastery which 
goes beyond the pleasure principle. This is another way in which to state 
Freud’s notion of the death drive and the repetition compulsion (Res 117–18). 
Foucault and Freud could in other words be said to agree in a certain sense 
about the operation of the death drive, or what could be referred to as an 
orgiastic desire for death (Dem 68) – that is, total madness. It is from here 
or by virtue of this ‘desire’ that Foucault writes his profound archaeological 
and genealogical studies of madness, subjectivity, knowledge, discipline and 
punishment, power, sexuality and ethics.
Law and madness
The ‘projects’ of Foucault and Derrida have often been presented as in op-
position to each other. When one however carefully scrutinises their relation 
to the texts of Descartes and Freud as was attempted above, it appears that 
they share a certain space. This shared space is not however situated ‘within’ 
metaphysics, but at a certain ‘remove’ from metaphysics.38 A reading of 
Foucault and Derrida is in other words possible, which allows us to see them 
as at a certain point exceeding metaphysics, a complete escape nevertheless 
remaining impossible. Such a reading allows us to view madness, also in 
Foucault’s texts, in a transgressive ‘sense’ and at the same time to appreciate 
the point or site from which he launches his radical and necessary critique 
of modernity. This total madness is another name for Freud’s death drive, or 
what in Derrida will become a ‘desire’ for death, referring to an anachronous 
37 For a more detailed discussion of the relation between mastery and the pleasure principle, 
see PC 395– 405, and Chapter 1.
38 The recent Foucault’s Law, which attempts a reading of Foucault and Derrida that identifi es 
a ‘responsive’ dimension to law, in contrast with its determinate dimension, on my reading, 
risks inscribing both thinkers into the metaphysics of presence. This is inter alia because 
the ‘responsive’ dimension is concerned only with possibility, and not with the impossible 
(Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009).
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time, a past which has never been present and which always remains to come. 
Madness in this ‘sense’ calls on reason and language and therefore also on 
philosophy and law to account for themselves (Foucault 2006: 537– 8; Res 
82–3). Another name for this madness as we saw is justice. Justice in this 
sense stands in tension with all claims of identity and sovereignty, also via 
law. Law’s confrontation with justice cannot be avoided. In the same way in 
which the self  can relate to itself  only by way of a passage through madness, 
law can be constituted only by way of justice. This justice, as will be pointed 
out in the chapters that follow, involves self-destruction; auto-immunity; a 
mad, impossible hospitality, without limitation, control or reciprocity. This 
mad hospitality furthermore enables us to see that behind the contingent and 
determined exclusion of ‘marginalised others’, which Foucault exposes, a more 
radical exclusion always takes place which makes these exclusions possible 
in the fi rst place. These exclusions can never be fully justifi ed, which opens 
up the law to transformation, not simply towards the possible or the potential, 
but the impossible which lies beyond social and historical contingency.
Chapter 5
The gift beyond exchange
How is one to think the fact that everything that is only is insofar as it is 
given?
Jean-Luc Marion
Derrida’s Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, stemming from a seminar presented 
for the first time in 1977 to 1978, stands in close relation to his thinking on 
justice and law. This can clearly be seen from ‘Force of law’ where Derrida 
describes justice in terms of a ‘gift without exchange, without circulation, 
without recognition or gratitude, without economic circularity, without cal-
culation and without rules, without reason and without theoretical rationality, 
in the sense of regulating mastery’ (AR 254).1 The exploration of the notions 
of time and the gift in Given Time takes place with reference inter alia to 
Heidegger’s well-known statement in his 1962 lecture in On Time and Being, 
‘es gibt Sein, es gibt Zeit’ (‘it gives Being, it gives time’; or ‘there is Being, 
there is time’) as well as Marcel Mauss’s analysis in The Gift of  the gift in 
archaic societies. Given Time has not as yet received much attention from 
legal scholars.2 This is unfortunate, since, as the quotation above shows, 
justice in Derrida’s texts clearly has to be understood with reference to his 
analysis of the gift. Derrida’s analysis of the gift furthermore relates to an 
issue which is of central importance for legal thinking, namely the origins of 
law. This issue is of course also addressed in other texts such as ‘Declarations 
of independence’ (Chapter 2), ‘Before the law’ (Chapter 3) and ‘Force of law’ 
(Chapter 6). Given Time nevertheless explores the question of law’s origin 
from a unique angle which in turn makes possible a better understanding of 
Derrida’s other texts on law. Given Time in addition points to the necessity 
1 See also Derrida (1994: 22–7).
2 For helpful ‘non-legal’ analyses of Given Time, see Bischof (2004: 354 – 63); Bennington (1993: 
188 –203); Caputo (1997: 140 –51); Horner (2001); Marrati (2005: 190 –7); Schrift (1997: 10 –11). 
See also the interview with Derrida in ‘OtG’ 54 –78.
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of exploring the relation between the thinking of Derrida and Heidegger, 
specifically in relation to the ontico–ontological difference, as well as the way 
in which this ties in with the origins of law.
For reasons of space the analysis here will be restricted to the first two 
chapters of Given Time. The chapter will start with a brief  exposition of 
Heidegger’s evaluation of metaphysics. As Derrida notes in Positions, his own 
thinking would not have been possible without the ‘attention to what Heidegger 
calls the difference between Being and beings, the ontico–ontological difference 
such as, in a way, it remains unthought by philosophy’ (Pos 8).3 In Given Time 
Derrida then also specifically engages with Heidegger’s thinking on Being as 
well as the difference between Being and beings, by contemplating that which 
precedes this difference, through the notions of the gift and of time.4 This 
will be followed by an outline of Mauss’s The Gift, specifically with reference 
to the way in which Mauss views the gift in terms of a circular economic 
exchange, as well as a brief  discussion of Derrida’s analysis of Mauss’s text. 
Here we will see the first signs of a development in terms of which the con-
cept of the gift will be exceeded towards a certain ecstasy, or what Derrida 
elsewhere refers to as ‘a jouissance of the concept to the point of overflowing’ 
(FWT 5). In the next section, Derrida’s own analysis of  the gift will be 
enquired into in more detail. This will take place in three parts. In the first 
place, Derrida’s analysis of Heidegger’s thinking on the es gibt and its relation 
to the gift and time will be enquired into with reference to On Time and 
Being. Second, an analysis of the ‘notion’ of sexual difference and its relation 
to the gift will be undertaken. In analysing this relation, a detailed reading 
will be given of Derrida’s Geschlecht. This in turn will be followed by an 
analysis of the relation Derrida posits in Given Time between the gift and 
mourning. The last section will consider the implications for law of the 
analysis of the gift, specifically with reference to ‘Force of law’.
Heidegger and metaphysics
The question of Being
For Heidegger, all philosophy since Plato, including its derivatives, con-
stitutes metaphysics. Heidegger points out in this regard that metaphysics 
concerns itself  with the question of being by asking ti to on (what is being?). 
Heidegger wants us to return to this question and to think it through in a more 
fundamental way. He wants to, in a sense, get behind the guiding question 
3 See also SP 153– 4.
4 It is perhaps important to note here that Derrida does not distinguish strictly between 
Heidegger’s thinking before and after the so-called turn (Kehre). The same approach will be 
followed in this chapter in elaborating on Heidegger’s thinking.
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metaphysics poses and to pose a more original question, that is: what sustains 
and directs the guiding question of metaphysics (Heidegger 1991: II 193)? 
Heidegger’s thinking can be said to be motivated by the completion of 
metaphysics or idealism brought about by Hegel’s thinking of the absolute 
Idea as well as its consummation in Nietzsche’s thinking of the will to power. 
Relying on the metaphor of harvesting we can say that Hegel succeeded in 
bringing in the first great harvest. Metaphysics, according to Heidegger, now 
only involves the threshing of empty straw. He therefore seeks to go back to the 
source of metaphysics so as to, as he puts it, ‘come to know the field and what 
it is capable of yielding’ (Heidegger 2005: 34). Heidegger is more specifically 
of the view that Western philosophy has forgotten the question of Being (das 
Sein). Although it has concerned itself  with Being throughout its history, 
metaphysics has not as yet adequately thought Being. The question Heidegger 
concerns himself  with is the more fundamental question (as compared to 
what happens in metaphysics) of the Being of beings. Being for Heidegger is 
not ‘a being’ (ein Seiende). A being can be any thing, such as what we can grasp 
with our hands, as well as mountains, a river, the moon, a group of people, 
the Japanese, Bach’s fugues, Hölderlin’s hymns, day, night, heat, noise, law 
etcetera (Heidegger 2000: 81; 1984a: 40; 2005: 111). Why is the question of 
Being important? According to Heidegger, the question of Being determines 
the way in which we relate to the world around us. This can be explained with 
reference to the word ‘is’ in language. Even though ‘is’ can be said to drift 
about ‘as the most threadbare word in language’, it also sustains all our saying, 
Heidegger contends. We implicitly use the ‘is’ in every verb we employ. It is 
the same with all substantives and adjectives, all words and articulations of 
words. Even in our (silent) conduct towards beings, for example by walking 
in a forest or reading a book, their ‘is’ or Being is at stake. We also are in 
relation with the ‘is’ when we for example relate in our thinking to a thing 
that is no longer or not yet, and even a thing that simply is not (Heidegger 
1991: IV 188 –93). The question of Being is thus extremely important and it 
is something we already have a pre-understanding of, even though we tend 
never to think about it. We could say that because of the brightness of beings, 
the light of Being is obscured. Being in other words withdraws when it reveals 
itself  in beings (Heidegger 1984a: 26). Our relation to Being is according to 
Heidegger made possible by man’s essential nature prior to any philosophical 
undertaking, for otherwise man would not have been able to relate to himself  
as a being or to other beings at all (Heidegger 2005: 88; IJsseling 1986: 115). 
Philosophy itself, which, as we saw, primarily concerns itself with the question 
of Being (although it has done so in an inadequate way), is thus made possible 
by this essential nature of man. Philosophy is not simply thought up, but 
awakened in man through his relation with Being (Heidegger 2005: 32). As 
we will see in more detail below, philosophy has grasped the question of Being 
in different ways: Plato represented Being as Idea, Aristotle as energeia, Kant 
as position, Hegel as the absolute concept, Nietzsche as the will to power, 
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but consistently as constant presence, which is what Heidegger wishes to 
place in question (Heidegger 2002c: 9; 2005: 39). These were of course not 
choices exercised by the philosophers concerned, but a consequence of the 
sending of Being beyond (modern) subjectivity (Goosen 2007: 334 –5).
The understanding of Being in metaphysics
Heidegger, as we saw above, regards Plato as the first metaphysical thinker and 
views Western philosophy as having been caught up in metaphysics ever since. 
The early Greeks were not as yet under the sway of metaphysics (Heidegger 
1991: IV 165).5 Plato and Aristotle nonetheless, like all philosophers after them, 
still contemplated Being – that is, the arche (principle) or ground of beings 
(Heidegger 2005: 71). What then happened with Plato’s thinking? Plato thought 
of Being in a way different from the early Greeks. He did not think Being as 
such, but thought it from the perspective of and with reference to (the essence 
of) beings (Heidegger 1991: IV 207–11). More specifically, for Plato Being is 
the idea or the universal – that in which the particular thing (a being) has its 
subsistence and from which it proceeds. Plato’s interpretation of Being as idea 
has, according to Heidegger, shaped the whole history of Western philosophy. 
One could say that all philosophy since Plato is ‘idealism’: Being is thought in 
the idea, the idea-like and the ideal (Heidegger 1991: IV 162– 4). The Christian 
understanding that all beings have a first cause in God as creator is similarly 
metaphysical (Heidegger 1991: III 7). It also proceeds by thinking Being with 
reference to beings. That which ‘is’ in the Christian understanding, is the ens 
creatum, in other words that which is created by the personal Creator-God 
as the highest cause (Heidegger 1977: 130). Christianity in other words states 
that the Being of a being is that it has been created by God (Heidegger 1991: 
IV 88). According to Christianity, beings have been thought out rationally 
beforehand. As soon as the link between Creator and creation is broken in 
modernity (Nietzsche’s ‘God is dead’), this idea is adapted and man now 
takes the place of God, so that the rationality and calculation of man becomes 
the measure of everything: that is, interpreted as Being (Heidegger 2000: 207; 
1977: 148). This is the enlightenment idea of reason (Heidegger 1991: III 7). 
According to Heidegger (1991: III 51) this is the profound insight of Nietzsche 
in his reflections on the will to power:
Only what represents and secures rational thinking has a claim to the 
sanction of a being that is in being. The sole and highest court of appeal, 
in whose field of vision and speech is decided what is in being and what 
is not, is reason. We find in reason the most extreme pre-decision as to 
what Being means.
5 See further, Chapter 7.
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What ‘is’ in metaphysics, is therefore necessarily determined by a specific 
understanding of Being (Heidegger 1977: 117, 127– 8). The understanding 
of Being in modernity, Heidegger ascribes in the first place to Descartes’ Ego 
cogito, ergo sum. This statement entails that ‘[a]ll consciousness of things and 
of beings as a whole is referred back to the self-consciousness of the human 
subject as the unshakable ground of all certainty’ (Heidegger 1991: IV 86).6 
In modernity, the idea (Being) in Plato has thus become that which man 
posits for himself (Heidegger 1991: IV 174). Accordingly only that ‘is’ which is 
correctly thought (Heidegger 2000: 207). Reason has become synonymous with 
the subjectivity of the human subject, entailing ‘the self-certain representing 
of beings in their beingness, that is, objectivity’ (Heidegger 1991: III 96). All 
beings are furthermore turned into objects (Heidegger 1993b: 251).
When Being is in the above-described ways turned into idea or ‘whatness’, 
the latter is promoted to the status of the Being of beings, to what really is 
or to what is most in being about beings, whereas beings are relegated to me 
on – that which really should not be and really is not. A disjoining in this 
way takes place between on and phainomenon. The idea furthermore becomes 
the paradeigma, the model and also the ideal (Heidegger 2000: 194 –9). 
Heidegger (2000: 197) describes the consequences of the cleft that opens up 
between the idea and the imitation as follows:
Because the idea is what really is, and the idea is the prototype, all open-
ing up of beings must be directed toward equalling the prototype, 
resembling the archetype, directing itself  according to the idea. The truth 
of phusis – alBtheia as the unconcealment that essentially unfolds in the 
emerging sway – now becomes homoiDsis and mimBsis: resemblance, 
directedness, the correctness of seeing, the correctness of apprehending 
as representing.
If  Being becomes idea there is no longer any link between beings and Being 
or between beings and truth (understood here as unconcealment or the 
happening of beings) – only between beings and idea. The foundations upon 
which metaphysical thinking is built, are thus not foundations at all, as they 
are themselves derived (and falsified) (Heidegger 1991: IV 163).
One can summarise Heidegger’s diagnosis of metaphysics by saying that 
metaphysics does not draw a clear distinction between beings and Being. 
Metaphysics regards Being as the most abstract and emptiest of concepts 
and in no need of being determined any further. Being is overshadowed by 
beings (Heidegger 1991: IV 157). This is not because of a mistake in thinking, 
but because in the appearance of beings, Being withdraws, conceals itself  
6 See also Heidegger (1991: IV 179; 1977: 129). This is not to be understood in an individual-
istic sense as the random opinion of an individual ‘I’; see Heidegger (1991: III 221).
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(Heidegger 1991: IV 226 –7). Being itself  and consequently also the difference 
between Being and beings thus remains unexplored because metaphysics does 
not take account of the fact that there is a fundamental difference between 
Being and beings (Heidegger 1991: IV 195, 196). This difference between 
Being and beings is referred to by Heidegger as the ontological or ontico–
ontological difference. We already saw above that everywhere and continually, 
man stands in a relationship with Being when comporting himself  towards 
beings. Man could thus also be said to ‘stand in the differentiation of beings 
and Being’ (Heidegger 1991: IV 153). It is this differentiation which makes 
possible ‘every naming, experiencing, and conceiving of a being as such’ 
(Heidegger 1991: IV 154). The ontological difference is thus the unknown 
and ungrounded ground and foundation of (the possibility of ) ontology and 
of all metaphysics. The differentiation between Being and beings, we could 
also say, forms the basic structure of metaphysics even though it has remained 
unexamined as such (Heidegger 1991: IV 182).
A different understanding of Being, in relation to time
Heidegger reflected on the question of Being in a number of ways. In Being 
and Time (1962 [1927]) he explored the question of Being as a first step with 
reference to that being for whom its Being or existence is a question: man, 
or in Heidegger’s terminology, Dasein (literally: there-being). Being can 
furthermore be understood only when we understand the notion of time 
(Heidegger 2005: 88). According to Heidegger, one of the problems with the 
usual conception of time is that it is generally referred to in the same context 
as space. The reason for this approach lies in the metaphysical conception 
of Being – in terms of beings, which appear in space and in time. This con-
ception fails to recognise that space and time are not the same (Heidegger 
2005: 84). In terms of the metaphysical concept of time, also to be found in 
Kant, time furthermore gives expression to permanence (Heidegger 2005: 
118). This involves viewing time as a calculable sequence of nows (the present 
as actual now, the past as no longer now and the future as not yet now 
(Heidegger 2002c: 11) and in terms of things that are present in time. This 
also informs the understanding of causality (Heidegger 2005: 109, 113). One 
of the limitations of the conception of time in Kant (time as a mode of 
comportment of the human subject) is that it does not address the question 
of Being. It more specifically involves an implicit understanding of Being as 
constant presence. Heidegger points out that Kant’s view of time simply 
involves that it occurs in man, instead of viewing time more fundamentally 
as ‘the ground of the possibility of the understanding of [B]eing’ (Heidegger 
2005: 88). Kant in this respect fails to investigate adequately the finitude of 
man, despite the fact that man stands at the centre of his enquiry in the 
Critique of Pure Reason (Heidegger 2005: 119). Instead Kant implicitly views 
man’s way of being as being-present (Heidegger 2005: 134). Kant’s discussion 
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of time is nonetheless important as it tells us, as Aristotle and Augustine 
also do, that time is not something that can be found somewhere like a thing. 
Time can be found only in ourselves (Heidegger 2005: 85). To this ‘vulgar’ 
metaphysical concept of time, Heidegger opposes authentic temporality. He 
arrives at this notion of temporality through an enquiry into the way in which 
Dasein actually experiences time. Stated briefly, this notion of temporality 
according to Heidegger involves a unitary relation of Dasein to the present, 
the past and the future, stretched along ‘ecstatically’ (Heidegger 1962: 462).7 
Ecstatic refers here to Dasein’s being carried to or stretching toward a certain 
‘whither’ (Kockelmans 1989: 283; Taminiaux 1994: 52). What Heidegger 
refers to as Dasein’s ecstatico-horizonal temporality, involves awaiting (the 
future), retaining (having-been) and making things/beings present. These 
ecstases do not follow in succession upon each other as in the ordinary con-
ception of time. The future is thus not later than the having-been and the 
having-been is not earlier than the present. Heidegger (1962: 401) expresses 
this idea as follows: ‘[t]emporality temporalizes itself  as a future which makes 
present in the process of having been’. The present or making things present 
in authentic temporality is dependent on an understanding of one’s own 
having-been thrown forth, which is in turn determined by an anticipation of 
one’s ultimate and ownmost possibility (Kockelmans 1989: 32, 257; Taminiaux 
1994: 51). The future furthermore has priority in authentic temporality as the 
future relates Dasein to his own Being-towards-death. Authentic temporality 
is therefore primordially finite (Heidegger 1962: 378 –9). The awareness of its 
own Being-towards-death places Dasein in a relation to Being and makes 
resolve and authentic existence possible. Heidegger refers to death in this 
regard as the ownmost possibility of Dasein, which is at the same time Dasein’s 
utter impossibility (Heidegger 1962: 354, 378). The awareness of Dasein’s 
own death thus structures temporality as it entails an anticipation of  the 
future which determines the way in which Dasein relates to what has been 
and in making present.
Heidegger (1962: 246 –52) moreover contends that Dasein is already thrown 
into the world and ‘is’ thus Being-in-the-world. This means that there is no 
world or reality outside of Dasein the existence of which has to be proven (as 
Descartes attempted) or to which one has no access (Kant’s ‘thing in itself ’). 
Both these (metaphysical) approaches assume a subject that is world-less and 
that seeks to assure itself  of a world (Heidegger 1962: 250; Chapter 1). In this 
respect Heidegger’s thinking is not very far removed from Hegel’s critique of 
Kant regarding the noumenon. As mentioned in Chapter 1, things for Hegel 
are simply phenomena and there is no reason to go beyond the phenomena 
to the things-in-themselves (Hyppolite 1974: 125). Heidegger’s thinking in 
7 Greek ecstasis = standing outside. This word is used by Heidegger ‘to emphasize a connotation 
of stretching towards or openness to’; see Taminiaux (1994: 52).
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this regard can be better understood when we relate it to what was said above 
regarding temporality. According to Heidegger (1962: 429, 472), entities other 
than Dasein are strictly speaking non-temporal; they are nonetheless entities 
within-the-world that are encountered by Dasein ‘in time’ due to Dasein’s 
temporality. It is because of Dasein’s awareness of its own mortality that its 
existence is an issue for it, although it tends to hide this from itself  by finding 
refuge in beings because of the security they seem to offer. Death is therefore 
for Heidegger not something that stands separate from life or beyond life, 
but is connected to the life of Dasein in a fundamental way. Heidegger believes 
that an authentic life (as compared to the inauthentic life of the ‘they’ – das 
Man) would entail being fully aware of one’s mortality:
Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself  has to take over in 
every case. With its death, Dasein stands before itself  in its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing 
less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-
longer-being-able-to-be-there.
(Heidegger 1962: 294)
In the above quotation we can see that the intricate relation between life and 
death is what for Heidegger defines Being. This comes out very clearly in 
another passage a few pages later in Being and Time (1962: 298): ‘Dasein is 
always dying already; that is to say, it is in a Being-towards-its-end.’ We see a 
similar kind of relation between life and death in Freud’s thinking in relation to 
the death drive which, as we saw, Freud views as a ‘desire’ of all living beings 
(Chapter 1). Western philosophy, it appears from the reflection of these two 
thinkers, has ‘hidden’ the relation between life and death from itself, thereby 
turning itself  into a metaphysics of presence. This is borne out by the way 
in which Being is implicitly viewed by metaphysics through all its epochs:
Of what do we say and has one said from times of old: This ‘is’? What 
does one take as in being even when one has fallen away from the prim-
ordial Platonic way of perceiving? We say something is of  that which 
we always and in advance encounter as always ready to hand; what is 
always present and has constant stability in this presence. What really is, 
is what already in advance can never be removed, what stands fast and 
resists any attack, survives any accident. The beingness of beings signifies 
permanent presence. What is thus in being is the true, the ‘truth’ one can 
always and truly hold on to as what is stable and does not withdraw, on 
the basis of which one can gain a foothold.
(Heidegger 1991: III 59– 60)
This notion of constant presence is for example expressed by Kant when 
he describes appearances in the Critique of Pure Reason: ‘All appearances 
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contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the transitory as 
its mere determination – that is, as a way in which the object exists’ (Heidegger 
2005: 116). Changes of appearance are in other words viewed simply as 
alteration and not as ‘rising up from nothing and disappearance into nothing’ 
(Heidegger 2005: 124). The reason for Being taking this form in metaphysics 
is related to the interest of life in constantly maintaining and securing itself. 
This is why the true world in metaphysics was taken to be the one that is 
constant and unchanging rather than one that is changing and transforming 
(Heidegger 1991: II 61–2). What was at first experienced as ‘presencing’ has 
due to metaphysics become ‘something present’ (Heidegger 1984a: 50). 
Heidegger’s discussion of chaos encountered by knowing (as compared to 
the commonsensical view that we encounter things or objects in an ordered 
way), in the context of a discussion of truth in Nietzsche, is revealing in this 
regard. Heidegger speaks in this respect of every living being, and especially 
man as ‘surrounded, oppressed and penetrated by chaos, the unmastered, 
overpowering element that tears everything away in its stream’ (Heidegger 
1991: III 84). Heidegger contends, in words that cannot but remind one of 
Freud’s contemplation of the death drive, that Being (in metaphysics) entails an 
overcoming of this sheer dissolution and annihilation. It is however because 
of a denial of death as part of his life that man takes his refuge in a particular 
conception of Being as what is permanent and stable. Instead of viewing this 
chaos as on the outside whilst praxis or reason provides stability on the inside 
(as metaphysics does), the chaos must according to Heidegger (1991: III 88) 
be seen as what is inside:
Rather, the living being as praxis, that is, as the perspectival-horizonal 
securing of stability, is first installed in chaos as chaos. Chaos as the 
onrushing urge of living beings for its part makes the perspectival secur-
ing of stability necessary for the survival of the living being.
Derrida’s assessment
Although acknowledging the necessity of Heidegger’s questioning of the meta-
physical tradition, Derrida’s assessment thereof (suspending for a moment the 
necessarily heterogeneous nature of Heidegger’s texts, which will be explored 
further below) is that it was not followed through to the end. What is called 
for according to Derrida is an even more rigorous thinking through of Being 
and of the metaphysical tradition. Heidegger’s enquiry into the truth of 
Being, although it involves a radical questioning of the tradition, according 
to Derrida, ultimately seeks in very metaphysical style a more fundamental 
truth and origin. Heidegger (2005: 71) in this respect for example describes 
Being as ‘the primary and ultimate ground of the possibility of every actual and 
conceivable being’. Derrida thus raises the question whether the ontological 
thinking of Being – or in Shakespeare’s words, ‘To be, or not to be’ – should 
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receive the precedence it is at times accorded by Heidegger.8 Heidegger 
furthermore retains in traditional metaphysical style, oppositions such as in his 
discussion of time and of Dasein between the authentic and the inauthentic (or 
fallen-ness), and of the proper and the improper, in spite of having suspended 
all ethical evaluation (MP 63– 4). In respect of the ontological difference, 
Derrida asks whether the thinking of the difference between Being and beings 
does not still come from the metaphysical order and whether there is not a 
difference still more unthought than the difference between Being and beings, 
thereby alluding to différance (SP 153; MP 66 –7). Heidegger’s analysis of 
temporality raises a similar kind of question, that is, whether an alternative 
conception of time – here, authentic temporality – does not still remain within the 
metaphysics of presence, as any conception of time inevitably must (MP 63; 
IJsseling 1986: 123). Lastly, Heidegger’s view of death as a possible impossibility 
of Dasein raises the question whether it does not risk inscribing death within 
a circular economy (Ap 29–30, 62– 4). Viewing death and time in this way, 
as we will see below, has important implications for our conception of justice. 
Despite these reservations, Derrida’s description of justice in terms of the 
gift and the invocation of justice in ‘Force of law’, as well as his distancing 
of this conception from the Kantian regulative idea, is clearly indebted to 
Heidegger’s destruction of the metaphysical understanding of Being as idea 
(AR 254 –5). This destruction is a necessary step should one ultimately attempt 
to think Being in terms of the gift. Marcel Mauss’s study of the gift further 
opens this possibility, as we will see in the discussion that follows.
Mauss’s The Gift
Mauss’s exploration of the gift in archaic or ancient societies understandably 
has a prominent place in Derrida’s analysis in thinking the gift and time in 
a way that exceeds metaphysics. Mauss shows that gifts in these societies have 
a structure of circular exchange and are motivated by economic self-interest. 
Gifts are in other words coupled with an obligation to give (generously), an 
obligation to receive, and an obligation to reciprocate with interest, taking 
due account of prescribed time limits (Mauss 1990: 46). A failure to participate 
in this reciprocal exchange could have fatal consequences as it would amount 
to an act of war (at 7). In the societies analysed, acts of destruction; the 
giving of alms to the poor; the giving of children in marriage; the invitation 
of others to share meals, drink and tobacco; and the exchange of presents, 
are all forms of obligatory gifts. According to Mauss (at 46, 60 –1, 90), the 
exchange of gifts lies at the origin of law, morality and economy. Mauss 
8 See SM 10 where Derrida introduces the notion of ‘hauntology’ in contemplating the ghosts 
of Shakespeare and Marx. The French ‘hantologie’ and ‘ontologie’ are homonyms, and can 
thus be distinguished only in writing.
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specifically contends in this regard that the principle of justice in modern 
legal systems has taken the place of the gift: justice derives from the obliga-
tion resting upon those in ‘primitive’ societies who had in abundance; they 
had to show generosity in giving alms on certain occasions on pain of being 
punished by the gods in avenging the poor, and in expectation that they 
would be richly rewarded by the gods should they do so (at 23).9 This obliga-
tion furthermore relates to the belief  that the gods and the dead are the true 
owners of things and possessions of this world (at 20). This at first required 
destruction in sacrifice to the gods (killing of slaves, burning of precious oil, 
casting of copper objects into the sea, and setting the houses of princes and 
blankets on fire), which of course also fulfilled the function of displaying 
power, wealth and lack of self-interest (at 20, 47– 8, 95). The giving of alms 
to the poor and of gifts to children, instead of to the gods, amounts to an 
evolution in society, entailing that men act in a way as representatives of the 
gods and the dead (at 22). It is only relatively recently, Mauss furthermore 
contends, that a distinction has been drawn in legal systems between, on the 
one hand, obligations and services that are not given freely, and on the other, 
gifts (at 61). According to Mauss, the exchange of generous gifts in these 
societies served and still serves the important function of preventing war and 
establishing peace between families, clans and tribes (at 104 – 6). It brings 
about a certain degree of stability on the basis of which legal and economic 
systems can develop. That the exchange of gifts serve to prevent war is an 
interesting conclusion, in light of Mauss’s own remarks concerning the 
destruction of wealth (in times of peace) as a kind of gift which he equates 
with war (at 8, 141–2 fn. 141, 147 fn. 166). The preference expressed for the 
exchange of gifts presumably lies in it being a war or defence of oneself  
without resort to arms (at 106). Mauss concludes his analysis by arguing for 
a return to the notion of generous giving, calculated but not excessive, found 
in ancient civilizations (thus effectively a return to nature, similar to what we 
found with Lévi-Strauss (Chapter 3)) in accordance with the principles of 
charity, social service and solidarity, and a movement away from cold-hearted, 
utilitarian, calculating laws and actions (Mauss 1990: 83–100; GT 66, 82).
Although in praise of Mauss’s study and of his reintroduction of the word 
and category of the gift as lying at the origin of legal, economic and moral 
systems, as compared to other authors who seek to do without it, Derrida 
is of the view that Mauss is not sufficiently concerned with his own observation 
that all the gifts he analyses are caught within a circular exchange (GT 26, 
37, 42). The same could be said of Mauss’s conception of justice. An exchange 
of gifts, Derrida comments, surely amounts to the annulment of the gift (GT 
24, 37). Another important comment of Derrida on Mauss’s study deserves 
mention here. Derrida questions the unity of meaning, which Mauss ascribes 
9 See similarly Nietzsche (1984: 64 para. 92) on justice as founded on exchange or barter.
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to the many different cultural practices, namely that they all amount to the 
exchange of gifts (GT 25– 6). Derrida does not do this in order to say that these 
practices cannot be described as gifts, but instead to contend and ultimately 
to show that the word ‘gift’ does not have a unitary meaning; that it instead 
‘suffers’ from a loss of meaning. The different words in different cultures 
which Mauss in each instance translate as the exchange of gifts, similarly 
exceed the notion of the gift as circular exchange (GT 55– 6). This questioning 
moreover ties in with Derrida’s later comments on Mauss’s description of a 
specific kind of gift – the potlatch. As we saw above, certain forms of ‘gift’, 
those involving the honour of  a chief, are described by Mauss as going 
even beyond this still limited notion of generosity – they involve a ‘madly’ 
extravagant destruction and consumption, without limits, of all kinds of 
property. Derrida notes that Mauss has some difficulty in describing the 
actions of the destruction carried out here in terms of the gift, where there 
appear to be no giving and returning and also no desire of expecting a return 
(GT 46 –7). This madness of a gift forgetting itself, of disbanding, of dis-
semination without return, ‘threatens a priori the closed circle of exchangist 
rationality’, Derrida notes (GT 47).10 Mauss in other words wishes to describe 
the gift in terms of a system of circular exchange, but in the process of 
describing it, he shows that the concept of the gift exceeds this system.11 This 
is of course not to say that these actions which Mauss describes ‘are’ or 
constitute gifts in the perfect sense. As we saw above, they can clearly also 
be inscribed within the system of circular exchange. Derrida is concerned 
here rather with the language Mauss uses in describing these gifts which 
seems to exceed his text on the gift as a system of circular exchange (GT 
45– 8). Mauss, in giving us a narrative on the gift of circular exchange, is 
himself  overtaken by the gift without exchange. We will see why this happens, 
arguably also in the case of a constitution, in the discussion that follows. In 
his conclusion, Mauss furthermore acknowledges that the terms ‘present’ and 
‘gift’ which he had been using throughout the text ‘are not themselves entirely 
exact’ (Mauss 1990: 93; GT 55). Derrida points out that Mauss here admits 
that the word ‘gift’ has no centre or identity; that its meaning is marked by 
dissemination and asymmetry.
10 The ‘madness’ of the gift, Derrida furthermore observes, operates by way of a differantial 
force (of delay) in two directions, that is, in exceeding the system of economic exchange and 
in again inscribing itself  within such an exchange (GT 39– 40, 47).
11 See e.g. Mauss (1990: 47): ‘In certain kinds of potlatch one must expend all that one has, 
keeping nothing back. It is a competition to see who is the richest and also the most madly 
extravagant [le plus follement dépensier] ... In a certain number of cases, it is not even a 
question of giving and returning gifts, but of destroying, so as not to give the slightest hint 
of desiring your gift to be reciprocated.’
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Derrida on the gift
The gift and Heidegger’s es gibt
The first chapter of Given Time assists in a better understanding of Derrida’s 
reading of Mauss. Derrida commences by setting out the usual conception 
of the gift. This entails that someone (A) wants, desires or intends to give 
something (B) to someone (C). As Derrida points out, this definition supposes 
a subject and a verb (GT 10 –12). It supposes, more specifically, a subject 
identical to itself  and conscious of its identity, seeking through the gesture 
of the gift, to have its own identity recognised so that that identity comes back 
to it. This definition – the condition of possibility of the gift – points also to 
the impossibility of the gift, to the destruction, annulment, and annihilation 
of the gift. The circular economy involved in this exchange in other words 
destroys the gift. Some ‘thing’ cannot strictly speaking be a gift if  it involves 
a relationship of circular exchange. As Derrida notes, ‘[f ]or there to be gift, 
there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, countergift or debt’ (GT 12). 
In every instance where something is given back, the gift is annulled. There 
can only be a gift if  it does not lead to a debt, to a contract, to a circular 
exchange, either in consciousness or the unconscious (GT 15–16). As soon 
as the gift appears as gift, it annuls or destructs itself, namely even before it 
leads to gratitude. A gift can thus only be a gift if  it does not appear as gift 
either to the donor or to the donee (GT 13–14). As soon as someone gives 
with the intention to give, a process of self-congratulation and self-approval 
and thus circular return to self  takes place. As soon as the gift gets caught 
up in the temporalising synthesis, as soon as it is accepted, and even when 
it is refused, destruction of the gift takes place.
In metaphysics, as Derrida points out, the gift and the debt, the gift and 
the cycle of restitution, the gift and the loan, the gift and credit, the gift and 
the countergift, have been thought together as a system. Derrida seeks to 
depart from this tradition by pointing to that in the tradition which posits 
that there can only be gift if  this does not involve return, if  it interrupts the 
system and the symbol. This requires a gift-event that would not be caught 
up within a system of economic exchange, as happens, for example, in the 
text of Mauss, and, as we will see shortly, in that of Heidegger. In describing 
this impossible gift-event, Derrida notes that it would not be sufficient for 
the gift to be forgotten by the donor and the donee only consciously and still 
be kept in the memory of the unconscious. The latter would simply entail a 
displacing – not an annulling or destruction (GT 16). The gift would have to 
involve an ‘absolute forgetting’ and an ‘absolute unbinding’ as distinguished 
from repression or displacement to the unconscious. This forgetting would 
involve an instant that no longer belongs to the economy of time (GT 17). 
It may appear strange to refer to the gift in terms of forgetting, unbinding, 
repression and displacement. The initial strangeness disappears when we 
126 Jacques Derrida: law as absolute hospitality
realise that Derrida at this point is no longer simply concerned with the giving 
of gifts in the ordinary sense – that is, ‘someone giving something to someone 
other’. He had just mentioned (GT 15–16) the insights of psychoanalysis into 
the unconscious and the implications this has for the economy of the gift 
(the unconscious too can participate in the circle of economic exchange) and 
is on his way towards engaging with the Heideggerian phrases es gibt Sein, 
es gibt Zeit which could perhaps take us beyond this circle. Through these 
phrases Heidegger, in On Time and Being, attempts to speak about time and 
Being in a non-propositional manner, that is to say without referring to them 
as present-being/being-present and without speaking of them in terms of a 
subject–predicate relation (GT 19–20). Both Heidegger and Derrida can, 
on a certain reading,12 be said to attempt to think Being and time as made 
possible or ‘given’ by ‘something’ else: Ereignis (event).13 This nevertheless 
happens in different ways.
In his exploration of the es gibt in Given Time, Derrida specifically focuses 
on the notion of ‘play’ which is mentioned by Heidegger in his discussion 
of time in On Time and Being (GT 22).14 Heidegger is contemplating here 
the es (it) of es gibt, and in this way can be said to seek to go beyond his 
previous analyses of Being. He asks specifically in this regard whence the 
12 According to Stambaugh, in her ‘Introduction’ to On Time and Being (at ix–xi), Heidegger’s 
rethinking of Being and time is tied to the fact that metaphysics begins when Plato separates 
Being (the Ideas or forms) from the realm of time (becoming, existence). Being is thus 
thought as that which never changes, whereas time is thought as that which constantly 
changes. In Time and Being Heidegger, in an attempt to think the notions of time and Being 
in a non-metaphysical manner, enquires into the temporal character of Being itself. This at 
the same time requires that time be thought in a way different from the seriality of a string 
of nows (present–past–future). A fourth dimension of time (the reciprocal play of past, 
present and future) is thus identified where no ‘thing’ in the ordinary sense occurs (as event/
Ereignis), but only Being, which, like time, is not a thing, and which cannot appear as such 
(in a phenomenological sense). In this reading, Ereignis and Being are equated.
13 As Derrida indicates, Ereignis is a difficult word to translate (GT 19). It is often translated 
as event. However, as Krell points out in Heidegger’s Basic Writings (at 396), in introducing 
‘The way to language’, Ereignis in Heidegger’s texts is used in a special sense, related to the 
Latin proprius or own-ness (see also Heidegger 1993b: 415–17). Krell therefore translates 
Ereignis as propriation (In Identity and Difference and On Time and Being it is translated 
by Stambaugh as ‘Appropriation’). Ereignis is furthermore closely related to Heidegger’s 
thinking on death which is, as we saw earlier, in turn viewed as the most proper possibility 
of Dasein; see Heidegger (1962: 294; 1993b: 417). Ereignis could be said to draw Dasein into 
its own; into its mortal becoming in other words; see Sheehan (1998: 315). Elsewhere Ereignis 
is translated as ‘Enowning’.
14 In other texts Derrida has indicated how the es gibt can be thought in terms of a promise 
that makes language possible, and therefore as ‘preceding’ the ‘is’ which Heidegger has shown 
is a characteristic of all language as well as the ‘what is’ question of philosophy; see MfPdM 
146 – 8; OS 129–36 fn. 5; Spurs 111; AL 302. Thinking of the es gibt in terms of a promise 
of course ties in closely with Heidegger’s thinking on the relation between language, Being 
and Ereignis.
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‘extending reach’ or giving of presencing – that is, of Being – takes place 
(Heidegger 2002c: 12–13). According to Heidegger, and this ties in with what 
was said above concerning temporality in Being and Time, not only what is 
present presences, but also what ‘has been’ in so far as it still concerns us 
and ‘what comes towards us from the future’ as it already concerns us. Such 
presencing, Heidegger notes, ‘is given’ (wird gereicht) in all these temporal 
dimensions. This ‘giving’ (dieses Reichen), he contends, reaches us ‘because 
it is in itself a reaching’ (ein Reichen) (Heidegger 2002c: 13). Heidegger (2002c: 
13) sees a reciprocal relation here between the past, present and future which 
he expresses as follows:
Approaching, being not yet present, at the same time gives [reicht] and 
brings about [erbringt] what is no longer present, the past, and conversely 
what has been offers future to itself [reicht zich Zukunft zu]. The reciprocal 
relation of both at the same time gives and brings about [reicht und 
erbringt zich] the present. We say ‘at the same time,’ and thus ascribe a 
time character to the mutual giving [dem Sich-einander-Reichen] to one 
another of future, past and present, that is, to their own unity.
Heidegger then asks about the ‘whence’ (woher) of the unity of this three-
dimensionality of what he refers to as ‘true’ (eigentlichen, also ‘real’ or ‘original’) 
time. The unity of time’s three dimensions, Heidegger (2002c: 15) concludes, 
‘consists in the interplay [Zuspiel ] of  each toward each’. This interplay of 
the three dimensions amounts to a fourth dimension of time which Heidegger 
refers to as ‘the true extending’, or perhaps rather ‘giving’ (das Eigentliche, 
in Eigenen der Zeit spielende Reichen). A fourth dimension of time thus gives 
and keeps together the dimensions of the past, present and future. It is this 
dimension which gives time as well as Being (Es gibt die Zeit, Es gibt Sein) 
(Heidegger 2002c: 16 –17) and which Heidegger refers to as das Ereignis (the 
event of Appropriation). On Derrida’s reading, Ereignis does not simply 
belong to time or to Being, but gives Being and time. In commenting on 
Heidegger’s analysis, Derrida notes that this fourth dimension of time is not 
a figure, but is a reference to ‘the thing itself ’ (GT 22). ‘This thing itself  of 
time’, he furthermore comments, ‘implies the play of the four and the play 
of the gift’ (GT 22).
Heidegger’s On Time and Being thus appears to make possible a thinking of 
the gift in the strict sense indicated above: a gift which does not involve the 
giving of some thing by some one (a subject) to an other (subject). At the same 
time this traditional definition of the gift could actually be employed if we hear 
something different in the words ‘one’, ‘thing’ and ‘other’ (GT 11–12). In the 
giving of the es gibt, as Derrida points out, the es (it) is not a thing; it also 
entails a giving ‘without giving anything and without anyone giving anything 
– nothing but Being and time (which are nothing)’ (GT 20). The last phrase 
in parenthesis is to be understood within the context of Heidegger’s analysis 
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in On Time and Being which shows that time in itself  is nothing temporal; it 
is also not a thing, and therefore in a certain sense, nothing. Time also does 
not properly belong to anyone (GT 28). Nothing however appears which does 
not need time or take time. Time is, in other words, the condition of possibil-
ity of phenomenality (GT 6). We could say that time, as determined by the 
revolution of the sun, daytime, makes phenomena appear. Similarly Being is 
not something, a thing or a being-present/present-being. This is why one cannot 
say ‘time is’ or ‘Being is’, but only es gibt Sein and es gibt Zeit (GT 20). If  
the gift, rigorously thought, entails exactly this – the giving of nothing that 
is and that appears as such, then time is what should be given as gift. In the 
words of Derrida ‘[w]hat there is to give, uniquely, would be called time’ (GT 
29). This also explains the first part of the title, Given Time. We could say 
regarding time and also regarding the gift that each of them ‘is what it is 
without being (it) [est sans l’être]’ (GT 28). Neither time nor the gift therefore 
exists as such. Nevertheless, there is gift and there is time.
Derrida points out that Heidegger’s thinking in On Time and Being is 
clearly still ordered by a desire for the proper (GT 21–2). This can be seen, for 
example, in the attempt to think Being and time properly or in their own or 
proper element.15 On Time and Being all the same opens the way to a thinking 
of the gift which, although not completely unrelated to the proper, exceeds 
the proper and reciprocation. Such a reading is made possible by Heidegger’s 
analysis of Ereignis which involves a self-withholding or self-withdrawal (Sich-
entziehen) in sending, also referred to as an expropriation (Enteignis) of itself  
(Heidegger 2002c: 22–3).16 This thinking of Ereignis in terms of what Derrida 
refers to as ex-appropriation (Points 270, 321), tying in closely with the 
notion of ‘play’ analysed above, opens the way to a thinking of the gift as 
exceeding economy.17 Thinking of the event (Ereignis) in terms of a gift 
beyond exchange moreover allows for the gift to be thought as opening the 
‘history of Being’ without belonging to it.18
The gift and sexual difference
Heidegger’s contention, as we saw earlier, is that Western philosophical thinking 
has forgotten the question of Being, which was first posed by the early Greeks 
15 Stambaugh’s interpretation, referred to above, ties in with what is said here. Heidegger (2007b: 9) 
expresses himself as follows in this respect: ‘Wir denken zuerst dem Sein nach, um es selbst in 
sein Eigenes zu denken. Wir denken sodann der Zeit nach, um sie selbst in ihr Eigenes zu denken.’ 
See also Heidegger (2002c: 6 and 22): ‘As the gift of this It gives, Being belongs [gehört] to 
giving’; ‘The gift of presence is the property [Eigentum] of  Appropriating [des Ereignis]’.
16 See further Chapter 7.
17 See also de Ville (2010b and 2011) on the notion of ‘play’ in Derrida’s thinking; and see 
Chapter 3.
18 See also Glas 242a and Gasché (1994: 194 – 8). This of course ties in with Dasein’s relation 
to death which was discussed earlier.
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(Heidegger 1962: 2).19 We furthermore saw that a certain ‘forgetting’ plays 
an important role in Derrida’s analysis of the gift. The forgetting that Derrida 
refers to is undoubtedly tied to Heidegger’s notion of forgetting (of Being), 
but it also goes beyond a forgetting of Being; it is said to involve an ‘absolute 
forgetting’. For Heidegger, the forgetting of Being is not a psychological or 
psycho-analytical category. Absolute forgetting, as Derrida refers to it and 
as we will see shortly, is indeed related to psychoanalytic repression, but at the 
same time exceeds it. Forgetting in this sense is closely related to Derrida’s 
thinking on time. In associating forgetting and the gift, Derrida seeks to go 
not only beyond the Heideggerian notion of a forgetting of Being, but also 
beyond the psychoanalytical idea of repression or the unconscious (GT 16 –18, 
23). The radical forgetting that Derrida is referring to here is first of all 
required of the donor(s), whether individual or collective. Derrida underlines 
that even the intention to give on the part of the donor, already suffices to 
annul the gift:
The simple intention to give, insofar as it carries the intentional meaning 
of the gift, suffices to make a return payment to oneself. The simple 
consciousness of the gift right away sends itself  back the gratifying image 
of goodness or generosity, of the giving-being who, knowing itself  to be 
such, recognizes itself  in a circular, specular fashion, in a sort of auto-
recognition, self-approval, and narcissistic gratitude.
(GT 23)
The above happens immediately and automatically when a subject or subjects 
are involved. A gift cannot therefore come about between two subjects 
exchanging objects, things or symbols (GT 24). Heidegger’s thinking in On 
Time and Being is for this reason of great importance in attempting to think 
the gift beyond exchange. As we saw above, it seeks to go back beyond a 
construction of Being in terms of subjectivity and objectivity (GT 24). To 
understand the relation between absolute forgetting and the gift, as well as 
the reason for Derrida’s invocation in Given Time of numerous psychoanalytic 
notions, such as the unconscious, desire (beyond desire), repression, forgetting, 
mourning and sexual difference (GT 16 –17, 25, 30, 118) a number of other 
texts of Derrida on Heidegger and on the gift need to be referred to.
In ‘Women in the beehive’ (at 150) Derrida is asked a question relating to 
an earlier remark of his in another interview concerning the relation between 
sexual difference and the impossible idea of the gift. Derrida raises the question 
here whether:
this extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, idea of the gift can still 
maintain an essential relationship to sexual difference. One wonders 
19 See also Heidegger (1991: IV 193; GT 18).
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whether sexual difference, femininity for example – however irreducible 
it may be – does not remain derived from and subordinated to either the 
question of destination or the thought of the gift ... I do not know. Must 
one think ‘difference’ ‘before’ sexual difference or taking off  ‘from’ it? 
Has this question, if  not a meaning (we are at the origin of meaning 
here, and the origin cannot ‘have meaning’) at least something of a chance 
of opening up anything at all, however im-pertinent it may appear.
(EO 172)
The answer to this question appears to depend on the ‘meaning’ attributed 
to ‘sexual difference’. It can on the one hand simply refer to a separation or 
the opposition of the traditional two sexes as in Hegel where ‘[i]n each sex 
the organic individuals form a totality’ and where sexual difference entails a 
hierarchical opposition of male activity/female passivity (Glas 110a, 112a–
13a). In relating this traditional idea of sexual difference to the gift, one can 
here for example think of a (sexual) relation between a man and a woman 
(as subjects) where ‘gifts’ are exchanged or ‘destined’ (‘WB’ 150). As we saw 
above, and as Derrida confirms here yet again, where (sexually determined) 
subjects are involved there can be no gift (‘WB’ 150). There can likewise be 
no gift in the case of calculation, consciousness and experience. For there to 
be gift one has to think a sexuality which is ‘completely out of the frame, 
totally aleatory to what we are familiar with in the term “sexuality”’, Derrida 
notes here (‘WB’ 151).20 A different ‘meaning’ must therefore be attributed 
to ‘sexual difference’ which goes beyond sexual duality.21
In invoking the second understanding of sexual difference, Derrida refers 
in ‘Women in the Beehive’ to his reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time in 
‘Geschlecht: sexual difference, ontological difference’. In this essay Derrida 
mentions the seeming silence about sex in Heidegger’s texts (Geschl I 382). 
Dasein in Being and Time, and therefore also the meaning of Being, appear 
to bear no sexual mark. Derrida however refers to a lecture in 1928 at Marburg 
University, which was meant to clear up the many misunderstandings in the 
reception of Being and Time, where Heidegger explained the need to conceive 
of Dasein as sexually neuter, that is, as belonging to neither of the two sexes 
(Geschl I 385; Heidegger 1984b: 136). It is interesting to note, Derrida (Geschl I 
386) comments, that Heidegger, in Being and Time (1927), makes no mention 
of the asexuality (Geschlechtslosigkeit) of Dasein, only Dasein’s neutrality, 
yet in the Marburg course this is one of the first traits he mentions: ‘This 
neutrality also indicates that Dasein is neither of the two sexes’ (Heidegger 
1984b: 136). Derrida notes the strangeness of this observation or clarification, 
20 See also Psy I 141 with reference to the work of Nicolas Abraham on sexuality in Freud 
thought of in an anasemic way.
21 See also Spurs 121.
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seeing that it appears commonsensical that if  Dasein is neuter, it does not 
belong to either of the two sexes. How should this observation regarding the 
neutrality as to sexual difference therefore be understood? Rather than simply 
understand it as a subtraction or negativity in characterising Dasein, Derrida 
notes with reference to Heidegger’s comments that this characterisation should 
be understood as a ‘positivity’, a ‘richness’, or a ‘power’ of Dasein (Geschl I 
387).22 According to Derrida, Heidegger is thus not desexualising Dasein. 
Sexual duality is indeed subtracted, but sexuality itself  is ‘liberated’ (Geschl 
I 387).23 Heidegger, Derrida notes, invokes this specific terminology rather 
than using the term ‘sexuality’ in a different sense, because of the way in 
which sexuality is usually understood, that is, in terms of the binary logic of 
male or female (Geschl I 388 –9). The sexual neutrality of Dasein does not 
therefore point to the absence of sexuality itself; not to the absence hence of 
libido, instinct or desire, Derrida contends, but simply to the absence of any 
mark belonging to one of the two sexes (Geschl I 387; EO 180). The meaning 
of the neutrality as to sexual difference that Heidegger refers to, Derrida 
summarises as follows:
If  Dasein as such belongs to neither of the two sexes, that does not mean 
that its being is deprived of sex. On the contrary: here one must think 
of  a predifferential, or rather a predual, sexuality – which does not 
necessarily mean unitary, homogeneous, or undifferentiated ... [I]t would 
indeed be a matter here of the positive and powerful source of every 
possible ‘sexuality’.
(Geschl I 387– 8)
A similar comment of Heidegger is to be found in ‘On the essence of ground’, 
dating from 1929. Heidegger (2007a: 122) points out here that Dasein’s exist-
ence for the sake of itself  is not to be confused with egoism or narcissism, 
but is to be understood as a precondition for its being an ‘I’ and for relating 
to a ‘you’.24 Only because of  this ipseity can a human being act in either 
an egoistic or altruistic way. Selfhood, Heidegger continues, ‘is neutral with 
22 Heidegger (1984b: 136 –7): ‘This neutrality also indicates that Dasein is neither of the two 
sexes. But here sexlessness is not the indifference of an empty void, the weak negativity of 
an indifferent ontic nothing. In its neutrality Dasein is not the indifferent nobody and 
everybody, but the primordial positivity and potency of the essence [die ursprüngliche 
Positivität und Mächtigkeit des Wesens (of Being)].’
23 Derrida links Heidegger’s strategic move here to what he (Heidegger) says in ‘Plato’s doctrine 
of truth’ about the private sense of aletheia (literally: unhiddenness). In the last paragraph 
Heidegger (2007a: 182) remarks that ‘[w]hat is first required is an appreciation of the 
“positive” essence of aletheia. The positive must first be experienced as the fundamental 
trait of being itself.’ See also Geschl I 397– 400.
24 See similarly the discussion in Chapter 1 on the ‘instinct of mastery’ in Freud.
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respect to being an “I” and being a “you,” and above all with respect to such 
things as “sexuality” [erst recht etwa gegen die “Geschlechtlichkeit”]’. The 
‘above all’ in this sentence is for Derrida of  primary importance as well 
as the fact that ‘sexuality’ appears in quotation marks, as if  Heidegger is 
here too referring to sexuality in the usual sense, and keeping open the pos-
sibility that Dasein’s ipseity may in another sense be marked by sexuality 
(Geschl I 389–91).
The above reading is confirmed when Heidegger in the 1928 lecture proceeds 
to comment on the isolation (a certain originary isolation) associated with 
this original ipseity of Dasein. Heidegger links this isolation with the theme 
of sexual difference: ‘As such, Dasein harbours the intrinsic possibility for 
being dispersed into bodiliness and thus [or subsequently] into sexuality 
[ faktische Zerstreuung in die Leiblichkeit und damit in die Geschlechtlichkeit]’ 
(Heidegger 1984b: 137). This furthermore leads to the disunity (Zerspaltung) 
of a determined sexuality. Heidegger notes that the dispersal and disunity 
(Zersplitterung, Zerspaltung) referred to here does not connote something 
negative in the ontic sense. At stake is the inmost isolation of Dasein, the 
not-yet of factical dispersion (Zerstreutheit); in other words, the ‘intrinsic 
possibility of multiplication [Mannigfaltigung] which ... is present in every 
Dasein and for which embodiment presents an organizing factor’ (Heidegger 
1984b: 138). This inherent possibility of multiplication (to be distinguished 
from simply multiplicity, diversity or plurality) furthermore precedes the 
(secondary) division into the sexes. This multiplication, or what can also be 
referred to as dissociation, unboundedness and de-socialisation, are not traits 
characterising the ‘fall’, accident or subsequent decline of Dasein, but are 
part of the originary structure of Dasein which affects it and its body (Geschl 
I 392). These ‘traits likewise belong to Being itself ’, Heidegger (2004b: 138) 
notes. Dasein is in other words in its essence characterised by a primordial 
bestrewal or dissemination (eine ursprüngliche Streuung) (Heidegger 1984b: 
138; Geschl I 393). As Derrida points out, it is this disseminating structure 
which makes possible Dasein’s relation to specific objects as well as its rela-
tion to itself  (Geschl I 393– 4). Dasein’s originary dispersion is furthermore 
closely linked to its thrownness (Geworfenheit), which Heidegger (1984b: 138) 
refers to as ‘a primordial feature of Dasein’. Thrownness, as Derrida notes, 
has to be understood as preceding any project on the part of Dasein, the 
categories of passivity and activity which are closely related to the subject, 
images of the fall, whether Platonic or Christian, as well as of spatiality. ‘The 
originary spatiality of Dasein’, Derrida notes, ‘depends on the throw’ (Geschl 
I 396).
To recap briefly before continuing the analysis: the ‘sexuality’ which Heidegger 
implicitly invokes here, is not to be understood as an allusion to some primitive 
or subsequent bisexuality (EO 180). Derrida could be said to read Heidegger as 
saying that ‘sexuality’ is an essential part of the structure of Dasein and there-
fore influences, or rather, necessarily determines the meaning of Being and 
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the ontological difference (Geschl I 390, 393).25 The word ‘sexuality’ should not 
be understood here in its usual sense. We saw above that Heidegger explicitly 
relates sexuality to the internal possibility which Dasein harbours within itself of 
dispersal, dissemination, destruction, shattering and fragmentation (Geschl I 
391–2; Heidegger 1984b: 137– 8). This dissemination, as we likewise saw, is not 
an ontic structure, but an originary structure of Dasein that affects it with lack-
of-binding. This originary dissemination likewise belongs to the Being of Dasein 
(Geschl I 393). To continue the analysis: this ‘theme’ of dissemination in Dasein’s 
relation to objects and to itself  is already to be found in Being and Time 
(Heidegger 1962: 439–  44). Although Heidegger sometimes refers to the dispersion 
of Dasein as a mode of inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) or as the falling 
(Verfallen) of Dasein in its everyday-being, this is not always the case. At times, 
it is used to describe the general structure of Dasein (Geschl I 399, 400). 
Inauthenticity is furthermore not a moralising critique, a philosophy of culture, 
a dogmatic religious account of the fall from an original condition or a corruption 
of human nature (Geschl I 400; Minkkinen 1999: 59 fn. 36). Nevertheless, 
Heidegger does sometimes in metaphysical fashion make use of the distinction 
between the authentic/proper and the inauthentic/improper and imposes a 
hierarchical opposition in this respect (MP 63– 4). Derrida explores further the 
structure of Dasein in Being and Time, with reference to what Heidegger (1984b: 
138) calls in the 1928 lecture, ‘Dasein’s stretching along in time [sofern Dasein 
als Erstreckung geschieht]. This stretching along, it appears from Being and 
Time, involves a ‘stretching along between birth and death [Erstreckung des 
Daseins zwischen Geburt und Tod ]’ (Heidegger 1962: 426). Heidegger observes 
in this respect that Dasein’s birth is not simply something in its past and that 
its death is not something that is still outstanding. ‘Factual Dasein’, according 
to Heidegger (1962: 426), ‘exists as born; and as born, it is already dying, in 
the sense of Being-towards-death’. Derrida, following Heidegger, links this 
Erstreckung or Ausdehnung (stretching, expansion, elongation, prolongation) 
to Dasein’s dispersion and remarks that this stretching along:
names a spacing which, ‘before’ the determination of space as extension [as 
one finds e.g. in Descartes], comes to extend or stretch out being-there, the 
there of Being, between birth and death. As an essential dimension of Dasein, 
the Erstreckung opens up the between that links it at once to its birth and 
to its death, the movement of suspense by which it itself tends and extends 
itself between birth and death, these two receiving their meaning only from 
that intervallic movement. Dasein affects itself with this movement, and that 
auto-affection belongs to the ontological structure of its historicity.
(Geschl I 394)26
25 See also Heidegger (1991: I 194).
26 See also Heidegger (1962: 424 –9).
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This possibility of ‘stretching along’, Heidegger (1962: 426) moreover points 
out, is made possible by the Being of Dasein. In light of what has been said 
above, Derrida concludes that Dasein’s essential dispersion makes possible 
this ‘stretching along’ between birth and death (Geschl I 394). It would not 
have been possible for the link between birth and death to take place (that 
is, time) without this dispersion, dissociation, or unbinding (394). The same 
applies to space or Dasein’s originary spatiality (Geschl I 395).27 This brings 
us back to the gift which as we saw cannot be located in space, but must be 
thought of in terms of ‘spacing’. Spacing is referred to by Aristotle as ‘ama’, 
the ‘together of time and space’, which allows for what Derrida refers to as 
the ‘becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of space’ or what could 
also be referred to as the difference between time and space, to appear or to 
be experienced.28 In On the Name and with reference to khora in Plato’s 
Timaeus, this is referred to as a ‘site’ ‘where the law of the proper no longer 
has any meaning’ (ON 105).
Dasein’s ‘sexuality’ in this pre-originary sense can in other words be said 
to be intrinsically linked with dissemination which stands in a close relation 
with death, and with the perfect gift. This link has already been made in 
previous chapters. At this point it may perhaps be helpful if  we turn back 
to Chapter 3 where a link was made between the gift and sexuality. We saw 
there that the prohibition of incest is coupled with the giving of gifts and 
that, according to Lévi-Strauss (1969: 65, 483), marriage is the archetype of 
exchange and that ‘the woman herself  [is] the supreme gift’. It was pointed 
out that according to Derrida, the mother and the sister – the objects of 
incestuous desire – are always already supplements of what is ultimately 
desired (OG 156 –7, 266). This makes of the prohibition of incest, which 
Lévi-Strauss posits at the origin of society, a secondary effect of what can 
be termed ‘absolute desire’. This ‘theme’ and the notion of ‘sexual difference’ 
are taken up also in Adieu, where Derrida in a discussion of Levinas’s notion 
of the welcome, refers to the feminine as a welcoming par excellence (at 39).29 
At stake here is feminine alterity or (the feminine side of ) sexual difference, 
which, as Derrida notes with reference to Levinas, is not simply one difference 
amongst others (A 40). From Levinas’s analysis, and thereby raising the 
‘political’ stakes of this analysis, it appears that the host is actually first of 
all a guest in his own home or country, and this takes place by virtue of the 
27 The pre-spatial dispersion of Dasein (in relation to death) is manifested inter alia in language 
(Geschl I 395; Heidegger 1984b: 138). In writing, which as we saw has been ‘repressed’ by 
metaphysics because of its relation to death (Chapter 1), this dispersion is e.g. expressed by 
the spacing of signs, punctuation, intervals, and differences between signs (OG 68, 167; Pos 
27). All graphemes, Derrida moreover notes, are of a testamentary essence (OG 69). See in 
this respect again SQ 53, as quoted in Chapter 1.
28 See in this respect OG 65– 6, 69; SP 143; Heidegger (2002c: 14 –15); Harvey (1986: 121).
29 See further Chapter 1.
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feminine welcome. At stake here is an originary dispossession by means of 
which ‘the “owner” is expropriated from what is most his own, the ipse from 
its ipseity, thus making of one’s home a place or location one is simply passing 
through’ (A 42).30 Levinas’s perhaps traditional and androcentric description 
of woman is thus read by Derrida in a way which makes it possible to think 
a pre-originary hospitality on the basis of femininity or the feminine side of 
sexual difference (to be distinguished from the empirical presence of a human 
being of the feminine sex), which ties in very closely with the notion of the 
gift beyond exchange (A 43– 4). It appears that something similar is at stake in 
Derrida’s reading of Heidegger’s analysis of the originary ‘(sexual) dispersion’ 
‘or dissemination’ of Dasein.31 Sexual difference in this transgressive ‘sense’ 
thus has little to do with the opposition between the male and female sexes. 
The ‘difference’ lies in a sexuality which exceeds what is usually understood 
under that term. At stake here is a ‘desire’ for absolute pleasure or the death 
drive. In Given Time it is referred to as the gift beyond exchange and in Glas 
as the putting in play or to fire of all, which must nonetheless, in order to 
make possible an economy of self-relation and a dialectic of meaning, engage 
in a constriction or binding (Glas 242a).32
The ‘structure’ appearing from the above analysis corresponds with the 
stricture of différance in terms of which dissemination or unbinding would 
‘precede’ any form of gathering or binding (Chapter 1). We can therefore 
perhaps speak here, with Kamuf (2001: 99), of ‘(sexual) differe/ance’.33 Dif-
férance, as we saw earlier, goes beyond the ontological difference, or the 
distinction between Being and beings, to the difference between the gift or 
self-destruction on the one hand, and economy, law, politics, reason, meaning, 
experience, science, knowledge and philosophy which are ‘in time’, on the 
other (GT 30). (Sexual) Différance, in other words, structures the relation 
between the desire for presence (which we also find in Heidegger’s analysis 
of Being) and the ‘desire’ for absolute pleasure, which remains continuously 
deferred. Différance could also be said to be ‘situated’ between Being/beings 
30 Derrida’s The Beast and the Sovereign opens with the same theme: ‘Feminine ... masculine 
[La ... le]. Let me recall the title proposed for this year’s seminar: the beast [feminine: 
la bête] and the sovereign [masculine le souverain]. La, le.’
31 The reason for choosing the ‘feminine’ figure simply ties together with the text Derrida is 
analysing, here that of Levinas. Something similar happens when Derrida reads Blanchot’s 
The Madness of the Day (AL 244 –5), although a slight difference creeps in when Blanchot 
adds a qualification in invoking the feminine figure (of law [la loi ]): ‘usually women’, he 
says. Because of this mixing of genders (not only women, Blanchot implies), Derrida speaks 
here of ‘the madness of sexual difference’ (AL 245). See further Derrida Spurs on the ‘figure’ 
of woman in Nietzsche.
32 See also PC 338 – 409; and Freud (2001: XXI 90 fn. 1).
33 See also Points 164 –5 where Derrida comments on the problematic nature of the word 
‘desire’ in this context, and also speaks of ‘a bliss greater than my bliss, it exceeds both 
myself  and my sex, it is sublime, but without sublimation’.
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and an other which is not ‘their’ other (ON 104). As soon as there is, as 
Derrida points out, there is différance (PC 66). ‘Prior’ to this stricture of the 
for-(it)self, although one is no longer reckoning with time here, but with an 
absolute past or the trace, one can, as Derrida points out in Glas, speak of 
a pure play of difference, of a difference without subject, of indifference, of 
a seminal effusion without return (Glas 239a– 41a).34 In binding itself, the 
gift puts a supplement or substitute in the place of that which the structure 
inhibits or forbids (PC 393). It is nonetheless the only way in which the gift 
can appear or show itself  as gift.
The gift and mourning
In Given Time a relation is furthermore posited between the gift and mourning, 
which need to be briefly explored, also in preparation for the discussion in 
Chapter 7. It is for example said in Given Time that ‘the question of the gift 
will never be separated from mourning’ (GT 129, fn. 13). To understand this 
relation it is necessary to refer to a number of other texts of Derrida where 
he, following the analyses of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, draws a 
distinction between the work of mourning on the one hand and mourning 
which does not take place in the normal way (Fors 125–38). The latter form 
of ‘mourning’, it appears from these texts, are analogous to the non-work 
or the play of the gift.35 Briefly stated, the work of mourning or ‘normal 
mourning’ according to Freud would entail the total digestion, assimilation, 
introjection and idealisation of the dead person in order to withdraw the 
libidinal investment in that person and to reconstitute the self.36 Although 
introjection is inevitable, being a desire for presence as counter-reaction to 
identification with the dead, total assimilation is strictly speaking impossible 
(‘M&S’ 235). This is because death makes clear the distinction between self  
and other, seeing that it requires of a self  to bear some one outside of them 
that absolutely exceeds them within them (MfPdM 33– 4; WM 159). ‘Abnormal 
mourning’, on the other hand, would involve the incorporation of the dead 
person in a crypt in the ego (Fors xvi–xvii). The dead person would thus not 
be internalised or become a part of the self  as in the work of mourning, but 
would nonetheless be taken inside the self, inhabiting the ego as a stranger, 
a persecutor, having been granted absolute hospitality and left in his/her 
alterity. The ‘living-dead’ person can in this way haunt our body, look at us 
and speak through us, become our law, the law, stronger and more forceful 
34 See also OG 66.
35 See inter alia GT 36; EO 57–9; MfPdM 3– 43; Points 320 –2; Fors xvi.
36 In Chapter 7, we will see how this form of mourning plays itself  out in relation to Marx.
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than us (WM 160).37 Even before their death, it appears, we already carry 
those we love in us as well as outside us in anticipating their death, which 
constitutes the self  and the relation to the self:
Even before the death of the other, the inscription in me of her or his 
mortality constitutes me. I mourn therefore I am, I am – dead with the 
death of the other, my relation to myself  is first of all plunged into 
mourning, a mourning that is moreover impossible. This is what I call 
ex-appropriation, appropriation caught in a double bind: I must and I 
must not take the other into myself; mourning is an unfaithful fidelity if  
it succeeds in interiorizing the other ideally in me, that is, in not respecting 
his or his infinite exteriority.
(Points 321)38
In Given Time as well as in other texts, Derrida seeks to extend the structure 
of mourning, noting that all work is actually a work of mourning, that is, 
linking mourning to our earlier discussion, we are always attempting to re-
appropriate ourselves as a reaction to our thrown-ness or loss of autonomy.39 
This motivates his call for a mourning of mourning or an end of mourning 
work, a beyond of the mourning principle (Points 48 –52; OH 111–19). This 
is not the same as the successful completion of mourning, but the giving of 
affirmation ‘to an other end’, which Derrida brings into relation with Freud’s 
speculation on the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Points 52). 
In abnormal mourning the boundaries between self  and other are breached 
to the ‘point’ of dissolution of the self.
37 Within the notion of mourning a further distinction has to be drawn, following Abraham 
and Torok, between ‘the foreigner incorporated in the crypt of the Self ’ as described in the 
text above and ‘the ghost that comes haunting out of the Unconscious of the other’ (Fors 
118 –19 fn. 21; Abraham and Torok 1994: 140 –1 fn. 1, 171–205). This ‘ghost’ or ‘phantom’ also 
has a place in the unconscious, but ‘is not an effect of repression “belonging” to the subject 
he comes to haunt with all kinds of ventriloquism; he is rather “proper” to a parental uncon-
scious’ (at 119). The ghost coming back to haunt is therefore not a return of the repressed 
(Fors 118 –19 fn. 21; EO 59). Derrida relies on both of these structures in his extension of 
the notion of mourning to the field of the political. This can be seen e.g. in his discussion of 
the consequences of the encounter in Baudelaire’s ‘Counterfeit money’ of the two friends with 
a beggar (or at least with the beggar insofar as he represents a purely receptive, expending 
and consuming agency within this particular culture) (GT 134 – 45). The beggar could be 
said to function here as a ‘hetero-cryptic ghost’ (Fors: xxxi). As Derrida notes, the poor, ‘[a]s 
marginal people excluded from the process of production and circulation of wealth ... come 
to represent the gods or the dead. They occupy the place of the dead man or the spirit, the 
return of the ghost, that is, of an always imminent threat’ (GT 138).
38 See also MfPdM 28 –9.
39 See also Glas 86b; WM 161.
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The gift, time and law
Our analysis up to this point can be recapped as follows: Derrida can be said 
to take a step back from Heidegger’s analysis, to ask about the source of the 
distinction Heidegger draws in Being and Time between authenticity and 
inauthenticity. According to Heidegger, Being itself  calls for authenticity (in 
relation to Dasein’s own death), and the inauthenticity that can be observed 
in das Mann (for example, a denial of death, and, as we will see in Chapter 7, 
also representation, technology and writing), indicates a ‘fall’. If  we however 
completely suspend such metaphysical (moral) hierarchies, as Heidegger him-
self  proposes we do, it becomes clear that an analysis is required which to 
a certain extent goes beyond that of Heidegger. This requires an enquiry into 
that which ‘precedes’ or gives Being and time, and of which Heidegger again 
recognised the importance. Derrida’s analysis of this ‘gift’ of Being and of 
time, and which departs in important respects from that of Heidegger, thus 
enables us to go beyond metaphysical oppositionality. This gift, or what 
Heidegger refers to as a fourth dimension of time, it furthermore appears, needs 
to be understood with reference to Freud’s insights in relation to unconscious 
processes, yet again, while at the same time transforming these insights.
In extending the notion of the gift and its relation to sexual difference and 
mourning to law, caution is advised. First, it is clear from the above account 
that Derrida’s analysis of the gift should not be understood as proceeding 
from the (Levinasian) face-to-face encounter with the other, with the perfect 
gift becoming impossible, as some readings suggest.40 An analysis of the gift 
has to proceed by way of the giving of Being and of time.41 A relation to the 
other as other is possible only as a consequence of such giving. Second, the 
giving of the perfect gift should not be understood as a personal (ethical) 
responsibility of the judge or as applying to the parties in dispute.42 As a 
number of Derrida’s texts make clear, the position analogous to the I, the 
self  or the subject as described above is that of a ‘we’, for example a people, 
nation or community, namely a collective subject, who relies on the law in 
general in an attempt to protect or safeguard itself  in its own interest from 
40 See Bernasconi (1997: 260 –1).
41 Law has an essential relation to time, as has been recognised by a number of legal scholars 
in recent times; see inter alia Rubenfeld (1998, 2001); Douzinas and Warrington (1994: 
211– 41); Douzinas (2007: 34 –50); Cornell (1992: 116 –54); van der Walt (2005: 191–231); 
Fitzpatrick (2001: 84 –90); Kirste (2002: 23– 44). As the analysis above indirectly showed, 
this law–time couple and the circularity of economic exchange which it necessarily entails, 
are nevertheless unlikely to be interrupted or exceeded when one seeks to think of time in 
terms of an Oedipal past, a time of reconciliation, a time of repetition, a diachronic relation 
between the actual other and the system, as an extension over time, or as a synchronisation 
of social time.
42 See also Chapter 1.
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its ‘desire’ for self-destruction’ or from absolute hospitality.43 Derrida’s analysis 
of the gift therefore raises questions concerning the traditional model of 
decision-making in terms of which a collective subject identical to itself  
simply re-appropriates its identity through the decision (GT 10 –11). This model 
of decision-making forms part of all legal discourses of self-legitimation, but 
can perhaps most clearly be seen in the recent debates in some jurisdictions 
concerning the seeking of the common good as the primary function of law, 
whether viewed communally, nationally, regionally or internationally.44
The founders of a state as well as legal decision-makers, as should be clear 
from the above discussion, are always already situated within the movement 
of différance and therefore also within the disseminal or thrown ‘spacing’ or 
‘a-temporality’ of the gift. It is from this non-localisable abyss, beyond space 
and time, and therefore without meaning, without property, without law, 
without right and without reason, that responsibility in decision-making, a 
responsibility necessarily without limit and before memory must be thought 
(Glas 49a–53a; AR 247– 8). Such responsibility would necessarily require a 
negotiation with the impossible, even though this must be followed by a 
binding, which, as Derrida points out, ‘is immediately to supplement, to 
substitute, and therefore to represent, to replace, to put an Ersatz in the place 
of that which the structure inhibits or forbids’ (PC 393).45 The gift, in other 
words, is unlikely ever to be ‘pure’, as a circulation of exchange will always 
again be instituted. The re-appropriation which therefore necessarily follows 
upon this exposition to the ‘perhaps’ of the pure gift, nevertheless cannot in 
the case of law be absolutely stabilised in the form of a collective subject. 
As Derrida puts it:
The subject assumes presence, that is to say sub-stance, stasis, stance. 
Not to be able to stabilize itself  absolutely would mean to be able only 
to be stabilizing itself: relative stabilization of what remains unstable, or 
rather non-stable. Ex-appropriation no longer closes itself; it never total-
izes itself.
(Points 270)
This is why, in ‘Force of law’, and as we will see in the chapter that follows, 
Derrida insists that there is the possibility of ‘general strike’, or what we 
could refer to here as ‘the perfect gift’, in every interpretive reading (AR 271). 
A written text such as a constitution opens itself to such a reading, as such a 
text, like the gift, does not return to the author. This is because a constitution 
43 See Rel 51; PTT 94 –100.
44 See Schuppert (2003: 215– 60) for a summary. See in this regard Nietzsche’s comment on 
the ‘common good’ in Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche 1989: 53 [Part II para. 43]).
45 See also AR 251.
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ultimately amounts to a perfect gift, in a similar way as does Mauss’s The 
Gift and Heidegger’s On Time and Being, the gift-giving character of which 
Derrida explores in Given Time. This gift-characteristic of a constitution is 
of course not the result of the intentions of its authors, but because of the 
gift ‘itself’ which as we saw sets law in motion through the giving of time and 
Being (GT 101). The gift, because of the stricture of différance, inevitably 
forms a part of the structure of every text.46
The possibility of the impossible gift in every interpretive reading entails 
also the ‘right’, granted by the gift, to suspend all norms of reading which 
ultimately also stand in the service of the preservation of law (AR 271, 272). 
Judicial decision-making cannot therefore, thought rigorously, consist simply 
of calculation or the application of norms of reading in an attempt to find, 
establish or create meaning. Set in motion by the gift, it should, it must affirm 
the gift. A legal reading affirming the gift has to defy the circularity of eco-
nomic exchange; it has to involve a certain madness which ‘allows’ itself  to 
be ‘taken’ by the gift.47 At the same time, because of the inevitable calculation 
and re-appropriation which is provoked by the unbearable demand of the 
gift; because of the necessity therefore of time becoming space and space 
becoming time, judicial decision-making also requires the taking account of 
or negotiation with law and rules (GT 142; AR 252). The gift, as we saw, 
inevitably erases, effaces itself  in this negotiation and thus in the giving, so 
that we can never say, ‘this is/was a gift or a just decision’.48 Without this 
thinking of the gift, the meaning-giving subject would be forever simply 
caught in the circle of economic exchange.
46 See also Horner (2001: 202).
47 See also AR 252, 255; G&L 95.
48 See also AR 251.
Chapter 6
Force of law
‘Force of law’ is one of Derrida’s most commented-on essays and more than 
any other, it has been dominated by a liberal reading. This reading will be 
contested in the present chapter. As indicated in Chapter 1, an appreciation 
of Derrida’s broader project is essential should one wish to understand what 
is at stake in his texts on law. This applies a fortiori here. ‘Force of law’ cannot 
be understood without an appreciation of Derrida’s relation to the thinking 
of especially Husserl, Heidegger, Freud and Levinas. Chapters 1 to 5 of Law 
as Absolute Hospitality have attempted to lay the basis, so to speak, for the 
reading of ‘Force of law’ that will follow. A close relation will appear here 
between Derrida’s analysis of writing, and specifi cally the notion of iterability
with reference to Husserl, and the origin of law; Derrida’s analysis of the gift 
which gives Being with reference to Heidegger, and justice; the stricture of 
différance in the analysis of the Freudian death drive, and justice; Derrida’s 
analysis of the preconditions for a relation with the other in Levinas, and 
justice; as well as Foucault’s tracing of the history of madness and Derrida’s 
deconstructive ‘implosion’ of this concept, and justice. If  ‘Force of law’ is 
understood within this context, as Derrida himself advises (AR 235), a number 
of important, but diffi cult issues in this essay can be clarifi ed. These include the 
relation between justice and singularity, the notion of the event, the notion 
of undecidability, the idea of the ‘mystical’ foundation of law, as well as the 
problem of good and evil. It may at fi rst sight appear that this chapter is 
engaged in a hair-splitting exercise. The distinctions drawn here are however 
essential to enable us to move away from the dominant liberal reading of 
‘Force of law’. The analysis undertaken here will not attempt to provide a 
close reading and explanation of the whole essay, but will rather focus on 
specifi c issues which have thus far plagued commentaries.
Justice, singularity and the event
In line with the predominant liberal reading, in seeking to spell out the 
implications of ‘Force of law’ (and even preceding that text), great importance 
has been attached to the notion of singularity in Derrida’s thinking, and 
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especially in this text, by (legal) scholars, both by those sympathetic to and 
those critical of his thinking. In these readings singularity is often placed in 
opposition to the generality of law (and of language).1 Such readings tie in 
closely with and in some instances are informed explicitly by traditional 
readings of the relation posited by Levinas between the other and the third.2 
Translated into the context of judicial decision-making, ‘Force of law’ has 
as a consequence been said to require what is impossible: simultaneous com-
pliance with the universal rule and its pertinent individualised exceptions 
(Rosenfeld 2005: 818 –21). In readings which place greater emphasis on 
singularity, every party in a court case has been said to be a potential other 
to the legal system (Thurschwell 1994: 1636 –7; Cornell 1992: 143). In the 
introductory chapter to a recent collection of essays on Derrida and legal 
philosophy, the editors similarly state that the thesis in ‘Force of law’ is:
that each judgment presents the call of the other; it literally brings the 
party accused or defended, before the judge. It is the face, the unique 
and irreducible image of the other, to which the judge must attend and 
respond. The face has been seen, the voice heard, the pain felt, if  pain 
there be.
(Goodrich et al. 2008: 12)3
In yet other versions, not everyone, but only those who are marginalised 
or in a position of suffering are viewed as the (singular) other to whom a 
responsibility is owed (Caputo 1993: 85–92; 1997: 131). In some of these and 
related approaches, law has, in line with the above readings, been denounced 
for its generality and (representational) violence and therefore its inability to 
do justice to the singular other(s).4 This denouncement has then in some 
instances been followed by calls for a model of decision-making which would 
concern itself with the singular other(s), that is to say the parties in a court case, 
rather than the legal system (Cornell 1992: 143). In similar vein, ‘Force of law’ 
has been read as requiring of decision-makers to take personal responsibility 
1 For some examples, see Rosenfeld (1991; 2005: 819–21); Beardsworth (1996: 25, 41–5); Caputo 
(1987: 179– 83, 189–90; 1993: 85–122; 1997: 135–7); Honneth (2007: 116 –17); Borradori (2003: 
168); Davies (1994: 272– 4); Gehring (2008: 58); Mahlmann (2003: 31); Kellogg (2003: 362– 6); 
Manderson (2006: 194); Belay (1996: 124 –350); Malan and Cilliers (2001: 442– 4, 446); Balkin 
(1994: 1157– 80); Sheehan (2000: 136 – 8, 141–2); Douzinas and Warrington (1994: 231–2); 
Douzinas and Gearey (2005: 75– 6); Goosen (1998: 35–7; 2007: 374 –5); du Toit (1998: 45, 
50 –1, 53); van der Walt (1998: 94 – 6).
2 See in this regard Levinas (2004: 157); and the readings by Cornell (1988: 1624 – 6; 1990: 
1703); Douzinas and Warrington (1994: 18 –20, 163– 6, 231–2); Critchley (1999a: 99–101); 
and see Chapter 1.
3 See likewise Critchley (1992: 273; 1996: 34 –5; 2008: 29).
4 See e.g. van der Walt (2005a: 11); Thurschwell (1994: 1636 – 8; 2003: 1200 – 02); Cornell (1992: 
80, 84); Motha (1998: 89–90); Davies (1994: 272); Kellogg (2010: 108 –10).
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for their decisions, rather than hiding behind or seeking to justify their deci-
sions solely with reference to the law (Thurschwell 1994: 1636 –9). In some 
versions the emphasis on singularity (recast as a plurality of interests) has 
furthermore been accompanied by a call for a reconciliation of the different 
interests in a legal dispute; and in light of the impossibility thereof, an acknow-
ledgement of sacrifi ce (van der Walt 2005a: 11–12).5 The brief  analysis of 
‘Violence and metaphysics’ and of Adieu in Chapter 1, as well as the analysis 
of the preceding chapters, should already have shown that these claims are 
all to a greater or lesser extent problematic. They oversimplify and moderate 
the radical claims made by Derrida in ‘Force of law’. There is simply no room 
in Derrida’s texts for an interpretation which would oppose the generality 
of law or of representational systems to the concrete other (person(s)), with 
a privilege now accorded to the latter. Such a reading would imply that 
Derrida, like all metaphysicians, privileges presence (the actual parties and 
their claims) as opposed to representation (law as a representative system).6 
Such a reading takes no account of Derrida’s broader project of deconstructing 
the metaphysics of presence. As specifi cally shown in Chapter 1, Derrida also 
does not simply adopt the Levinasian approach to the other (ethics) and the 
third ( justice). He radically transforms Levinas’s thinking in this respect. The 
readings of ‘Force of law’ referred to above fail to see that the notion of 
justice which Derrida invokes here exceeds Being, rather than being focused 
directly on (human) beings.7 As we saw in Chapter 5, justice, like the perfect 
gift, ‘is’ Being’s other without belonging to it.8
A close scrutiny of ‘Force of law’ itself  is nonetheless required to ascertain 
whether there is authority for the above claims. The passages which seem to 
come closest to supporting these readings provide the following:
An address is always singular, idiomatic, and justice, as law [droit], seems 
always to suppose the generality of  a rule, a norm or a universal im-
perative. How to reconcile the act of justice that must always concern 
singularity, individuals, groups, irreplaceable existences, the other or 
5 See similarly van Marle (2009: 38) who contends, by invoking Derrida, that the protection 
of the freedom of speech of one person will inevitably lead to the violation of that of another. 
She extends the same argument to the right to equality.
6 Litowitz (1995: 345– 6), despite the otherwise highly problematic nature of his reading, makes 
this point well; here he, like others, nonetheless misreads Derrida as in the fi rst place positing 
such a presence.
7 See in this respect also Chapters 1 and 7. Derrida’s discussion of the man–animal relation 
in this and other texts, likewise makes clear that he is not simply following Levinas here, who 
generally focuses only on the human face.
8 The complexity of Derrida’s thinking in relation to the other is admirably explored by Saghafi  
(2010), an exploration which, on my reading, corresponds closely with the reading attempted 
here.
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myself  as other,9 in a unique situation, with rule, norm, value, or the 
imperative of justice that necessarily have a general form, even if  this 
generality prescribes a singular application in each case?
...
To address oneself  to the other in the language of the other is both the 
condition of all possible justice, it seems, but, in all rigor, it appears not 
only impossible (since I cannot speak the language of the other except 
to the extent that I appropriate it and assimilate it according to the 
law [loi] of  an implicit third) but even excluded by justice as law [droit], 
inasmuch as justice as law seems to imply an element of universality, the 
appeal to a third party who suspends the unilaterality or singularity of 
the idioms.
(AR 245)
These passages indeed seem to oppose law’s generality to the singular other. 
The multiple appearance of the word ‘seems’ in these passage as well as 
the question mark at the end of the one passage, however indicate that one 
should tread carefully here. To understand what is involved in this ostensible 
‘opposition’, we should moreover not stop reading here. If  we accept that 
this is Derrida’s understanding of justice, how should we then understand 
later passages which refer to justice as a ‘demand of gift without exchange’ 
(AR 254), as madness (AR 254), as an experience of absolute alterity (AR 
257), to say nothing of the analysis of Benjamin’s Critique in the second part 
of the essay, more specifi cally the fi gure of the general strike, the notions of 
the ruin and of the spectral nature of law, and divine violence? If  the gift 
is owed to the (singular) other, to which other or others exactly is this gift 
then owed? Especially towards the end of the second part of ‘Force of law’, 
it becomes clear that Derrida is, in the above-quoted passages, still slowly, 
patiently on the way towards the deconstruction of the metaphysical concept 
of justice. He is raising a diffi culty here, asking a question, posing possibilities 
tied to his opening remark (‘This is for me a duty, I must address myself  to 
you in English’ (AR 231)). He is by no means, in typical metaphysical style, 
positing a defi nition of justice in oppositional terms. He is instead alluding 
here to a Benjaminian and/or Levinasian-type distinction between singularity 
on the one hand and generality or representation on the other (AR 295; 
Chapter 1). In so far as Levinas is concerned, Derrida will note a little later, 
just before elaborating on the different forms of aporia in the relation between 
justice and law, that he ‘would be tempted, up to a certain point, to bring 
the concept of justice ... closer to Levinas’s’ (AR 250). After pointing to 
attractive features of Levinas’s discourse on justice and the other, he however 
9 Other possible translations of the phrase ‘moi comme l’autre’ are ‘the self  as other’, ‘I, like 
the other’ or ‘me as other’.
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stops himself short because of certain ‘other diffi cult questions’ he has ‘about 
Levinas’s discourse’ so that he ‘cannot be content to borrow a conceptual 
trait without risking confusions or analogies’ (AR 250). As appears also from 
the analysis in Chapter 1, although there are clear correspondences between 
the thinking of Derrida and Levinas, the differences are considerable too, and 
Derrida cannot be said to simply take over Levinas’s thinking, specifi cally 
not in so far as the relation to the other and the third, which is alluded to 
in the above passages, is concerned.10
In so far as Benjamin is concerned, in Critique of Violence he in fact 
attempts to ‘apply’ his earlier theorisation of language to law (AR 259; Staikou 
2008: 270). The distinction between singularity and generality/representation 
accordingly corresponds with Benjamin’s view that the originary destination 
of language was appellation, nomination, the giving or the appeal or presence 
of the name, that is that language is originally (as expression) not a means 
to an end (AR 259, 297).11 Benjamin’s thinking about singularity, as Derrida 
points out, clearly privileges presence, as opposed to representation (AR 
259– 60). At the same time, Benjamin acknowledges that the language of 
communication and representation cannot be clearly distinguished from that 
of expression (AR 297; Staikou 2008: 269). Benjamin likewise acknow ledges 
in applying his theory of language to law, as we will see below, that the (pure) 
founding of law cannot be clearly distinguished from its conservation. That 
is because the founding violence fi nds itself  repeated and ‘represented’ in 
every act of conservation (AR 260). Pointing to this kind of ‘contamination’ 
between presence and representation has been part of Derrida’s deconstruc-
tive ‘strategy’ since his fi rst texts on Husserl’s phenomenological refl ections 
on language.12 The strategy employed here involves pointing to a paradox. 
In the case of the deconstruction of the hierarchical opposition between 
speech and writing, Derrida likewise points to a paradox: writing is devalued 
by metaphysics, but speech, which is privileged, is shown to include the same 
features as writing.13 This strategy does not however come to a rest at this 
10 Another indication that Levinas is alluded to in the quoted passages, is the notion of ‘the 
rectitude of address’ which is referred to by Derrida just before these passages (AR 245) 
and which is again invoked in the brief  discussion of Levinas (AR 250). In A 1–3 Derrida 
will give this Levinasian notion a radically new twist: in the language of Chapter 2, the 
performative speech act (I address myself  to you) becomes an absolute performative, 
perverformative, or an overfl owing of the performative; see AR 256. See also SM 13 where 
the notion of ‘address’ is taken up again in the context of spectrality, Derrida noting that 
‘such an address [i.e. to spirits] is not only already possible, but that it will have at all times 
conditioned, as such, address in general’ and at SM 221: ‘Could one address oneself in 
general if  already some ghost did not come back?’
11 For Benjamin, as Derrida points out, ‘[l]anguage is not a means to an end (a thing or signifi ed, 
even an addressee) to which it would have to make itself  correctly adequate’ (AR 286).
12 See also AR 297.
13 See e.g. OG 42–3.
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point, but proceeds further towards what he in earlier texts referred to as the 
emergence of a new ‘concept’ (Pos 42).14 In ‘Force of law’, the paradox opens 
the way towards an aporia in a similar way in which in Specters of Marx, 
the contradictions in liberal-capitalism (the disjointedness in time) opens the 
possibility of justice (Chapter 7). The above quoted passages in ‘Force of 
law’ cannot therefore be read or invoked as the ‘fi nal outcome’ of a strategy 
of deconstruction, but instead bears a resemblance to what in his earlier texts 
were the fi rst ‘phases’ of such a strategy.15 Derrida is thus contending in these 
passages of ‘Force of law’ that there is a seeming tension between the require-
ment of justice of relating to someone as other in a purely idiomatic way 
(for example through the proper name), and the other requirement of justice 
– generality or universality as characteristic of law and language. As in other 
contexts (for example, the event, the date, the invention, a performative speech 
act), Derrida is ultimately concerned here with showing that there can be no 
pure event, pure idiom, pure invention, pure performative, as there is always 
already, from the fi rst moment, representation, repetition, mechanisation and 
technology.16 This idea of repetition at the origin is of course expressed by 
the Derridean notion of ‘iterability’ (AR 272, 277– 8).17
This seemingly paradoxical situation, as noted above, requires another 
strategic ‘phase’, namely thinking of justice in terms of an aporia, that is, 
‘something that does not allow passage ... a nonpath’ (AR 244).18 With refer-
ence to the section on Freud in Chapter 1, we can say that the ‘concept’ of 
justice, after its deconstruction, is no longer a concept in the traditional sense. 
It now incorporates the contradictory operation of ‘desire’, and as a result 
exceeds economy.19 Derrida speaks in this regard of justice in the sense of ‘a 
responsibility without limits, and so necessarily excessive, incalculable, before 
memory’, an experience of inadequation or an incalculable disproportion, as a 
14 One can certainly agree with Bennington (2009: 8 –9) that there has been a shift in the 
strategy Derrida employs in his early texts (e.g. in deconstructing the speech–writing 
hierarchical opposition) compared to his later texts where ‘ethical’ concepts such as justice, 
hospitality, the gift, etc. (which have in general not been marginalised by metaphysics) are 
analysed. Nonetheless, as will be argued, the strategy as set out in Positions is still employed 
to some extent.
15 To point to such a strategy in Derrida’s texts is of course not to be confused with an approach 
that would turn deconstruction into a method or technique as proposed e.g. by Balkin 
(1986 –7, 1994); see further Chapter 1.
16 See also Derrida OG 163 on presence and representation in Rousseau; and AR 252 where 
Derrida refers to the mechanics or the technology introduced by the necessary iterability of 
judgements.
17 See also Weber (2008: 178 –9); and see Chapter 2.
18 See also Ap 23 where Derrida refers to aporia as ‘the impossible, the impossibility, as what 
cannot pass [ passer] or come to pass [se passer]: it is not even the non-pas, the non-step, but 
rather the deprivation of the pas (the privative form would be a kind of a-pas)’.
19 On the ‘notion’ of a general economy, see WD 251–77; and PC 389.
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gift without exchange, and with reference to Levinas, as absolute dissymmetry 
(AR 247–51). The discussion in Chapters 1 to 5 already made clear that the 
formulation of this new ‘concept’ of justice cannot be viewed in isolation 
from Derrida’s broader project – that is, the deconstruction of the metaphysics 
of presence. The readings referred to above, take little account of this broader 
project or of the context of Derrida’s remarks on singularity/generality. It is 
at this stage necessary to determine the implications for singularity of this 
re-inscription. What Derrida’s analysis of law and justice shows (and the above-
quoted passage already indicate this) is that the technicality or generality of 
law is not a negative accident, something that happens by mistake to law. 
Instead, it is a necessary part of its structure. This structure, as we will again 
see below with reference to law-founding and law-preserving violence, further-
more points to that which makes law possible – (unconditional) justice, or 
as Derrida also refers to it: the law (la loi) of law (le droit), alluding therewith 
to the analysis of Kafka’s Before the Law (AR 233; Chapter 3). When we 
take account of some of Derrida’s other texts on the concept or notion of 
singularity we can see that singularity is, similar to law, but almost imper-
ceptibly, deconstructed in ‘Force of law’, in a movement away from presence 
towards a thinking of unconditional, incommensurable or immeasurable sin-
gularity.20 The relation between justice/the unconditional and singularity for 
example comes to the fore in Derrida’s discussion of unlimited hospitality, 
which he refers to as the ‘unique and singular and absolutely only great Law 
of hospitality’ requiring an unconditional welcome (OH 81).21 This thinking 
of singularity is of course still related to law, but requires a new relation 
between itself, justice and law. This does not consist in opposing a specifi c 
party or even all the parties in a court case to the law, but in a relation – a 
differantial relation (or aporia) we could say – beyond this opposition. Derrida 
makes this clear also when he discusses the three examples of the impossible 
experience of aporia in ‘Force of law’ and when he says that a judge cannot, 
if  she wants to do justice, simply apply a rule to a case; there has to be a 
suspension or destruction of law, and a reinvention in each case. This is 
because ‘[e]ach case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely 
unique interpretation which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee 
absolutely’ (AR 251). There is no opposition at stake here between the sin-
gular case or singular others on the one hand, and the generality of law on 
the other. The tension, differantial relation or aporia lies between incalculable 
justice or singularity ‘reconceptualised’ as a general economy on the one 
hand and law as a restricted economy on the other.
20 See in this regard especially TS 12–13, 61; R 52–3, 150 –1; SM 37; ET 77– 81; Neg 180; FWT 
51–3, read with AR 297 where this ‘different sense’ of singularity is explored.
21 See ‘VR’ 22 where Derrida in response to a question from Caputo, points out that attention 
to singularity is not opposed to universality.
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As appears inter alia from Derrida’s analysis of Benjamin’s Critique of 
Violence, every act of conservation (of law) and therefore every act of inter-
pretation evokes the possibility of a general strike. In other words, justice, 
which as we saw, entails incalculable disproportion and a loss or an expro-
priation of the proper, lies at the ‘origin’ of every interpretation, which also 
has to take account of the law (AR 252). This understanding of justice cor-
responds closely with the analysis in Chapter 1 of the ‘stricture’ of différance 
as involving both a disseminating unbinding and a conserving binding (AR 
234 –5). Derrida’s analysis by way of Kant as well as of Pascal of the inherent 
force of law (AR 233, 238 –9)22 likewise ties in closely with the notion of a 
differantial relation of forces. At stake in the relation between justice in itself  
(if  it exists) and justice as law, is on the one hand an absolute astricture, a 
powerless, impotent force (AR 238) or the greatest/an essential weakness (AR 
235; Neg 226), namely justice as the perfect gift, beyond reason and law; and 
on the other, a binding, stricture or mastery of forces.23 The forces at stake 
here are like the German word Gewalt, neither legal nor illegal, or both at the 
same time, in the same way in which the foundation of a state (and ultimately 
every self-conserving act of law) goes beyond this opposition (AR 234).24
It may still be contended that there are many passages in ‘Force of law’ 
where Derrida refers to the other and that these passages indicate the import-
ance of understanding justice in terms of singularity.25 There can be little 
22 See also R 92–3; and BS 207.
23 Derrida’s opening remarks clearly ‘perform’ this intricate relation between justice and law, 
both transgressing the law imposed on him (that is, addressing the audience in English and 
not in French) and at the same time submits to the ‘law’ imposed by the majority (AR 231; 
see also Jacobson 2005: 794; McCormick 2000: 1706). In doing the latter he is speaking the 
language of the ‘other’, which he describes as the condition of all possible justice (AR 254). 
This does not refer only to the fact that he is speaking a language that is foreign to him 
(English), but he will, perhaps more importantly, be taking the language of law to its limit, 
that is, deconstructing it, which will enable an encounter with the other as other, thereby 
exposing or giving himself  up to the other (AR 244; also McCormick 2000: 1709). Derrida’s 
remark that speaking English is always an ordeal, test, trial, hardship (épreuve) for him and 
possibly also for his listeners (AR 245) can be understood in a similar sense. Lastly, his 
comments about ‘address’ being a transitive verb in English, and thus the possibility to say 
in English that one addresses ‘someone’ or that one addresses ‘a problem’ (with the implication 
of directness), as compared to French where one addresses oneself  to someone (AR 243– 4), 
similarly allude to the notion of justice as deconstructed which, although it cannot be 
thematised or spoken of directly (AR 237), requires an experience of aporia (which Derrida 
AR 244 –5 equates with the ‘mystical’), or analogously ‘an exposure to death, without defense’ 
(A 1–3, at 3) and thus with no return to the self  (as happens with a direct address).
24 The foundation of a state is always ‘illegal’ in the sense that there is no law that authorises 
it, but also legal, because the new law to be established will retrospectively legitimise it (see 
Chapter 2).
25 Reliance is also sometimes placed on The Gift of Death where Derrida appears to say that 
in responding to the call of a specifi c person, I will be sacrifi cing the interests of another; 
e.g. Thurschwell (2003: 1200 –1). This is based on an a-contextual reading of the passages 
Force of law 149
doubt as to the importance of singularity within this context. The question 
is how to understand these references to the other. In discussing the second 
aporia, Derrida for example notes that the infi nite idea of justice is ‘irreducible, 
irreducible because owed to the other, owed to the other, before any contract, 
because it has come, it is a coming [ parce qu’elle est venue], the coming of 
the other as always other singularity’ (AR 254). This passage, and others that 
may be referred to, should similarly not be read out of context, and especially 
in light of what was said in Chapter 1 about the relation between Derrida 
and Levinas as well as the role of language and conceptuality in Derrida’s 
thinking. This passage in ‘Force of law’, it is important to note, is immediately 
followed in the same paragraph by a refl ection on justice in terms of the gift 
without exchange and the ‘desire’ for justice. At stake is thus no longer the 
traditional concept of justice, but a concept which has been ‘auto-deconstructed’ 
(AR 362– 4), and by way of which it becomes possible to encounter the other 
(Naas 2003: 93–114). Derrida is thus not positing here that a direct relation 
to the other as other is possible in the context of law; he is speaking of the 
other in another ‘sense’, of absolute alterity. The passage in question where 
the coming of the other is invoked can be further clarifi ed when we take 
account of Derrida’s refl ections elsewhere on the concept of the event, which 
is often used to describe the coming of the other (FWT 58). When Derrida 
speaks of the third aporia (urgency) in ‘Force of law’, he for example invokes 
the notion of justice that remains to come. He continues as follows:
‘Perhaps’ – one must [il faut] always say perhaps for justice. There is an 
avenir for justice and there is no justice except to the degree that some event 
is possible which, as event, exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations 
and so forth. Justice, as the experience of absolute alterity, is unpresent-
able, but it is the chance of the event and the condition of history.
(AR 257)
Derrida’s other texts on the concept of the event show that the event has a 
similar ‘structure’ as was described above in respect of singularity (FWT 58). 
involved. At stake here is not a simple choice between ‘others’ (leading inevitably to the 
sacrifi ce of  some other), but as in the case of  Abraham, between my own and thus my-
self  (family, friends, nation, ‘pets’) and others (in whom I am generally less invested); see 
‘OF’ 69. On Derrida’s reading (of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling) Abraham is faced with 
this dilemma in the akedah, and he decides to forsake ethics (the law of the family, the 
community, the nation – G&L 60) to respond to God’s call to sacrifi ce Isaac. He is prepared 
to sacrifi ce his son, and thus also himself  (what God promised him through his son) with-
out expecting any return (G&L 73). The phrase ‘every other is every bit other (tout autre 
est tout autre)’ which Derrida repeats here, challenges inter alia the justifi ability of such a 
(selfi sh) preference. It is nonetheless a complex expression which ‘can barely be translated 
and is perhaps perverse’ (‘AO’ 13), and points furthermore to the structure which makes 
possible a relation to the other as other; see Saghafi  (2010: 7–28, 58 –9); see further Chapter 1.
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The incalculability of justice (as well as of other concepts such as friendship, 
democracy and the gift) is what allows for a new thinking of the event, and 
of the future. It is in other words only when we are ‘prepared’ by way of a 
deconstructed concept of justice, hospitality, friendship, democracy and the 
gift, to encounter that which comes with a certain defenselessness or exposure, 
without mastery and without sovereignty, without horizon of expectation, 
that the future has a chance.26 This is to be compared with a situation where 
the future is approached from the perspective of determinate concepts (also 
of justice) which have been constructed from within a thinking which privileges 
presence and which through its totalising horizon closes one off  from that 
which comes. Responsibility, Derrida says elsewhere, requires that the other 
(which is not, or at least not without qualifi cation, to be understood as an-
other person) take the decision in me.27 Derrida’s thinking about the event 
moreover and very importantly goes beyond humanism as it involves an 
openness to whatever or whoever comes. As should be clear, this openness 
and exposure still involves singularity, but without being tied to presence.28
Undecidability
It should be evident that the above structure does not leave us without any 
criterion to choose between the interests of the different parties to a dispute, 
and thus only with the task of a reconciliation of interests, or a personal, 
ethical responsibility for the outcome. It also does not mean that a court 
should simply always decide in favour of those who can be regarded as ‘suf-
fering others’. Much more is clearly required if  a judge is to be responsible 
in this hyperbolic sense. In elaborating on the second aporia in ‘Force of 
law’, Derrida likewise makes clear that ‘undecidability’ does not, as is some-
times contended29 mean relativism. Undecidability is in other words not merely 
about an oscillation or tension between two different approaches to a matter, 
two different (calculable) interpretations of the same rule or between the 
universality of law and the singularity of a unique situation. The ‘undecidable’ 
rather corresponds with the notion of justice as elaborated on above:
26 Derrida’s notion of the future must of course not be understood in terms of a future presence 
but with reference to the Freudian notion of belatedness (Nachträglichkeit) or the return of 
the repressed which disrupts the idea of a distinction between the past and the future; see 
e.g. AF 80. See further Chapter 8.
27 See FWT 53; PF 68 –9; AR 255. This is also to be compared with the mention in the quotation 
at the beginning of this section of justice in terms of ‘the other or myself  as other [l’autre 
ou moi comme l’autre]’ which must clearly be understood with reference to death (see Saghafi  
2010: 87, 90, in the context of photography), and thus by taking account of Heidegger, 
Freud and Marx; see SM 219–21, and see further Chapter 7.
28 See in this respect AR 297; ET 77– 81; FWT 51; TP 47; R 52–3.
29 See e.g. Hurst (2004: 258); Hägglund (2008: 182, 185, 203).
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Undecidable – this is the experience of that which, though foreign and 
heterogeneous to the order of the calculable and the rule, must [doit] 
nonetheless – it is of duty [devoir] that one must speak – deliver itself  
over to the impossible decision30 while taking account of law and rules.
(AR 252)
Undecidability thus entails going beyond calculation as well as beyond a 
simple opposition between universality and singularity. Both of these ways 
of  understanding undecidability would imply retaining the metaphysical 
notion of subjectivity (both in an individual and in a collective sense), which 
Derrida clearly dislocates in ‘Force of law’, noting that ‘a subject can never 
decide anything’ (AR 253). As Derrida also points out in Politics of Friend-
ship, the traditional, metaphysical concept of decision entails the decision of 
a sovereign subject, autonomous, fully conscious, identical to himself  and 
unaffected by the decision. This also happens in the decisionism of Carl 
Schmitt (PF 68). Such a view of the decision, neutralises the event, and has 
the consequence that nothing actually happens. For a decision to bring about 
an event (which is not foreseeable, programmable, calculated), Derrida argues, 
it has to be passive and unconscious (PF 68 –9). Tying the decision to his 
thinking on hospitality, Derrida furthermore notes that this involves the 
‘recalling’ of ‘an old forgotten decision’ (PF 68)31 and continues as follows: 
‘The passive decision, condition of the event, is always in me, structurally, 
another event, a rending decision as the decision of the other. Of the abso-
lute other in me, the other as the absolute that decides on me in me’ (PF 68). 
It should be clear that Derrida’s relation to Freud’s unconscious as explored 
in Chapter 1 is at stake here, rather than a duty of the decision-maker to 
decide in favour of (one of ) the parties to a dispute. As Derrida also indicates 
elsewhere, there is no identity (whether of the self  or the nation) which is 
only afterwards confronted by the arrival of the other. There is no such thing 
as a subject with the ability (and free choice whether or not) to welcome the 
other. Identity is always already dissolved in and through the welcome, which 
does not entail a return to the self, but instead the violation and expropriation 
of the self (AR 361). At stake is thus a rethinking of the concept of subjectivity 
as well as the idea of the other as an actual person with determinable 
attributes. As pointed out earlier, Levinas in Totality and Infi nity refers to 
30 Commentators tend not to distinguish carefully between justice (as well as the gift, 
hospitality, forgiveness, etc.) as the impossible and simple impossibility; see e.g. Rosenfeld 
(2005: 819–20); Gehring (2008: 61); van der Walt (1998: 93– 6; 2005b: 249–50); Balkin (2005: 
737); Hägglund (2008: 37, 43, 140 –1). Justice according to Derrida is not simply impossible, 
but a ‘desire’ for the impossible which haunts us; see e.g. ‘TID’ 246 –7; Neg 343–70. This 
distinction has very important implications for the relation between justice and law; see 
de Ville (2007b).
31 See also PTT 134.
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the subject as host, and in Otherwise than Being as hostage. Derrida analyses 
this strange paradox as follows (A 111):
As host or hostage, as other, as pure alterity, a subjectivity analyzed in 
this way must be stripped of every ontological predicate, a bit like the 
pure I that Pascal said is stripped of every quality that could be attributed 
to it, of every property that, as pure I, as properly pure, it would have 
to transcend or exceed. And the other is not reducible to its actual 
predicates, to what one might defi ne or thematize about it, any more 
than the I is. It is naked, bared of every property, and this nudity is also 
its infi nitely exposed vulnerability: its skin. This absence of determinable 
properties, of concrete predicates, of empirical visibility, is no doubt what 
gives to the face of the other a spectral aura, especially if  the subjectivity 
of the hôte also lets itself  be announced as the visitation of a face, of a 
visage. Host or guest ... Gastgeber or Gast, the hôte would be not only 
a hostage. It would have, according to a profound necessity, at least the 
face or fi gure of a spirit or phantom (Geist, ghost).
The above passage speaks of the absence of a ‘decision’ by a ‘subject’. The 
notion of undecidability again comes to the fore, in a very complex manner, 
in Derrida’s analysis of Benjamin’s Critique of Violence (AR 289–92). Here 
reference is made to divine violence (in Judaism) beyond law and the state 
as ‘decidable’ (pointing in this way inter alia to the destruction of mythic law 
by divine violence), yet as without decidable knowledge. In other words, 
divine violence does not lend itself  to human determination or knowledge 
or decidable certainty. The undecidable in this sense, as Derrida points out 
in the Prolegomena, is often associated with the demonic or with what is 
demonically ambiguous (AR 259). On the other hand, law founding and con-
servation – that is, the mythical violence of the Greek world – although it is 
itself  paralysed by undecidability (it being impossible to distinguish between 
true and false, correct and incorrect) is the place of decidable knowledge. 
It is in other words subject to human determination. Derrida does not 
oppose these forms of violence or power like Benjamin at some point does, 
but instead emphasises the need to participate in both.32 This is because 
there is no pure moment of undecidable justice, but always, confi rming the 
earlier analysis, a differantial relation between (undecidable) justice and 
(decidable) law, a relation which needs to be ‘negotiated’ in singular instances 
(AR 257).
32 See also Derrida Glas 209a on the undecidable concept which is no longer strictly speaking 
a concept.
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The ‘mystical foundation of authority’
Derrida’s analysis in ‘Force of law’ of law’s positing as resting solely on itself, 
such positing thus being a violence without ground, has often been pointed 
to by commentators. The ‘mystical’ nature of this non-foundation has not 
however as yet been adequately explored. Derrida enquires into the phrase, 
the ‘mystical foundation of authority’ here with reference to its appearance 
in the writings of Montaigne and Pascal, and later also in Benjamin (AR 
238 – 41).33 The ‘meaning’ he will give to it, if  one can call it such, will 
however differ from its conventional meaning. From Pascal we have a Pensée 
which as Derrida notes, cites Montaigne without naming him in referring to 
the mystical foundation of law’s authority. The passage from Montaigne 
reads as follows:
Lawes are now maintained in credit, not because they are just, but because 
they are lawes. It is the mystical foundation of their authority; they have 
none other ... Whosoever obeyeth them because they are just, obeyes 
them not justly the way as he ought.
(AR 239– 40)
Derrida fi rst notes the distinction drawn here by Montaigne between law and 
justice. He furthermore points to the notion of ‘credit’ in the quotation, 
noting that the authority of laws rests simply on the credit extended to them. 
In other words, their only foundation, and this is what makes the foundation 
‘mystical’, is that one believes in them (AR 240). Here we already start 
moving beyond the idea found in many commentaries that Derrida is simply 
saying that ‘Law is grounded only on itself, based on an arbitrary violence 
without ground’ or that it is ‘a giant construct without ground’.34 Montaigne 
interestingly compares what he refers to as ‘law’s legitimate fi ctions’ to the 
trickery which women employ in compensating for the lack in their own 
natural beauty. The absence of natural law, Derrida glosses, thus calls for 
‘the supplement of  historical or positive (that is to say, an addition of 
fi ctional) law’ (AR 240). The invocation of faith and fi ction in this context 
has already been partly explored in Chapters 2 and 3. At stake here is a 
typical metaphysical opposition between knowledge–faith and fact–fi ction. 
Derrida will again not simply seek to overturn this violent hierarchy, namely 
by showing that (modern) law, despite its attempt to anchor itself  in the 
existence of the autonomous, reasonable subject, actually fi nds its foundation 
33 Gasché (2002: 981) remarks on the infl uence of Kafka on Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, 
which underlines the link between ‘Force of law’ and ‘Before the law’.
34 See e.g. Teubner (1997: 764); and Litowitz (1995: 330).
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in faith and fi ction at work within knowledge and fact. This step of overturn-
ing in turn (again) calls for the emergence of a new ‘concept’, in this case an 
originary or pure faith which makes possible the distinction between faith and 
know ledge (as well as of subjectivity) in the fi rst place.35 The same happens 
with the fact–fi ction opposition, which subsequent to its overturning,36 
is repositioned through the invocation of a fi ctional, heteronomous law or 
obligation, which precedes law understood as autonomy (Chapter 3). One of 
the most illuminating examples of this originary faith or fi ctional law is to 
be found in Abraham’s sacrifi ce of Isaac, which Derrida explores in The Gift 
of Death. In an interview Derrida refers to the akedah as an ‘absolute religious 
experience, if  there is such a thing: the pure act of faith, the asymmetrical 
obedience to an absurd order, an unintelligible order, an order that is beyond 
ethics and knowledge’ (‘E&F’ 35). This pure or elementary act of faith can 
also be referred to as an absolute performative (Staikou 2008: 281–2) as well 
as the experience of non-relationship, absolute interruption or absolute 
dissymmetry (Rel 64 –5).37 The pure faith at stake here is thus irreducibly 
tied to responsibility, a responsibility which involves ‘absolute risk, beyond 
knowledge and certainty’ as well as beyond debt and duty (G&L 7– 8, 64, 
80).38 The notion of the ‘mystical’ employed in ‘Force of law’ is thus clearly 
another name for the notion of justice, which Derrida similarly describes 
as unpresentable and incalculable (AR 257). He can therefore also invoke 
Wittgenstein’s notion of the ‘mystical’ here (AR 242),39 which, at least on a 
35 See also Naas (2008: 62– 80); Bischof (2004: 222–3).
36 See in this respect BS 217–18 where Derrida notes that in all instances where power makes 
law, where it gives itself  right and thereby legitimises its own violence this takes place by 
way of the fable, ‘i.e. speech that is both fi ctional and performative, speech that consists in 
saying: well, I’m right because, yes, I’m right because, yes, I’m called Lion and, you will 
listen to me, I’m talking to you, be afraid, I am the most valiant and I’ll strangle you if  you 
object’.
37 See further Chapters 2 and 7.
38 See also Psy I 394 (‘No apocalypse, not now’) on the ‘fable’ of nuclear war; and for analysis, 
Klein (2008).
39 This seems to be a reference to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus where Wittgenstein 
remarks the following (6.522): ‘There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They 
make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.’ This passage is specifi cally referred to 
and briefl y analysed by Derrida in his refl ections on negative theology in ‘How to avoid 
speaking: denials’ (Psy II 150). There is also a reference in this text, which ties in closely 
with the above analysis, to the last proposition in the Tractatus: ‘What we cannot speak of 
we must pass over in silence.’ Negative or Apophatic theology in brief  adopts the view that 
the mode of being of God is infi nitely beyond what can be expressed in human language. 
Human language can give expression only to that which is fi nite, to that which has an 
essence and existence, and thus cannot capture the super-essentiality of God. It is therefore 
more appropriate, when one is compelled to rely on fi nite language, to speak of God in 
terms of what he is not, than describing his attributes in positive terms. In distinguishing 
deconstruction from negative theology, Derrida has pointed out that negative theology 
ultimately believes in a superior and transcendent being (and thus a presence) beyond 
Force of law 155
certain reading, can be said to correspond with the notion of an originary 
faith.40
There is a clear correlation between the above analysis, specifi cally the 
notion of the unpresentable, and Derrida’s ‘To speculate – on Freud’ where 
he incidentally refers to Freud’s speculations on a beyond to the pleasure 
principle as ‘mystical’ in nature (PC 354) as well as Derrida’s refl ections in Fors 
on the psychoanalytical theorisation of Abraham and Torok on cryptonomy. 
As appears from the discussion in Chapter 1 (Freud) and Chapter 5 (on 
mourning), in both instances something is at stake which goes beyond the 
Freudian unconscious and which is in a radical sense unpresentable and 
unknowable. According to Abraham and Torok (1994: 130), the notion of 
the crypt involves erecting a secret tomb in the ego as well as within language, 
that comes back to haunt the ego which has become a cemetery guard. In 
Fors Derrida generalises this structure of the crypt, taking it beyond its 
therapeutic context, and ties it to the Freudian death drive.41 He refers there 
to the crypt as a kind of false unconscious or artifi cial unconscious within 
the divided self  (Fors xiii), elucidating thereby the ‘locality’ of the law of 
fi ction referred to above. In ‘Force of law’ he applies this structure to law 
which is said to have encrypted its own forces of self-destruction, and which 
continue to haunt it.42 The crypt is specifi cally alluded to by Derrida when 
he notes in ‘Force of law’ that in the ‘violent structure of the founding act’ 
of law or of a state, there is a silence ‘walled up, walled in because this silence 
is not exterior to language’, which, he adds, is what he means by the mystical 
foundation of authority (AR 242).43 In the founding of law, Derrida notes 
somewhat later on in words which clearly allude to the analysis in Fors, the 
‘problem of justice will have been posed and violently resolved, that is to say 
buried, dissimulated, repressed’ (AR 252; WAP 5). The moment of law’s 
suspension, he also notes, alluding to Freud and Heidegger, is always full of 
anxiety, anguish, distress, Angst (angoissant) (AR 249).
language, even though this being is so incomprehensible that his being cannot fi nd expression 
in language. Although Derrida acknowledges a certain resemblance in relation to the language 
used, compared to negative theology about the existence of a Supreme Being, différance 
does not exist, is not a present-being in any form, and has neither existence nor essence. 
The latter ‘notion’ claims to exceed and thereby at the same time to inscribe the being at 
stake in negative theology (that is, God) within its operation. Deconstruction is therefore 
not concerned, as negative theology is, with naming an unnameable being, but to explore 
the other of being, its condition of possibility.
40 For more detailed considerations of Wittgenstein’s relation to the mystical, see Glock (1996); 
and Atkinson (2009), although these do not correspond with the reading proposed here.
41 The death drive in Derrida’s texts is clearly not to be viewed as something negative which 
needs to be avoided, as some authors, e.g. van Marle (2004: 609–12) have suggested; see 
Chapter 1.
42 See e.g. the invocation of the ghost or haunting (la hantise) of the undecidable (AR 252–5).
43 This passage should be read with ‘A number of yes’ (Psy II 231– 40).
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In the second part of ‘Force of law’, when Derrida continues with his 
analysis of the ‘mystical foundation of authority’ via Benjamin’s Critique of 
Violence, the correlation with his analysis of the Freudian death drive as well 
as of the crypt can also clearly be seen. In spite of other differences between 
Derrida and Benjamin that will be referred to below, Derrida expresses his 
agreement with Benjamin’s contention that law is inherently violent and that 
the state seeks to have a monopoly on violence (AR 266 –7). The primary 
interest of law consequently lies in laying itself  down and preserving itself. 
The state thus fears fundamental, founding violence most of all as this kind 
of violence could ultimately present itself  as having the right to found new 
law (AR 268). The violence that founds law is not alien to law, Derrida notes, 
following Benjamin, but that in law which suspends law; an instance of non-
law in law (AR 268 –70, 275). This is related to Benjamin’s interpretation of 
the right to strike, which is a right that modern legal systems grant to workers 
and which can be relied on in a general strike, Benjamin contends, to abolish 
law and to found a new law. Derrida extends this idea by contending that by 
means of modern technology something similar to a general strike can be 
brought about without having to mobilise great numbers of people (AR 271). 
With reference to Derrida’s other texts, it could moreover be said that this 
right to law or the right to found new law is not restricted to the right to 
strike, but to be implied also in other fundamental rights guaranteed in a 
constitution such as the right to equality, which potentially comes into play 
in every interpretive reading (R 52).44 The founding of law or of a state is 
terrifying, Derrida notes, inter alia because these moments of founding are in 
themselves and in their violence uninterpretable or indecipherable – that is, 
an ungraspable revolutionary instant (AR 269, 274). He explicitly links the 
nature of these founding moments, which corresponds with the analysis above 
44 I disagree with the reading of van Marle (2008: 136), referred to briefl y above, of Derrida’s 
notion of equality as being paradoxical in the sense that in order to ensure equality between 
two parties one necessarily excludes others. Ensuring equality would in other words lead to 
the ‘destruction’ of equality. The structure of equality explored by Derrida in Rogues (48 –55) 
is different: it includes (apart from equality in its traditional forms) an incalculable equality 
which is so radical that it destroys the sovereignty of the state and therefore also democracy as 
traditionally conceived. The self-destruction or auto-immunity of democracy and friendship, 
by analogy of which van Marle (134 –7) bases her reading of equality, likewise entails 
something different in Derrida’s Rogues and Politics of Friendship: it is not in the exclusion 
of non-citizens (van Marle does not say specifi cally who is excluded in the case of democracy, 
but see Thomson 2005: 26 on whom she relies) and of friends that democracy and friendship 
destroy themselves (this instead shows reliance on the restricted notion of the traditional 
concept of democracy and friendship), but in the desire for its own abolition or self-destruction 
(a friendship and democracy which show no concern for the self  in an individual/collective 
sense) which underlies these concepts in the same way in which the desire for justice under-
lies law as outlined above. This desire for self-destruction (which would indeed entail the 
absence of exclusion) furthermore calls as we saw for affi rmation, not mere notifi cation or 
avoidance.
Force of law 157
of the crypt, with the notion of ‘mystique’ (AR 269). This is to be understood 
further with reference to the way in which the violence that is used in order to 
found a new state is justifi ed in revolution: by relying on the future anterior. 
The in-progress or to-come founding of a new law, revolutionaries as a rule 
(implicitly) contend, now already justifi es the ‘illegal’ violence that is taking 
place (AR 269). The ‘mystical’ can with reference to Benjamin thus be said 
to be that instance of non-law in law which suspends established law in order 
to found another law (AR 269–70). This moment, Derrida says:
always takes place and never takes place in a presence. It is the moment 
in which the foundation of law remains suspended in the void or over 
the abyss, suspended by a pure performative act that would not have to 
answer to or before anyone. The supposed subject of this pure performative 
would no longer be before the law [devant la loi ], or rather he would be 
before a law [devant une loi ] still undetermined, before the law as before 
a law nonexisting, a law still ahead, still having to and yet to come [devant 
la loi comme devant une loi encore inexistante, une loi encore à venir, encore 
devant et devant venir.
(AR 269–70)
The use of ‘la loi’ as compared to ‘le droit’ as well as the clear allusion (and 
reference immediately after) to Kafka’s Before the Law are to be noted here. 
The founding of law (le droit), even though it involves a suspension of law, 
is ‘based’ on what Derrida refers to as an ‘anterior law’ and which fi nds 
expression in the fi gure of the general strike (as well as of war and the ‘great’ 
criminal) in Benjamin’s text. These fi gures all challenge radically the legal 
order itself  and in the process lay bare the inherent violence of the legal 
order (AR 267– 8, 273–5). Benjamin expresses a somewhat similar idea through 
the notion of  divine violence mentioned earlier, which is without means that 
look to an end, and which Derrida likewise refers to in terms of the ‘mystical 
foundation of authority’ (AR 285). What Derrida admires about this thinking 
of Benjamin, he says, is its acknowledgement that there can be no justice and 
no responsibility without an exposure to all risks, beyond certitude and good 
conscience (AR 287). Derrida however distances himself  from the (bloodless) 
divine violence which Benjamin ascribes to justice, its complete separation 
from law, the notion of the divine as sovereign, as well as Benjamin’s anti-
parliamentary and anti-Enlightenment stance (AR 259, 285–98).45 The stricture 
45 This clearly does not entail a rejection of the whole of Benjamin’s analysis. At AR 259 
Derrida refers e.g. to the ‘[t]he profound logic of this essay’, although it is ‘still too Heideg-
gerian, too messianic-Marxist or archeo-eschatological’ for his liking. In TS 56, Derrida 
likewise comments that reading Benjamin’s text helped him in formulating his own position 
on law and justice. For an excellent analysis of these Heideggerian aspects of Benjamin’s 
thinking, see Staikou (2008).
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of différance which Derrida insists on should be clear from this objection as 
well as from Derrida’s description of the relation between law and justice. 
For Derrida, justice is, as it is for Benjamin, an ‘anterior law’ and not of the 
order of knowledge.46 Differing from Benjamin, however, justice for Derrida 
is indissociable from law and yet without sovereignty (R 150).
Repetition and law-enforcing violence
The notion of the ‘mystical’, in its relation to repetition, comes to the fore 
especially in Derrida’s analysis of law-conserving violence in Benjamin’s text. 
It ties in closely with the above discussion of the notion of the crypt as well as 
the Freudian death drive coupled with the repetition compulsion (Chapter 1). 
In the fi rst part, and as discussed above, Derrida had already contended that 
justice in the incalculable sense comes into play in every act of  judicial 
interpretation. The structure in terms of which this takes place is analysed 
in more detail in the second part of ‘Force of law’. Here Derrida seeks to 
complicate the Benjaminian distinction initially drawn between law-making, 
law-enacting or law-founding violence–power (rechtsetzende Gewalt) on the 
one hand and law-preserving violence–power (rechtserhaltende Gewalt) on 
the other (AR 264 –5, 272). Benjamin himself  later acknowledges in his dis-
cussion of the police, that this distinction is not a rigid one (AR 276 – 81). 
Law-founding violence–power, Derrida notes, is already enveloped by the 
need for its conservation, in other words, because of the need for repetition 
(AR 272, 274 –5). In the fi rst part of ‘Force of law’, he likewise pointed out 
that law always necessarily includes its enforceability, and that the latter is 
therefore not something secondary to law (AR 233).47 Law founding in other 
words entails the positing of what is believed should be conserved; it there-
fore entails the promise of its own repetition in future, the sharing of a 
46 See also ‘Préjugés’ 94 where Derrida notes something similar in refl ecting on Lyotard and 
judgement. This needs to be understood in close relation to Derrida’s refl ections on Heidegger’s 
thinking of Being and the Freudian death drive: that is, beyond subjectivity, see e.g. PC 264, 
287– 8, 321, 379.
47 According to Agamben (2005: 37–9), the expression ‘force of law’ (with reference to Derrida’s 
essay) refers not to the law, but to decrees of the executive, particularly in a state of exception, 
which would not formally qualify as law but which would nevertheless have the force of law. 
The issue of executive decrees in such circumstances would lead to the non-application of 
law. Derrida does not use the expression in the strict legalistic sense in which Agamben 
seeks to use it. Derrida’s reliance on it is tied to the English idiomatic expression ‘to enforce 
the law’ which cannot be directly translated into French, as well as the German word 
‘Gewalt’, which can be translated as power, violence and force. Derrida furthermore uses 
this expression in light of his discussion of the Benjaminian distinction referred to above 
which he will show deconstructs itself. As we will see below, all law enforcement according 
to Derrida destroys law, and not only executive action in the case of a state of exception.
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heritage and a tradition.48 There can thus be no purity in the founding of 
law, Derrida concludes (AR 272, 277– 8). The same applies to conservation: 
the conservation of law cannot be strictly distinguished from the founding 
of law as it re-founds and conserves. Whereas Benjamin seeks to return to a 
pure origin, a presence without representation (AR 281), Derrida seeks to 
draw the consequences of this structure of contamination.49
This structure of contamination is shown implicitly in Benjamin’s analysis of 
the police (understood here in a wide sense, that is, including all enforcement 
of law (AR 278)), who, as he points out, is supposed to only conserve law, 
but actually also founds, enacts or produces law. Because of this mixing of 
functions and also because of their ubiquity, the power or violence of the 
police is described by Derrida, following Benjamin, as phantom-like or spectral 
(AR 279; CF 14).50 In spite of the institution of democracy and the principle 
of separation of powers, the police make regulations themselves and in doing 
this, set new goals which are not provided for in law (CF 14).51 This is to be 
compared, Benjamin says, with the position in an absolute monarchy where 
the police represent a ruler in whom legislative and executive powers are 
united. The police in modern states also act in situations where no legal basis 
exists for doing so. The police therefore, strictly speaking, completely or 
absolutely (literally, ‘throughout’) [durchaus] act outside the law.52 Derrida 
elaborates on this with reference specifi cally to modern technology and the 
consequent ubiquity of the police, their ability and authority to intrude in 
every sphere.53 This constitutes an internal degeneration of the democratic 
principle: police power is intended to protect democracy, but is essentially 
uncontrollable in its technological autonomy.54 Law and democracy through 
the need for police powers thus destroy themselves. The police, we could also 
48 Elsewhere in Acts of Religion Derrida asks rhetorically whether this promise is not in itself, 
in its structure, ‘a relation to the future which involves forgetting, indeed a sort of essential 
indifference to the past, to that in the present which is not present, but also an ingathering, 
that is, a memory of the future’ (AR 185). The ‘indifference to the past’ that Derrida refers 
to here should clearly not be understood as a reference to the past present, but as a moment 
which never (can) become a presence: the non-presence of law’s suspension which threatens 
law from within with its own destruction.
49 See also de Vries (1992).
50 Benjamin (1996: 243): ‘Unlike law ... a consideration of the police institution encounters 
nothing essential at all. Its power is formless, like its nowhere-tangible, all-pervasive, ghostly 
presence in the life of civilized states.’
51 See also AR 295 on the police force that becomes the true legislative power; and see Schup-
pert (2003: 563–5) on the dominant or at least very important role of the executive in the 
enactment of legislation by parliaments in constitutional democracies.
52 Benjamin (1977: 189).
53 AR 279– 80; see also Schuppert (2003: 578 – 81) on the extension of state powers through 
the notion of a state function of ensuring inner security.
54 The ‘theme’ of democracy destroying itself, or auto-immunity, will be taken up again more 
extensively in Derrida’s Rogues.
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say, deprive law of its strength and its authority, its force, ‘dooming it to a sort 
of self-persecuting disidentifi cation’ (OS 61–2). The concept of law must there-
fore be understood as being ‘double’, because if  it consisted only in force and 
authority, it would not have been possible for it to lose its force and authority 
(OS 62).55 The ghostly double or spectral duplicity that Derrida invokes here 
refers to his analysis in Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, where in a reading 
of Heidegger he shows that the concept of spirit is double, both preserving 
and destroying itself, in a differantial relation with its ‘self ’ and its ‘other’, 
we could add (AR 279– 80).56 Spirit, in respect of destroying itself, is closely 
associated with fi re, not of the hearth, but of burning itself, setting fi re to 
itself, confl agrating itself (OS 83–98). When Derrida refers to the Fort-Dasein of  
the police he therefore points not only to his analysis of the game of Ernst – 
Freud’s grandson – in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which involves a dispersal 
as well as mastery of the self,57 but also to the fact that even though the 
police destroy law, the polis nevertheless has to rely on the police for the 
conservation of law (AR 280). Derrida’s statement, following Benjamin, that 
‘[t]here is something decayed or rotten in law, which condemns it or ruins it 
in advance’, must be understood in the above context (AR 273).58
Derrida furthermore seeks to generalise the above structure, contending 
that the same can be said in relation to the consequences of all law enforce-
ment whether or not it belongs to the institution of the police (AR 278). This 
can be understood as a reference to the broad discretionary or interpretive 
powers granted to offi cials in modern legal systems which is usually justifi ed 
with reference to the inability of legislative assemblies to regulate everything 
in detail, the unpredictability of future situations, as well as the need for 
fl exibility in the taking of decisions.59 This nevertheless means that those who 
enforce the law (and ultimately the constitution) make what purport to be legal 
rules or decisions but which are not authorised by ‘law’, or are authorised 
only in so far as the authorisation ‘perverts’ law. They in other words found, 
create or produce ‘law’ and therefore also violence which can only be said to 
be authorised by law in so far as law at the same time authorises its own 
abolition.60 Administrative law (as well as criminal procedure), which through 
55 See also OG 39– 40 for a similar argument concerning speech and writing.
56 The footnote reference to Of Spirit in Cornell et al. (1992: 66), appearing there as note 12, 
does not appear in the Cardozo Law Review version and likewise not in Acts of Religion. It 
is likewise absent from the 1994 French version.
57 See Chapter 1.
58 See also PTT 99 where Derrida draws a comparison between repression in the psychoanalytical 
and the political sense – in the latter instance through the police, the military and the economy 
– which ‘ends up producing, reproducing, and regenerating the very thing it seeks to disarm’.
59 See e.g. Schuppert (2003: 562).
60 It should be clear that this argument would not be affected should a specifi c constitution ex-
pressly (or by implication) authorise the delegation of discretionary powers. According to this 
analysis it would mean that the constitution effectively authorises its own degeneration/abolition.
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the laying down of requirements of legality or grounds of review, inter alia 
seeks to ensure that offi cials act within their powers or according to certain 
procedures, can from this perspective be seen as a modern response to this 
‘degeneration’ of law. Administrative-law cases however show that the 
purpose(s) of a law, as well as the scope of the powers and duties laid down 
in legislation, are hardly ever easily determinable. Judges furthermore often 
defer in varying degrees to the substantive and procedural decisions taken 
by administrators which leave further scope for the creation of ‘law’ by the 
administration.61 More recently, privatisation, deregulation and attempts at 
achieving the ends of government through state contracts, public procure-
ment, public–private partnerships, self-regulation and public participation, 
have given a new dimension to this ‘degradation’ of law.62
The above brief  analysis is of course not meant as criticism of the grant 
of discretionary powers in modern legal systems or of constitutional and 
administrative law in general, or to suggest that there should be a return to 
some ‘pure’ state of law. Modern states can hardly function without these 
institutions. Derrida can also not be read as saying that administrative and 
constitutional law, also in their other attempts to structure discretion or to 
ensure ‘good’ decision-making, do (and should) not place more or less 
effective limits on the exercise of discretionary powers.63 His analysis would 
also not deny that limits are often (and should be) imposed in constitutional 
democracies as to the permissible extent of parliamentary delegation of 
powers (CF 14 –15).64 Derrida, reading Benjamin, seeks to show and to draw 
consequences from the fact that the state cannot any longer, or perhaps never 
could, achieve its purposes through the legal order itself; a ‘supplement’ is 
always required. This supplement, however, as we saw above, necessarily leads 
to the abolition or degeneration of law because of the indeterminacy that is 
involved in interpretation and enforcement.65 Because of the co-implication 
of law founding/making and law enforcement, the (legal) validity of both is 
undermined. The abyss of this destruction points to an ‘origin’ of law which 
precedes the idea of origin as auto-institution. This ‘destruction’ would in 
other words not have been possible if  it was not already inscribed within the 
origin of law. Any ‘conception’ of law must consequently also make provision 
for its perversion, its auto-deconstruction or auto-immunity through repetition, 
61 See e.g. Craig (2008).
62 For an excellent overview of this trend in administrative law, see Schuppert (2003: 
440 – 627).
63 Foucault (2004) is very critical of the ability of such measures to control the disciplinary 
and bio-power of our age. Derrida is likely to have shared this view, although their analyses 
and strategies differ in a number of respects.
64 See in this respect Schuppert (2003: 553–7).
65 See also Schuppert (2003: 559– 65) on the independence of the administration in enforcing 
legislation and the important role of the executive in the enactment of legislation.
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not only as an accident, but as its condition of possibility, its pre-origin (AR 
290) which continues to haunt it.
Law therefore remains haunted by the ‘desire’ for self-destruction. The found-
ing of law, one could also say, following Benjamin, is made possible by that 
which threatens its ruin (AR 278). In the conservation of law and therefore 
in every act of interpretation, there is moreover a return of the mystical, of 
justice, of what Benjamin would refer to as the general strike. This is the case 
even though there is a performative violence at the heart of every interpretive 
reading and even though interpretation is never neutral and never non-violent 
as it depends on the established order that it interprets (AR 270 –1).
‘Applying’ justice
In thinking of the practical consequences of Derrida’s analysis, one is reminded 
of Derrida’s remark in an interview that ‘[d]econstruction cannot be applied 
and cannot not be applied’ (‘Ai’ 218). In the above discussion we saw that 
the same can be said of justice: it is always at stake, yet it always withdraws 
from law; justice cannot fi nd application in a legal system. We furthermore saw 
that justice requires that the legal system itself  be exposed to the impossible 
revolutionary decision – that is, a loss of  property, of  rights,66 of  economy, 
of meaning, of reason, of sovereignty, of citizenship.67 Derrida’s notion of 
justice thus stands in clear tension with law, to be understood here in terms 
of a restricted economy, benefi ting in violent and calculative fashion a com-
munity, both from those on the ‘inside’ who, because of their (economic and/or 
political) marginalisation might want to abolish the rights and privileges 
granted by the legal system to its (main) benefi ciaries,68 as well as from those 
on the ‘outside’ who might want to ‘unfairly’ benefi t from the economic and 
other forms of wealth of the state by entering and residing there illegally. 
66 The need for this a-temporal ‘loss’ of rights is tied to the relation between the concept of 
right and the power as well as sovereignty of the state; AR 242; BS 207, and see also Foucault 
(2004: 1– 40).
67 This ‘loss’ ties in closely with Derrida’s reading of Hegel’s analysis of ‘the Jew’ in Glas 
47a–53a. A reinterpretation of justice in Derrida’s thinking as an obligation towards the 
parties to a dispute (see above), as an opening of law to responsiveness in relation to the 
singularity of the other (Fitzpatrick 2001; Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009: 53–97), or as plurality 
(van der Walt 2005a) may make it more palatable to lawyers, but clearly involve a moderation 
which has important consequences for what can be expected of law.
68 In The Beast and the Sovereign Derrida in the same vein repeats like a refrain the opening 
statement of La Fontaine’s The Wolf and the Lamb: ‘The reason of the strongest is always the 
best’; also mentioned in AR 241. See also ET 63 where Derrida defi nes the state institution 
as ‘a system of powers which in fact always represents, in the name of the state – and history 
has taught us to think this – a fraction of the nation, if  not a class, then at least something 
which is not the “integral will” nor often the “general will” of all the citizens of this state, 
past, present and future’. See also de Ville (2011).
Force of law 163
Modern law understood thus is moreover enforced by a calculation which takes 
place not only through the use of strict legalistic methods of constitutional 
interpretation, but also procedural and value-oriented approaches with reference 
to open-ended concepts such as human dignity or the common good. These 
calculations are inherently without (legal) foundation, as they are (conserving) 
repetitions of a self-founding act, which as a rule is in itself  neither legal nor 
illegal and can only retrospectively lay claim to legality (AR 269; CF 57). 
This abyssal foundation of law does not open on to nihilism, but to the 
chance (and threat) of a justice without and beyond law.
Justice thus requires a suspension of and resistance to such (economic) 
calculation and fi nds expression for example in the notions of the perfect 
gift as well as absolute hospitality, both of which expect no return (of law and 
community) to the self. Justice, as expounded by Derrida, seeks to undermine 
the rule of law as well as the rule of law. Liberal legal theory, which dominates 
in the world today, sees only ‘cases’, which must be dealt with in terms of 
existing rules and legal principles. There is no space, possibility or allowance 
here for going beyond law, resisting law, in deciding a ‘case’, even a ‘hard 
case’. Derrida’s analysis of  the structure of  law, on the other hand, allows 
for the ‘suspension’ of the rule of law. In other words, in an actual case that 
comes to court, the judge (especially in an apex court), representing the com-
munity, has to, in revolutionary fashion, ‘abolish’ law and the state (that is, 
sovereignty) as mechanisms which institute and maintain a restricted economy. 
As we saw above, this does not entail a form of decisionism. The subject, 
understood here in a collective sense, is radically displaced. Judging for 
Derrida is furthermore not simply or in the fi rst instance about the (interests 
of the) parties to the dispute, parties who will often seek to keep in place 
law’s restricted economy. Justice goes far beyond their actual claims, which 
will already have sought to reduce justice to (potential and possible) law. The 
parties and their claims can be judged only because of and by way of the 
differantial tension between law’s binding and self-destructive tendencies. A 
negotiation, an unbearably risky negotiation, is therefore necessarily required 
with the impossible decision, which can also be referred to as a general 
economy (WD 251–77), a madness in other words (AR 254).69 Only in this 
‘exposure’ is there a chance for decision, for responsibility, which would not 
simply involve a return of the community to itself. This follows necessarily 
from the structure or perhaps rather ‘stricture’ (Chapter 1) of law explored 
above – that is, law’s ruin is inherently part of its structure. The excessive 
responsibility ‘before memory’ which justice demands (AR 247)70 is likewise 
69 See Chapter 4.
70 In the fi rst version of ‘Force of law’, ‘devant la mémoire’ was translated as ‘toward memory’, 
from which Cornell (1992) drew some interesting, albeit very restricted consequences for the 
relation between justice and law; for commentary, see de Ville (2007a).
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not to be understood simply in terms of a genealogy of actual denials of 
justice, but much more radically with reference to the erased and ‘cryptic’ 
memory of self-destruction. While justice does not therefore simply demand a 
concern for suffering or marginalised others, this structure of law and justice 
should, depending on whether the decision-maker indeed ‘gives’ herself  over 
to the impossible decision, in most instances lead to an invention of law 
which favours those who are ‘marginalised’. The qualifi cation ‘most’ is added, 
because justice is not to be confused with the claims of those who have 
nationalist, ethnic, racist, linguistic, xenophobic, religious–fundamentalist 
and other similar aspirations, even though those who propagate these views 
often view themselves as ‘marginalised’. These aspirations are expressions of 
the desire for presence, whereas justice as we saw, stands in a differantial 
relation to this desire. As appears from Rogues, justice calls for the thinking 
of a radical equality, without reference to borders, class, gender, race, species, 
generation etc.
Chapter 7
The haunting of justice
Heidegger’s reading of the Anaximander fragment in Der Spruch des 
Anaximander,1 and Derrida’s brief and very dense analysis thereof in Specters 
of Marx2 are indispensable in understanding the notion of law as absolute 
hospitality, specifi cally its spectral and hyper-political dimensions.3 Through 
a close reading of these two texts a further attempt will be made in this 
chapter to understand Derrida’s rethinking of the concept of justice, and 
how it ties in with Marxism, with Heidegger’s thinking on Being, as well as, to 
some extent, Levinas’s thinking on the other. We start in this introduction 
with a few brief  remarks about Anaximander and the fragment remaining 
of his thinking as well as of the readings thereof by Heidegger and Derrida. 
Anaximander (c.610 –547 BC) is usually referred to as a pre-Socratic thinker. 
Like Thales, Anaximander refl ected on the origin or principle (arche) of that 
which exists. Whereas Thales thought that everything which exists derives 
from water, Anaximander regarded the apeiron, the limitless, indeterminate 
or indefi nite as that from which all things derive. Simplicius, in his book 
On Aristotle’s Physics, drawing from Theophrastus, reports the saying of 
Anaximander as follows:
Anaximander of Miletos, son of Praxiades, a fellow-citizen and associate 
of Thales, said that the material cause [arche] and fi rst element of things 
was the Infi nite [apeiron], he being the fi rst to introduce this name of the 
material cause. He says it is neither water nor any other of the so-called 
elements, but a substance different from them which is infi nite [apeiron], 
from which arise all the heavens and the worlds within them. And into 
1 The essay was fi rst published in 1950 in Holzwege. The German version of the essay will be 
referred to in cases where it requires our specifi c attention.
2 I will be relying on the Routledge Classics 2006 version, the page numbers of which differ 
from the earlier English version (1994).
3 This further refl ection on justice seems to be anticipated by Derrida in a footnote in earlier 
versions of ‘Force of law’, said there to be ‘only a preliminary version’ and his thinking on 
justice as ‘work in progress’ (Cornell et al. 1992: 3). See also R 88; and Bischof (2004: 200).
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that from which things take their rise [genesis] they pass away [ phthoran] 
once more, ‘as is meet [kata to chreon]; for they make reparation and 
satisfaction [didonai diken kai tisin] to one another for their injustice 
[allBlois tes adikias] according to the ordering of time,’ as he says in these 
somewhat poetical terms.4
The ancient Greeks did not use quotation marks, so that it is not perfectly 
clear where the actual words of Anaximander start and where they end. The 
quotation marks in the above passage were introduced later on. The transla-
tions of Nietzsche in a treatise completed in 1873 and published posthumously 
in 1903 and of Diels, also from 1903, referred to by Heidegger, are similar 
in most respects to that of Burnet. For our purposes the most important 
differences lie in Nietzsche’s translation of the phrase didonai ... diken kai 
tisin allelois tes adikias as ‘they must pay penalty and be judged for their 
injustice’ and Diels as ‘they pay recompense and penalty to one another for 
their recklessness’ (Heidegger 1984a: 13). In Der Spruch Heidegger will chal-
lenge these traditional translations and readings of the fragment which are 
to the effect that it simply contemplates the laws of nature. As we will see in 
the second part of this chapter, Derrida in Specters commends Heidegger’s 
reading, although he raises certain concerns, which will inform his own read-




Before enquiring in more detail into Heidegger’s reading of the Anaximander 
fragment, it is necessary to place his reading in a broader context. A some-
what more detailed description of Heidegger’s thinking and its relation to 
law was provided in Chapters 1 and 5. Only a brief  outline, in so far as it is 
required for the further discussion, will be given here. As also appears from 
his other texts, and as already indicated earlier, Heidegger is of the view that 
metaphysics started with Platonism, when Being or the ‘is’ of beings is 
interpreted as the most universal of beings and as idea (Heidegger 1991: IV 
164). Being is therefore interpreted on the basis of beings and with reference 
to (the essence of ) beings. Being itself is not thought by metaphysics (Heidegger 
1991: IV 207–9). Being is instead turned into a being, for example the 
Supreme Being as fi rst cause or the subject of subjectivity. Metaphysics, as 
4 Footnotes omitted. Burnet (1920: ch. 1, s. 12).
5 See also R 86 where Derrida indicates that his reading of Der Spruch ‘plays a discreet but 
decisive role throughout the book [i.e. Specters of Marx]’.
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Heidegger points out, has a fundamentally onto-theological character. A 
further feature of metaphysics is its conceptuality which starts when with 
Plato, Being is understood as the essence of beings. The writings of the early 
Greek thinkers, including Anaximander, are according to Heidegger not as 
yet under the infl uence of metaphysics and that is why he attaches such 
importance to them.6 Their importance furthermore lies in the intimation they 
had of, as Heidegger (2000: 174 –5) puts it, the ‘suddenness and uniqueness 
of Dasein, an intimation into which they were urged by Being itself ’. This 
passage makes clear the close relation in Heidegger’s thinking, also after Being 
and Time, between Being and Dasein, without however making of Being a 
product of man.7 The early Greek thinkers, as Heidegger also points out 
elsewhere, were exposed to Being, which disclosed itself  to them as physis, 
logos, dikB, moira and chreon (Heidegger 1984a: 55; 2000: 175). Heidegger’s 
reading is therefore an attempt to read the fragment in a non-conceptual 
way, an attempt to ‘think like the early Greeks’.
Heidegger sees metaphysics as fi nding its ultimate expression in Nietzsche’s 
interpretation of Being as will to power. Because the metaphysics of subjectivity 
here attains the peak of its development, the most extreme withdrawal of 
Being takes place (Heidegger 1991: IV 237, 241). The consequence of this is 
a profound uncertainty in man. Because man is in a covert way the abode 
of Being itself  in its advent, the withdrawal of Being leads to uncertainty 
without man being able to discover the source and essence of this uncertainty. 
This leads to man seeking self-assurance in beings which are ‘surveyed with 
regard to what they can offer by way of new and continuous possibilities 
of surety’ (Heidegger 1991: IV 235, 238). This search for certainty fi nds its 
ultimate expression in modern technology as an attempt to secure permanence, 
but which instead points to man’s homelessness (Heidegger 1991: IV 248).8 
The greater the danger that technology will slip away from human control, 
the more urgent the will to mastery becomes (Heidegger 1977: 5). The usual 
defi nitions of technology are that it is a means to an end or that it is an 
activity of man, both defi nitions being instrumental and anthropological 
in nature (Heidegger 1977: 4, 5). Heidegger seeks a defi nition of modern 
technology which brings it into relation with Being. For Heidegger (1977: 
20), the essence of technology consists in enframing (Ge-stell) which refers 
to the challenging forth of man ‘to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, 
as standing reserve’. Objective reality is in other words experienced as a kind 
of storeroom from which the subject can take and use without limitation to 
satisfy his endless needs (Goosen 2007: 336). Man himself  is even treated in 
6 See also de Boer (2000: 177).
7 See e.g. Heidegger (1993b: 240, ‘Letter on humanism’).
8 For an analysis of Heidegger’s views on technology in the legal context, see e.g. Wolcher 
(2004); and Tranter (2007).
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this way. Enframing is not however here to be understood as the essence of 
technology in the traditional way (Heidegger 1977: 30). Heidegger in other 
words seeks to give a non-metaphysical defi nition of  technology. Accord-
ing to Heidegger (1977: 22), modern machine-power technology, although 
it only developed in the second half  of the eighteenth century, is a result of 
representational or calculative thinking which has its origin in the seventeenth 
century. Enframing is in other words a result of  the sending or destining 
of Being as objectifying representation (Heidegger 1977: 24, 29–30). Even in 
its concealment and precisely in its being concealed, Being nevertheless 
remains as promise of itself  (Heidegger 1991: IV 226 –7). Heidegger’s refl ec-
tion on the early Greeks could be read as in part an attempt to address the 
question of modern technology. Heidegger does not, as is often thought, 
view technology simply negatively. He nevertheless sees an extreme danger 
in its essence. This danger, he notes, does not lie in the potentially lethal 
machines and apparatus of technology, but in its preventing man from enter-
ing ‘into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more 
primal truth’ (Heidegger 1977: 28). Technology, we could say in somewhat 
simpler terms, points to the rule of subjectivism, both individual and collec-
tive, in modernity, and at the same time, shows that subjectivity as well as 
the certainty and security that seemingly goes with it, are an illusion (Heidegger 
1977: 152). In the danger of technology therefore also lies a saving power, 
according to Heidegger (1977: 32–3), as it may reveal to man his essential 
belonging to and responsibility in relation to what grants, preserves or safe-
guards (das Gewährende). Technology can in other words show a way beyond 
subjectivity.
In so far as Heidegger’s reading of the fragment is concerned, it is important 
to note that he is not engaging in a philological or psychological exposition, 
seeking to determine what was present to the thought of  Anaximander 
(Heidegger 1984a: 18, 57). Such a reading would amount to a calculation 
and to the loss of thinking (Scott 1994: 131). Heidegger also does not seek 
to come to a more accurate formulation in his translation of Anaximander 
as compared to the standard translations (Scott 1994: 132). This does not 
however mean that his is an arbitrary translation. The question Heidegger 
seeks to answer is what comes to language in the fragment (Heidegger 1984a: 
20). Heidegger’s ‘problem’ with traditional translations and interpretations 
of the fragment lies in their relation to Platonism. As he points out, Nietzsche 
categorises Anaximander as a pre-Platonic philosopher, and Diels refers to 
him as a pre-Socratic. Hegel, although he does not refer to the Anaximander 
fragment, regards the early Greek thinkers as pre-Aristotelian (Heidegger 
1984a: 14 –15). The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle are in this way used 
as a standard to consider and judge the early Greek thinkers. Platonic and 
Aristotelian concepts and representations are furthermore used to guide the 
interpretation of these thinkers. It is also mistaken, according to Heidegger, to 
believe that logical thinking can guide us in interpreting the fragment, as logic 
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was developed only later in the Platonic and Aristotelian schools. Theophrastus, 
who lived until about 286 BC, as Heidegger furthermore points out, was a 
contemporary of Aristotle and the latter’s student. Both Aristotle and Theo-
phrastus regarded the early thinkers as having contemplated the things of 
nature and as looking for the origins of beings in nature. This is also how 
these thinkers are thought of by Hegel and those after him. The word generally 
used for ‘nature’ – that is, physis – at the time of Aristotle however took on 
a different meaning than it had for the early Greek thinkers – the broad sense 
of the totality of being. Physis in Platonic/Aristotelian thinking designated 
a special region of beings separated from ethos and logos. These so-called 
refl ections on nature of the early Greek thinkers are furthermore after Hegel 
thought of as inadequate in comparison with the thinking on nature developed 
in the Platonic and Aristotelian schools, the school of Stoicism and the schools 
of medicine (Heidegger 1984a: 16).
As already noted, the Anaximander fragment was copied by Simplicius in 
his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, the commentary having been written in 
AD 530. Simplicius was a Neoplatonist, and the copy of the fragment derived 
from Theophrastus (c.371–286 BC) (Heidegger 1984a: 16). As Heidegger 
points out, from the time that Anaximander had pronounced his saying to 
the time that it was written down by Simplicius, more than 1,000 years had 
gone by. Heidegger at this juncture raises the question whether the fragment 
can still tell us something after 2,500 years. It being the oldest one left to us 
by the Western tradition in itself  of course does not give it any more weight. 
If  the thinking expressed in it however surpasses all that came after it, the 
fragment would have a claim to our attention (Heidegger 1984a: 18). As we 
saw above, according to Heidegger, the early Greek thinkers thought Being 
as such, whereas since Plato, Being has become the name for the essence of 
beings or the Supreme Being. Being is thought as constant presence, as presence 
at hand (Heidegger 2000: 206 – 8, 216, 220). The early thinkers however 
thought of Being as presencing and of truth as unconcealment (Heidegger 
1977: 146).9 At this stage of Greek thinking, as Heidegger/Krell eloquently 
puts it, the ‘Being of beings is gathered (légesthai, logos) in the ultimacy of 
its destiny ... The history of Being is gathered in this departure’ (Heidegger 
1984a: 18). This destiny, as we saw above, fi nds its ultimate expression in 
Nietzsche’s will to power, according to Heidegger. In addition to its other 
concerns, Heidegger’s reading of the Anaximander fragment is an attempt 
to think the future in a way different from how it is done by historiography: 
predicting the future with reference to the past as determined by the present 
(Heidegger 1984a: 17). This, according to Heidegger, effectively amounts to 
9 Heidegger would later note, and this will be important for our discussion of Derrida’s reading, 
that the early Greeks nevertheless did not think the ‘it gives’ (es gibt) of Being as such; see 
Heidegger (2002c: 8), and see further Chapter 5.
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the destruction of the future. Derrida’s thinking, as we will see below, closely 
ties in with that of Heidegger in this respect.10
The fragment as giving expression to the ontico–ontological 
difference
Heidegger (1984a: 19–20) acknowledges that his translation will appear violent. 
However, such ‘violence’ is necessary if  one is to attempt to understand what 
comes to language in the fragment, that is to say if  one reads it as a thinking 
of (the truth of ) Being. The traditional interpretations of the Anaximander 
fragment are to the effect that it refers to the origin and decay of things and 
that it describes the process thereof. In these interpretations the fragment 
describes a kind of economy of exchange in nature. It would thus be a vague 
statement about an exchange of constructive and destructive moments, but 
without as yet an understanding of the laws of motion. It would furthermore 
be a kind of primitive natural science, a description of nature in human terms of 
a moral and juridical nature, by referring to justice and injustice, recompense 
and penalty, sin and retribution. Theophrastus’s fi nal words in the paragraph 
cited above would then be understood as rightful criticism of Anaximander 
for his use of poetic terms to describe the processes of nature. Grammatically, 
Heidegger points out, the fragment consists of two clauses. For easy reference, 
the Greek version of the fragment is set out here:
ex on de he genesis esti tois ousi kai ten phthoran eis tauta ginesthai 
kata to chreon. didonai gar auta diken kai tisin allelois tes adikias kata 
ten tou chronou taxin.
The matter of ta onta which is at stake in the fi rst clause (‘into that from 
which things take their rise they pass away once more’) literally refers to 
‘things’ or ‘beings’ in their multiplicity. This is according to Heidegger not 
a reference to an arbitrary multiplicity, but to the multiplicity of beings in 
their totality (at 20 –1). ‘Beings’ is furthermore not to be understood here as 
referring only to things or to the things of  nature as the traditional trans-
lations seem to suggest. It refers also to ‘[m]an, things produced by man ... 
the situation or environment effected and realized by the deeds and omissions 
of men ... [as well as] daimonic and divine things’ (at 21). These are not 
simply also in being (or beings), as Heidegger notes, but are even more so in 
being (seiender) than are things of nature (at 21; Heidegger 2003: 305). 
Heidegger is here clearly alluding to his existential analysis in Being and Time 
of  Dasein as the only being open to Being. The Aristotelian–Theophrastian 
assumption that ta onta is to be understood as a reference to the things of 
10 See Neg 219.
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nature in a narrow sense is therefore groundless. This is also the case with 
the criticism that what Anaximander says here about nature and which should 
therefore have been expressed in scientifi c terms is imperfectly expressed by 
him in moral–juridical language. In interpreting the fragment one must fur-
thermore abandon the idea that Anaximander is speaking here with reference 
to the traditional disciplines of ethics and jurisprudence. This does not how-
ever mean that Anaximander did not as yet have an understanding of law 
and ethics (Sittlichkeit) (at 21; Heidegger 2003: 305). The distinctions we 
currently draw between disciplines such as ethics, jurisprudence, physics, 
biology and psychology, were however not as yet made at the time of Anax-
imander. This does not mean that what is expressed in Anaximander’s saying 
is simply some vague indeterminacy. The words dike, adikia and tisis in the 
fragment, Heidegger furthermore notes, do not have a limited disciplinary 
meaning, but rather a broad or rich signifi cation which cannot simply be 
confi ned to the traditional disciplines. They are specifi cally used ‘to bring to 
language the manifold totality in its essential unity’ (at 22). What Anaximander 
says is therefore anything but primitive, a confusion between disciplines, or 
simply an anthropomorphic interpretation of the world.
We can only enter into dialogue with the Greek thinkers when listening 
occurs, Heidegger notes. This requires that the words which are usually 
understood as referring to ‘beings’ and ‘to be’ are heard in a different way. 
These words include ‘ta onta’ (beings), ‘einai ’ (to be), ‘estin’ (is) and ‘on’ 
(being) (at 23). Heidegger emphasises that he does not wish to question the 
correctness of the traditional way in which these words are translated. He 
however asks whether we have really thought what the words ‘being’ and ‘to 
be’ mean in our own languages and furthermore whether these translations 
are suffi cient in order to understand what the Greeks were addressing with 
these words (at 24). According to Heidegger, in early Greek thinking, Being 
still illuminates itself  in beings which makes a claim to a certain essence of 
man (at 25). This essence of man unfolds historically as a sending of Being. 
Being at the same time grants or safeguards (wahren) this essence and releases 
it without the essence separating itself  from Being (at 25). The reason for the 
forgetting of Being in Western thinking lies in the fateful withdrawal of Being 
as it reveals itself  in beings or in Being’s holding on to its truth (at 26). In 
its illumination of beings, Being sets them adrift in errancy. The inability of 
man to see himself, Heidegger notes, ‘corresponds to the self-concealing 
of the lighting of Being’ (at 26). World history could be said to be a result 
of this keeping to itself  or epoche of  Being (at 26 –7). Moreover, as the begin-
ning of the epoch of Being is ‘Greek’, the important question in translating 
the fragment is whether it speaks to us of onta in their Being (at 27). Should 
this be so, the fragment would of course have a claim to our attention. 
Heidegger clearly believes that this question should be answered in the 
affi rmative. We have to look at ta onta not simply in terms of what it expresses, 
Heidegger points out, but in terms of its source which is also the source from 
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which the fragment speaks (at 28). It is therefore necessary to at fi rst remain 
outside the fragment so as to, as Heidegger puts it, ‘experience what ta onta, 
thought in Greek, says’ (at 28).
Remaining for that reason for the moment ‘outside’ the fragment, Heidegger 
fi rst considers the question of its authenticity. He notes that it is not clear 
from Simplicius’s quotation of the Anaximander fragment where it starts or 
where it ends (at 28). Based on the words used, some of which according 
to Heidegger are Aristotelian in structure and tone rather than archaic, as 
well as the practice of quotation of the Greeks, he concludes that only the 
following can be regarded as an actual quotation from Anaximander: ‘kata 
to chreon. didonai gar auta diken kai tisin allelois tes adikias’ (at 28 –9).11 It is 
also precisely this part, as Heidegger points out, which is regarded as ‘rather 
poetic’ by Theophrastus, which therefore hints at their ‘original’ nature (at 
30). This does not however mean that the rest of the paragraph of Simplicius 
has to be completely disregarded: it can still serve as secondary testimony 
concerning Anaximander’s thinking (at 30). This brings us to the question 
of how the words genesis (originating) and phthora (passing away) in the part 
left out are to be understood. Must they in other words be understood as 
pre-conceptual words (taking account of  the fact that conceptuality is 
possible only from the moment that Being is interpreted as idea, and from 
then on is unavoidable (at 29)) or as Platonic–Aristotelian conceptual terms 
(at 30)? In light of the above, the answer to this question is evident. Heidegger 
thus takes the view that genesis and phthora are not to be understood in the 
modern sense of development and decline, but in the light of physis (Being) 
‘as ways of luminous rising and decline’ (at 30). Although genesis can be 
interpreted as originating, it should therefore be understood here as ‘a move-
ment which lets every emerging being abandon concealment and go forward 
into unconcealment’ (at 30). Similarly phthora must be understood as a 
going which ‘abandons unconcealment, departing and withdrawing into 
concealment’ (at 30).
In light of the reasons for the exclusion of the fi rst section of what is 
traditionally thought as making out part of the fragment, Heidegger notes 
that we cannot be sure whether Anaximander used the words on or ta onta, 
although there are no indications against this (at 30 –1). In so far as the word 
auta in the second clause is concerned, because of what it says and also 
because of its reference back to kata to chreon, it must necessarily be under-
stood as a reference to ‘being-in-totality experienced in a pre-conceptual way’, 
or to beings. A more diffi cult question is what ta onta refers to when account 
is taken of the above (at 31). Heidegger points out that ta onta, with all its 
modifi cations (estin, en, estai, einai), speaks everywhere in the Greek language. 
11 In Heidegger’s earlier reading of the fragment, in 1941 (Heidegger 1981; 1993a), the fi rst and 
last parts, which are left out in the later version, are still analysed as part of the fragment.
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In terms of its subject matter, its time and the realm to which it belongs, 
it provides us with an opportunity to consider something which lies outside 
philosophy (at 31–2). In Plato and Aristotle, on and onta become conceptual 
terms, from which the terms ontic and ontological are derived (at 32). The 
word on however has a double function: it refers both to the ‘to be’ of a 
being and to a ‘being’ which is (at 32). The ontico–ontological difference, or 
the distinction between ‘to be’ and ‘a being’ lies concealed in on, Heidegger 
notes (at 32). The words on and onta are presumably truncated forms of the 
original words eon and eonta which are used inter alia by Parmenides and 
Heraclitus (at 32–3). The ‘e’ which relates on and onta to estin and einai are 
thus only to be found in these original words (at 32). The word eon (usually 
translated as ‘being’) is not only the singular form of eonta (usually translated 
as ‘beings’) but refers to Being or as Heidegger expresses it, to ‘what is singular 
as such, what is singular in its numerical unity and what is singularly and 
unifyingly one before all number’ (at 33).
The word eonta is explored further by Heidegger with reference to a passage 
in Homer’s Iliad where the seer Kalchas is called on to explain the reasons 
for the plague sent by Apollo to the Greek camp. It reads as follows:
And among them stood up
Kalchas, Thestor’s son, far the best of the bird interpreters,
who knew all that is, is to be, or once was [ta t’ eonta, ta t’ essomena, 
pro t’ eonta]
who guided into the land of Ilion the ships of the Achaeans
through that seercraft of his own that Phoibos Apollo gave him.
(at 33)
What appears from this passage is fi rst that a distinction is drawn between 
ta t’ eonta (that which is in being), ta t’ essomena (that which will be) and 
pro t’ eonta (the being that once was) (at 34). The ta eonta thus refers to 
being in the sense of the present. The ‘present’ (gegenwärtig) is however not 
here to be understood in the modern sense of a ‘now’ as a moment in time, 
or in the sense of an object which is ‘present’ to a subject. ‘Present’ must be 
understood in terms of the essence of eonta, and not vice versa. Of import-
ance in this respect is that the word eonta refers also to the past and the 
future, namely to beings that are not presently present. This is borne out by the 
reference the Greeks made to that which is presently present as ta pareonta, 
meaning ‘alongside’, in the sense of coming alongside into unconcealment. 
That which is present (gegenwärtig) is therefore not to be understood in the 
sense of gegen (a subject vis-à-vis an object) but rather in the sense of Gegend, 
that is ‘an open expanse ... of unconcealment, into which and within which 
whatever comes along lingers’ (at 34). That which is presently present (ta 
eonta) cannot therefore be understood in isolation from what is absent. As 
Heidegger puts it, ‘[e]ven what is absent is something present, for as absent 
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from the expanse, it presents itself in unconcealment’ (at 35). What is presently 
present is also only such in its lingering awhile – that is, in its arriving 
in-between a double absence. This of course differs from the metaphysical 
understanding of Being which excludes any absence from Being (de Boer 
1997: 155). The experience of the seer Kalchas, as Heidegger points out, 
consists in a gathering of all things present and absent (at 35– 6). He in other 
words has an understanding of Being as presencing rather than as constant 
presence – that is, the metaphysical understanding.
Being, as the presencing of what is present, Heidegger contends, must be 
understood as already truth in itself  (at 37). Truth must not however here 
be understood in the metaphysical sense as a property of beings or of Being. 
Truth in other words does not refer to a characteristic of divine or human 
cognition or a property in the sense of a quality. Instead, truth must in light 
of the above be understood as the gathering that clears and shelters. Heidegger 
spells out the following implications of this understanding of Being for that 
which presences:
What is presently present in unconcealment lingers in unconcealment as 
in an open expanse. Whatever lingers (or whiles) in the expanse proceeds to 
it from unconcealment and arrives in unconcealment. But what is present 
is arriving or lingering insofar as it is also already departing from uncon-
cealment toward concealment. What is presently present lingers awhile. 
It endures in approach and withdrawal. Lingering is the transition from 
coming to going: what is present is what in each case lingers. Lingering in 
transition, it lingers still in approach and lingers already in departure.
(at 37)
The (excluded) section directly preceding the fragment should therefore be 
understood not as expressing simply the passing away or inevitable destruc-
tion of things as appears at fi rst sight, but rather as giving expression to their 
transitional structure (de Boer 2000: 178). Underlying and pervading the 
lingering of things in presence is their arising out of and returning to absence or 
unconcealment and is again to be compared with the metaphysical approach 
of excluding from what is present all absence (Heidegger 1984a: 37; de Boer 
2000: 178). This clearly assists with an understanding of Being itself, namely as 
a presence which is thoroughly pervaded by absence (Heidegger 1984a: 37; 
de Boer 2000: 178). We could also say that Being must be understood as 
presencing embedded in a twofold absence (Heidegger 1984a: 41). This amounts 
to a jointure (Fuge) between presencing and its twofold absence (Heidegger 
1984a: 41; 2003: 327). In the words of Heidegger: ‘What is present emerges 
by approaching and passes away by departing; it does both at the same time, 
indeed because it lingers’ (at 41–2). This analysis also informs Heidegger’s 
translation of dikB: not as justice as is usually the case, but as joint or juncture 
(Fug or Fuge) or as another name for Being (Heidegger 2000: 177, 179).
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Heidegger continues his analysis by pointing out that also in Homer, ta 
eonta does not refer exclusively to the things in nature or to objects of human 
representation (at 38). This of course ties in with his (Heidegger’s) reading 
of the reference to ‘beings’ in the Anaximander fragment as referring not 
only to the things in nature. Homer applies the term eonta inter alia to ‘the 
Achaean’s encampment before Troy, the god’s wrath, the plague’s fury, funeral 
pyres, [and] the perplexity of the leaders’. Man too belongs to eonta, Heidegger 
points out: ‘[H]e is that present being which, illuminating, apprehending, and 
thus gathering, lets what is present as such become present in unconcealment’ 
(at 38). After this analysis of that which lies ‘outside’ and which at the same 
time serves as the source of the fragment, Heidegger returns to the fragment 
itself  by commenting on its second clause. The word auta, he points out, 
refers back to what was named in the fi rst clause: ta onta, which as we saw, 
refers to everything presently and un-presently present in unconcealment (at 
40). The word auta likewise refers to everything that presences by lingering 
awhile: ‘gods and men, temples and cities, sea and land, eagle and snake, tree 
and shrub, wind and light, stone and sand, day and night’ (at 40).
Dike and adikia
The question Heidegger poses next is what at bottom runs through whatever is 
present, or stated differently, what is the basic trait of what is present (at 41)? 
The answer: adikia. For the reasons stated above, Heidegger however wants to 
depart from the traditional translation of this word as ‘injustice’. He then asks 
three questions which necessarily take us back to the question of technology 
addressed earlier, as well as the ontological (which is at the same time an 
‘ethical’) question of respecting others as others:
How is what lingers awhile in presence unjust? What is unjust about it? 
Is it not the right of whatever is present that in each case it linger awhile, 
endure and so fulfi l its presencing?
(at 41)
In seeking an answer to these questions, Heidegger notes that the word a-dikia 
suggests that dike is absent (at 41). Dike is often translated as ‘right’ and even 
as ‘penalty’. Heidegger however contends that to really understand what 
comes to language in the fragment we must resist our moral–juridical notions. 
The fragment can then be heard to say that wherever adikia rules, all is not 
right with things – that is, something is out of joint. This raises the question 
whether the traditional translations of dike fi t here. Heidegger points out 
that the fragment does not say that what is present is only occasionally out 
of joint. It says that what is present as such is out of joint. What presences 
can however only possibly be out of joint, Heidegger contends, if  presencing 
at the same time consists of  jointure. The joining or jointure that is at 
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stake here relates to the discussion above of ‘whiling’. As we saw, whiling is 
necessarily related to a twofold absence: approaching and withdrawal. It 
is in this ‘between’ where the jointure is to be found. Heidegger phrases this 
as follows:
In both directions presencing is conjointly disposed toward absence. 
Presencing comes about in such a jointure. What is present emerges by 
approaching and passes away by departing; it does both at the same time, 
indeed because it lingers. The ‘while’ occurs essentially in the jointure.
(at 41–2)
How are we to understand the fragment when it says that adikia, understood 
now as disjointure, is the fundamental trait of eonta? Heidegger understands 
adikia here as the attempt of what is present to endure, or to insist upon its 
while (at 42, 43). This seems to tie in directly with his analysis of modern 
technology as briefl y set out above, as well as with the ethico-ontological 
question of the respect to be accorded to others as others. As we saw, 
Heidegger contends that modern technology’s ‘essence’ lies in subjectivism 
or the self-assertion of man as an attempt to ensure security and certainty 
(Heidegger 1993b: 244). Man in other words abandons his relation to Being in 
Platonism, and even more so in modernity, the age which is most characterised 
by adikia (Scott 1994: 140). Heidegger (1984a: 42) however points out that 
the fragment does not only say that what is present consists in disjunction. 
It says this and something else. In spite of the attempt of man to maintain 
himself  in disjuncture, he still remains in a relation with Being (‘whatever 
lingers awhile ... gives jointure’ (at 43)).
This brings us to the translation of the word didonai. Heidegger seeks to 
relate didonai in the fragment to diken and reads it as saying that ‘whatever 
lingers awhile with a view to disjunction didonai diken, gives jointure’. 
Heidegger then asks what ‘give’ means here. He continues as follows:
How should whatever lingers awhile, whatever comes to presence in 
disjunction, be able to give jointure? Can it give what it doesn’t have? If  
it gives anything at all, doesn’t it give jointure away? Where and how 
does that which is present for the time being give jointure?
(at 43)
In other words, how can man, for example, who insists on sheer continuation 
and who is thus characterised by disjointure (adikia), give jointure (dike)? 
According to Heidegger, ‘giving’ here must be understood in terms of the 
(essence of the) manner of presencing (at 43). Giving in this context does not 
entail giving away, but more primordially, as acceding or giving-to (Zugeben), 
giving what properly belongs to another (at 43; Heidegger 2003: 329). As we 
saw above, what belongs to that which is present is the jointure of its while. 
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In the jointure, whatever lingers keeps to its while. It does not insist upon 
sheer persistence. Jointure therefore belongs to whatever lingers awhile, which 
in turn belongs in the jointure. Heidegger at this point equates jointure with 
order. Dike is thus to be understood as enjoining order. Adikia, on the other 
hand, is disjunction or disorder. Whatever comes to presence does not therefore 
simply fall into disjunction (and insist on its while at the expense of others), 
but instead surmounts disorder (at 44). The word didonai is consequently to 
be understood as designating this ‘letting belong to’ (at 44). This amounts 
also to an acceptance by that which comes to presence that it belongs to the 
non-present, in other words, to death (Arendt 1977: II 193), which as we 
learn from Being and Time, belongs to man as his ownmost possibility, ‘the 
possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein’ (Heidegger 1962: 294).12
The next question Heidegger considers is to whom didonai diken or the 
giving of order is directed (at 44). On his reading, present beings only become 
present when they let enjoining order belong allelois, namely to one another 
(at 44 –5). The word allelois in the fragment, according to Heidegger, is not 
related to diken and to tisin as the translation of Diels has it, but only to 
tisin. The latter word, Heidegger points out, is usually translated as penalty. 
This translation is not wrong, but this is not the original and essential 
signifi cance of the word (at 45). Heidegger instead relates tisin/tisis to esteem 
and to heed, to taking care of something. This stands in contrast with what 
was said above regarding adikia. In seeking to persist, as we saw, that which 
lingers awhile does not pay attention to the others that linger, to the order 
of the while (at 45– 6).13 They instead strike ‘a haughty pose toward every 
other of its kind. None heeds the lingering presence of the other’ (at 45– 6).14 
In order to bring tisis in line with its more original meaning as well as in 
relating it to what was said above regarding adikia, Heidegger translates tisis as 
Ruch or reck (care), which consists in letting something remain in its essence 
or as itself.15 This part of the fragment can therefore be understood as saying 
12 See also Heidegger (1984a: 101).
13 See also Ben-Dor (2007: 148 –9); Staikou (2008: 278).
14 Wolf (1950: 231–3) gives a detailed analysis of adikia in this respect. According to Wolf the 
(human) beings who act in this way should necessarily bear the consequences of their 
actions; see also Wolf (1972: 140 –59) (‘Maβ und Gerechtigkeit bei Solon’). The privilege 
accorded in this reading to a close-knit community (see 230 –1), in attempting to translate 
Heidegger’s thinking of Being into Being-with-others-in-law, is noteworthy; see further Mink-
kinen (1999: 75– 82) for an excellent analysis of Wolf’s fundamental ontology of law.
15 Oppermann (2003: 45– 69) reads the fragment as entailing a view of justice as a rhythmic 
process where tisis (understood as care) complements justice/law as restitution. This is no 
doubt a commendable proposal in principle. Unfortunately little account is taken in this 
article of Heidegger’s questioning of the metaphysical tradition by enquiring into Being and 
the ontological difference between Being and beings – apparent inter alia in the equation 
of Being in Heidegger’s thinking with ‘what is’ in the article (at 59). A conception of justice 
is thus developed which would clearly be metaphysical on Heidegger’s terms.
178 Jacques Derrida: law as absolute hospitality
that beings which linger awhile let order (Fug) belong, didonai diken, in so far 
as they do not disperse themselves by arrogantly persisting and not leaving 
room for each other among what is present (at 47).16 Beings in other words 
give order by allowing reck to pervade their relation with others, didonai ... 
kai tisin allelois (at 47). We must therefore understand allelois in close relation 
with tisis and within the context of the manifold of what lingers awhile (ta 
eonta) in the open expanse of unconcealment and not simply as indeterminate 
reciprocity in a chaotic manifold, as the translations of the fragment usually 
have it. The word kai between diken and tisin is consequently also not simply 
to be understood in its usual sense as ‘and’, but as describing the manner in 
which beings grant order: by giving reck to one another (at 47).
The word adikia is according to Heidegger in light of the above to be 
understood as referring to the disorder of the reckless. Beings in other words 
let order belong, and thereby also reck to one another, in the surmounting 
of disorder (adikia) (at 47). The questions Heidegger seeks to answer then 
are to whom the order of jointure belongs and what brings about this order 
(at 48 –9). This is essentially about the relation between the fi rst and the 
second clauses and about establishing which clause is the determining clause.17 
To answer these questions, Heidegger shifts his attention to the word gar (‘for 
they make reparation’), translated as ‘for’ or ‘namely’. This word serves as a 
reference back to the fi rst clause, Heidegger points out. The second clause, 
one could say in light of the discussion above, comments on the manner of 
the presencing of what is present (at 48). It in other words speaks of the 
release of whatever is present into reckless disorder as well as the way in 
which ‘present beings surmount disorder by letting order and reck belong to 
one another’ (at 48). The only remaining words of the fi rst clause, kata to 
chreon, usually translated as ‘according to necessity’, must therefore speak 
of presencing itself, that is to say of the Being of beings, as well as the extent 
to which presencing determines what is present as such. Only in this way can 
the second clause, by commenting on the manner of presencing of the present 
(that is, beings), refer back to the fi rst clause by means of gar. The question 
this raises is whether presencing (Being) is to be understood in terms of what 
is present (beings), or the other way around. Which clause, in other words, 
dominates? The word kata, usually translated as ‘according to’, here means, 
Heidegger contends, ‘from up there’ or ‘from over there’. The word thus 
‘refers back to something from which something lower comes to presence, 
as from something higher and its consequent’ (at 49). Beings should clearly 
16 See also Wolf (1950: 231).
17 Richardson (2003: 517) understands Heidegger as saying that the focus of the fi rst clause 
of the fragment is on Being, and that of the second on beings, whereas ‘the theme of both 
is identical: the process by which beings come-to-presence in non-concealment’. The relation 
between the two clauses in turn refl ects the ontological difference.
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be understood in terms of Being. As Heidegger points out, that which is 
present can only become present as such in consequence of presencing. Chreon 
is therefore that which ‘enjoins matters in such a way that whatever is present 
lets order and reck belong’ (at 49).
Heidegger next proceeds to consider the meaning of to chreon. As already 
indicated, ever since Being becomes the idea in Plato, a distinction is no 
longer drawn between presencing and what is present. Presencing itself  
becomes something present and is now understood as the most universal or 
the highest of present beings, in this way also becoming a being among other 
beings (at 50). The essence of presencing, and thus also the distinction 
between presencing (Being) and what is present (beings), in this way remains 
forgotten. According to Heidegger this forgetting of the ontological difference 
is not a result of some inadequacy in thinking. It instead belongs to the self-
veiling essence or the destiny of Being, since Being keeps to itself. Because 
of this, the ontological difference collapses and remains forgotten. In this 
forgetting of Being the history of the Western world, that is metaphysics, 
comes to the fore (at 51). That which ‘is’, or is regarded to exist, stands in 
the shadow of the oblivion of Being. The importance of the early Greek 
thinkers, as indicated above, lies in the fact that they precede this history. 
Even though these thinkers did not think the ontological difference as such, 
its trace can still be detected in their language. The word chreon, Heidegger 
points out, originally has nothing to do with necessity or what must be, as 
one fi nds in traditional translations. It derives from chrao, chraomai and 
alludes to the hand (he cheir); it suggests getting involved with something, 
reaching for it, extending one’s hand to it. The word chrao also bears the 
connotation of placing something in someone’s hands or of handing over, 
delivering, or letting something belong to someone (at 51–2). This delivery 
nonetheless keeps the transfer in hand as well as that which is transferred. 
To chreon must consequently be understood as ‘the handing over of presence 
which presencing delivers to what is present, and which thus keeps in hand, 
i.e. preserves in presencing, what is present as such’ (at 52).
Heidegger thus translates to chreon as der Brauch, which Krell renders as 
‘usage’ (at 52). Usage as a translation of to chreon is not to be understood 
here in the usual and ‘modern’ sense of ‘utilizing and benefi ting from what 
we have a right to use’ (at 52). It should be understood in the sense of to 
brook [bruchen], Latin frui, German fruchten, Frucht, Heidegger contends. 
The originary sense of ‘usage’, as Heidegger points out, is to enjoy and to be 
pleased with something. Only in its derived sense does it refer to consuming 
or gobbling up (at 53). ‘Along the lines of usage’ is thus to be thought as 
letting something present come to presence as such or in light of the above, 
as ‘to hand something over to its own essence and to keep it in hand, pre-
serving it as something present’ (at 53). Enjoyment is therefore not to be 
identifi ed with some form of human behaviour, and thus with some being, 
not even of the highest being. It rather refers to ‘the manner in which Being 
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itself  presences as the relation to what is present, approaching and becoming 
involved with what is present as present: to chreon’ (at 53).18 Heidegger 
summarises as follows this understanding of to chreon and its relation to tisis 
and dike:
As dispenser of the portions of the jointure [of what is present in the 
transition between twofold absence (arrival and departure)], usage is 
the fateful joining: the enjoining of order and thereby of reck. Usage 
distributes order and reck in such manner that it reserves for itself  what 
is meted out, gathers it to itself, and secures it as what is present in 
presencing.
(at 54)
The enjoining of order necessarily involves the limitation of what is present 
and thus also the imposition of boundaries (at 54). This brings us to the 
question of the apeiron, the boundless, limitless, infi nite or indefi nite in 
the thinking of Anaximander as the origin of everything that is present.19 
The apeiron is mentioned by Simplicius in the fi rst part of his exposition of 
Anaximander’s thinking quoted above. To chreon is at the same time apeiron, 
Heidegger contends (at 54). As we saw earlier, accompanying the process of 
presencing as jointure, there is the constant danger of disjointure. Usage (to 
chreon), in so far as it is also the boundless, is responsible for ‘sending the 
boundary of the while to that which presences awhile’ (Heidegger 2002b: 277; 
1984a: 54). Being (to chreon) can thus be said to presence ‘without bounds, 
not joined by order and reck’ (at 54).20
Heidegger’s translation of the fragment fi nally reads as follows: ‘entlang 
dem Brauch; gehören nämlich lassen sie Fug somit auch Ruch eines dem Anderen 
[im Verwinden] des Un-Fugs’ (Heidegger 2003: 342). Krell translates this as 
follows in English: ‘along the lines of usage [or ‘letting something present 
come to presence as such’ (at 53)]; for they let order [dike] and thereby reck 
[care] belong to one another (in the surmounting) of disorder’ (at 57).21 
18 This translation can also be understood in light of the relation between Being and man 
which Heidegger spells out elsewhere. Being is ‘needful’ of an abode, which is only to be 
found in man. Being itself  is need (das Brauchen) and man, as we saw above, is in need of 
Being (Heidegger 1991: IV 244, 248).
19 Much more attention is given to the apeiron in Heidegger’s earlier reading of the fragment; 
see Heidegger (1993a: 94 –101).
20 See further Heidegger (1993a: 95): ‘To apeiron is the arche of  being’ [ist die arche des Seins]’. 
Heidegger reads the arche here as ‘enjoinment’ and apeiron as repelling or hindrance 
(Verwehrung). To apeiron consequently entails the repelling of limit, where limit means 
‘the closing off  of presencing into a fi nal presence, into the permanence of a mere presence’ 
(at 98).
21 Diels and Kranz (1951: 487– 8), responding to Heidegger’s translation, declare in this respect that 
in the language of the sixth century BC the concepts dike, adikia, diken, didonai and tisis, already 
belonged to the specifi c sphere of the law and that to chreon can never mean ‘der Brauch’.
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Heidegger’s acknowledgement that this translation cannot be proved scien-
tifi cally and that it is not based on a philological and historical analysis, is of 
course no reason for derision, but is based on the realisation that the whole 
notion of ‘proof’ is a product of metaphysics which poses man as subject (as 
against an object), as the ultimate measure of things (Heidegger 1991: IV 238). 
Heidegger’s refl ection on the Anaximander fragment does not stop with the 
translation, but is ultimately an attempt to think through the crisis of the 
modern age. This crisis, Heidegger notes towards the end of his analysis, can-
not be understood by applying the modes of thought of the current age:
Curiously enough, the saying fi rst resonates when we set aside the claims 
of our familiar ways of representing things, as we ask ourselves in what 
the confusion of the contemporary world’s fate consists.
Man has already begun to overwhelm the entire earth and its atmosphere, 
to arrogate to himself in forms of energy the concealed powers of nature, 
and to submit future history to the planning and ordering of a world 
government. This same defi ant man is utterly at a loss simply to say what 




The differences in the respective readings of the fragment offered by Heidegger 
and Derrida are, to put it simply, determined by the different ways in which they 
view death, with consequences for the way in which they view technology.22 
For Heidegger, as we saw in the above analysis, death should be recognised 
as an essential part of life23 and as the ownmost possibility of Dasein 
(Heidegger 1962: 294; 1984a: 101), with consequences for its mode of being, 
for example in creating technology as well as in relation to the concepts it 
employs. Viewing death as a possibility of Dasein is according to Derrida 
22 Derrida also explores briefl y certain aspects of Heidegger’s Der Spruch elsewhere, e.g. in 
Psy II 49 (‘Heidegger’s Hand’), where he refers to to chreon which as we saw Heidegger 
wishes to understand as ‘keeping in hand’. In brief, Derrida analyses the opposition Heidegger 
institutes between the hand and technics, and points the way towards a thinking of the hand 
which would relate it more closely to the gift without exchange; see Chapter 5. Of further 
importance in this regard (alluded to by Derrida in ‘Heidegger’s hand’) is the opposition 
Heidegger generally posits between man and the animal, which necessarily has implications 
for determining the potential receivers of the gift. In SQ 84 –5, and Rel 60, he refers briefl y to 
the distinction Heidegger (1984a: 57) draws between faith and thinking. See also MP 64 –7; 
and Geschl IV 195.
23 See Heidegger (2000: 139), as quoted in Chapter 1.
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tied too closely to a capability, ability, power, and potentiality and therefore 
to presence (Ap 74 –5; PC 356).24 For Derrida, neither Dasein nor any other 
being has a relation with death as such, which means that death cannot be 
‘possible’ for, or ‘proper’ to Dasein or to other beings (Ap 76; Dem 50 –1, 65).25 
Coming to the relation between death and technology, Heidegger, as we saw 
above, views technology as an expression of the will to power. Being itself  
or physis according to Heidegger, precedes and cannot as yet be associated 
with tekhne (ET 133). In Derrida’s thinking, as is shown for example in his 
analysis of speech and writing, and the development of the notion of arche-
writing, there is of course no space for such originary purity (Chapters 1 and 2). 
Furthermore, and tying in with the above, as Derrida has pointed out else-
where (ET 39, 58, 79– 80), technology evokes the spectre of our own death.26 
Technology in other words dislocates, expropriates, delocalises, deracinates, 
dis-idiomatises, de-territorialises and dispossesses (Rel 45). This is something 
we both desire and are repulsed by. Technology consequently, simultaneously 
and violently, summonses the desire for the home, the family, the nation; 
territory, native soil and blood; language, culture and humanity (ET 115, Rel 
45– 6, 56 – 8). In announcing our own death, technology thus gives rise to a 
(metaphysical) desire for rootedness, for presence, to some extent also in the 
thinking of Heidegger.
To understand Derrida’s reading of the fragment and the concerns he raises 
about Heidegger’s reading, it is important to understand the broader ‘theme’ 
of Specters of Marx, which, as we will see, ties in very closely with the 
analysis above of death and of course with the notion of différance. As 
Roudinesco remarks in an interview with Derrida, ‘I am convinced that 
Specters of Marx is a profoundly Freudian book’ (FWT 175).27 This indeed 
seems to be the case. Apart from the obvious, that is the frequent invocation 
of Freud’s name, of the work of mourning, of Oedipus, of ghosts, of the 
uncanny, and of fetishism, other comments which illustrate the Freudian 
connection, and more specifi cally the Freudian death drive and repetition 
compulsion at the heart of Specters,28 include the mention of ‘a beyond the 
economy of repression’ (at 26), the ‘most ancient ancientness’ (at 87), the 
24 See further Chapter 1.
25 A reading of Heidegger to the same effect is of course not excluded; see Ap 77.
26 Critchley (1999a: 172– 6) comes close to such a reading of Specters by way of Stiegler, but 
his (i.e. Critchley’s) understanding of the notion of an ‘originary technicity’, although 
insightful (and even though to be found in SM 115), risks simply overturning the hierarchical 
opposition between the proper and the technological.
27 See also FWT 78 – 80 and ‘M&S’ 259 where Derrida comments that in Specters he attempts 
to analyse ‘the paradoxical symptoms of a geopolitical mourning ... [and] to articulate them 
with a new logic of the relations between the unconscious and politics’.
28 This is specifi cally discussed in SM 217–18 (with a reference in fn. 39 to PC; see also ‘M&S’ 
224). See further PC 268 –9, where a connection is already made between Marx and phantoms 
in the consideration of Freud’s death drive.
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fear of oneself  (at 143), ‘the death and expropriation at the heart of the 
living’ (at 164), being possessed by the spectre (at 165), being haunted by 
oneself  (at 164) (the comment that) ‘life does not go without death, and that 
death is not beyond, outside of life’ (at 176 –7), the auto-immunity of the 
living ego (at 177),29 the occupation of man by what is most strange, distant, 
threatening (at 181), and the ghost being there ‘before its fi rst apparition’ (at 
204). Marx, Derrida notes in the same vein, was someone haunted, persecuted, 
harassed and obsessed more than others by and with ghosts (at 126, 132).30 
He not only loved, but detested ghosts (at 141). It was as if Marx and Marxism 
in general, Derrida comments, were frightened by someone within themselves 
(at 130 –2). He and others therefore attempted to ontologise this ghost/
spectre of communism, attempted to make it a present, living reality, in the 
form of the Communist Party (at 114, 126 –30).31 At stake in this haunting 
is a terrifying messianic promise, appeal, injunction, urgent demand of justice 
and permanent revolution (at 36 – 40). In Ghostly Demarcations, Derrida like-
wise refers to this messianic experience as an ‘apprehension’ as it involves an 
‘exposure without horizon, and therefore an irreducible amalgam of desire 
and anguish, affi rmation and fear, promise and threat’ (‘M&S’ 248 –9). Because 
of its frightening message, the self, when confronted by this ghost or spectre, 
which Marx conjured for us and which cannot now but haunt us, is fi lled 
with anxiety and repulsed thereby, attempting to conjure it away, restrict and 
appropriate it (SM 132–3). Derrida, likewise haunted, seeks not to exorcise, 
but instead to affi rm the spectre, to retain and welcome it as spectre (at 220). 
This is for the sake of the future, for which, as Derrida notes, we need 
Marx:
no future without Marx, without the memory and the inheritance of 
Marx: in any case of a certain Marx, of his genius, of at least one of 
his spirits.
(at 14)
The fragment as giving expression to différance
Derrida understands and commends Heidegger’s Der Spruch as an attempt 
to read the Anaximander fragment and to think justice in a way which 
goes beyond juridical–moral considerations. This is specifi cally clear from 
Heidegger’s translation of dike as jointure and of adikia as disjointure, rather 
than injustice (TS 7). Derrida’s question is however whether Heidegger in 
29 See further Rel 51; OS 96 –113; and TOH 33– 4.
30 See also ET 25.
31 See also ET 127– 8; and de Boer (2002: 25– 6). Derrida SM 9 ascribes this attempt at 
ontologising to the work of mourning; see further Chapter 5.
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fact fully succeeds in moving away from such considerations, in light of the 
privilege he accords here, as he also does elsewhere, to the gathering or joining 
of Being, rather than its disjoining or dissemination (SM 34).32 With reference 
specifi cally to Heidegger’s analysis of didonai diken (the giving of jointure) 
in Der Spruch, and tying in closely with our discussion in Chapter 5, Derrida 
raises the question whether Heidegger does not skew the asymmetry between 
the gift and what is given (‘the accorded favour’), in favour of the given (at 
32). This seems to happen in spite of the fact that Heidegger himself  posits 
‘what is given’ as the accorded favour, in this case ‘of the accord that gathers 
or collects while harmonizing’ (at 32). Derrida is in other words suggesting 
that through Heidegger’s privileging of dike rather than that which gives dike, 
Heidegger risks again inscribing the gift and thereby justice within a system 
of exchange.33 This happens despite the fact that Heidegger realises that one 
should think justice in terms of the gift, that is to say as beyond right, calculation 
and commerce (at 30 –2). This move likewise carries the risk of re-inscribing 
‘this whole movement of justice under the sign of presence’ (at 32). This is 
not to deny the profundity of the shift to be found in Heidegger, specifi cally 
in his reading of didonai diken in the fragment. As Heidegger notes, this is 
an attempt to think dike on ‘the basis of Being as presencing’ (aus dem Sein 
als Anwesen gedacht) and as ‘the ordering and enjoining Order’ (der fugend-
fügende Fug) (Heidegger 1984a: 43; 2003: 329). Although this presence is thus 
a received or unveiled presence (rather than a constant presence), Derrida 
notes that it remains appropriable and gathered together (SM 32).
A further diffi culty in Heidegger’s reading lies in his invocation, here as 
well as elsewhere, of more ‘original meanings’. This invocation is based on the 
assumption that there is some fi xed sense, object or referent anterior (some 
being or Being itself ) and exterior to ‘the word’ or to language understood 
as representation (in other words, technology) and is according to Derrida 
provoked by a (or rather the metaphysical) desire for presence (Psy I 102). 
Derrida contends, as we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, that meaning (and this 
would include the meaning of Being) is always derived, the consequence of 
an economy of différance, and thus not originary in nature. This of course 
does not make Heidegger’s reading ‘wrong’, but it does show the diffi culty 
of escaping from metaphysics and calls for a reading of the fragment which 
exceeds the focus on Being. Derrida therefore asks whether it is not rather 
in the Un-Fug, disjointure or dislocation of Being (and of time), in other 
words, in adikia, that ‘justice as relation to the other (la justice comme rapport 
32 See also ‘VR’ 14; FWT 80 –1.
33 See also Bischof (2004: 211) who reads Heidegger’s analysis of Dike in terms of harmony 
as implying that the other should be given only that which already belongs to him, although 
he does not have it as yet. Justice with Heidegger thus remains of an economic, distributive 
nature, marked by restoration.
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à l’autre)’ is possible (SM 32). This passage should again not be understood 
as if  Derrida is simply adopting Levinas’s view on the other, as Critchley 
(1999: 151, 157– 8) for example contends. Such a ‘Levinasian’ reading would 
seem to be supported by the English translation of a subsequent passage. In 
the passage concerned, Derrida (formalising, as he notes, in the extreme and 
too quickly what is at stake here) points to the relation between deconstruc-
tion and disjointure from which it (deconstruction) draws its inspiration and 
injunction:
to what must (without debt and without duty) be rendered to the singularity 
of the other, to his or her absolute precedence or to his or her absolute 
previousness [à sa précedénte ou à sa prévenance34 absolues], to the hetero-
geneity of a pre-, which, to be sure, means what comes before me, before any 
present, thus before any past present, but also what, for that very reason, 
comes from the future or as future: as the very coming of the event.
(SM 33)
The possessive adjective ‘sa’ (with the English equivalents, ‘his, her, its’) is 
here twice translated as ‘his or her’. The (unfortunate) impression created is 
that Derrida is speaking here of ‘the other’ in the sense of a masculine or 
feminine human being, which is not however borne out by the rest of the 
passage. At stake here, as the context makes clear, is not in the fi rst place the 
other as a human being, but the other as the other of Being, as the gift of 
Being, as the revolutionary messianic event (SM 211–2). Only this disjointure 
in Being, and not its gathering, as Heidegger would contend, opens up the 
ability ‘to do justice or to render justice to the other as other ( faire justice ou 
rendre justice à l’autre comme autre)’ (SM 32).35
To say that Heidegger privileges gathering of course does not mean that he 
disregards disjointure completely. Heidegger’s text, due to its heterogeneity, 
necessarily stands open to a different reading and in the fi rst part of his short 
commentary, Derrida emphasises specifi cally those sections of the text where 
Heidegger notes, but does not thematise, the splitting, division or dissension 
in Being.36 One could say that Derrida’s reading of the fragment entails a 
34 A footnote of the translator (n. 28) here explains that the word prévenance ‘ordinarily has 
the same sense of thoughtfulness, consideration, kindness’, but that it is here ‘being taken 
also in its etymological sense of “coming before”’.
35 See also ‘VR’ 14; R 150. The same applies to SM 81–2 where the democracy to come and 
absolute hospitality are invoked with reference to the call ‘for the infi nite respect of the 
singularity and infi nite alterity of the other’; see further Chapter 6 on singularity.
36 See also Geschl I; and see further Psy I 114 –5 on the words Anwesen (being or becoming 
present, or presencing) and Anwesenheit (presence) in Heidegger (1977: 115–54). In Derrida’s 
close reading, Anwesenheit in Heidegger’s texts ‘is not simple, it is already divided and 
differing, it marks the place of a splitting, a division, a dissension [Zwiespalt]. Engaged in the 
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different way of ‘listening’ than Heidegger’s.37 This ‘notion’ of a division or 
split in Being can easily be misunderstood. First, this dislocation in Being 
(the Un-Fug) does not for Derrida have the negative connotation that 
Heidegger accords to it (resisting in the while). This appears clearly from 
Derrida’s ‘Retrait of metaphor’. For Heidegger the withdrawal or the self-
concealing revealing of Being in metaphysics entails that Being gets spoken 
of as if  it is a being. As we saw above, Heidegger sees this withdrawal 
‘negatively’, as a ‘fall’ or ‘errancy’. For Derrida however this ‘withdrawal’ is 
instead what gives rise to metaphysics. He in other words reads Heidegger as 
exposing a ‘structure’ that precedes the ontological difference. This ‘structure’ 
(which is of course not to be understood in the metaphysical sense) of a split 
in Being, involves a differantial relation between the withdrawal of  Being, 
which can also be referred to as the erasure of the trace, on the one hand, 
and the relation between Being and beings (the ontological difference) on the 
other. The Un-Fug in Der Spruch, in Derrida’s reading thus becomes what 
requires affi rmation as the condition of possibility of the joining (Fug).38 
Second, and as already noted earlier, to speak of the split in Being or of the 
‘other’ of Being, does not amount simply to a falling back onto beings, and 
more specifi cally on the human being as ‘other’.39
Dike and adikia
Heidegger, as we saw, translates dike as Fug, as joining, as articulation of 
accord or harmony and adikia as what is disjointed, twisted and out of line, 
in the wrong, or in error. In his commentary, Derrida points out that the 
phrase mit Fug und Recht, mostly translated as ‘within rights’, ‘rightfully’, or 
‘rightly’, stands opposed to what is ‘wrong’ (SM 27). The German equivalent 
for disjointure is the phrase aus den Fugen, aus den Fugen gehen. As we further 
opening up of this dissension, and above all by it, under its assignation, man is watched by what-is, 
Heidegger says, and such would be the essence of man “during the great Greek epoch.” Man 
thus seeks to gather in saying (legein) and to save, to keep (sozein, bewahren), while at the same 
time remaining exposed to the chaos of dissension.’ See also MP 65 where Derrida similarly 
speaks of making thought tremble by means of a Wesen preceding Anwesen (Being as 
presencing) in the context of the Anaximander fragment, as well as Geschl IV 206 –7 on the 
tension of a double movement in An-wesen. For commentary, see Marrati (2005: 94 –5).
37 See in this respect MP ix–xxix; and Geschl IV.
38 The dissension in Being which must be overcome is also addressed by Heidegger in a number 
of other texts. Especially illuminating is Heidegger (2000: 141–2) where he notes that in order 
to open itself  to unconcealment, Being has to gather itself, in other words it has to ‘have 
rank and maintain it’. He continues as follows: ‘Gathering is never just driving together and 
piling up. It maintains in a belonging-together and piling up. It maintains in a belonging-
together that which contends and strives in confrontation. It does not allow it to decay into 
mere dispersion and what is simply cast down.’
39 See Chapter 1.
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saw above, Heidegger evaluates the state of the world of his day in terms of 
the withdrawal of Being, which has led to subjectivism and fi nds expression 
in modern technology and other forms of calculation. A more authentic 
relation with Being is thus relied on by Heidegger to evaluate the present. 
Derrida’s evaluation of the ‘ten plagues’ of the new world order is also 
‘guided’, not however by Being, but by différance, which as we saw, takes on 
board (tele–technic) dislocation (adikia) as part of its ‘structure’, beyond the 
ontico–ontological difference. Understanding Derrida’s assessment of the state 
of the world (at 96 –117) poses a specifi c challenge. At fi rst sight Derrida is 
simply pointing here to the absurdity of Fukuyama’s claims that liberal–
democratic capitalism has achieved a global victory. By pointing to the ‘ten 
plagues’ (including new forms of unemployment; exclusion of certain citizens 
from political participation and the expulsion of others; the waging of eco-
nomic war; contradictions in the concept of the ‘free market’; the aggravation 
of foreign debt; the close link between the arms industry and trade with the 
economy of many countries; the spread of nuclear weapons; the waging of 
inter-ethnic wars; the growing power of drug cartels; and the problems faced 
by international law), Derrida shows that this ‘victory’ is instead fragile, 
threatened, and in some respects catastrophic (at 85).40 There however appears 
to be another dimension to this assessment as Derrida also sees something 
‘positive’ in these ‘plagues’. This can perhaps be understood as follows: Fuku-
yama’s claim is at the same time a philosophical (quasi-Hegelian) claim of 
the attainment of full (and just) presence by liberal–economic capitalism. In 
Kojèvian terms, what Fukuyama is claiming is that ‘the cancellation of the 
gap between desire and need suspends any excess, any disadjustment’ (at 90). 
The claim is therefore of an end in disadjustment, in the ‘out of joint’, pre-
fi guring an eternal ( just) present (at 90).41 In his analysis, Derrida seeks to 
show that liberal–economic capitalism is not contemporaneous with itself, 
that it has no closed identity, and that it is actually disjointed (at 94). This 
disjointedness appears also from the ten plagues, understood as a dislocation 
that is taking place in our time in traditional conceptuality, relating specifi cally 
to economic and social matters, in close connection with nation-state sover-
eignty. Like Marx (and Anaximander), we thus live in a time of disjunction 
which allows for a thinking of  justice, the gift and hospitality as always 
remaining to come (at 139– 40). As Derrida puts it:
[Marx] belongs to a time of disjunction, to that ‘time out of joint’ in 
which is inaugurated, laboriously, painfully, tragically, a new thinking of 
borders, a new experience of the house, the home, and the economy.
(at 219)
40 See also R 86.
41 See also R 86.
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There thus appears to be a close link between the two meanings of the ‘out-
of-joint’. As Derrida moreover indicates in the essay ‘The time is out of 
joint’, the French disjoncter means disjunction, but also délirer, ‘to become 
mad or deranged (‘TOJ’ 14 –15).42 Similarly, to be ‘hors de ses gonds’ – that is, 
to be off  one’s hinges – can be translated as ‘out of joint’. Hamlet, Derrida 
furthermore suggests here with reference to Nietzsche, saw some Thing beyond 
the ghost of his father; he saw too much, namely absolute disorder, monstrosity, 
a terrifying thing, what is beyond measure, absolute injustice, the Thing itself, 
death, which renders him silent (about this secret thing he saw) (‘TOJ’ 34 – 6). 
As in Chapter 4, madness is thus the background ‘theme’ in Specters, the 
‘madness’ of communism which needs to be affi rmed in view of the out of 
jointness of our time. In Derrida’s reading (SM 85), Fukuyama’s claims (and 
the media attention he received at the time) are exactly attempts at denying 
the injustices/out of jointness of liberal–economic capitalism and at ‘conjuring 
away one more time in a jubilatory and manic fashion’ Marx’s spectre, the 
spectre of communism, which, like democracy, remains to come:
[C]ommunism has always been and will remain spectral: it is always still 
to come and is distinguished, like democracy itself, from every living 
present understood as plenitude of a presence-to-itself, as totality of a 
presence effectively identical to itself. Capitalist societies can always heave 
a sigh of relief  and say to themselves: communism is fi nished since the 
collapse of the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century and not only is 
it fi nished, but it did not take place, it was only a ghost. They do no 
more than disavow the undeniable itself: a ghost never dies, it remains 
to come and to come-back.
(SM 123)43
Returning to Heidegger, Derrida in Specters in other words attempts to think the 
‘out-of-joint’ in a way which in some sense ‘precedes’ the originary sending 
of Being (Staikou 2008: 279). As Derrida puts it in ‘The time is out of joint’: 
deconstruction is about ‘dislocating, displacing, disarticulating, disjoining, 
putting “out of joint” the authority of the “is”’. The assurance that lies in 
the original gathering, sending and epochality of Being (Heidegger 1984a: 
18) is in other words placed in question by adikia.44 There would then no 
longer be any guarantee of destiny gathering itself  up, identifying itself, or 
determining itself  (Psy I 128). In relation to the inter-ethnic wars plaguing 
the world, Derrida specifi cally notes that ‘[a]ll national rootedness, for example, 
42 Heidegger EGT 35 likewise refers to the seer Kalchas as a madman because of what he 
sees.
43 See also ‘NM’ 23– 6.
44 See Psy I 104, 120 –2, 404 –5; and see further Marrati (2005: 93– 4).
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is rooted fi rst of all in the memory or the anxiety of a displaced – or dis-
placeable – population. It is not only time that is “out of joint,” but space 
in time, spacing’ (SM 103). This is a consequence of ‘tele–technic dis-location’ 
or what Derrida elsewhere refers to as ‘the techno-scientifi c and techno-
economic transformation of the global fi eld’ (FWT 97). The ‘ten plagues’, 
are thus viewed in terms of a ‘structure’ of disjointedness which is not only 
negative, but allows us to see the acceleration in what we referred to in 
Chapter 1 as the ‘implosion’ of traditional conceptuality. Measurelessness 
(the apeiron in the Anaximander fragment)45 in other words, ‘becomes the 
law’ (‘TOJ’ 34). In this way it allows us, for example, to think beyond the 
concepts of state and nation, towards what Derrida calls a ‘new International’, 
an attempt to think an alliance without party, state and private property (SM 
35, 105–7). From the structure of disjointedness or the ‘other of Being’ thus 
also comes an appeal or demand for justice beyond law, or a messianic 
promise (SM 110 –12). Heidegger’s Der Spruch however also stands open to 
such a reading. Derrida notes in this regard that Heidegger’s understanding of 
the present as je-weilig (lingering awhile) and of the word weilen (lingering), 
are related to the notion of transition or passage. The future, he points out 
in an attentive reading of  a passage to be cited in a moment, is however 
dominant in this transition. The transition comes from the future towards 
the past, from that which has not yet come, and which therefore remains to 
come. Heidegger (2003: 323) puts it as follows: ‘Das Weilen ist der Übergang 
aus Kunft zu Gang. Das Anwesende ist das Je-weilige’. Krell translates this 
passage as follows: ‘Lingering is the transition from coming to going: what 
is present is what in each case lingers’ (Heidegger 1984a: 37).46 This coming 
from the future causes a disjuncture in the present and therefore in time (SM 
28). Heidegger’s text thus opens the possibility of thinking about justice in 
terms of a disjuncture in time, as that which has not yet come, and which 
therefore remains to come.
Another question, also posed by Heidegger, and which ties in with a dif-
ferent thinking of justice, would be whether one could say that the fragment, 
in stating that adikia belongs to the eon of  the eonta, betrays a pessimism or 
nihilism in the Greek experience of Being (SM 29). Heidegger (1984a: 44) 
does not think so. He rather sees in this expression a ‘trace’ of the tragic 
which cannot be explained in aesthetic or psychological, and by implication 
also not in psychoanalytical fashion (SM 29; Heidegger 1984a: 44). This trace 
of the tragic according to Heidegger calls on us to think Being on the basis 
45 See also PC 398 on the relation between the apeiron and limitless pleasure; and Dis 160 on 
the relation between the limitless and dialectics. The apeiron is thus not read as another 
name for Being as in Heidegger (1993a: 94 – 6), but as that which gives Being.
46 Julian Young, in Heidegger (2002b: 263), translates the passage as follows: ‘The stay is the 
transition from coming to going. What is present is what, in each case, lingers awhile.’
190 Jacques Derrida: law as absolute hospitality
of didonai diken, the gift of jointure, or justice beyond right (SM 29). The 
question for Derrida is what this justice entails and how it is related to the 
reparation of injustice (SM 29). Does justice simply entail equivalence, 
the righting or compensation of a wrong, the restitution of something due, 
as has been the case throughout the history of law (SM 24 –5, 29)?47 Derrida 
asks whether justice does not rather entail giving beyond the due, the debt, 
the crime or the fault (SM 29). In answering this rhetorical question he points 
to Heidegger’s statement that the fragment does, and also does not speak of 
the disjointedness of the present time to itself  (SM 29). On the one hand, 
Heidegger states that the fragment unequivocally says that the present is 
adikia, out of joint. This is a reference to the transitory passage which the 
present ‘is’, by being related to or joined to its coming and going. Presence, as 
we also saw above, is enjoined in this way – a matter therefore of injunction. 
The fragment on the other hand also refers to didonai diken. As Heidegger 
(1984a: 42) points out, this is not to be translated as justice in the sense of 
vengeance, that is to say as payment, recompense or penalty. Heidegger, as 
we saw, refers to ‘giving’ here in order to link adikia, which he interprets as 
disjointure, with diken, which he wants to read as jointure or order. Diken 
thus gives order by surpassing disorder. Diken is furthermore enjoined in this 
regard by chreon which Heidegger (1984a: 52) understands as ‘the handing over 
of presence’. At this point (SM 26), Derrida draws our attention to Heidegger’s 
three questions on giving, which were quoted above. To this is to be added 
Heidegger’s question in the next paragraph (Heidegger 1984a: 43) which reads as 
follows: ‘How should what is present as such give the jointure of its presencing?’ 
We saw that Heidegger does not simply want to understand giving here as 
giving away, but in the more original sense of ‘acceding or giving-to’. This 
is Krell’s translation of the word ‘Zugeben’ (Heidegger 1984a: 43; 2003: 329).48 
Derrida however points out that Zugeben most often carries the meaning of 
‘addition, even excess, in any case that which is offered in supplement, over 
and above the market, off  trade, without exchange, and it is said sometimes 
of a musical or poetic work’ (SM 31).49 Heidegger’s understanding of didonai 
diken as giving to an other what properly belongs to him (was als Gehörige ihm 
eignet) (Heidegger 1984a: 43; 2003: 329) is therefore not necessarily restrictive, 
47 For an illuminating discussion of justice as simply un-injustice, see Hofmann (2006: 72– 6). 
It would not be far off  the mark to say that this is a characteristic of most modern legal 
systems as has also been commented on by Kelsen (1973: 14): ‘The principle of retaliation 
expresses only the specifi c technique of positive law, which adjoins to the evil of wrongdoing 
the evil of a penalty. But that is a principle underlying all positive legal norms, and thus 
every legal order can be justifi ed as a realisation of the retaliation-principle.’
48 Young, in Heidegger (2002b: 269), translates it as ‘conceding’.
49 The Collins German Dictionary elaborates on the word zugeben as follows: ‘(zusätzlich geben) 
to give as an extra or bonus; (bei Verkauf auch) to throw in (inf ). Jdm etw ~ to give sb sth 
extra or as a bonus, to throw sth in for sb (inf )’.
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as this giving what is due appears to escape the dimension of the contracted 
debt.50 Heidegger’s text thus opens a reading to the effect that the giving 
which is at stake here involves ‘a gift without restitution, without calculation, 
without accountability’ (SM 30).51 Justice, which is related to the gift, would 
furthermore be removed from the fatality of vengeance, and more than this: 
infi nitely foreign, heterogeneous at its source (SM 25). It yearns for a day no 
longer belonging to history, a day that is both before us, namely to come, as 
well as more ancient than memory itself  (SM 25). This statement clearly ties 
in with the ‘main theme’ of Derrida’s book here under discussion, as analysed 
above.
The revolution
Specters of Marx makes it clear that Derrida is a thinker of the revolution, 
together with Marx and Benjamin. Derrida’s thinking in this respect is clearly 
informed by Freud’s analysis of the death drive, although the infl uence of 
Heidegger cannot be discounted. Heidegger’s refl ection on Being and the 
ontological difference has made it possible to see the closure of metaphysics. 
Freud makes possible the exceeding of metaphysics. In Specters and elsewhere 
Derrida engages in a quasi-psychoanalytical analysis of the interrelation 
between life and death, of death as already part of life. This stands in sharp 
contrast to Marx’s statement (also to be found in Luke 9:60) that the dead 
must bury their own dead. In Derrida’s reading, this statement, which we 
also fi nd implicitly in Fukuyama, seeks to bring about an absolute and fully 
present life that ‘does not know about death and does not want to hear about 
it’ (SM 219–20).52 Acknowledging death in life amounts in turn to an ac-
knowledgement of a disjunction in time. This disjunction, which Anaximander, 
Shakespeare, Marx and Heidegger each in their own way bear testimony to, 
opens the possibility of a notion of justice which exceeds the circularity of 
economic exchange. This moreover allows for the radicalisation of Marx’s 
thinking on the revolution, separating it from ontology. The spectre of com-
munism, and with that the abolition of law, of the state, of sovereignty, of 
property, of rights, of citizenship, of meaning, haunts every legal–political 
act. This spectre cannot however be made present; it always remains to come. 
The revolution thus no longer involves the attempt to seize power in an 
Oedipal manner. It is a ‘desire’ for powerlessness rather than for power (‘TL’ 
11). It seeks to do the impossible. At stake is a permanent revolution which 
involves ‘an interruption, a radical caesura in the ordinary course of History’ 
(FWT 83).
50 See also Geschl IV 195.
51 Derrida already develops the outlines of this reading in Geschl IV, specifi cally at 195.
52 See also ET 126 – 8.
Chapter 8
Hospitality towards the future
Law as Absolute Hospitality has attempted to show something of the com-
plexity of Derrida’s thinking whilst at the same time seeking to open certain 
texts to a different reading than they have predominantly been subjected to 
in the legal context. Whereas the methodical, the postmodern, the ethical–
liberal, and the cosmopolitan readings analysed in Chapter 1, arguably inscribe 
Derrida’s texts and the legal theory which is derived from his texts within 
the metaphysics of presence, the reading contended for here seeks to leave 
open Derrida’s texts to the future.1 The sense of the ‘future’ employed here 
has to be understood in a specifi c sense, as was made clear especially in 
Chapters 1, 2 and 7, which touched upon the concept of time. The meta-
physical concept of time, as we saw there, is of time as a sequence of ‘now’ 
moments, with its anchor in the ‘living present’ (‘PTF’ xix). At stake in the 
deconstruction of the concept of time is not the future present, a future that 
is foreseeable, predictable or anticipated.2 The ‘futuristic’ reading of Derrida 
in Law as Absolute Hospitality as well as his own invocation of the future 
(l’avenir) involves something very different. According to Derrida, the future 
as such, if  it exists, is the condition of possibility of history and overfl ows 
history and the present (‘PTF’ xiii; TS 19–21). At the same time, the future 
in this sense would stand no chance if  there was not also a historical link, 
tradition, memory and synthesis (‘PTF’ xiii). As appears from a number of 
Derrida’s texts,3 the notion of the future as employed here is to be understood 
in a similar way as the ‘to come’, the event, the promise and the impossible, 
and furthermore does not involve a utopian ideal as is sometimes thought. 
As Derrida puts it in a 1998 interview in response to a question on the notion 
of ‘monstrosity’ in his texts:
1 See also TS 30 –2.
2 Compare the assertion of Rosenfeld (2008: 84 – 6); and Mitchell (2005: 922) who contest 
somewhat too quickly Derrida’s statement that religious fundamentalisms ‘open onto no 
future and, in my view, have no future’ (PTT 113), assuming that Derrida refers to the ‘future’ 
in the usual sense.
3 See e.g. Psy I 1– 47 (‘Psyche: inventions of the other’); and Neg 225– 6.
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At the end of the foreword to Of Grammatology I say that ‘monstrosity’ 
is the only word that we can use to describe the future ... I describe 
monstrosity simply as the future, that is, that which has no recognizable 
form. The future, if  there is such a thing, is monstrous. I use the word 
rhetorically to refer to an event that has no recognizable form. The future 
is the non-identifi able ... Monstrosity should ... be viewed as that which 
overtakes us. It does not approach us head on. That which approaches 
from ahead, which is in front of me, can be seen. It constitutes a horizon 
of expectation. I see it coming ... The future often comes from the back. 
The future comes back.
(‘TID’ 261)
The ‘monstrosity’ of the future again comes to the fore in Derrida’s discus-
sion with Borradori in Philosophy in a Time of Terror. Here he argues that 
the trauma of September 11, 2001 does not lie simply in the events or the 
memory thereof as they unfolded in the past or present. What is more trau-
matic is the ‘irresistible foreboding’ of the return of a terror ‘worse than 
anything that has ever taken place’ (PTT 97). The traumatism thus comes 
from ‘the unpresentable future, from the open threat of an aggression capable 
one day of striking’, which our unconscious is already aware of (PTT 98, 102). 
Derrida is with this discussion of an auto-immunitary suicide clearly allud-
ing to his own earlier readings of Freud’s death drive. The (monstrous) future 
that comes back, the past that is more ancient than memory, refers to a 
‘desire’ for death, or to what we have elsewhere in this book referred to as 
the promise/threat of madness, auto-immunity, the democracy to come, the 
law before the law, the perfect gift, unconditional justice and absolute 
hospitality.4
There is a necessary (differantial) relation between this ‘future’ and law as 
we experience it in time. However, for as long as the concept of subjectivity 
remains fi rmly in place, this ‘future’ has almost no chance of coming. Accord-
ing to Derrida, the future in this radical sense stands a chance only through 
the affi rmation of the absolute threat/promise, which translates into a decon-
struction of the conceptuality that we take for granted in law. Without such 
an affi rmation, coupled with a rethinking of conceptuality (including of the 
concepts of time and of the subject), there will only be the implementation 
of a calculable and foreseeable programme. The advantage of ‘coming to 
grips’ with Derrida’s thinking, through a close reading of his texts that relate 
to law, is that it enables the radical opening of law, not only towards what 
is possible, but towards the impossible.
4 For an excellent analysis of Derrida’s thinking in relation to monstrosity, see Saghafi  (2010: 
29– 49).
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Rethinking conceptuality
We saw in the fi rst seven chapters of Law as Absolute Hospitality, how Derrida 
seeks in a sense to ‘implode’ or ‘dissolve’ philosophical concepts, or perhaps 
rather to point to their self-implosion or dissolution.5 Conceptuality is etymo-
logically related to seizing and grasping. To know, to understand or to com-
prehend is ‘to grasp’, from Latin comprehendere, ‘to take together, to unite; 
include; seize’; also ‘to comprehend, perceive’ (to seize or take in the mind), 
from com- ‘completely’ + prehendere ‘to catch hold of, seize’ (Online Etymology 
Dictionary). The German Begriff (concept), begreifen (to understand), greifen 
(to grasp, to seize) gives expression to the same idea (AR 362). Derrida’s 
rethinking of conceptuality which resists such (conscious) grasping is of 
course not done in order to return to some form of empiricism, pragmatism 
or realism (PTT 88). It is by way of the ‘new concepts’, which he in a sense 
invents, that we are required to and enabled to rethink the future. The focus 
in Chapters 1 to 7 was mainly on the concept of law/justice, but also touched 
on the concepts of sovereignty, the subject, the decision, responsibility, 
democracy, the gift and hospitality. In Chapter 2 we saw how Derrida’s think-
ing on subjectivity and the relation to language subverts the notion of the 
people as constituent power. In this way, the concept of sovereignty is shown 
to be inhabited by a certain auto-immunity. In Chapter 3, the origin of law 
is enquired into via Freud’s Totem and Taboo, Kafka’s Before the Law, and 
Lévi-Strauss’s refl ections on totemism and incest. In all these readings we 
fi nd a ‘desire’ for absolute pleasure which is suppressed in the constitution 
of an origin in the metaphysical sense. The concept of law is in other words 
inhabited by a ‘desire’ for its own destruction. In Chapter 4, Derrida’s reading 
of Foucault assisted us in rethinking the concept of reason in law. Reason 
structures language, although it appears that reason itself  is inhabited by a 
total madness which ‘forgets’ about the interests of the self. In Chapter 5, 
we saw that the gift is not merely an object of interest in law – that is, some-
thing to be regulated – but in a sense similar to the discussion in Chapter 3, 
lies at the origin of law. The concept of the gift, when rigorously analysed, 
furthermore cannot be viewed as an institution of circular return. For a gift 
to qualify as gift it must exceed economic circularity. In Chapter 6 we refl ected 
on ‘Force of law’ where Derrida contends in line with what has been said 
thus far, that justice needs to be thought in terms of madness, the gift and 
the ‘desire’ for absolute pleasure. The concept of law is thus inhabited by 
unconditional justice, expecting no return to the (collective) self. In Chapter 7 
the concept of law was again refl ected on, this time via Heidegger’s refl ections 
on the Anaximander Fragment. Whereas Heidegger, in going beyond the 
5 See also AR 362; ‘Host’ 211; PF 142.
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traditional conception of law/justice, associates law/justice here with binding 
and thus with dike, Derrida links law/justice with disjointure and thus with 
adikia. Justice would be possible only through a disjointure in time. This does 
not simply involve the realisation that every now-moment is itself  connected 
to the past and the future.6 At stake is the Freudian insight in relation to 
death: an absolute past, which has never been present, and which doubles as 
the absolute future, which remains to come, always haunts and disrupts the 
present.
Derrida’s deconstruction of concepts leads in each instance to their ‘implo-
sion’, their becoming meaningless, in other words. Whereas all our (meta-
physical) concepts are understood as identical to themselves, because of their 
being tied to origin, truth, presence and meaning, and furthermore give 
expression to a restricted economy involving a circular return to the self, 
these ‘new concepts’ no longer are and no longer do. The need for rethinking 
conceptuality of course ties in closely with Derrida’s analysis of language 
and the ‘mediating’ role which language always plays. There is no getting 
away from language, but at the same time traces have been left in language 
of the ‘desire’ which exceeds language and makes it possible in the fi rst place. 
In analysing Malabou’s The Future of Hegel, and specifi cally the phrase 
voir venir, which she understands as ‘being sure of what is coming’ as well 
as ‘not knowing what is coming’, Derrida, in line with what was said above, 
remarks:
This ‘interplay’ of necessity and of surprise does not only happen once 
in language, as if  by chance, as if  it resulted from a simple accident of 
and in the idiom. Language must be able to play, there must be within 
it the very display of its aptitude to play, the habit of conjugating, and 
of holding in itself  and for itself, in the very body of its syntax and of 
its lexicon, the constant mark of this transformation, something like the 
permanent habitus of this alteration.
(‘PTF’ xii–xiii)
As we saw in Chapter 1, concepts have, because of the way in which philosophy 
has approached death (as something to be defeated by life), been viewed from 
the position of the living present. What Derrida says about the concept of 
hospitality – ‘It is to death that hospitality destines itself ’ (AR 360) – is ‘true’ 
of every concept, including the concepts of sovereignty, subjectivity and law.7 
Every concept registers an auto-deconstruction in itself. It shows hospitality 
6 See e.g. Hägglund (2008: 40 –1).
7 See e.g. Derrida’s deconstruction of the concepts of freedom and equality in R 19– 62 and 
FWT 47– 61.
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towards and contains within itself  an other, which is no longer its other (AR 
362).
Law, politics and hospitality
The reception of Derrida in the legal context has not as yet taken on board 
the need for a radical rethinking of conceptuality, and more specifi cally of 
subjectivity. In the twentieth century, legal realism sought to destroy the 
remaining vestiges of a transcendent notion of justice by attempting, in a 
scientifi c way, to reduce law to the factual conduct of judges (Maris and 
Jacobs 1997: 304 –5). CLS followed in the footsteps of realism by revealing 
the lie behind law’s claims to neutrality with the refrain that law is simply 
politics in disguise (van der Walt 2005a: 146). In doing so, deconstruction 
was appropriated by CLS, shaping it into a kind of Sartrean subjectivist 
mould. Commendable efforts have been made to distinguish Derrida’s think-
ing from its appropriation by CLS.8 These readings have nonetheless, as was 
pointed out in Chapter 1 and elsewhere, fallen claim to a similar kind of 
relativism and subjectivism which characterise legal realism and CLS. The 
above analysis sought to show that in Derrida’s thinking, a more ‘radical’ 
disruption of subjectivity takes place so that there always is a ‘negotiation’ 
at stake with the demands of the impossible. This is not a negotiation by a 
subject who remains in control, and it does not involve a compromise, but 
instead a very risky movement (‘E&F’ 32).
We see the re-inscription of subjectivity perhaps best in the concept of 
hospitality. As noted in Chapter 1, at stake are two equally imperative 
laws which form part of the ‘concept’ of hospitality and which are not in 
opposition to each other, but in a differantial relation. Hospitality involves, 
as is generally thought, preparation for the coming of the guest, the extension 
of a welcome and the provision of food and shelter (AR 360 –1). As Derrida 
notes, hospitality however also entails more:
[T]o be hospitable is to let oneself  be overtaken [surprendre], to be ready 
to not be ready, if  such is possible, to let oneself  be overtaken, to not 
even let oneself be overtaken, to be surprised, in a fashion almost violent, 
violated and raped [violée], stolen [volée] ... precisely where one is not 
ready to receive – and not only not yet ready but not ready, unprepared 
in a mode that is not even that of the ‘not yet’.
(AR 361)
8 See e.g. Cornell (1992: 100 –3); van der Walt (2005a: 6 –7, 146 –7).
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Hospitality thus involves the subject being both host and hostage (A 54 –5). 
There is consequently no ‘I’, in an individual or collective sense, having the 
ability or power to make room for the other. The ‘I’ is already in its structure 
inhabited by an alterity (TS 84). It is from this non-place of absolute hospitality 
that the restricted economy of law and politics needs to be rethought. As 
was indicated in Chapter 1, deconstruction does not involve a neutral method, 
which is appropriable by both the left and the right. One could term decon-
struction ‘radically leftist’, although such a description still domesticates 
deconstruction’s transgressivity. It would perhaps, with certain precautions, 
be more accurate to say that Derrida’s thinking could serve as a ‘basis’ for 
critical left thinking in the politico-legal fi eld, and moreover, in a consistent 
and radical manner. This is shown by his own refl ections on inter alia the 
death penalty (FWT 139– 65), immigration/citizenship (OH, PF ), stem-cell 
research (R 141–59), the notion of the family (FWT 33– 46), man’s relation 
to ‘animals’ (AIA), terrorism (PTT ), the punishment of ‘criminals’ (FWT 
139–96), dealing with ‘rogue’ states (R), addressing poverty (G&L 86; GT 
134 – 45), the concepts of equality and freedom (R 19– 62; FWT 47– 61), 
freedom of speech (‘Pas’ 23– 4), testimony (WA 28 –70), the idea of self-
government, the concept of democracy and the issue of the sovereignty of 
the nation-state (PF, R), reason (R), the pardon (CF ) and even something 
as seemingly unimportant as the signature (Chapter 2). Derrida also radically 
destabilises all assumptions we may have about meaning in legal interpreta-
tion; and could perhaps helps us to rethink a notion such as the rule of law.9 
In addition, Derrida’s thinking in general, concerning, for example, subjectiv-
ity and time, enables a rethinking of politico-legal conceptuality as a whole, 
beyond the circle of economic exchange.
Legal philosophers of a new species
In an effort to contemplate the task of the legal philosopher in the twenty-
fi rst century and beyond, as well as to understand what is at stake in the 
re-conceptualisation of the politico-legal fi eld alluded to above, Nietzsche, 
and Derrida’s reading of  Nietzsche, can be of  assistance. In Politics of 
Friendship, Derrida attempts to rethink the concept of  friendship, and 
with that of politics and democracy, inter alia along with Nietzsche. Derrida’s 
reading of Nietzsche ties in closely with his (Derrida’s) other texts on the 
event and the arrivant. The absolute arrivant, Derrida notes in Aporias, 
‘surprises the host ... enough to call into question, to the point of annihilating 
or rendering indeterminate, all the distinctive signs of a prior identity’ (Ap 34). 
In For What Tomorrow Derrida makes a similar comment on the event:
9 See de Ville (2006).
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That is what an event worthy of the name can and ought to be, an 
arrivance that would surprise me absolutely and to whom or for whom, 
to which or for which I could not, and may no longer, not respond – in 
a way that is as responsible as possible: what happens, what arrives and 
comes down upon me, that to which I am exposed, beyond all mastery. 
Heteronomy, then – the other is my law.
(FWT 52)
At stake in the Politics of Friendship is likewise a thinking of the dangerous 
perhaps, which Derrida ties explicitly to the notions of the arrivant, the event 
and the decision (PF 28 –9). Closely related to this, Nietzsche (1989: 10 –11) 
speaks in Beyond Good and Evil of  a new species of philosopher whom he 
sees coming: philosophers of the future, of the dangerous perhaps. As 
Derrida points out, Nietzsche calls on them to come, yet they can in a way 
be said to have already arrived (PF 34 –7). These new philosophers will not 
be friends of the truth, like the philosophers who have preceded them. They 
will be free, very free spirits, Nietzsche (1989: 53) notes. At stake in this 
(promised) coming, on Derrida’s reading, is a thinking of the future as well 
as a ‘carrying and sustaining [of ] the future’, that is ‘capable of enduring the 
intolerable, the undecidable and the terrifying’ (PF 37– 8). Ronell (2008: 164), 
with reference to Nietzsche and Derrida, views these new, or ‘genuine’ phil-
osophers, as she calls them, as:
powered by the self-threatening wheelworks of performativity. Rather 
than describing and merely computing, the genuine philosopher tests the 
limits of intelligibility, making things happen with decisive positings that 
are by no means enslaved to what is.
Nietzsche (1989: 10) then also accuses the metaphysicians of not being 
capable of going beyond their faith in antithetical values, which he refers 
to as a frog-perspective.10 The dangerous perhaps, the event, similarly calls 
on us to not simply reverse,11 but to go beyond the opposition between 
antithetical values as well as beyond a good conscience (PF 31). This involves 
a certain madness, as we saw in Chapter 4, and the philosophers of the 
perhaps must thus not fear being referred to as ‘fools’ by the metaphysicians 
(PF 34). It is this madness that the legal philosophers of the future, the 
philosophers of the dangerous perhaps, the arrivant thinkers, need to explore 
and watch over (PF 39– 41). Switching to the language of hospitality, with 
which we are still engaged here, we can speak of hospitality to the impossible, 
10 See also PF 30.
11 As we fi nd in some way or another in CLS (Chapter 1), van der Walt (2005a) and Hägglund 
(2008).
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or even, as Derrida puts it, tying in with our discussion on Freud, being 
‘hospitable to the death instinct’ (PF 68, 113). These new philosophers are 
in terms of the logic of différance both desired and undesired, called and 
repressed, friends and enemies, and their coming thus deferred (PF 37, 42, 
173– 4). Their task, thought of as specifi cally legal philosophers, would be to 
bring to the fore the aporia within every legal concept, to move law beyond 
what is simply possible. In their reading of legal sources they would similarly 
expose that which makes these texts possible in the fi rst place. At stake is 
thus a movement away from essence, consistency and truth towards the 
(dangerous) logic of the perhaps (PF 29). From Nietzsche and Derrida we 
hear the call: ‘Kommen Sie!’ ‘Venez!’ ‘Come!’
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